THE
Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra Research Publication

VOL. II

Edited by

SATKARI MOOKERJEE, M.A., PH.D.

DIRECTOR

NAVA NĀLANDĀ MAHĀVIHĀRA,
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दत्तशर्मा

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NAVA-NĀLANDĀ-MAHĀVIHĀRA RESEARCH PUBLICATION

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NAVA NALANDA MAHAVIHARA,
P. O. NALANDA, PATNA DT.

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The Government of Bihar established the Nalanda Institute of Research and Post-Graduate Studies in Buddhist learning and Pali (The NAVA NĀLANDĀ MAHĀVIHĀRA) at Nalanda in 1951 with the object, *inter alia*, to promote advanced studies and research in Buddhist learning, and to publish works of permanent value to scholars. This Institute is one of the five others planned by this Government as a token of their homage to the tradition of learning and scholarship for which ancient Bihar was noted. Apart from the Nalanda Institute, four others have been established and have been doing useful work during the last eight or nine years, Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning at Darbhanga, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna, The Bihar Rashtra Bhasha Parishad for Research and Advanced Studies in Hindi at Patna, and the Vaisali Institute for Post-Graduate Studies in Prakrit and Jainology at Vaisali.

As part of this programme of rehabilitating and reorientating ancient learning and scholarship, the editing and publication of this Research Volume II has been undertaken with the co-operation of the scholars of the Institute and outside. The Government of Bihar hope to continue to sponsor such projects and trust that this humble service of the world of scholarship and learning would bear fruit in the fulness of time.

PREFACE

We have great pleasure in introducing to the academic world the Volume II of *The Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra Research Publication.* Just like its predecessor, it is also the outcome of team-work in which several scholars have taken part. The majority of the articles relate to Buddhist thought. It is a happy feature that all the contributors have been associated with our Institute, in one capacity or another. The old Nālandā Mahāvihāra was noted for its universalistic outlook and wide intellectual interests. There was no branch of knowledge in India which was not cultivated within its precincts. Our Institute (Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra) is, not only by its nomenclature but also in its aims, objectives and aspirations an humble successor; and the hopes of the Buddhist World will be fulfilled only when this infant institute will grow in dimensions and reach the zenith of its development to justify the name and anscestory which it claims. Accordingly, we have not been squeamish and did not impose restrictions on our contributors. The papers, each in their own way, throw light on subjects which were studied in ancient India. The speciality of this Volume is that it contains articles both in English and Hindi.

We now propose to give a running survey of the subject-matter of the contents. The first article is entitled 'The Omniscient as the Founder of Religion.' It treats of a subject, which has not only a religious appeal but a metaphysical interest. It was suggested by the late Sir Brajendra Nath Seal, the then George V Professor of Philosophy in Calcutta University in about 1930, that this subject should be studied and presented to the modern world with its metaphysical foundation. The writer also felt that the problem did not outlive its interest and utility. The second article is entitled 'The Nature of Ultimate Reality', and it has been tackled from the standpoint of diverse Schools of Indian philosophy.

The third paper deals with the Sarvāstivāda, the philosophical position perhaps of the oldest Buddhist School, which dominated the intellectual and religious atmosphere of India and Central Asia for several centuries. The original literature of the School in Sanskrit is entirely lost and survives only in Chinese and Tibetan translations. The writer has drawn upon Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakoṣa* and the *Sphuṭārthā*. The fourth paper deals with the problem of Avyākṛtas, the vexed questions which were not answered by the Buddha. The author throws a new light and the problem receives a new orientation.

The fifth article gives the original Pali text of the *Vuttodaya* and its English exposition. The subject has an interest for the students of Pali in which the verses intermingle with prose.

The sixth occupies itself with the 'Methodology of *Vibhangappakaraṇa*'. It presents a comprehensive study of the method followed in *Abhidhamma Literature*, which with its diverse enumerations, permutations and combinations of the different psychical factors charged with an ethical tone is apt to confuse a neophyte. In the light of the present exposition the *Abhidhamma* texts will be sized up and the student will be conducted into the central core of the topics.

The seventh article deals with 'Ānandavardhana's Concept of Doṣa'—a subject which has a perennial interest for students of literature. Ānandavardhana was an epoch-making writer of the 9th century A. D. and has influenced the standard of literary criticism in India for several centuries and his influence has not been undermined by powerful critics.

'Nature in the Theragāthā' is the subject-matter of the eighth article. It seeks to show that the Buddhist Elders, though their interests were overwhelmingly religious and spiritual, were not impervious to the aesthetic aspects of Nature.

The ninth article 'Abhidharmāvatāra by an Unidentified Author' is a reconstruction from Tibetan and Chinese texts. It has been contributed by Prof. Hajime Sakurabe, the quondam

Professor of Chinese and Japanese in our Institute. The importance of the contribution cannot be overrated. Our knowledge of Abhidharma Literature in Sanskrit is compelled by circumstances to be sectional owing to the loss of original literature. This lacuna can be filled up only by reconstruction, study and exposition of the Chinese and Tibetan sources in which the translations of the original works are preserved. Prof. H. Sakurabe has specialised in Abhidharma and his contribution bears the stamp of authority.

The next contribution deals with some aspects of social life in the Sixth Century B. C.. The last article in English is contributed by Shri S. V. Sohoni, I. C. S., President of the Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra, who is a recognised authority in Ancient Indian History & Culture and the guardian angel of our Institute.

Now we come to the articles in Hindi. The first treats of Nirvāṇa in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.* The second gives a survey of the materialistic Philosophy of the Cārvāka School, which is noticed in the Vedas and Upaniṣads and also in Buddhist Literature. The third is a study of Sarahapā, one of the leading figures in Siddha Literature, which is preserved in Tibetan. The last one is a Hindi translation of some works of Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna from Tibetan. Dīpaṅkara was one of the latest-patriarchs of Vikramaśilā monastery. He migrated in his old age to Tibet to preach the holy religion of the Buddha and died in harness in the snow-clad country. The writer is a Tibetan by birth and Buddhist by faith. He writes good Hindi and his translation naturally inherits the importance of the original works which are lost in Sanskrit.

With these prefatory observations I present this work to the academic world. I hope that it will be received by scholars with the generous feelings which were bestowed on our first volume.

I shall be failing in my duty if I do not thankfully acknowledge the hearty cooperation of the members of the staff of the Institute and the Printers, The Tara Printing Works, Varanasi.

S. MOOKERJEE, M. A. PH. D.
Director,
Nalanda, 30th March, 1960. *Nava Nalanda Mahavihara.*

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THE OMNISCIENT AS THE FOUNDER OF A RELIGION

Professor S. Mookerjee
M. A., Ph. D.
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THE OMNISCIENT AS THE FOUNDER OF A RELIGION

It is found that all great religions claim validity for their tenets and practices on the basis of either a revelation or the mystic experience of a prophet. Revelation again may be words and commandments of God delivered to a gifted man at some time, which subsequently become the creed of the followers of the prophet. Such is found to be the case with Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The authenticity of the text revealed to the prophet is bound up with the character and personality of the seer who becomes the founder of the religion. The seer may be a human being possessed of enormous powers of spiritual insight and receptivity or an incarnation of God. The creed based on the authority of a person, human or divine, may be characterised as personal revelation. In India on the other hand the Brahmanic religion does not claim authenticity and validity of their scripture on the authority of a person divine or human. It is claimed that the Vedas are an eternal entity, uncreated either by God or a gifted human being. The revelation, if it be called such at all, is impersonal (*apauruṣeya*).

A religion is professed to be valid for all times and places, races, tribes and nations. It necessarily presupposes on the part of the propounder of the religious text, whether God or a semi-divine or a gifted human being, unerring knowledge of past, present and future. The Mīmāṅsā school in India did not believe in personal God or the possibility of a human being having the knowledge of the entire reality of three divisions of time. In one word, the Mīmāṅsist does not believe that a person can be omniscient.

Religion and Personal God

Now Buddhism and Jainism are two great religions of India, but neither their promulgators nor their followers believe in personal God. They, however, affirm their faith in the eternal spiritual and moral laws, particularly the law of karma and do not believe in creation. The Mīmāṅsists and the Jainas are of the opinion that the world is uncreated and exists from eternity to eternity. The Buddhists of all schools are agreed that there are no eternal verities and every thing is in perpetual flux both in material and psychical planes. Events come into being by dint of the causal law, which is a natural brute force, independently of the agency of an intelligent being.

The problem of creation, according to these thinkers, springs from an idle hypothesis fostered by animistic superstition. All schools of philosophy in India, worth the name, maintain that individual living beings possessed of a soul or a psychical continuum, as the Buddhists hold, are existing from the eternal past and do not depend on any super-human agency for their existence and function. This constitutes a vital difference of Indian thought and religions from the Semitic creeds. The soul is immortal and exists parallel to God even according to the theists. The belief in God is necessary for the validation of the religious scripture which is ensured by God's omniscience. The performance of religious duties must produce desirable consequences without fail. The well-being in future life after death is dependent upon the performance of prescribed rites and ceremonials whose causal efficiency is not discernible by a person of limited knowledge. Furthermore it is asserted that the performance of a good act or meditation or prayer cannot be supposed automatically to bring about the desirable results and similarly that of sinful deeds, their undesirable consequences by natural causal efficiency. These acts good or evil must produce a spiritual effect namely merit or demerit which are responsible for good and evil results in the condition of the individual in future life after death. These spiritual forces, meritorious and demeritorious, are brute facts and they can be made productive of reward or punishment only by an intelligent agent by bringing them into operation. This is the *raison d'etre* of belief in personal God. The Buddhists and Jainas and so also the philosophers of atheistic persuasion do not consider this theory of intelligent supervision and personal operation of moral laws by a divine being as logically necessary. They assert that moral and spriritual laws are effective just like the brute laws of nature by reason of an inherent natural necessity.

It is a strange phenomenon almost as paradoxical as Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark that there may be religion without belief in God. But however paradoxical it may appear to the followers of religions of Semitic origin, the so-called atheistic religions in India are characterised by the same fervour of faith of their followers as is the characteristic of theistic religions. These religions which do not bank on the grace of a personal God, are however persuaded of the inevitable efficacy of spritual and moral laws. They assert that these laws are inviolable in their operation and God cannot arbitrarily dispense rewards and punishments irrespective of the spiritual desert of the persons and His excercise of the juristic function is limited by the moral law. Personal God is postulated to account for the effective functioning of the law of moral justice. It is, however, believed by the advocates and followers of the so-called atheistic religions that unless the moral law is autonomous, God's interference will not and cannot make them efficacious. God is an uncreated being and His powers and laws must be uncreated. His will cannot alter the law as that will make of God a despot. So even those who believe in God's operation of the moral law must believe that this law is an impersonal, uncreated, eternal governing principle. It is, therefore, rational to accord one's allegiance to this autonomous impersonal law as God cannot alter its course.[1]

THE *Raison d'etre* OF THE RELIGIOUS IMPULSE

We have however made this digression in order to rebut the natural preconception that a religion is preposterous nonsense without belief in personal God. Even Vedānta believes that the

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1. Cf. namas tat karmabhyo vidhir api na yebhyaḥ prabhavati—Śilhana's *Vairāgyaśataka*.

ultimate reality is the impersonal Absolute Brahman and the essence of all living beings is identical with it. All religions, whether of theistic or atheistic persuasion in India, however assert the supremacy of the law of karma. Individual souls, at least *sub specie temporis* are running their course from an undated past parallel to God. But though existentially independent of an efficient cause, they are by their very nature limited by ignorance. They are not aware of the causes of their unhappiness and imbecility and also the ways and means of the amelioration of their unenviable state of existence. Man is ambitious and strives to transcend his limitations, physical, moral and spiritual. According to Vedānta man is Brahman himself and it is only by the mysterious and inscrutable association with ignorance he comes to forget his intrinsic perfection. But the lapse from infinite perfection which is his very essence and inalienable nature is an accident. Nothing can be estranged from its intrinsic essence and unless a man recovers his innate perfection he cannot remain content and happy. This constitutes the nisus and *vis a tergo* of his divine discontent. It is for this reason that a man resents his inferior status and any aspersion on his intelligence and ability is most galling to him. Man, unless stupefied by the drug of ignorance, will not voluntarily acquiesce in his degradation. He will not succumb to death, because he is immortal. So this perpetual nisus for infinite perfection is the special prerogative of man. The aspiration for Nirvāṇa is not an unnatural impulse for self-immolation but for transcendence of the limited personality which is a state of incarceration. The very fact that a man achieves progressive emancipation from his limitations and rises higher and higher in the intellectual and moral scale is the index to his infinite perfection, which alone can put an end to his restless quest and striving.

In the spiritual field, that is to say, in religion, he is dependent upon others for the knowledge of the secrets of the spiritual law, empowered with which he may successfully strive to extinguish his weaknesses and reach a higher state. But nothing short of infinite perfection will satisfy a man's ambition once for all.[1] It is only from the study of the scriptures a man comes to know of heaven and hell and that a man who acquires merit will go to heaven and a man who commits sins will be degraded to hell after death. Furthermore, his tenure of residence either in hell or heaven is only for a limited period of time after which he will again be born on earth. This process of birth and rebirth is interminable unless he comes to have the knowledge of the secrets of the moral law and learns the limitations of good and bad moral actions, which only lead to a good or bad station, equally temporary. He then longs for a life of eternal tranquillity and blessedness from which there is no chance of downfall. This is the life of perfect freedom in which man is emancipated from all limitations which necessarily entail misery.

THE OMNISCIENT AS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF RELIGION

Now the knowledge of such supersensible facts as heaven and hell and salvation, the course of transmigration through an infinite expanse of time and space cannot be secured by means of sense perception or inference or any other organ which are available to a human being. Only a person gifted with supersensuous knowledge can enlighten ordinary mortals about these facts which occur after death. The antecedent history of an individual through the indefinite past can be envisaged only by a man of supernormal powers. Or in the alternative such knowledge can be vouchsafed only by revelation, that is, the eternally existent Vedas which do not owe their existence to any individual person, divine, human or super-human. The latter is the position of the advocates of Vedic religion. The Buddhists and the Jainas on the contrary do not believe in the possibility of impersonal revelation and also in the authenticity of the Vedic scripture. They assert that a gifted person comes to acquire the knowledge of the supersensible realities by dint of his spiritual discipline and meditation. In one word, he becomes omniscient and nothing sensible or supersensible is hidden from his ken. It is only on the authority of these prophets and seers, their

[1] cf. nā'lpe sukham asti bhūmai 'va sukham—*Chāndogya*

followers practise the course of discipline prescribed by the former and seek to work out their ultimate salvation from the limitations of worldly life. The validity of Buddhist religion depends upon the omniscience of the Buddha. The adherents of such religions believe that by pursuing the discipline of holy life they can also acquire the knowledge of ultimate mysteries and gain the ends of life. For this they need not go to the professors of Vedic lore in whose competency they have not the slightest confidence. They further assert that the Vedas must have been the products of human beings and if there be anything valid in them it must have been delivered by men of super-human wisdom and insight.

KUMĀRILA'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESUPPOSITION OF THE OMNISCIENT.

Kumārila joins issue with the Buddhist and with the Jaina and also other schools of religion and philosophy who derive their scriptures from a particular person believed to have been omniscient. Kumārila assailed this fundamental presupposition by strong logical arguments. He definitely asserts that this belief in an omniscient person, divine or quasi-divine is only an unfounded superstition fostered by long generations of deluded persons. They have been deluded by others and are in their turn engaged in propagating this heresy. There is no proof that there was an omniscient person. Supernatural powers are falsely accredited to these *soi-disant* prophets by their blind followers, who are impervious to all reasoning. Kumārila observes that the knowledge of *dharma* (religious merit) and *adharma* (religious demerit) is not accessible to a human being independently of the deliverances of the Vedic scripture. If, however, the knowledge of very many empirical facts is claimed for the founder of a religion, the Mīmāṅsist will waive his objection. Kumārila maintains that one may know many things and if his claim to omniscience is confined to this knowledge one need not seriously dispute his claim or wound his vanity. One may also claim to have knowledge of all things by knowing the categories inculcated in a philosophical treatise. For instance the Buddhist asserts that there is no reality beyond the five aggregates—the *skandhas*; the Vaiśeṣika asserts six categories as comprising all existent things; the Sāṅkhya sums up the entire gamut of reality under twenty-five principles. By knowing these tenets and doctrines the followers of these philosophical or religious creeds may consider themselves to be conversant with all existent facts. But this pretension to omniscience, based on the knowledge of the conclusion of a system of philosophy, is however, not so immodest as the claim to direct knowledge of supersensible reals or laws. One may put up with such airs of superiority *de haut en bas* as academic extravaganza. But one who claims detailed intuitive knowledge of all entities on the part of his prophet is certainly deluded. It is not seen that a person knows the number of atoms and hairs of his body. This is not only absurd but also useless. Such knowledge is not conducive to or necessary for the achievement of the ultimate purpose of life. The claim is as absurd as the assertion that a man sees all that exists including smell and touch with his own eyes.

Moreover, such superfluous knowledge does not stand a prophet in good stead at all. We need not pursue further this line of enquiry as it has no bearing on the supreme question at issue. The Buddhists claim that the Buddha knows *dharma* and *adharma*, that is, what constitute virtue and vice. This claim can be substantiated only by establishing the unquestionable validity of the scripture promulgated by him. This is however disputed by the Mīmāṅsist. The knowledge of such supersensuous verities as virtue and vice, religious merit and demerit, is not believed to be possible on the part of a man, however exalted or gifted he may be, independently of the revealed text. This is the contention of the Mīmāṅsist. The Buddhist is called upon to controvert this contention by proving the capacity of the Buddha for the knowledge of these ultimate mysteries. Instead of attempting this task directly, he seeks to prove that the Buddha is aware of the infinite details of the universe. This is so much labour wasted in vain. The Mīmāṅsist is not interested in confuting this fantastic pretension.

If his contention, that the nature of virtue and vice and the efficacy of particular actions for the acquisition of blessed existence after death are unknowable, is not met by convincing arguments, he will think his position established. The claim that the Buddha knows all things entails also his eternal knowledge of all impure, loathsome and obnoxious things, which are believed to be characteristic features of hellish life and this is a sort of punishment. A sane person will seek to avoid these painful and horrible scenes, but the omniscient prophet is eternally condemned to derive whatever satisfaction he can from these ugly sights.

ALLEGED IGNORANCE OF VEDIC LORE

Moreover, it is not proved that the Buddha had knowledge of the content of Vedas with their ancillaries and auxilliary disciplines. How can then one claim the knowledge of all things on his part ? It may be claimed that though no direct evidence evincing his knowledge of the Vedic lore and tradition is come across in the Buddhist scripture, the presumption of the knowledge of these disciplines on his part cannot be ruled out. It is not necessary that he must have preached all that he knew. But this is too naive a presumption. One may likewise claim omniscience for the poets, though they may not have put on record their knowledge of superfluous things in their works.

One may however contend that this analogy with poets is entirely silly and out of place. The poets do not claim knowledge of supersensible mysteries nor is there any evidence of such knowledge in their works. But the Buddha has given definite injunctions for the performance of righteous actions which lead to their relevant results in life after death. His knowledge of the efficacy of actions for unseen and unforeseeable events is proof of his capacity for knowledge of all supersensible facts. So if the knowledge of any particular supersensible event is not stated by a definite *ipse dixit*, it is quite legitimate to presume his actual knowledge of it. The knowledge of infinite particulars is not capable of being recorded within the limited compass of the scriptures recording his sermons and preachings.

It must be presumed that he was aware of every detail of the Vedic lore and religion, though he did not have an occasion for criticising the items in detail.

A PLETHORA OF PROPHETS AND THEIR FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES

The plausibility of this contention is not denied by Kumārila but he poses a crucial question. Well, there are so many prophets and promulgators of religions, each and all of whom claim to be aware of all the mysteries of spiritual life. There are found in their works sermons and instructions treating of the mysteries of religion such as heaven and hell and also injunctions laying down the right course of action. But in their conclusions they differ widely from one another ; whom should we vote for as the omniscient one, as all cannot be regarded as omniscient preaching as they do conflicting tenets and dogmas ? Take for instance the case of the Buddha and Kapila. Both of them are regarded as omniscient by their adherents, though the followers of the one school vehemently controvert the contention of the other school. It is difficult to pick and choose. If the Budhha be omniscient, why should not Kapila be so ? If both of them are equally accepted as omniscient, why should then there be such divergence and discrepancy in their views and conclusions ? It is contended that some of the assertions of the Buddha are found to be verified by empirical evidence ; but this is equally true with the assertions of Mahāvīra and Kapila. So the partial corroboration of their preachings cannot be pressed as evidence of their omniscience. Furthermore, whatever arguments are put forward by the Buddhists out of love of their religion for the demonstration of the omniscience of the Buddha are equally found to be propounded by the followers of Mahāvīra–the Jaina prophet. Whatever refutations are urged by the Buddhist against the Jaina, they are rebutted by the Jaina on precisely similar grounds. The Buddhist for instance accuses Mahāvīra of ignorance and false teaching and the Jainas in their turn condemn the Buddha on the ground that the Buddha taught false doctrines like the momentariness of things and not *Syādavāda* which affirms that the nature of things is indeterminate. These mutually contradictory contentions and refutations only serve to cancel one another as based on false assumption and unattested premises. Kumārila asserts that his task has been made infinitely easier by the activities of these rival camps. His scope of refutation has been narrowed down to a few fundamental issues. He urges certain weighty considerations against the very fundamental presupposition of omniscience.

THE MODUS OPERANDI OF OMNISCIENCE

So far as the Buddha, Mahāvīra, Kapila *et hoc genus omne* are found to be existent beings, they are not distinguishable in kind from ordinary persons. They are possessed of similar points of strength and weakness, so far as the sensible features are taken into account. The only difference from ordinary mortals is claimed to lie in their capacity for knowing all facts that exist, existed and will come into existence. But what may be the organ of their direct intuition of all things in one sweep ? Certainly they could not have such knowledge by means of sense organs. We cannot suppose that the Buddha's eye-sight was of a different kind and he visualised all sensible objects by means of it. That would render the other senses superfluous. The claim of the Buddhists that "Buddha knew everything by one intuition and saw everything at once by one cognition", is too big a demand. It is passing strange that he knew everything and had direct access to the thoughts of others and distant, subtle objects and things, intercepted by barriers, by one cognitive act. There is no evidence in its support and there ought to be a limit to one's credulity. The nature of things and their powers are found to be uniform in all times and places. No body can claim that a person perceives smell with his eyes. It is quite legitimate to infer that even in the remote past the function of the sense organs were the same or similar. It may be argued that the Buddha knew everything by his mental vision. The mind of course can take stock of everything which is capable of being known by the senses. But so far as external objects are concerned, the mind is incompetent to apprehend them independently of the aid of sense organs. A blind man has his mind but he does not see things with it.

Of course we meet with men of superior intellect and higher mental capacity, but their difference from ordinary mortals is a matter of degree and not of kind. Even the wisest man, known to be able to see subtle minutiae, cannot transcend the limits of their faculties. It is found that a particular person excels others in perceiving distant sounds of fine shades but cannot visualize things with the ear or hear sounds with the eyes. In the knowledge of *Śāstras* we find one man exceeds another but the superiority is confined to the knowledge of that particular discipline. Thus one may be proficient in grammar and tell a right word from a wrong one, but may be absolutely innocent of Mathematics and Astronomy. A mathematician again is found to be deficient in his knowledge of grammar. A man however well-grounded in Vedic lore and history cannot be supposed to be able to envisage gods and the religious endowment of other men. It is undeniable that by practice and application one acquires special powers. An athlete by long practice excels others in high jump, but however efficient he cannot jump over a league. So by superior knowledge one can see a little more than untrained persons. It is not possible that he comes to know things which are supersensible. A person confined in a room can inspect all the contents inside it ; but he cannot be supposed to know things which exist in another region separated by long distances, mountains and seas. In the dialogue between Nala and Ṛtuparṇa recorded in the Mahābhārata we meet with a wise saw "One does not know everything. There is no consummation of knowledge in one person. An omniscient is an impossibility".[1] This statement gives the true assessment of human powers.

We have seen that men's cognitive powers are confined and limited to adjacent objects which are present at the time. But perception is not possible of a future event and an inference of such facts is also conditioned by perceptual data on which induction is based. It follows that there is no man who can see supersensuous things directly. One can have knowledge of these things only by the light of eternal revealed scriptures. It has been contended by the Buddhists that the knowledge of the Buddha is also derived from the scriptures left by his predecessors such as Kaṇaka, Kāśyapa etc. But this does not dissolve the doubt. Human beings as they were, the preceding Buddhas were subject to the same limitations and as such their knowledge of supersensible verities must be suspect. Even if the chain of Buddhas be pushed back to infinite past that will only end in proving the prolonged existence of wrong tradition. Simply the infinite duration of a thing does not invest it with genuineness. There is gold in the mines from beginningless time and so also specious gold. Their continuity through time does not put them on the same level. The claim of an infinite chain of enlightened Buddhas from the beginningless time is thus an idle hypothesis. The claim has not been subjected to scrutiny and can pass muster only with those who are blind followers willing to be duped by a false pretence.

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[1] Sarvaḥ sarvaṃ na jānāti sarvajño nai'va vidyate.
Nai'katra pariṇṣṭhā'sti jñānasya puruṣe kvacit.—*TS.*

ORGAN OF OMNISCIENCE

Let us now examine the plea of omniscience in the light of accredited cognitive instruments. So far as our present knowledge is concerned we do not perceive any man who is aware of all existent things. So perception as proof of the omniscient is overruled. Inference also cannot fare better. The Buddhist lays down three types of logical grounds (probanses) for the possibility of inference. (1) One is based on causal relation. We infer the cause from the effect as we do fire from smoke. This is possible because the necessary concomitance in agreement and difference between smoke and fire is perceived in numerous cases. So far as the omniscient is concerned, it is not possible to light upon an event which may be regarded as the effect of the former. No event can be affiliated to imperceptible omniscience as its effect. (2) Nor can we find out any attribute which may be regarded as bound up with omniscience by virtue of essential identity. For instance one may infer that a triangle is a trilateral figure because the former is necessarily bound up with the latter by bond of identity of essence. But such an essential characteristic of the omniscient is not capable of being spotted out. Furthermore, inference of existence will be necessarily fallacious. If the omniscient be the subject (minor term) all the probanses will be futile. The conclusion of the inference is "The omniscient exists as a matter of fact". What can be the probans (middle term)? If it be existential, it will be an unproven attribute, since the very existence of the omniscient is in dispute and an existential attribute predicated of it will involve a *petitio principii.* If on the contrary, the probans be non-existential, it will prove the contrary, that is to say, its non-existence.[1] On the other hand if it be of an amphibious nature compatible with both existence and non-existence, it will not prove anything conclusively. So all attempts at inference of an omniscient will be futile. Scriptural authority again cannot be supposed to lend countenance to this belief. So far as the Vedas are concerned there is no such textual evidence. As regards the Upaniṣadic texts which speak of the omniscient they are only eulogistic exhortations and have no intrinsic validity. And as for the Buddhist scriptures their authenticity is itself a matter of doubt. The assertions of the Buddha himself cannot be cited as evidence because this only begs the question. It can be accepted as legitimate evidence only if it be supposed to be the assertion of an omniscient and the speaker is supposed to be omniscient on the basis of the assertion. The argument is an instance of the vicious circle. Again the testimony of his disciples such Śāriputra cannot be accepted as proof unless the speaker be himself omniscient. The Buddhists have been forced to admit an infinite series of Buddhas, but all this is of no avail. A person, however reliable, cannot be presumed to ascertain an omniscient unless he himself possesses omniscience. Even the most enlightened contemporaries could not guage the omniscience of the Master because of

[1] asiddho bhavadharmas' ced vyabhicāryubhayās'rayaḥ, dharmo viruddho 'bhavaṣ' ca sā sattā sādhyate kathaṃ.-*PV.*

their incompetency. So their testimony must be dismissed as statement of interested parties or if their sincerety and veracity be unquestionable, it will still fall short of proof because their assertions are not founded on direct knowledge.

But it may be argued that the Buddha could divine the thoughts of all his disciples and this proves his capacity for knowing supersensible facts. Even if we grant the authenticity of this assertion, it cannot be cited as a logical proof of omniscience. It will not establish his knowledge of all men and their thoughts spread over three divisions of time and infinite regions, simply for the impossibility of verification. It is quite plausible that a man who knows magic can delude a number of persons by his magical powers. One may divine things hidden in one's clenched fist or food that he has eaten or the thing that he has thought; but these do not prove that he is conversant with the secrets of spiritual life. Of course in the *Purāṇas* we find descriptions of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Maheśa as possessed of supreme knowledge, dispassion and supernatural powers. This is plausible, because they derive their knowledge from the Vedas and their being is constituted by the Vedas themselves. They are the custodians of the vedic lore and are as eternal as the Vedas. But this cannot be supposed to afford evidence of the Buddha's omniscience because *ex hypothesi* the Buddha's knowledge is not derived from the Vedas. It would be more rational if the Buddha were supposed to have derived his knowledge of religious mysteries from the Vedas. But that would not prove his independent knowledge of all facts.

Nor can we rely on analogy as proof of omniscience. For instance, one may have knowledge of a wild cow from analogy with a domesticated cow. And when he comes across a wild cow in a forest, he remembers the forester's instruction and concludes that this is a wild cow. But we do not come across any person analogous to an omniscient; so analogy is also not available as proof. It may be argued that though perception, inference and analogy may not be available as evidence of the omniscient, it can be proved by logical implication (*Arthāpatti*). The Buddha has discoursed on *dharma* and *adharma*, which are not amenable to empirical evidence. All instructions and sermons are conditioned by knowledge. The Buddha's instructions and sermons therefore indicate his knowledge of these mysteries. But this argument is possessed of very little worth. It is not proved that his discourses are valid. It is not necessarily true that instructions of all persons are antecedently conditioned by direct indubitable knowledge of their contents. There are impostors and humbugs or selfdeluded persons who have preached religion to their followers. Their sole motive was to consolidate their position and authority. In this way many false sects have come into existence. It cannot be asserted even with the faintest semblance of truth that the Buddha had his schooling from the accredited tradition of the Vedas. He has addressed his sermons to all and sundry, to the low caste people and outcastes who are not eligible for such teaching. This shows that he set at nought the tradition and convention of the custodians of the Vedic religion. It may not be illegitimate to infer that the Buddha was a vainglorious prophet who wanted to set up a new religion and creed in defiance of accredited Vedic authority and his teachings stem from vanity and fatuity.

A few Buddhist philosophers have argued that they only intend to establish the logical and metaphysical possibility of an omniscient being. Their contention is that omniscience is possible in a person because knowledge is seen to be progressive in men and this progression must reach final consummation. But this plea does not cut ice with Kumārila. Even if the cogency of the argument be conceded, it does not establish the omniscience of the Buddha. Granted that there may be an omniscient person, but this general sort of conclusion does not avail the Buddhist, unless it be proved that the Buddha himself is omniscient and that his words are infallible. It has again been argued that all things must be perceived by some person because they are knowable just like colour and taste. This also will be futile, if it proves the omniscience of some other person, since that will have no bearing on the authenticity of his *ipsissima verba.* The Buddhists have again put forward an argument of a mystical nature. When the Buddha in the course of his meditation passed through all the ten stages (*daśabhūmi*) of meditation, all the impurities and imbecilities, moral and spiritual, automatically dropped out and he attained clear vision of every thing. All facts presented themselves to his vision as clear as crystal. If for argument's sake this claim be admitted, though it is not open to verification, still it will fail to carry the point at issue. He could not at that stage give out a sermon describing his experience. Description by speech necessarily entails the employment of concepts and these concepts are regarded by the Buddhists as unreal figments of deluded imagination. His sermons would be like the lecture of an ordinary professor, because he must need lapse from his omniscient vision while engaged in shaping a discourse.

It has however been contended by a school of Buddhist philosophers in order to avoid this *impasse* that the Buddha did not utter a single word in between his enlightenment and his decease. All the sermons accredited to the Buddha were but automatic emanations from the pores of his bodies or environs and not deliberately framed discourses. The Buddha was engrossed in meditation; but the sermons came out in answer to the questions of persons who approached him for enlightenment. These give the knowledge of the spiritual mysteries, *dharma* and *adharma* in the light of which persons practise the courses of discipline which lead to their spiritual well-being. Kumārila very plausibly observes, "These myths of explanations can be accepted only by those who are possessed of infinite credulity. But we are guilty of incredulity and demand rational proofs which, however the Buddhist does not vouchsafe". If for the sake of argument we accept the story at its face value, it will not serve the purpose of the Buddhist. The words that issue from the crevices of the person of the Buddha may legitimately rouse suspicion whether they are actually delivered by the Buddha or by some Brahmin impostors uttering them from a distance or by some petty ghosts and goblins. So no credence can be attached to these assertions as veritable preachings of the enlightened one.

The objections of Kumārila have been summed up above. Now the objections of Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa[1] are to be considered. The omniscience of a human being independent of the knowledge of the Vedas has been found to be an unfound myth. Let us now consider the possible *modus operandi* of the knowledge of an omniscient. Does the omniscient know all things simultaneously or in successive stages? The simultaneous knowledge of all things pure and impure and possessed of contradictory character cannot possibly be supposed to be acquired by one single cognitive act. Things are infinite in their number and distributed over the three divisions of time. Who can know these things severally and distributively even in hundreds of years? If the supposed omniscient knows things in their general character as belonging to a class, he will not be cognisant of the particulars with their specific individuality. One may have general notions and ideas and in the end may comprise all things under the most comprehensive concept of existence. But this sort of knowledge cannot be supposed to constitute omniscience, unless the plurality of things be reduced to false appearance. But this will end in monism, which will reduce morality and religion to naught. The reduction of plurality to a simple monolithic unity has been regarded by many as false knowledge, as it is at variance with our uncontradicted experience and the laws of morality, which presuppose the existence of good and evil. The putative omniscient banking on this knowledge of oneness of things may legitimately be suspected to be a deluded person and his utterances may be wrong and misleading. And if pluralism be an undeniable fact, it cannot be known at one sweep or even successively by an individual because of the infinite variety. The Buddhist has contended that the Buddha knows all things and together with their causes by a transcendental intuition born of deep meditation. But there is no proof of such an omniscient in the shape of perception or inference or verbal testimony. It has been contended that unenlightened persons are incompetent to envisage all things because they are not equipped

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1. These two authors are unknown and no work of them is extant.

with the necessary organ and resources. It is only the Buddha who is equipped with an extraordinary organ of knowledge, who can envisage all things and he stands in a class apart from ordinary mortals. But all these contentions are inspired by fanaticism and have no sanction of logical proof. The conclusion therefore follows irresistibly that no scripture composed by a human being can be regarded as an authority for the knowledge of religious duties and their contraries, *i.e.* ultimate good and evil.

DENIAL OF OMNISCIENCE BASED ON EMPERICAL EVIDENCE

It must be admitted that Kumārila has forged a formidable array of arguments against the possibility of the omniscient. It must be antecedently observed that his denial of a perfectly enlightened being from whose ken nothing visible or invisible is hidden is based upon inductive knowledge. But induction is subject to doubt however much one may try to make it secure from uncertitude. He, however, pins his faith upon eternal Vedas and is persuaded that knowledge of supersensible reality can be derived only from the Vedic texts. But this assertion of knowledge of supersensible truths from scripture is riddled with insuperable logical difficulties. Even if the Veda be eternal, the knowledge of its meaning is secured with the help of some teacher. The teacher's lecture and the pupil's understanding are both contingent events, occurring as they do at determinate times and places. The Vedas themselves do not explain their meaning and as unknown and unstudied are as good as non-existent. Apart from the logical difficulties concerned with a contingent effect arising from an eternal cause, the assertion of the eternal existence of scriptural texts, judged by pragmatic considerations, is perfectly unavailing. It is therefore, obvious that the meaning of the Vedic text is made intelligible by the teacher who has acquired knowledge of it. So Veda as known is always a contingent fact and its usefulness proceeds from this event. It is immaterial to assert that the Vedas are uncreated when their brute existence is unproductive of any pragmatic. cosequence. The main purpose of Kumārila in controverting the existence of a person acquainted with the mysteries of religion is to safeguard the authoritativeness of Vedic scripture. But the authority of the Vedas is realised by teachers and pupils who are not eternal facts. If the series of teachers and pupils, unintercepted and continuously existing from eternal past be conceded, it will make the postulation of eternal Vedas of very little practical value. At any event the series of persons conversant with the secrets of spiritual life has to be admitted though their knowledge may be derived from the Vedas. The eternity of the Vedas as the religious scripture need not be refuted in the present context, since we are concerned with the possibility and actuality of an omniscient being. What the Buddhist is concerned to establish by arguments is the logical possibility of an omniscient and to prove that the Buddha was such an omniscient being. By omniscience the Buddhist does not mean that the Buddha had necessarily detailed knowledge of all things and events occurring in the universe in the past, present and future. What he wants to prove is that the Buddha developed an immaculate power of vision to which the secrets of religion, namely, the ways and means of acquiring provisional and eternal blessedness, presented themselves without obstruction. Whether the Buddha knew the entire number of atoms and hairs of his body and head is a trivial question. Of course to the enlightened vision of the Buddha nothing is a sealed book and so he must have known all these trivialities if this was the necessary concommitant of the knowledge of the eternal spiritual mysteries, viz. the conditions of heaven and hell and emancipation. Kumārila has not been able to refute this possibility. He has only asserted upon empirical grounds that there is no proof of existence of an omniscient person. But he has not offered a single argument proving the logical absurdity of the conception of an omniscient.

Let us consider the sources of knowledge accepted by the Mīmāṅsist and see whether they can prove the non-existence of an omniscient. Assuredly he cannot rest his denial on the authority of sense perception. How can one perceive the minds of other persons ? How can one know that there is no omniscient unless one has access to the mental constitution of all beings ? This assertion can be justified only by such knowledge and this will be tantamount to the admission of omniscience on the part of the opponent. So perception cannot be proof of the negation of omniscient. The Mīmāṅsist has contended that he does not make perception the proof of the impossibility of omniscience, but the fact that an omniscient being has never been perceived. Were such a person existent he must have been perceived. That is his contention. But this contention is obsolutely futile because the fact of non-perception does not prove the non-existence of the omniscient, because perception is neither the cause (*kāraṇa*) nor the determining logical condition (*hetu*) of the existence of things. There are many thnigs which we do not perceive, particularly those which are not amenable to perception. If one were to deny the existence of such things on the basis of his non-apprehension he would only make a fool of himself. Of course non-existence of a thing can be inferred if it were shown that there was no cause or logical determinant of it. For instance one can infer that there is no smoke in a lake because of the impossibility of fire therein. One can legitimately assert that there is no mango garden in a desert, because trees cannot grow in it. But perception does not stand in the relation of causality or logical concomitance with the omniscient and so the default of the former does not entail the default of the latter. Does the Mīmāṅsist make his knowledge the condition or the concomitant of the existence of all things ? If he could do it he must be presumed to have the capacity of perceiving all existent facts. In that case he will himself be omniscient.

Unless the Mīmāṅsist be an omniscient he cannot successfully deny an omniscient. If he were not possessed of such capacity, the denial of the omniscient on the basis of his personal limited range of perception or its default would be inconclusive. If he makes the nonperception of all persons the ground of denial, that will presuppose his knowledge of the minds of all persons. How can he assert that no body has perceived an omniscient, unless he can substantiate it by the knowledge of all persons and their mental functioning ? So the conclusion irresistibly follows that perception cannot be pressed forward as evidence of non-existence of an omniscient. After all an omniscient is not perceivable by senses. And so the failure of sense perception to envisage such a person cannot be the proof of his non-existence. Mere default of perception on the part of a person of limited knowledge and capacity cannot be the logical proof of the non-existence of a thing which is not competent to be perceived. One cannot deny without being involved in absurdity the marriage of his parents on the ground of his non-apprehension. How can he be sure of the existence of his ancestors when he has no perceptual knowledge of them ?

If he relies upon the testimony of other persons who have seen the event in question, how can he legitimately deny the testimony regarding an omniscient ? If he is sceptic of the testimony of a human being on the ground of his fallibility and proneness to falsehood, how can he believe that his parents were united in wedlock or he has had ancestors ?

Let us waive this objection. But we ask the Mīmāṅsist to weigh his reasons for the categorical denial of omniscience, when the minds of all the persons that exist in the world are not open to inspection. At most he should suspend his judgment either for or against the omniscient. But he cannot be categorical in his denial without being dogmatic ? He cannot assert that all persons in the world are unacquainted with an omniscient, because he cannot know the minds of all and their knowledge too. The proposition that there is no omniscient, because he was perceived by none, cannot be supported by inductive evidence. The possibility of an unknown person being omniscient cannot be theoretically ruled out. Perception or want of it therefore fails to establish the nonexistence of an omniscient being. Nor can inference be made the ground of this denial. Inference is possible on the basis of two-fold probans, namely, effect and essential characteristic. There is nothing which can be cited as the effect of non-omniscient, simply because one cannot know the mental equipment of all persons and its causal operation by the Joint Method. Likewise a characteristic essentially connected with non-omniscient cannot be trotted out as a logical ground for the same reason. Thus we see that the Mīmāṅsist who banks upon empirical evidence as the proof of the unreality of omniscient also fails to prove that all persons are non-omniscient. If we grant that he has succeeded in establishing his point that there is no evidence in favour of an omniscient, he also fails, it must be admitted, to establish that an omniscient is impossible; or to put it the other way round he cannot prove that all persons will be known to be non-omniscient. So at the utmost the upshot will be a cautious suspension of judgment and a non-commital assertion. The issue of the existence of omniscient must be left a moot question and not a settled fact either way. One may at most contend that the balance of evidence being equally distributed, both the propositions asserting and denying omniscience should be regarded as undecided. An attitude of healthy doubt should be adopted and not one of dogmatic denial.

But the Mīmāṅsist declines to leave the matter aside as a moot problem. He says the issue is not a matter of doubt. Doubt is possible only in regard to observed facts. One may doubt whether the object standing ahead in a dark night is a man or a lamp-post, because he has had direct knowledge of both and is undecisive because there is no crucial evidence in favour of one of the alternatives. But an omniscient cannot be the subjectmatter of doubt because no person has knowledge of it. But this contention is suicidal. If doubt is deemed possible only between two definitely observed reals and the existence of an unobserved fact be denied outright, then one must also deny the existence of his ancestors. Doubt is possible between existence and non-existence of a fact if there is no proof available for both the alternatives. If the organ of sight be defective or be non-existent, a person cannot prove the existence of a perceptible fact, say, jar or a chair; and even if the person be possessed of full vision, he cannot perceive a chair or a table existing in another room. Thus non-perception is possible both when a thing is existent and non-existent, Therefore mere non-perception cannot be made the ground of affirmation or denial of even an existent fact. If there be no decisive proof of existence or non-existence, the thing should be left a matter of doubt. Similarly the omniscient should be regarded as a matter of doubtful issue if positive and negative evidence be equally unavailable. The Mīmāṅsist is categorical in his denial of the omniscient, but a man possessed of a modicum of logical insight must adjudge that the matter is unproven either way. Dogmatism should be suspect in all circumstances.

One may however argue that if an omniscient be an existent fact in the present or past why should he not be perceived ? If men of average capacity be incompetent to perceive him, why should not there be an effect left by him on the basis of which his existence could be inferred. Certainly we do not perceive our eyes, but we are not doubtful of their existence, because we have got visual knowledge which is the effect of it. But this is not the case with the omniscient. This contention, notwithstanding its plausibility, cannot be valid. The fact that we do not perceive an effect is not a legitimate ground for inferring the non-existence of the cause. It is supposable that the cause may exist without producing any expected effect. For instance there is fire in a red hot iron ball, though there is no smoke. Or it is possible that the effect is imperceptible like the past mental mood of a person. Or there may be a visible effect, but the relation of it with an invisible cause may not be ascertainable. So the absence of an effect cannot be made the ground of the inference of the non-existence of its cause. The omniscient is imperceptible to an unenlightened man and so the failure of his perception and inference cannot prove the non-existence of the former. It is well-known that knowledge is neither the efficient cause nor the necessary concomitant of its object and so its default cannot be the proof of the non-existence of its object. The absence of fire implies the absence of smoke, because the former is the cause of the latter and an effect cannot come into being in the absence of the cause. It is legitimate to infer the non-existence of a human being in a dead planet, because of the absence of oxygen therein. The presence of oxygen is a necessary condition of life and so its absence entails the absence of its concomitant. Similarly the absence of a triangle entails the absence of a trilateral figure, because the latter is necessarily concomitant with the former. But knowledge is neither the cause nor the necessary concomitant of the object and so the absence of the former cannot entail the absence of the latter. To return to the issue, the absence of knowledge of omniscient or of any effect thereof, even if it be a fact,. cannot be put forward as evidence of the non-existence of the omniscient. At most the existence of omniscient should be left a matter of doubt and not capable of being categorically denied.

It may fairly be claimed that the Mīmāṅsist's denial of the omniscient has been shown to be inspired by dogmatic bias, though the existence of the omniscient may have not been established by a knock-down proof. Let us now address ourselves to the problem of positive evidence, before we get down to brass tacks. We want to make it clear that the Buddhist is not directly interested in the proof of knowledge of all things on the part of the Buddha. He only affirms that the Buddha knew the way to heaven and emancipation and the question of his knowledge of all details of the universe is only a subsidiary issue. Dharmakīrti has made an appropriate statement in this connection. It is not a matter of academic interest nor is it love of abstract metaphysics, which impel us to examine the possibility of a trustworthy teacher who knows the ultimate truths. We want to know what is the true path for the desired goal of life. Every sane man wants to get rid of the miserable conditions of life which make the living beings the victims of destiny, which gives no quarter or makes allowance for natural foibles. A righteous man must transcend the limitations and imperfections incident to ignorance and imbecile will-power. We therefore, want to know whether there is any person who knows the secrets of religion, namely, what is to be avoided and what is to be acquired, and also the necessary means and conditions for the achievement of the supreme purpose. It is a matter of indifference whether he knows everything, essential and non-essential. We want to know what we have to practise for transcending the limitations of our present life. If there is a person who is competent to give instruction on this question of practical discipline, we must accept his teaching and follow the path chalked out by him. It is futile and irrelevant whether he knows the number of insects that exist in the world. We are not at all interested to know whether he sees things from far or near. If the capacity for distant vision be the criterian of the validity of his knowledge and constitute the credentials of the religious teacher, let us worship the vultures and eagles who see things from a long distance. We want to have recourse to the teacher who knows the ultimate (four noble) truths. We follow the Buddha because he is unerringly conversant with these truths and can show us the means of deliverance.[1]

DEFENCE OF OMNISCIENCE

The assertion of Kumārila that the ultimate spiritual truths can be known exclusively from the Vedic lore and no person is competent to acquire this transcendental knowledge unaided by the light of revelation is also much too sweeping a generalisation. How can the Mīmāṅsist affirm that the knowledge of virtue and vice cannot be acquired by any person when he is not aware of the mental capacity of all persons? The Buddhist does not set out to establish the existence of the omniscient regardless of the latter's knowledge of these fundamental truths. Again the assertion that the omniscient must be condemned on the ground of his direct experience of impure things such as the taste of wine is quite wide of the mark. The omniscient does not taste these impure articles with his tongue. And so the charge falls flat. The omniscient has knowledge of all things good or evil because they are presented to his mental vision from a distance. They do not produce any deprevity because he is not actuated by the motive of self-enjoyment like the habitual drunkard or men of vicious inclinations.

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[1] Chapter I verses 31-35.

The performance of the Vedic sacrifices and rites is motivated by desire for personal happiness and the sacrificer is selfish enough to gain his own objective even at the cost of suffering of other living beings. The Buddha has inculcated the supreme doctrine of the baselessness of personal identity in order to rebut the development of selfish desires. The self *qua* personality is only a figment of the diseased imagination. Man's essence is the impersonal absolute which does not admit of compartmental egos. The realisation of the falseness of the ego and the ego-centric impulses leads to the blessedness of freedom (*Nirvāṇa*). This ideal undoubtedly strikes terror in the heart of superstitious persons; but this is welcomed by the wise man disabused of all prejudices and preconceptions.[1]

If poets could be credited with such knowledge of the fundamental religious truths, we would have no scruple to accept them as omniscient. We do not assert that the Buddha is the only Omniscient possible. Whoever knows these truths is regarded as omniscient by us and we do not arbitrarily fix a limit to the number. The Buddha has affirmed all things to be impermanent and nailed to the counter the superstition of a permanent egoity. But other teachers seem to countenance this superstition as truth. So there can be no comparison between the Buddha and the other *soi-disant* prophets. It is our position that the omniscient is one who knows the true essence of all things. If however, the differences of the essence of religions are counted to be provisional and relate rather to the apparent nature of things and if there is perfect agreement and unanimity on the essential nature of things, all of them should be regarded as omniscient and true prophets. We are not fanatic on the omniscience of a particular prophet. We do not claim that the Buddha is only omniscient or the last of the series. If it can be shown that Kapila, Vardhamāna and other religious teachers are agreed on the ultimate nature of reality and the differences are more apparent than real, inspired by the consideration of the equipment of persons of various descriptions, we should offer our obeisance to all of them. It is the later followers of the different religious creeds who fail to distinguish the provisional from the eternal truth and confuse the topical with the ultimate value, that indulge in mutual recrimination. The professional custodians of religions are attached to the external vesture and refuse to read between the lines and discover the spirit underlying the words and ceremonies. We must here take note of the generous and impartial attitude of Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla, which is a rare trait even among the moderns. The most powerful animadversion made by Kumārila on the advocates of the omniscient is this charge of divergence of views among the accredited religious founders. Certainly the apparently irreconcilable conflicts between the religious teachers which have been further aggravated by the interpretations of their respective followers have created a deadlock for an enquirer of truth. The matter could not have assumed such an ugly shape and proportion if the exponents of the different creeds paused to assess the ultimate significance of their doctrines and abstained from making mountains out of molehills. If however we rivet our attention on unessential details of outward rites and ceremonies, more or less dictated by past tradition and environmental conditions and refuse to assess them at their proper value, the quarrels of religions will never cease. If we persist in this one track line of thought, we shall never be able to appreciate the good features in other religions. It is nothing short of preposterous to think that all other religious teachers were deluded except the prophet of one's own religious creed. This attitute has led to fanaticism and religious pride which are the worst passions of the human mind. Śāntarakṣita had the fairness to admit the possibility of other religious teachers being aware of the ultimate truth. It is the latest religious teacher, Śri Rāmakrishṇa of Dakshineshwar, who has unambiguously declared that there is a core of unanimity on essentials in all religions. It is grateful that at least two old Buddhist philosophers have had the courage of their conviction to endorse this possibility. The want of this charity of heart has been responsible not only for the antagonism among different religions, but also for the creation of warring sects and sub-sects even in one religion.

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[1] T.S. 3321-27.

The differences among the later followers of the Buddha, the Vaibhāṣika, the Vijnānavādin and the Mādhyamika are to all appearance irreconcilable and one may legitimately conclude that they have misinterpreted the original teachings of the Buddha. It is absurd to suppose that the Buddha sponsored these mutually inconsistent doctrines, which is not creditable even for an ordinary man of commonsense. It is a thousand pities that no attempt has been made to weed out the overgrowths and get to the essential kernel. Unfortunately the broad hints by Śāntarakṣita have not been followed out and they have been suffered to remain only a theoretic counsel of perfection.

ORGAN OF OMNISCIENCE.

Let us return to the original issue. It is the contention of the Buddhists of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school that our inner essence is consciousness which is intrinsically pure and transparent. But being associated with and dominated by evil tendencies and predispositions it becomes incapacitated for envisaging the Truth. These impurities are called *Kleśāvaraṇas*. They serve to subdue the mind and cover up the natural light of consciousness. They foster the sense of egoity and engender possessive instincts. Consequently all that tends to gratify the senses is hugged and whatever seems disagreeable is hated by the person under its influence. Egoity is thus the initial handicap and love, hate, pride and fatuity stem from it. So long as a person is deluded into thinking that he is an individual and his enterests are thwarted by other individuals, he will not cease to entertain feelings of hostility and hatred toward the latter. His attachment to agreeable persons and things and hatred for the opposites constitute this bondage. This bondage can be put to an end only when the illusion of egoity is eradicated by the realization of the impersonal nature of one's being, and this automatically leads to the cessation of the passions of love and hate. This is effected by a prolonged course of discipline in Yogic contemplation. The spiritual aspirant at once attains emancipation ; but a person gifted with indominable will and unflagging perseverance goes further and ultimately overthrows the barriers and obstacles which intercept the vision of entire reality. These fetters are called *jñeyāvaraṇas.* With the demolition of these barriers to knowledge the enlightened person attains free access to the nature of all things that appear to exist. He becomes omniscient and acquires the power of enlightening others. In the usual course of nature when a man is under bondage, the knowledge of things comes to him in driblets through the channel of the senses. The person naturally feels that knowledge is dependent upon the fitness of the senses and he is only a receptive vessel. But this is not a true appraisal of the nature of consciousness. Instead of being aids, the senses are so many handicaps. When a man becomes free from the blinding passions of egoity and love and hate, his inner consciousness embraces the whole gamut of reality. The senses and the organs of cognition are only instrumental in presenting things to the inner consciousness of the subject. This condition of the subject has been set forth by the imagery of the man in the cave in which there is only one aperture for admitting light. The man in such a condition imagines that his knowledge is dependent upon this aperture in the wall. This is a superstition. When the walls of the prison are broken down or the man is taken out in the broad day light, he will have the full vision of things without impediment. This is the case with the enlightened man. He now becomes independent of the senses in the acquisition of knowledge. This is the logic of omniscience and also of enlightenment, which is the proximate condition of freedom.

It may be urged that the so-called evil dispositions, love and hate, are existing from eternity and they are part and parcel of the mental life of a person. As regards egoity this cannot be supposed to have been super-induced by accident. Why should then egoity be regarded as weaker than the contemplation of non-egoity ? Are not all these ideas derived from the pessimistic outlook of the Buddhist ascetic who thinks too much of the imperfections of the world and comes to believe that the world is an unmixed evil from top to bottom ? Even if it be granted that pure consciousness is impersonal and non-egoistic, it is a matter of actual fact that the metaphysical non-egoity and the felt ego-consciousness together with love and hatred are existing side by side. How can there be antagonism between them ? The Buddhist assumes and so also the majority of philosophers in India, in spite of their differences major and minor, assert that ego-consciousness is the source of unhappiness. This egocentric bias is supposed to be worsted by the realisation of the true nature of the self, which is impersonal according to the Vedāntist and the Buddhist, and other than the ego according to other schools. Why should not the tables be turned ? It is a matter of observation that when the mind is occupied by the awareness of ego, the idea of non-ego goes to the wall. What is the warrant for supposing that the non-ego will gain the upper hand over the ego ? So far as experience goes even the most learned philosophers and ascetics are not found to be free from the much-maligned egocentricity and self-love and hate of evil. An ordinary man of the world and also a critical thinker fall into the same group. This is a very serious question for all advocates of ascetic ideas. The issue can be set out in clear terms as follows. Is the falsity of the ego a mere dogma or capable of being supported by unmistakable evidence ?

The Buddhist philosophers of all schools are unanimous on the truth of egolessness. But is it not an unproved postulate inspired by irrational hatred of the world ? The contention of the opponent is that egoity is a constant fact and if non-egoity be metaphysically true, their co-existence is a pointer to the absence of antagonism between them. But this contention according to the Buddhist is not based on a true estimation of human psychology. That egoity persists in spite of the ultimate truth of non-egoity is not evidence of the absence of antagonism, or, to put it the other way about, of coordinate status of egoity with non-egoity. The opposition becomes manifest whenn on-egoity comes to the focus of consciousness. It is a felt fact that a person forgets his egoity when he is engrossed in other thoughts[1] ? The feeling of continuity of personal identity does not warrant the supposition of the permanence of the ego, since continuity is possible even without an abiding bond of unity. This is exemplified by the continuous stream of a river. The contention of the opponent that egoity cannot be an illusion because it is not worsted by perception of non-egoity is not tenable.

Is it a fact or not that contemplation of non-egoity shoves aside the egoistic feeling ? We feel that the ego is not felt when a man is deeply occupied with other things. It may be argued that conscious cotemplation of egolessness is impossible and so non-egoity, if it is a fact at all, cannot be directly intuited, since no body can feel the urge for such contemplation. But this is based upon an inadequate knowledge of human psychology. We may legitimately ask, why should it be impossible ? Is it due to the fact that all men are averse to such contemplation ? Or, even if one may feel an urge for it, he cannot be successful for want of knowledge of the thing to be shunned. Or it may be urged that even if the defect, namely, egoity be known, the realization of the ineradicability of the defect restrains him from such wild goose pursuit. Or though not ineradicable it may be regarded as an uncaused occurrent or again though it may have a cause one may not know what it is and without knowing the cause of the disease no body can make an attempt to get rid of it.

Or let us suppose that though the cause be known, one may not feel the urge to root it out in view of the eternal existence of the cause. Or even if the cause be not eternal, these defects, namely, love and hate, may be inalienable characteristics of living beings. No body can get rid of his nature just as the leopard cannot change his spots. Further even if these dispositional drawbacks be not natural, there may be no means to eradicate them and even supposing that there may be means to their eradication, the want of knowledge of the means will make the defect continue to exist. Or it may be supposed that though the cause of the destruction be known, it cannot be operated. Or the attempt will not lead to its total extinction, because contemplation of non-egoity may not exceed its limit and as such fail to attain the fullest intensity, necessary for overpowering the defects. It is also supposable that though the contemplation of non-egoity may reach its maximum strength and succeed in subduing the passions, the latter may relapse just as copper liquefied by fire reverts to its original hardness. Any one of these possibilities of the failure of the attempts may restrain a person, possessed of even a faint trace of rationality, from pursuit of this will'o-the-wisp.

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[1] Cf. The self-forgetfulness of Śakuntalā and her unawareness of the curse of sage Durvāsā as depicted by Kālidāsa.

Let us examine these hypotheses of the innate futility of the spiritual discipline one by one. The first objection is that no body feels an interest in the cultivation of non-egoity and the consequent depersonalisation ; but it proceeds from inadequate knowledge of the springs of volition. There may be persons who are embittered by the miserable conditions of worldly life and naturally seek relief from it. This fear of the misery of the world may furnish the motive force for pursuit of spiritual discipline leading to the extinction of egoity. This is found to be the keynote on which Theravāda harps without a break. This is certainly not a very exalted motive, being concerned with self-deliverance alone. But there may be other persons, who without regard for their own interest, are by nature inclined to do good to others and seeing the suffering of fellow creatures identify themselves with the latter and seek the remedy for their distress. And this leads him to the pursuit of spiritual discipline in order to find out the ways and means of deliverance of all living beings. In their case their merciful disposition is the *vis â tergo* for the realization of non-egoity. One may object, why should a man of intelligence engage in doing good to all and what will he gain by it ? The answer is, he will gain nothing but the satisfaction of selfless service. Disregard for personal happiness and advantages should not be construed as a sign of unwisdom. Such a person completely identifies himself with others and does not distinguish his own interest from those of the rest. One may have a poor opinion of his prudence, but there have been and may be such persons who think for others and live for others without self-regarding motives. It is not infrequently found that there are persons whose whole breeding has been such that they find particular delight in seeing persons involved in calamities and derive great satisfaction from inflicting injury upon others, even when there is no clash of interest.

It was found that certain persons gloated over the misfortune of King Faruk of Egypt when he was deposed, though they had not the remotest trace of connection with the politics of Egypt or any link with the unfortunate person by way of religion or theory. Tyrants and oppressors of mankind again are apt illustrations of disinterested cruelty. Their sadistic impulses have been developed to the maximum degree and their sole source of pleasure is the suffering of fellow creatures. If such instances of selfless cruelty be not impossible there may be persons who are just the antipodal opposites. The Bodhisattva is described as one such person who gets all satisfaction from promoting the well-being of others and alleviating their distress. So the motive of self-interest is not always relevant. It is quite understandable if a prudent man thinks them to be cranks ; but opinions are bound to differ.

Let us consider the second objection that there can be no knowledge of the defects and drawbacks for the eradication of which a man may engage in spiritual discipline. The moral and emotional defects such as love, hate, delusion, pride, malice, jealousy etc. are quite familiar and they occasionally arise and cease. So they cannot be eternal and ineradicable. Consequently they are not uncaused events and they cannot be caused by any eternal fact. The cause of these immoral tendencies is found in undue self-love, self-conceit and the possessive and acquisitive impulses which impel a person to gain an advantage at the cost of others. A totally selfish person, if he has the intellectual power and strong determination does not stickle at any thing, however criminal and immoral it may be, that may serve his own selfish gain. This selfishness and egotism fostered by it however cannot be regarded as inalienable instincts of living beings. The Buddhist does not believe in the metaphysical reality of individual persons, whose mutual interests are antagonistic to one another. The ego is according to him a false creation of ignorance. It may however be supposed that though a complex personal identity may not have a metaphysical validity, the fact of consciousness cannot be brushed aside as the nucleus of personal identity. The Buddhist idealist explicitly asserts the reality of consciousness as an ultimate fact. These animal instincts may be regarded as the necessary characteristic of consciousness, though not of the ego. But this supposition is found to be baseless on the examination of the functional character of consciousness itself. It is the nature of consciousness to know itself and also others if there are any such objects. Whatever may be the *modus operandi* by which consciousness operates on the given data it is almost certain that it should take stock of them in their true character, unless there are conditions for leading it astray. If consciousness be intrinsically incompetent to know things as they are, it will not have the character of self-apprehension and other-apprehension. It cannot therefore be supposed that the nature of consciousness is to know things as they are not or the objects will not be such as they are known. This will only end in universal scepticism and nothing will be determined as real. Our consciousness then would be reduced to bankruptcy and reality would be *eo ipso* unitelligible. As this is an unconscionable hypothesis, it must be postulated that it is the essential character of consciousness to take note of reality as it is. The real nature of consciousness is impersonal. According to the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra*[1] and also the Upaniṣad consciousness cannot be compartmental. It is one spirit which is immanent in all individuals. If this be a true assessment of reality, there is no reason for clash of

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1. MSAL.

interest. Reality is characterised as the Absolute Self in the Upaniṣads and pure consciousness and being in Mahāyāna. Ultimately the two descriptions do not differ materially, except in nomenclature. It is quite possible that philosophers of all schools will not subscribe to this monistic conclusion. But the Buddhists of all schools despite their metaphysical differences, are uncompromising on the issue that the ego is a phantom and so egoistic impulses are unfounded and unsubstantial overgrowths induced by ignorance oi the true nature of reality. This ignorance and its consequential products namely, self-love and hatred of other individuals, are bound to be annihilated by correct spiritual discipline. There are Buddhists who believe in external reality and also in other individuals as different centres of consciousness. But the essence of the individual is to be realised as non-egoistic, because the ego is unreal. The egoistic impulses are the cause of the misery of the world and also of the person himself. The ego is not an ineluctable fact. When one contemplates the non-ego and cultivates universal love the egoistic impulse recedes to the back. The elimination of the egocentric bias induced by such contemplation of the non-ego gives a foretaste of the blessedness and tranquillity which satisfy all desires.

It will be unfair to ignore the happy consequences of the cultivation of egolessness. Suppose that all persons cease to hate one another and come to believe that the good of others is identical with his own good. The upshot will be that jealousy, malice, hatred, pride and megalomania will cease to disturb the peace of the world. Of course the existing state of things may not countenance such an optimism. But the ideal is there and if even the conditions of life may not be at their optimum, the enlightened Bodhisattva will not yield to despair. The present tenure of human life may be too short for the achievement of the optimum condition. But the Buddhists believe in long series of life after the death of the present body. The scope for prolonged exercise of spirituality is not limited by want of opportunity. The Buddhist pins his faith on the ultimate redemption of all living beings by the demolition of the evil passions and tendencies which stem from ignorance. Ignorance is conquered by enlightenment. The evil tendencies are not comparable to the hardness of the copper plate which relapses after the removal of heat. In the case of evil passions, the incessant cultivation of spirituality makes the recrudescence of the evil tendencies impossible. If a natural example is to help the understanding, one may point to the total calcination of the fuel by fire. When egolessness becomes established on a firm basis, there is no possibility of reverting to the pristine condition of moral and spiritual servitude. It is not a fair contention that the impersonal state of consciousness is an unnatural and unreal conception. A man realises his blessedness and freedom when in rare moments he ceases to think of himself and helps another fellow being in his misery. This shows that real happiness is centred round this consciousness of selflessness. It is not natural for a person who realises this blessed condition to try to get rid of it. He will rather stick to it against odds.

But what can be the organ for this blessed realisation ? The Buddhist prescribes a course of meditation on egolessness. This meditation when matured ends in the vision of the non-ego. The efficacy of meditation for producing direct intuition of the thing meditated upon need not be doubted or denied. Constant meditation of a lover on his absent sweetheart makes him visualise his beloved. This may be a hallucination, but it shows that meditation when matured culminates in vivid realisation of the object. The religious experience of the saint cannot and should not be dismissed as a hallucination. The hallucination cannot last for long. Moreover it cannot give rise to a system of thought which is found to be consistent and which advocates highest ethical principles which are conducive to the welfare of all beings. It will be uncharitable to regard these saints as self-deluded persons. Miracles have been suspect, but many a saint has given proof of their supersensuous knowledge. Some of their findings are verifiable by empirical evidence. As we believe in the assertions of the scientists which we are not capable of attesting by our own knowledge, so it should not be regarded as sign of stupid credulity to accept the assertions of religious experts as true knowledge of supersensible facts. These experiences are not subjective delusions. There may have been hypocrites and humbugs who may have deceived other persons by their false pretensions. But this has been made possible because like counterfeit coins they resemble the true saints. Total hypocrisy is unthinkable. Simulation succeeds only to the extent it imitates the real. Furthermore the spiritual powers of the saints should not be measured by the yard-stick of our own knowledge. It may be fallacious to measure the spiritual power of the saint by analogy with our equipment. The trees in the desert yield poor fruits, but that cannot be made the ground for asserting that we cannot have trees producing very big fruits in a fertile soil. The poorness of our spiritual knowledge may be due to the fact that the optimum conditions are not present which may be available in the case of others. The religious saints not only help one in spiritual progress, but also in the material plane. By following the course of prayer and worship prescribed in the scriptures one attains desirable results. One is cured of desperate illness by dint of prayer. It will not be proper attitude to dismiss these cases as mere fortuitous occurrences, and we have records of persons of unimpeachable moral integrity which bear testimony to these miracles. One, who has not got direct experience of these occurrences, should suspend his judgment, and not decry them as incredible fabrications. The Buddhist claims the Buddha to be an enlightened seer of supersensible truths and it will not be correct on our part to dismiss *a priori* his claim as an absurdity. The claim deserves to be tested or one should keep an open mind.

The possibility of mystical experience of supersensible reality has been shown to be well-grounded. At any rate the sceptic cannot prove his contention that such knowledge is impossible. But it may be asserted, and that not in a spirit of frivolous flippancy, that each religious sect has claimed its anonymous prophet as an omnsicient person and dismisses the claims of other such sects *de haut en bas*. For instance as has been pointed out by Kumārila that Kapila has been declared omniscient by his followers and the Buddha by his disciples. It is certainly preposterous to claim that one saint should possess the final knowledge of religious mysteries and all others are false prophets. In modern times the Christians are found to claim the Christ to be the true path-finder and dismiss the other prophets as false pretenders. This is not a commendable attitude. But it is also logically difficult to believe that all the founders of religious sects, whose number is legion, are possessed of true vision alike. Why should then be such vital differences in the gospels preached by them ? The Christ is supposed to be the believer in a personal God, whereas the Buddhist upholds the opposite conclusion. India is a land of multitudinous religious sects with their irreconcilable differences in theory and practice. With the progress of science and critical thinking it has become incredible that a man of average education should accept one such prophet as the true teacher and dismiss the rest as victims of delusion. In India the advocates of each religious sect have tried to bolster up their own system of philosophy supposed to be taught by their putative prophets and condemn the other prophets and the other systems of philosophy, and thereby seek to establish the truth of their own religion. The Jainas have criticized the Buddhist system of thought and the Buddhists have picked holes in the Jainasystem of religion and philosophy with unabating zeal. This is typical of all other sects. It is also painful to observe that each sect calls the other bad names and have exhausted the vocabulary of vituperation. Certainly this sort of bandying abuses against each other by rival sects is not calculated to produce conviction. An honest man with no pretension to religious experience may feel inclined to be sceptical of the claims of all. What should then be the true solution of this tangled problem ? It is a pity that the followers of different religions and particularly their missionaries are imitating the tactics used by merchants engaged in diverse trades and professions who claim the genuineness of their stuff and traduce that of others. Should one follow the example of the communist countries, which have tabooed all religions, or find reasons for believing in the truth of religion as such ?

We have already found that the Buddhists prescribe a course of moral discipline which is to be cultivated for a protracted period of time. This discipline consists in abstension from injury to living beings, from theft which consists in appropriating the property of others without permission and free gift, from indulgence in frivolous amusements, telling lies, scandal-mongering, cruel speech and action, gossiping, nursing ill-will, and false views and doctrines. These immoral practices have to be studiously avoided by the spiritual aspirant. He must also desist from all immoral activities and tendencies such as not helping others in their distress; not serving the superiors, not speaking the truth, or speaking unkind words, not doing good, shirking study, want of faith, unkindness and undue craving for good things of the world. The religious man must rise superior to these weaknesses, which are very common lapses of the vulgar mass.

It is to be noted that this emphasis upon the inexorable cultivation of moral discipline is also common to Vedic and Jaina religions. The preliminary conditions laid down in the Upaniṣads to be fulfilled by the spiritual aspirant are almost the same as we find in the Buddhist scripture. In the Bhagavad-gītā we meet with the same relentless and ceaseless exhortations. It must therefore be admitted that the code of moral discipline is the same in India barring verbal differences. No particular sect, worth the name, can claim superiority in this regard. Secondly, the emphasis upon the practice of meditation free from all cares and worries in a secluded place under the guidance of an expert is also common to the Upaniṣadic and Buddhist religions. In Patañjali's Yogasūtra elaborate rules with minute details for the successful practice of meditation are found in abundance. We meet with almost the same instructions in the *Visuddhimagga* and the other Buddhist works and in the Jaina religious works *mutatis mutandis*. There is also perfect agreement that meditation culminates in direct intuitional realisation of the ultimate truth. The differences are in interpretation and every school seeks to bring it into conformity with the specific religious doctrines which give the stamp of special individuality to each. If however one dispassionately studies the points of agreement one will be convinced that in them alone lies the essential strength of the religious discipline and the differences are more or less formal and verbal in character. But in the later stages of development sectarian exclusiveness gained the upper hand and each sect began to claim the exclusive monopoly of final truth. Of course there are minor differences in every religion in rituals and liturgies which are due to tradition and environmental conditions in which they had their origin and growth. Whatever be the differences in the interpretation of the contents of scriptural revelation there are reasonable grounds for believing that all of them contain a core of truth which is common.

It is a matter of sincere regret that the professional custodians of the different religions have been more interested in preserving their separate individuality and the consolidation of their vested interests, socio-polical influence and their hold upon the common herd of their followers. This has resulted in unwholesome rivalry and scramble for converts. The motive is far more political and economical than spiritual and moral. This has made institutionalized religions the sources of feud and jealousy. And instead of promoting the spiritual elevation of men and women they have hastened the course of moral degradation and downfall. The sincere follower of a particular religion is taught to nurse hatred for other creeds. Religious wars in the medieval age are the blackest spots on the escutcheon of spiritual purity. The civilized nations of the world have perhaps realised the fatuity of such wars. But the rich nations of Europe and America are financing missionary organisations whose sole purpose is to convert the economically and culturally backward peoples of Asia and Africa to Christianity. Ceremonial conversion is a relic of medieval barbarism and its principal aim is to create divisions in the ranks of the nation and gain the political sympathy of the proselytes. It is high time that the evangelist should desist from this trade in souls.

We have made a digression which has been necessitated by the survey of the practical results produced by professional religions up till now. If however the moral discipline inculcated by the great religions of India be followed, illwill and jealousy will disappear from the religious field. The fundamental basis of all religions may be found in the revelation understood in its wide significance, irrespective of the considerations whether it (revelation) is held to be vouchsafed by a personal God or impersonal discovery of the putative founder or an impersonal eternal verity. It is the common presupposition that man has an innate capacity for the realisation of the ultimate truth which is not accessible by the ordinary instruments of empirical knowledge. Kumārila has called in question the veracity of this claim of supernormal intuition. He poses the questions "Does the enlightened person, Buddha or any other prophet, come to have a vision of the total reality in one sweep or in successive stages ? How can the infinite number of things in the limitless regions and worlds be known by one act ?" To this the Buddhist replies that the Buddha's objective is not the detailed knowledge of all existent facts, but the spiritual truths, the realization of which will bring about the cessation of a man's bondage. The knowledge of infinite details is only consequential. As for the *modus operandi* of such transcendental intuition the Buddhist leaves two courses open. The enlightened being may have a full vision of all that exist in one sweep or part by part as occasions make it necessary. When he comes down to the average human level he retains the capacity for envisaging all truths either in succession or simultaneously as the occasion arises. This has been set forth with abundant clarity in the *Milindapañho* by Nāgasena. The Buddha does not cease to be omniscient even when he chooses to come down to the level of his enquirers. He has the capacity of free access to all planes of reality. By suitable and homely examples, Nāgasena has sought to clinch the issue.

But Kumārila has posed a hard question. Even supposing that the enlightened man has the intuition of all reality he must lose hold of it when he propounds his sermons. Intuition is undiscursive and as such cannot be translated into words. Words are according to the Buddhist epistemology incapable of revealing the reality as it is and only serve to obscure it by giving rise to conceptual knowledge. Conceptual knowledge *ex hypothesi* is false knowledge because it fails to present the truth and gives only a blurred picture. So the prophet's sermons cannot be accepted as valid and genuine because the ultimate truth is not susceptible to conceptual interpretation and linguistic expression. To this charge the Buddhist gives a commonsense reply. True, linguistic representation cannot give the full view of reality, but it is not baseless or false for that reason. We find it in the case of ordinary persons when they inform a man of an actual fact experienced by them. It is found to be true because though the information gives only a conceptual construction it is derived from the intuition of an actual fact. Such is the case with the enlightened one with this difference that he knows all, whereas an unenlightened person knows only a part of reality. But how can there be the desire to teach? This desire presupposes conceptual knowledge which is false by its nature? The answer to this objection is given as follows. A desire may be good or bad according as it is inspired by pure or impure motives. The enlightened one is not subject to moral defects and hence his resolve is also pure, being motivated by the accumulated disposition of benevolence and mercy practised in the stage of the Bodhisattva. He knows that conceptual knowledge is not by itself a true picture of the real, but being derived from a true intuition it leads to the attainment of the real by a person who follows up the clue. The capacity for teaching cannot be incompatible with true knowledge. Were it so, there would be no revealed literature and the world would be without any reliable basis for the practice of religion. It is true that the conceptual knowledge and volitition contaminated by vices and moral impurities are false; but it is not liable to suspicion in the case of the enlightened one who has cleansed his mind of all impurities. As regards the assertion of the idealist Buddhists that the Buddha remains perpetually absorbed in the enlightened vision and words come out automatically from his person and surroundings, this is no doubt an extraordinary statement. But it is given as a tentative hypothesis. In spite of the words of the gospel being unpremeditated by the enlightened one, it is not to be considered as unauthentic or apocryphal. How can such utterences be regarded as spurious when they are found to be confirmed by empirical evidence also? The gospel emanating from the Buddha though unmediated by a conscious volition cannot be believed to have been inspired by evil spirits or fraudulent persons. Such high morals cannot be taught by evil spirits.

As regards the *modus operendi* of the transcendental intuition envisaging the entire world of reality, two different interpretations have been given. Those who believe in the representative theory of perception hold that external reality is not envisaged by itself, but is mirrored in consciousness. As regards the charge of its being vitiated by the touch of impure, vile things of the world we have already disposed of it. Things are known as they are and they cannot affect the transparent purity of the consciousness of the Enlightened. As regards another Buddhist school which believes in direct presentational intuition of the object the world is envisaged by the enlightened as it is. The consequential objection that the infinite world cannot be envisaged by one intuition without being reduced to finite dimension, need not be seriously considered. The transcendental knowledge of the enlightened one exceeds the ordinary intuitions of ignorant persons in every dimension. The infinite is seen as infinite and so there is no distortion. The Buddha knows the pure and the impure at once and hence he could teach of things which are to be avoided and which are to be adopted.

The objections of Kumārila that one cannot transcend the limitation of senses is met by the answer that the Buddha's knowledge is not determined by senses. The Buddha sees with his mind, that is innate consciousness, which is not dependent on the good offices of the senses. All the objections of Kumārila are based upon empirical knowledge. The powers of things and living beings cannot be finally determined. We come across instances of unwonted powers of senses in different animals. But this is by the way. "Consciousness is by nature luminous and cognisant of reality as it is and the limitations are caused by adventitious and accidenal impurities."[1]

It may be claimed that the theoretical possibility of an omniscient has been established with considerable plausibility. No amount of argument can prove the existence of an omniscient person in the present, past or future with mathematical certainty. But we cannot dismiss the validity of religious experience *a priori*. Let us quote in this context the words of Professor Broad, one of the greatest philosophers of the world in the present day. "If a man who had no ear for music were to give himself airs on that account, and he were to talk *de haut en bas* about those who can appreciate music and think it highly important, we should regard him, not as an advanced thinker, but as a self-satisfied philistine..............In the same way, when persons without religious experience regard themselves as being on that ground superior to those who have it, their attitude must be treated as merely silly and offensive. Similarly any theories about religious experience constructed by persons who have little or none of their own should be regarded with grave suspicion."[2]

We have examined the difference in the views of different prophets, each claimed by their followers to be omniscient. We are persuaded that the professional custodians of religions have magnified the points of difference and ignored the points of agreement in the fundamentals unconsciously or deliberately in order to preserve their separate entity.

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[1] T. S., 3435, *Tattvasaṅgraha Pañjikā*-Śāntarakṣita-Kamalaśila—the last chapter.

[2] *Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research, P. 192,* *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Vidyānanda.

ERRATA

PAGE	LINE	INCORRECT	CORRECT.
13	29	such	such as
13	34	guage	gauge
17	31	things and	things
18	9	emperical	empirical
22	34	jar	a jar
24	17	may have not	may not have
25	34	deprevity	depravity
26	26	essence	preachers
26	31	only	the only
27	25	one track	one-track
28	30	enterests	interests
30	35	whenn on-	when non-
37	1	sign	a sign
37	20	proper	a proper
37	35	anonymous	eponymous
41	8	impersonal	personal
42	5	*ex hypothesi is*	*is ex hypothesi*
63	22	upto	up to
65	33	impunged	impugned
66	last	*ed*	*ad*
104	26	readily	already

THE NATURE OF ULTIMATE REALITY

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THE NATURE OF ULTIMATE REALITY

We meet with a regular riot of speculations on the nature of ultimate reality both in Indian and European philosophy. In India, Philosophy, for good or evil, crystallized into different schools which in the course of centuries of evolution became pronouncedly articulated and well-defined with their contour staked out with prominent frontier ramparts. Generations of thinkers professing unwavering allegiance to the fundamental principles of a school perfected the edifice by positive contributions and also by negative demolition of the hostile attacks. The consequence has been an unambiguous defence of a system of thought leaving hardly any room for misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the fundamental position. Thus for example the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, in both epistemology and metaphysics, has been made by the labours of generations of scholars a strong citadel of realism inspiring respect and awe even of the opponents. The criticism of rival philosophers has been answered with consummate skill. One may or may not agree with the arguments or with the conclusions reached by their means. But disagreement does not argue a defect or weakness. It is next to impossible that the Buddhist idealist or the Vedāntic-Absolutist will ever subscribe to the broad results achieved by the subtlest logical weapons invented in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arsenal. Their differences are fundamental and no amount of adverse criticism will induce either party to capitulate or strike a compromise. Philosophers are noted for their uncompromising differences in outlook. However helpful compromise may be in practical life, it is utterly out of place in philosophy.

There are however some honest thinkers in every school who find the arguments of the opposite camp convincing and undisguisedly avow their appreciation. Udayana, for instance, is a realist out and out and yet has shown due deference and respect for the conclusion of the Vedāntic monist in opposition to the Buddhist nihilist and idealist. Śaṅkarācārya, an unrelenting and ruthless critic of realistic attitude, is found to profess unstinted admiration for the author of the *Nyāyasūtra*. In the empirical plane he accepts some of the tenets of the Nyāya school. His acceptance of the epistemological position of the Bhāṭṭas is significant. In the ultimate conclusion, the differences are in unmistakable opposition with those of Nyāya, though procedurally there are found points of agreement.

DIVERSITY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Indian speculations constitute a curious and diverse mosaic and all sorts of possible philosophical standpoints are found to be advocated in different schools. There are dualists, pluralists, monists, extreme sceptics, nihilists, idealists, solipsists, and unabashed materialists and their bearings on practical ethics, social life and individual career are conspicuous by their divergence. It is a facile superstition born of ignorance of the multiplicity of schools of thought in India that India has come to be looked upon as the fertile soil of idealistic thought with its contempt for the worldly values and utter absorption in things of the other world. It must be noted however that Indian idealism, particularly of Vedāntic persuasion, is grounded in epistemological realism and is unyielding in its advocacy of ethical values and strict moral discipline. This apparent inconsistency has been misunderstood. But it has preserved national solidarity and makes for the well-ordered disciplined life in family and society. Unfortunately we cannot claim this harmonization of values, provisional and ultimate, for the Buddhist schools of thought which are too palpably marked out by their negative attitude.

SĀṄKHYA-YOGA SCHOOL

The Sāṅkhya school of thought seems to have been the oldest system in India. The two teachers of the Buddha, Ālāra-Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputra, are reputed to have been adherents of Sāṅkhya thought. Sāṅkhya again seems to have been closely associated with the Yoga discipline of meditation. In the *Kaṭha*, *Maitrī* and *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣads we come across characteristic Sāṅkhya doctrines. The Sāṇkhya is frankly dualistic in ontology, believing in two coordinate and parallel principles, each autonomous in its own sphere. They are diametrically opposed to each other. The contrast between changing matter and unchanging eternal consciousness is too obvious. There is nothing in common between them. All activities, physical, vital and mental are accredited to matter. The mind is but an attenuated form of matter almost corresponding to the brain of modern physiology. The cerebral functions are here hardly distinguishable from mental modifications. The mind is a remote evolute of primordial matter and so are also intelligence and egoity. The relation between matter and spirit is an unfathomable mystery which cannot admit of a rational explanation. But it is found in empirical life that the mind is in constant flux in which sensation, perception and conception succeed one another without break. Of course deep sleep, fainting fits and intoxication caused by drugs and narcotics seem to point to a passive state of existence in which the mind is brought to a standstill. According to Sāṅkhya-Yoga epistemology, the mind and the senses which are the channels, through which the external world of matter communicates its message to consciousness, remain in these abnormal conditions in a state of suspended animation and do not affect the integrity of consciousness. The spirit or consciousness is impersonal and impartible. It is self-subsistent. There can possibly be no truck between spirit and matter. But that our mental activity is illumined by consciousness is an undeniable fact. Sāṅkhya accepts this as the original datum and explains the apparent interaction of spirit and matter by a theory of transcendent illusion. Mind and spirit become identified for all practical purposes and mental activities are spiritualized by the light of consciousness and so empirically the two become indistinguishable. But in reality the two are perfectly autonomous and independent of each other. Though consciousness is the presupposition of personality in which the active elements of primordial matter (*prakṛti*), and passive consciousness seem to interpenetrate each other, the former (consciousness) appears to lose its autonomy. And this explains the imperfection and limitation of the spirit which to all intents and purposes undergoes a state of bondage. This bondage is severed only by the realization of the autonomy of the spirit and its absence of ontological relation with matter. This is called *viveka-khyāti*, that is, the realization of the numerical difference and distinction of spirit and matter.

Classical Sāṅkhya is indubiously dualistic and believes in the ultimate reality of matter as a distinct principle from consciousness. The relation between them is not regarded as realistic but as an illusory appearance, the falsity of which is realizable only in final enlightenment, Sāṅkhya has made contributions of far-reaching importance in the field of cosmogony and evolution. The process of evolution is from simple to complex, each succeeding stage gathering up the fundamental characteristics of the preceding one. The theory of creation of the world, both mind and matter, and the theory of evolution marked out by its theory of causation have been accepted *mutatis mutandis* in the Purāṇas and also Vedānta.

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA ATOMIC THEORY AND ITS CRITIQUE

It must be noted that the theory of the construction of the world from atoms was sponsored by the Vaiśeṣika school and we find the atomic theory emphasized in Jaina ontology and also the realistic schools of Buddhist philosophy. The Vaibhāṣikas and the Sauṭrāntikas explain material transformation by means of conjunction and disjunction of atoms. It is extremely difficult to determine which of these schools is original in the promulgation of the theory. The atomic theory is not regarded as orthodox by Śaṅkarācārya. It is in fact the diametrical opposite of the Sāṅkhya theory of evolution of the cosmic order from one principle. The emergence of the heterogeneous cosmos from one homogeneous unitary principle presents logical difficulties. This has been the gravamen of the criticism of

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school on the Sāṅkhya theory.[1] Both sides have however their points of strength and weakness. Barring the Nyāya school, the atomic theory did not find much favour with the orthodox systems. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention that many cannot be deduced from a monistic principle leads them to postulate a number of atoms of different classes as the prius of the cosmic plane.

But this theory is not immune from criticism. Atoms cannot shed their atomicity and any amount of combination and permutation cannot explain the emergence of a massive body possessing three dimensions. The criticism of Vasubandhu of atoms has become classical in Indian philosophy. Vasubandhu observes that an atom must occupy space and the area occupied by it must be marked out by the points of compass. An atom is *exhypothesi* an indivisible whole devoid of parts. If other atoms from the different points of space—north, south, east, west, up and down—are to combine with the nuclear atom, they must touch it in different points. But there are no points or parts in the atom which will admit of such conjunction. On the other hand, if they all combine in one point, the result will be an atomic dimension which is a contradiction of facts of experience. We see bodies and not atoms, and the latter cannot account for the former. Furthermore, the relation of whole and parts is also not intelligible. According to the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, parts combine to constitute a whole which is a unit. In the whole we find one and many combined, and the age-old problem of the synthesis of one and many stares the advocate of atomism in the face. The explanation of the atomist does not carry conviction. He makes the assumption that the combination of atoms must be possible somehow. He again takes his stand on the empirical fact that a whole is divisible into parts, and the division must come to a halt at some point on pain of infinite

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1. See *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Ch. 1, 7 :
ekasya na kramaḥ kvā'pi vaicitryaṃ ca samasya na.
śaktibhedo na cā'bhinnaḥ.........

regress. The utimate parts must be indivisibe. If a body were infinitely divisible, the relative magnitudes of the Himālaya and the mustard seed, both being possessed of an infinite number of atoms, will not be susceptible to a logical explanation. The *reductio ad absurdum* of infinite divisibility of matter furnishes the *raison d'etre* of the atomic theory. Every philosophical theory must have a rational basis. But it is to be examined whether the rationale of the hypothesis squarely meets all the difficulties. However plausible the atomic theory may appear, it transpires to founder on the question of the emergence of triple dimension *from dimensionless* atoms. The physical combination of atoms is thus an enigma.

SĀṄKHYA THEORY OF EVOLUTION

The Sāṅkhya theory that small things are carved out of one of greater magnitude is supported by experience and presents no logical difficulty. One infinite all pervasive principle called *Prakṛti,* which we have rendered as primordial matter for want of a better equivalent, is the material cause of all physical objects, which are scooped out of the infinite substance and are embedded in it. When small things are found to coalesce into a greater magnitude, there is no new creation, but only the manifestation of the magnitude inherent in the infinite matter in which every limited object moves and lives and has its being. The *Prakṛti* is infinitely great and also infinitely small, and the small is only a function of the great. The Sāṅkhya theory of causation as manifestation of an inherent real obviates a large number of problems which are inevitable in the emergent theory of causation. A new thing or character is found to emerge on the combination of several conditions. But there can be no logical explanation why one set of conditions gives rise to one kind of effect and not another. As we have observed before, the mind or pure understanding is also a quasi-physical entity derived from *prakṛti.* The Sāṅkhya thus seeks to explain the emergence of the cosmic order with all its bewildering varieties from one single principle believed to be possessed of infinite powers.

The theory of triple *guṇa—sattva, rajas* and *tamas*—is supposed to account for attraction and repulsion and self-sustenance of all that exists in the material plane. Consciousness stands alone and supreme in its own sphere. The combination of the two makes for the emergence of physical, ethical and religious activities and their progression to the maximum limit. We have already alluded to the far-reaching influence of Sāṅkhya on the development of philosophical, religious and cosmological speculations in India. Its influence is not only operative in orthodox thought but also discernible in the Buddhist and Jaina schools. The Jaina believes, with slight modifications in the Sāṅkhya theory of causation. The Jaina contention that the effect is both identical with and different from the cause is only a reiteration of the Sāṅkhya theory. The simultaneous identity and difference of the effect is also expressly asserted in the *Yogabhāṣya*[1]. The Sāṅkhya theory of causation does not endorse the absolute identity of the cause and the effect as is supposed by a superficial student of Sāṅkhya. The identity and continuance of the causal stuff in the effect is maintained by the Sāṅkhya, but the aspect of difference is not brushed aside. Whether this difference entailed by change of the cause into the effect is qualitative or functional, the change is indubious. There is a difference in the change and this difference is not considered incompatible with identity. In this interpretation of the causal relation, the Sāṅkhya and the Jaina are at one. In the ethical plane, Sāṅkhya again is an advocate of unqualified *ahiṃsā*. The sacrifice of animals is not immune from the evil consequences in spite of its sanction in the scripture as an expedient to a higher and better order of existence. Sacrifices are not denied their efficacy, but the life of happiness to be attained by it is qualified by a quantity of suffering due to injury to living

[1] *Yogabhāṣya* and *Yogasūtra*, III, 13.

I ekāntatānabhyupagamāt

II etena mṛtpiṇḍādyavasthāsu kāryāṇām
ghaṭādīnām anāgatānām sattvaṃ veditavyam,

beings. This unqualified advocacy of *ahiṃsā* seems to have exercised pronounced influence on Jaina and Buddhist thought.

THE VEDĀNTIST'S REACTION TO SĀṄKHYA SPECULATION

After all that is said and done, the dualistic ontology of Sāṅkhya did not and could not satisfy the philosophical conscience of subsequent thinkers. It is quite likely that dualistic Sāṅkhya speculation developed independently and was not affected by the monistic speculations found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*. There seems to exist no plausible ground for supposing Sāṅkhya thought to be antecedent to these Upaniṣads. In later Upaniṣads we find distinct mention of Sāṅkhya concepts and categories; so also in the *Bhagavadgītā*. But the dualism of Sāṅkhya is found in the latter to be superseded by a monistic interpretation and *Prakṛti* is made subordinate to one supreme spirit called *Brahman*. It is again doubtful whether the original Sāṅkhya thought was dualistic or monistic, atheistic or theistic in its character. Dr S. N. Dasgupta promulgated his theory that theistic Sāṅkhya was the original doctrine. Dr Animā Senguptā has followed out this line of thought in her recent work. As a matter of fact we find both theistic and atheistic trends in Sāṅkhya thought as represented in the *Mahābhārata*. In support of the theistic contention it may be pointed out that Sāṅkhya would not have received the encomiums bestowed on it in the *Gītā*, had it been atheistic in its fundamental standpoint. However that may be, the Sāṅkhya doctrine of dualism endorsing two coequal ontological principles standing in sharp opposition to each other provoked spirited opposition from the advocates of Upaniṣadic monism, of whom Śaṅkarācārya was the paragon and chief protagonist. The striking feature of monistic thought is found in its denunciation of change and the relegation of matter to a subordinate position. The *Prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya with all its evolutionary stages is not repudiated in toto, but is made a subordinate and subservient instrument in the hands of God. God *quâ* the Absolute *Brahman* is impersonal who behaves as a personality in association with *Prakṛti*, which is now conceived to be the power and energy of God. Imprimis the Sāṅkhya belief in two infinite reals existing side by side fails to take note of the logical difficulty that belief in two infinites is tantamount to the degradation of each to finitude, as each will function as the limit of the other. Though *Prakṛti* is not limited by space and time which are rather its subsequent evolutes, it cannot be thought to be infinite if there is another real, viz., *puruṣa*, the conscious spirit existing alongside of it. Secondly, the belief in two infinites is as anomalous as the belief in two *bests*. The *best* must be one and so also the infinite. There is another overwhelming objection to the dualism of Sāṅkhya that it cannot give a rational explanation of the interaction of two infinites and their influence on one another. Thirdly, the theory of superimposition of matter and its changes on the unrelated *puruṣa* (spirit) is asserted to be an act of illusion. This illusory nature of the influence of matter upon spirit and vice versa paved the way for the doctrine of *māyā*. The cosmic order with all its apparent grandeur and beauty is affirmed to be derived from an act of transcendent illusion which is the heel of Achilles in Sāṅkhya thought. The monistic philosophers of the school of Śaṅkara, who called themselves non-dualists to emphasize their opposition to Sāṅkhya dualism, made their assault on these vulnerable points of Sāṅkhya. The Vedāntist's critique of Sāṅkhya ontology relentlessly exposes the weak points of Sāṅkhya thought and urges that the Upaniṣadic proposition *ekamevādvitīyaṁ* (the one alone and without a second is the ultimate reality) delivers the ultimate truth.

Futher, the doctrine of plurality of souls sponsored by Sāṅkhya is regarded by the Vedāntists as an uncritical dogma. It derives from a confusion of the empirical subject with the transcendental self (*puruṣa*). The Vedāntist also believes in the plurality of individual subjects (*jīvas*), but the plurality is only apparent. It is one Absolute which masquerades as a plurality of subjects in and through the medium of nescience.

Prakṛti is equated by Vedānta with objective nescience. Like the Sāṅkhya concept of *prakṛti* the original nescience is believed to be one ontological principle, though its divisions are as infinite as the adjuncts of individual subjects (*jīvas*). The arguments given in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*[1] in support of the doctrine of plurality of selves are inconclusive, since all the grounds of inference only belong to empirical subjects and are absolutely inapplicable and irrelevant to the pure self. The argument that there are as many selves as are subject to birth and death at different times and places and have different organs is a case of non-sequitur. Pure self is not subject to birth or death and the organs do not belong to him. So also the rest of the arguments. Sāṅkhya asserts that each self is transcendent pure consciousness of which spatio-temporal limitations are unpredicable. The self in one word is eternal and infinite. The plurality of infinites spells self-contradiction. If there be two infinites, each will set a limit to the other. Besides, numerical difference can be established only on the basis of opposition of attributes and functions, as has been observed by Dharmakīrti. It is the possession of contradictorily opposed attributes which spells numerical difference, and the difference of attribute is due to difference of causes[2]. Let us see if this dictum is applicable in the present case. All the *puruṣas* are infinite pure consciousness, unamenable to change, and imperishable entities. Infinitude negates spatio-temporal limitation. Now there is no difference between one self (*puruṣa*) and another in respect of these attributes. Accordingly there is no logical ground for inference as numerical difference. Further, the attributes being eternal and constitutive of the very essence cannot be said to derive their difference from different causes. Again the difference of one empirical subject from another is determined by different egoity and different psycho-physical apparatus. But the pure self of the Sāṅkhya is not an ego. It thus turns out on examination that there is not an infinitesimal shred of evidence of the numerical difference of self. It is a traditional dogma which is endorsed in deference to empirical considerations, which are however entirely irrelevant to the pure self, as conceived by the Sāṅkhya himself.

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[1] Janma-maraṇa-karaṇānāṃ pratiniyamād ayugapat-pravṛtteś ca. puruṣabahutvaṃ traiguṇya-viparyayāc caiva-*Sāṅkhyakārikā*-18.

[2] sa eva hi bhedo bhedahetuś ca yad-viruddha-dharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca.

We have already called attention to the anomaly created by the postulation of the independent infinites with diametrically opposite characters without any direct interaction. All causation is accredited to *prakṛti* which is a dynamic principle constantly changing and yet maintaining its identity. Consciousness as an ontological principle is impervious to change. Activity on the part of consciousness is only a misnomer. Change and activity involve a qualitative variation and if consciousness were susceptible to change, it might as well mutate into an unconscious entity. That would involve the consequence that consciousness would cease to be what it is and cease to exercise its characteristic function, that is to say, to illuminate the different changes which occur in the unconscious mind. Consciousness liable to change into unconsciousness would not be inherently distinct from brute matter. Again an unconscious entity cannot be supposed to develop consciousness—the two being antipodally opposed to each other. The Sāṅkhya was aware of this problem and therefore put down consciousness as a separate category. The mind, for instance, is a translucent material evolute which is in constant flux, changing from one state to another without interruption. These mental states are always lighted up by consciousness. This process of illumination is explained by Sāṅkhya by the theory of reflection of consciousness and because of its translucence catches the reflection of consciousness and becomes self-conscious as it were. But the resulting illumination is only vicarious. The mind or the mental state shines in the horrowed light, since all illumination belongs to consciousness. Even the light of the sun cannot illumine itself unless it is known and owned up by a conscious subject. If the conscious self (*puruṣa*) were liable to change, the process of illumination would be at best fitful and precarious. This is the fundamental position of the Upaniṣads. Whatever shines and reveals itself does so by the light of the self.[1]

Matter *quâ* intelligence (*buddhi*) is thus made self-conscious by means of a *tertium quid, viz.* reflection. This reflection is supposed to do duty for original consciousness, and is at best a superimposition and unreal appearance. The relation of consciousness and matter cannot be real and this is tacitly admitted by the Sāṅkhya. It is a case of transcendental illusion, normally unrealized, when the knowing subject is under the spell of ignorance. The self appears to be in bondage which comes to an end when by a process of moral and spiritual discipline, the subject comes to realize the innate difference and distinction of matter and spirit (*vivekakhyāti*). This theory of Sāṅkhya is endorsed in toto by the Vedāntist who however pushes this process to its logical conclusion. Not only the relation of consciousness and matter is an illusion, but matter itself is made of the same stuff. Matter cannot be an independent reality, nor can it lay claim to ultimacy. The existence of matter is undoubtedly an empirically felt fact, and its existential status cannot be brushed aside. It is an experienced fact. But experience contradicted by reason cannot be erected into valid evidence. Matter is made of the same stuff as its products are. The doctrine of causation which amounts to the admission of identity-cum-difference suffers from an inescapable logical defect. The effect cannot be absolutely identical with the cause because that will make the causal operation utterly abortive. If the effect were previously existent, there would be no point in trying to bring it to existence again. Causation implies the coming into existence of an effect which was not in previous existence. Bringing into existence an existent effect will imply double existence which is pure and simple nonsense. But the effect also cannot be believed to have been an utter nonentity inasmuch as a nonentity cannot be made an entity by any amount of effort. The relation of cause and effect is thus found to be neither a case of pure identity nor non-identity, and there is no third term in between. It is thus logically indeterminate. It must be in other words an unreal appearance. The Sāṅkhya's postulation of logical indeterminacy which is also the position of the Jaina philosopher is in flagrant contradiction with a fundamental law of thought. A thing can be real or unreal, existent or non-existent, but cannot be supposed to be both or neither. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the law of indeterminacy (*anekāntavāda*). Unless we throttle or guillotine our logical conscience this explanation cannot pass muster.

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[1] I. tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvaṃ
tasya bhāsā sarvam idaṃ vibhāti.—*Kaṭhopaniṣat*, II. 2. 15.
II. sadā jñātāś cittavṛttayas tatprabhoḥ puruṣasyā' pariṇāmitvāt—*Yogasūtra*, IV 18.
III. vivekakhyātir aviplavā hānopayaḥ
Op. cit., II, 26.

Furthermore, change is made by Sāṅkhya the cardinal nature of matter or not-self. But the concept of change is found on analysis to rest on a facile confusion of thought. Change connotes, as the Jainas have defined it, origination, cessation and identity. In other words, a thing ceases to be what it was, comes to be what it was not and yet remains the same. Cessation and coming into existence are logically incompatible with identity or continuity. To put it in sober unmetaphorical language, change transpires to be an appearance. An average man uninitiated in the intricacies of logical thought accepts it as real. Because of natural indolence and intellectual inertia, he is unwilling to put it to logical tests. The logical impossibility of change and causation thus convicts matter of unreality.

The Vedāntist examines matter, that is, not-self from various angles of view and finds it riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies, and accordingly dubs it as an appearance. It is at any event not an ultimate reality. Matter is there, and though its claim to ultimate truth cannot commend itself, it cannot be relegated to the rank of an ordinary illusion. It has empirical reality with its own laws and methods. It has pragmatic consequences of vital importance. Ethics, religion, science and all departments of knowledge are made possible by the existence and opposition of not-self. Circumstanced as we are, we have to reckon with it. The fact that we are not perfect and that the conditions of the world are not an ideal state of being is an undeniable proposition. The very fact that we can change it is a pointer to the proposition 'it is not an ultimate fact'. But the world cannot be made perfect or transformed into the Kingdom of Heaven unless it is radically changed. This radical change means, according to Vedānta, the reign of the spirit in which matter will cease to function. The self according to Vedānta is inherently perfect. It is perfect consciousness because it is infinite. It is perfect knowledge because there is no tinge of ignorance to discolour it. It is perfect being, because there is nothing to limit its existence. It is self-subsistent (*sve mahimni pratiṣṭhitaḥ*) and does not depend on any other extraneous condition, because there is none. It is bliss, perfect and complete, because it is absolutely free. Bliss is the necessary concomitant of freedom. This self is one and the appearance of many selves is only an illusion. The fact that a man loves himself and seeks to maintain his existence in spite of the horrors of disease, decay, and death is the evidence of the truth that the self is blissfulness. This conclusion of the Upaniṣads has been reinforced by Śankarācārya and his loyal followers and adhrents by means of powerful logic. Furthermore, the unbroken succession of saints and holy persons who have realized the truth by their transcendental self-realization has made its claims irresistible and unrepudiable. The Upaniṣadic truth of the identity of the individual with the absolute does not entail what is regarded as an ontological fallacy, viz. acosmism. The cosmos is real because it is shot through and through by the Absolute *Brahman*. The opposition of natural forces and wills, emotional frustrations and playing at cross purposes, the feuds and jealousies which now mar the peace and amity of the nations of the world must needs be a passing phase. These evils are the outcome of ignorance of the intrinsic reality of the true self. In spite of the cloudy side of life, there is a redeeming feature in that sane and sober persons who can take a balanced view of men and things have not lost their faith in the innate goodness of man. Wickedness, falsehood, treachery, fraud and malice are symptoms of spiritual malaise and insanity. These evil tendencies are aberrations from truth and are ultimately self-stultifying and and self-destructive. The sway of evil derives its strength from man's self-forgetfulness. They cannot give happiness even to the victor because he is held in bondage by these evil forces. It is only the free man who is happy. That man is free who is not afraid of his enemies and who does not seek happiness in external things. The free man is always self-possessed and is never swayed by passions of self-love or hatred of others. He finds his self in all, and therefore is beyond the range of these moral and spiritual aberrations.

WAR AND AHIṂSĀ

In the *Bhagvadgītā* Arjuna is exhorted by the Lord to regain his spiritual freedom by abjuring the emotion of weakness born of ignorance. It appears anomalous that Arjuna is exhorted to fight his enemies. But his fight is not motivated by desire for self-glorification or greed for others' possessions. The reign of wickedness had to be ended and as this could not be achieved without killing persons who were blinded by evil tendencies and ignoble passions, it was regarded as a righteous war. Wickedness is not found *in abstracto.* It manifests itself and operates in and through individual creatures. And punishment involving death, if unavoidable, serves to help him in getting rid of these evil propensities. Of course, moral persuasion is to be preferred to physical punishment. But when a man is infatuated with power and ignoble self-love, moral sermons fall as damp squibs. Duryodhana is a typical instance. Extreme diseases, mental, moral or physical, demand extreme remedies. Death of the body is not a bad event if it proves to be a means to self-improvement. Besides, wickedness unchecked has the tendency to run to the extreme limit. It inflicts insufferable misery upon nations and thus blocks their progress, intellectual and moral. War cannot be outlawed until all the peoples of the world realize the fatuity and futility of self-aggrandizement at the cost of others. When this consummation will be reached, education will solve all the problems. *Ahiṃsā* is the noblest principle and embodies the highest moral excellence. But it is not confined to the physical plane. *Hiṃsā* (injury and violence) stems from moral weakness, turbid understanding and distorted self-love. Unless the sources are extinguished, outward *ahiṃsā* will only be a fetish. Sometimes infliction of death may be an act of supreme kindness. When all means of persuasion fail to prevent a person from the pursuit of wickedness which spells self-degradation and self-abasement, the career of wickedness can be arrested either by lifelong incarceration or death which are equally preventive. After all, the purpose and justification of life lie in the possibility of opportunities for self-elevation and self-purification.[1] When a man's life becomes the source of his moral downfall and spiritual degradation, it will be better for him to be rid of it. This is the determining principle of *saṃlekhanā*,[2] a form of religious suicide by starvation, prescribed in Jaina canon. Vedānta in its practical application takes cognizance of this truth in spite of its unsavoury appearance.

Vedānta is a philosophy of idealism *in excelsis*. But it does not despise the world. It is aware of the truth that man is imperfect and is under the sway of moral and intellectual infirmities. It again believes that these limitations are not ineradicable realities. They can be overcome and overpowered and vanqnished, because they are unreal appearances. This requires moral discipline and also social and legal sanctions. Vedānta is full of love for weak creatures and is solicitous of their salvation. But emancipation from the evil forces entails a laborious process which is punctuated with pain and also delight. The pain is apparent and the bondage is only provisional, however long its lease of life may appear. As the science of medicine prescribes surgical operation, Vedānta likewise lays down rules of discipline, deviation from which is stalled by punishment.

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[1] "Taportham āyuḥ"–*Mālatimādhava*, I, verse 5.

[2] Māraṇāntikīṃ Saṃlekhanāṃ Yoṣitā–*Tattvārthasūtra*, VII,17.

VEDĀNTIC ETHICS COMPARED WITH BUDDHIST AND JAINA ETHICAL CODES

In ethics, Vedānta is at one with Buddhism and Jainism. It is only superficial knowledge of the Vedic religion and ignorance of its innermost implication, which are responsible for the facile condemnation of Vedic morality. In spite of contrary appearances, Vedānta both theoretical and practical, is unfaltering in its advocacy of *ahiṃsā* (non-injury) and universal love and compassion. The Buddha only preaches the supreme values which are advocated in the Upaniṣads, Mahāvīra's exaltation of *ahiṃsā* does not posit an antithesis to it. It will be a happy day when the entire creation abjures violence and injury and follows the path of peaceful living. But it will never reflect credit on human intelligence if it ignores the ruling facts of life. In the animal world weaker creatures are killed by stronger ones in order to procure food. It is only in civilized and cultured communities of human beings, these exalted ethical ideas have been preached and lived upto in progressive degrees. Vedānta declares the unity of all souls, and love in the social plane is the necessary concomitant of it. The enlightened man loves entire mankind and even brutes and birds because he finds in them his own identity. But the unenlightened man is swayed by unreason and is ruled by laws of animal life. He is to be rescued and uplifted from the animal plane and it cannot be gainsaid that it is fear of punishment which serves to arrest his spiritual degradation. The Buddha did not refrain from infliction of mental pain caused by ostracism and expulsion from the order. So also does the Jaina canon advocate various sanctions and penalties for the offending monks and laymen. The philosophy of punishment has a double motive. It deters the spread of lawlessness by the segregation of incorrigible lawbreakers, and seeks thereby to produce a healthy reaction in the offender.

The *Bhagavadgītā* declares the supreme efficacy of the moral virtues of love and non-injury and also asserts the necessity of various sorts of penalties up to war for the restraint and correction of delinquents. We are persuaded that there is no logical inconsistency between them.

CRITERION OF REALITY AS PROPOUNDED BY ŚANKARĀCĀRYA

While commenting on the verse[1] of the *Bhagavadgītā* which lays down the proposition "An unreal can never become real and the real can never become unreal, and this is the truth which has been discovered by the seers of old", *Śaṅkarācārya* propounds the criterion of reality and unreality as follows. What is real and what is not, can be determined only by the light of reason and understanding. Now experience is the evidence of the real. But uncontradicted experience alone can be relied upon as a proof of reality. The object of illusion, e.g. the snake in the rope or silver in the mother-of-pearl, is asserted to be unreal because the experience of silver is contradicted by the experience of mother-of-pearl. Our knowledge of silver does not continue and is superseded by that of the mother-of-pearl. The latter experience is regarded as proof of the reality of mother-of-pearl because the object of experience continues uncontradicted. Taking the cue from this finding, Śaṅkarācārya observes that the object of experience which persists and which is not superseded by another should be counted as real; and that which is supplanted by another object must be set down as unreal appearance. Now applying this criterion to putative normal experience, it transpires that in every experience there is a constant element coupled with a variable one. The knowledge of the chair is found to be superseded by that of the table and this is typical of all experiences. The objects are found to be inconstant and superseded by others. Relatively speaking, the mother-of-pearl is regarded as real and not the silver because the former is more persistent than the latter.

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[1] *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 16.

But though relative persistence holds good in ordinary experience as criterion of reality, it has only a provisional validity. We observe an infinite multiplicity of objects—one succeeding and ousting the predecessor, and there is no finality in the process. But there is one constant element in every experience. We observe the table as an existent; so also with regard to other objects such as the chair, pen, tree etc.

Every object experienced is known to be an existent fact. The element of existence is the inalienable adjective of all the varying objects. There is no experience of a fact which is not qualified by existence. It is the only constant factor which is never found to be supplanted. Though the chair is superseded by the table in course of our experience, the adjectival element of existence is the unvariant factor. Variability and supersession is the criterion of the unreal. In consequence, though the phenomenal objects envisaged in experience are found to be liable to supersession, existence is not. There can be no knowledge of which existence is not the ineluctable content and referend. One can deny the reality of one object after another, but existence is unamenable to negation. The negative judgement may however be regarded as a case of exception. When one asserts "The tiger is not here" it may be contended that there is no reference to existence. Obviously existence is not the determining adjective of the tiger. But this is because the tiger does not appear to consciousness and so it fails to affiliate existence as its qualifying determination. But this negative judgment is at bottom also an existential judgment inasmuch as negation is not intelligible without reference to a positive background. The negation of tiger is equivalent to the affirmation of the empty locus. It follows therefore that whatever may be liable to supersession and denial, existence is the undeniable referend and so its reality is not liable to be impunged under any circumstance.

EXISTENCE IDENTICAL WITH CONSCIOUSNESS AND BLISS

"Reality is Existence" and "Existence is Reality". The two propositions are convertible. But this existence is not a brute fact. It must be consciousness. If existence were other than consciousness and an object of it, it will be insentient appearance. There is no proof of unconscious insentient matter save and except by consciousness of it.[1] The relation of subject and object, consciousness and content, object and awareness is logically indeterminable. The object does not stand in the relation of identity or of difference. On the former alternative, the object will be one with consciousness and become the knower and not known. The latter alternative will raise insuperable logical difficulties. Difference cannot be the determining relation of the object to consciousness. That will obliterate the distinction between the known and the unknown. If the known were different as much as the unknown from consciousness, the known will have no determination. So difference must be abandoned as a relation between the two. And as identity, and difference connoting non-identity embrace the whole universe between them, a third alternative is impossible. Thus the relation of subject and object is only an illusory relation. Accordingly objectivity (*Viṣayatā*) transpires to be the criterion of unreal appearance. If existence be an object other than consciousness, it must be set down as unreal appearance. But we have found that the reality of existence cannot be liable to denial. So existence and consciousness must be one identity.

This result is arrived at when the problem is viewed also from the side of consciousness. Can consciousness be other than existence ? The very question is self-contradictory. Consciousness other than existence would be a non-existent fiction, which is an impossible idea. Applying the criterion of supersession and denial we find that consciousness invariably and *eo ipso* eludes negation. The denial of consciousness reduces to assertion of it since the denial must be self-conscious. So the negation of consciousness turns out to be a case of blatant self-contradiction. The ultimate reality must therefore be set down as a monistic principle which comprises existence and consciousness as inalienable elements. The two in fact are one impartible real. As regards the element of bliss (*ānanda*) which has been laid down as the character of reality in the Upaniṣads, we have already noted that bliss is the invariable and inescapable concomitant of infinitude and freedom. There is no limit conceivable to the concept of existence-cum-consciousness because everything that can lay claim to existence is engulfed in its orbit. The ultimate reality is therefore existence, consciousness and bliss rolled into one. The inevitable limitations of conceptual thought and human language make it necessary to characterize the ultimate truth by three concepts, which are however grounded in one indivisible real and as such must be one ontological principle.

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[1] Yathā ca sadbheda aupādhikaḥ evam sajjñānandabhedo'pi sattvarahitajñānānandayoḥ śūnyatvaprasaṁgād bodhātmatvarahitasataśca bhānābhāvpras'amgād dṛśyatve kalpitatvena sattvāyogāt sadbodhātmaka-sākṣiṇaśca parapremāspadatvenāndasvābhāvyāvagamāditi.

the *Kalpataru ed.* Br. Ṡu I. I. 2.

VEDĀNTA VERSUS BUDDHISM

Now, our dissertation will remain incomplete unless we refer to the opposition by the Buddhist schools of philosophy. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and their followers have made causal efficiency the criterion of reality and by their dialectics have sought to prove that all existents are momentary. Causal efficiency is actually exercised in time and efficiency invariably involves the production of the effect. It is the causally efficient which is supposed to be real, and the Buddhist does not believe in potential efficiency which is tantamount to efficiency held in abeyance. It is unthinkable that efficiency will not result in actual production. If the seed in the granary does not produce the sprout, it shows that it does not possess the causal efficiency for it. The efficient seed must be different from the inefficient one. The two are numerically different in spite of similarity of appearance. The similar is not the same. Each entity therefore is brought into being by the preceding entity which is its cause and perishes in the immediately succeeding moment by producing the result. It does not persist after production of the result, because its causal efficiency is exhausted by production of the effect which is its *raison d' etre.* The curious reader may satisfy himself by following the course of the dialectic pursued by the fluxist, which has been treated at length by me in the *Buddhist philosophy of Universal Flux.*

A CRITIQUE OF CAUSALITY

The advocate of momentariness starts with certain assumptions and postulates. The first assumption is that causal efficiency is the criterion of reality. But it is legitimate to pose the question "Is causal efficiency real or not? If real, what is its criterion?" It cannot be causal efficiency itself. Even unreal illusory experiences have causal efficiency. The illusory snake inspires fear and the actions resulting from it. The person suffering from the illusion either runs away or goes forward with a stick to kill it. So causal efficiency cannot be made the criterion of reality. Furthermore, causality itself is an intractable concept. It derives from an unjustifiable belief. The relation of cause and effect cannot be one of identity as seems to be the putative position of the Sāṅkhya. The relation cannot be determinate and definite if logically considered. As has been pointed out by Candrakīrti[1], if an effect absolutely different from the cause can be produced by the latter, it is not understandable why it should not produce any other effect equally different from it. Besides, the identity of cause and effect would make the cause productive of itself which is a contradiction in terms. Causality *ex hypothesi* is a relation between two facts. To make the cause the same thing as the effect or vice versa will amount to the repudiation of causality. Nāgārjuna has subjected it to an elaborate criticism and comes to the finding that causality is an appearance, and whatever is explained in terms of causality must give appearance and not reality. The Sautrāntika theory of momentariness of things and the assertion that all existents are particulars having no nexus between them topples down with the collapse of the fundamental basis *viz.* causality.

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[1] anyat pratītya yadi nāma paro' bhaviṣyaj, jāyeta
tarhi śikhino bahulo'ndhakāraḥ

—Prasannapadā, ad. M K., I'I.

Nāgārjuna has subjected all the concepts and catagories of the realistic and idealistic philosophers to relentless criticism and shows that they are vitiated by inherent antinomies. He comes to the conclusion that there is no reality behind and beyond the world of appearance. Though Nāgārjuna's ultimate philosophical position has been interpreted in positive terms by some respectable scholars, we are persuaded to believe on the evidence of his texts and those of his faithful exponent Candrakīrti that Nāgārjuna is a pure negativist. Whatever may be the position of Nāgārjuna, the historical truth of negativism (*śūnyavāda*) as a philosophical doctrine is not susceptible of denial. It is this negativism which is criticized by Asaṅga and Śaṅkarācārya and their followers.

Nāgārjuna has demonstrated the relativity of all concepts and categories, and relativity according to him connotes the lack of intrinsic reality. Nāgārjuna asserts that reality must be one which is intrinsically existent and cannot abrogate its existence under any circumstance. In other words, reality must be absolute and unconditional. He however shows that all phenomena are causally determined and the succeeding phenomenon depends on the antecedent for its existence. In other words, the existence of a phenomenon is borrowed and derivative. There is no positive entity found in experience or envisaged in thought which is free from the sway of the causal law. Whatever is caused is dependent on the cause. The cause also being in its turn determined by the antecedent condition is wanting in existence in its own right. Nāgārjuna deduces the corollary that all existents are intrinsically unreal and the appearance of reality is purely illusory.

The latest exponent of negativism seems to be Prajñākaramati the author of the *Pañjikā* on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva. He examines the thesis of the idealists that consciousness is the ultimate reality, though the objects are not. The idealist agrees with Nāgārjuna so far as the objective world is concerned. But he joins issue on the question of consciousness. Prajñākaramati takes up this contention of the idealist and shows that consciousness is always relative to a content. There must be something of which one can be conscious.[1] The Buddhist idealist, particularly Dharmakīrti, contends that the object has no extramental status because it is perceived together with consciousness. Consciousness and content are known together and simultaneously. This shows that there must be an inalienable relation between them. This necessary concomitance of consciousness and content can be explained only on the basis of essential identity. According to Dharmakīrti, causality and essential identity are the determinants of necessary universal concomitance.[2] The effect is necessarily bound up with the cause at the inceptive stage because the latter is responsible for its existence. But it is not necessary that the effect should be bound up with its cause throughout its career. There is no intrinsic relation between the carpenter and the chair which is made by him except at the moment of its production. The relation of consciousness and content on the other hand is necessary from both sides. Neither can exist without the other. They must sink or swim together. Causality cannot account for this bilateral necessity of relation. The basic relation between them must therefore be identity. In spite of the apparent difference of the content from its awareness, they are not two facts, but one fact apparently undergoing bifurcation. Dharmakīrti deduces from this the finding that the content is only a false appearance and consciousness is the only reality.[3] Prajñākaramati regards this conclusion as unwarranted. He accepts the premiss that consciousness and

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1. *Op. cit, pp. 389 ff.*
2. Kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād
   vā niyāmakāt, Avinābhāvaniyamaḥ–*Pramāṇavārtika, Svārthānumāna*, Verse 33.
3. Sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ.

content are identical as they are necessarily felt together. But he contests the conclusion of the idealist that consciousness is real while its content is unreal appearance, which, he asserts, does not follow from the premisses. If the content is unreal, consciousness, being identical with it, must also be unreal. One identical fact cannot be real in one aspect and unreal in another, when the two aspects are identical. As regards the contention of the idealist that pure consciousness is independent of a content and is bereft of objective reference, Prajñākaramati calls in question the validity of the plea. There is no proof of pure contentless consciousness. So consciousness cannot be the ultimate reality. स्वयं प्रकाश, ज्ञानस्वरूप चैतन्य इसका प्रमाण हो सकता है

VEDĀNTIC CRITICISM OF BUDDHIST NEGATIVISM

Monistic Vedānta takes up this challenge of the Negativist. Consciousness is transcendent according to him and its relation with an external object is only accidental and apparent. The relation of consciousness and its content or object cannot be one of pure identity, since the felt difference cannot be brushed aside. The felt togetherness may point to a necessary relation and the latter is found on the evidence of experience to partake of identity and difference both. The combination of these two opposed characters shows that it is not a real fact but an illusory appearance. Accordingly, the deduction of the reality of consciousness and the unreality of the content by Dharmakīrti is a plain case of non-sequitur. The reality of consciousness as opposed to its contents is however deducible from the criterion of reality formulated by Śaṅkarācārya. The contents are all variable and inconstant appendages, whereas consciousness is the unvariant element in all experiences. The contents can be successfully denied without entailing any logical absurdity. But consciousness defies denial. Denial itself is a form of consciousness, or, to be precise, is attested by it. The attesting consciousness does not lend itself to denial, because it makes denial possible. So consciousness and content cannot be placed on the same footing. Consciousness is one identical unvariant principle and the ultimate datum of all knowledge. It is the ultimate reality and we have already adduced indefeasible arguments in support of this position.

We now propose to examine the thesis of momentary consciousness, maintained by the Vijñanavādins of the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The proof of momentariness is supposed to be furnished by causal efficiency believed to be the essential character of a real. We have found that the argument based on causal efficiency is extremely weak and has very little cogency. As regards the plea that consciousness must vary with its contents and as such must be a series of momentary units, it also does not seem to be possessed of substantial value. The contents are many and variable. But that has little bearing upon the internal nature of consciousness. We have already found that the relation of consciousness and content is not an intrinsic necessary nexus, but a loose juxtaposition. The contents are found to be unreal superimposition because they fail to satisfy the criterion of reality. The thesis of the negativist and that of the Buddhist subjectivist are based on partial appraisal of data and as such are bound to be fallacious and misleading.

It is comforting to note that the subjective pluralism sponsored by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is not endorsed by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. These two representative thinkers believe that consciousness is one unchanging eternal principle existing in the different centres of subjectivity. Each individual subject is a partial manifestation of the ultimate reality, which is distorted by ignorance and the concomitant passions and impulses. Each individual is the Buddha in essence and in *posse.* It is the one eternal principle which is struggling for manifestation in each centre. The ultimate reality called *dharmakāya* is the one transcendent consciousness, infinite in its blissful existence. The appearance of misery and finitude is bound to vanish in the ultimate stage of perfection which is its inalienable character. There is striking similarity between the Upaniṣadic *Brahman* and the Buddhist *Dharmakāya* in all important characteristics barring the terminological difference. *Nirvāṇa* is the attainment of the intrinsic perfection which realizes itself on the disappearance of the mass of impurities superinduced upon it by nescience. Gauḍapāda was acquainted with this philosophical position and had no scruple to identify the Buddha with the Absolute *Brahman*, which is declared in the Upaniṣads to be the only ultimate Reality and Truth. He made an appeal to the Buddhists to shed their parochial outlook and make common cause with Vedānta. It seems warranted to surmise that the advocacy of pluralistic consciousness-centres and the resolution of each into an infinite series of particular consciousness-moments by the latterday Vijñānavāda school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is only a reaction against the possibility of merger of Buddhism with Upaniṣadic Vedānta. It is a matter of profound disappointment that the reactionary spirit ultimately prevailed and shoved aside the monistic idealism of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. It is again remarkable that Śaṁkarācārya criticised this pluralistic idealism of the Buddhists as rank subjectivism, but he has not a word of complaint against the monistic idealism sponsored by the school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. There is a brood hint in Śāṅkaracārya's criticism of *Vijñānavāda* that the acceptance of the monistic *vijñānavāda* would end all dispute between orthodox *Vedānta* and Buddhism.[1] Unfortunately Asaṅga's works fell into oblivion and Dignāga's pluralism assumed paramountcy in Buddbist thought. The Buddhist idealism as interpreted by Dr Suzuki seems to be a reinstatement of Asaṅga's philosophy which is identical with monistic Vedānta.

VEDĀNTA WEDDED TO THE BUDDHISTIC ETHICS

It is surprising that the supreme ideal of the *Bodhisattva* and his cult of universal love and compassion were not sought to be affiliated to an adequate metaphysic. It is Vedānta and the monistic idealism of Asaṅga which can give a rational justification of the altruistic ethics of universal love. The *Bodhisattva* feels that his emancipation from bondage will remain

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1. Brahmasūtrā-bhāṣya ad II, 2.

incomplete and partial if all suffering creatures are not rescued from the morass of degradation brought about by blinding nescience. Vedānta also teaches this very truth. The philosophy of love propounded in the dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Upaniṣad propounds the truth that all love is directed to the Self which is one in all beings. When the wife loves the husband and the husband loves the wife, it is owing to the unconscious realization of the identity of the Self in each other. There are indications of universal love and friendship in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Gītā.* But the supreme ethics of the *Bodhisattva* cult gives out a pronounced picture of the unity of Being. Vedānta wedded to the ethic of the *Bodhisattva* cult will be the inspiring philosophy of mankind, which with its solicitude for the weak and the wretched creatures will solve all problems, theoretical and practical. We find this consummation in the philosophy of life lived and taught by Sri Rāmakrishṇa and preached by Swāmī Vivekānanda and herein Vedānta and Buddhism are fused in a living organic pattern, and become philosophy and cult at one.

SARVĀSTIVĀDA

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SARVĀSTIVĀDA

I. THE MEANING OF *Sarvam Asti*

1. The Sarvāstivādins are so called because they uphold the doctrine of *sarvam asti*, that is, 'all exists'.[1] The other appellation they are associated with is Vaibhāṣika, that is, those who stand by the *Vibhāṣā* (Commentary).[2] The Sarvāstivādins believe that the *dharmas* (elements) exist in essence (*dravyataḥ*) in all times—past, future and present—and consequently they are confronted with the problem of giving a rational exposition of the nature of the *dharmas* associated with the three times. They are also required to explain the nature of change (*pariṇāma*) that takes place when a future *dharma* (element) enters into the past through the present. Vasubandhu records four distinct views of the ancient exponents of the school and also appends an illuminating criticism of each of the views. The discussion is lively throughout and gives a vivid picture of the critical analysis of the doctrine of *sarvam asti.* We shall also examine in the course of our exposition the parallel Sāṃkhya-Yoga conception of change (*pariṇāma*) as recorded in the *Yogabhāṣya* and its point of contact and difference with the Sarvāstivāda doctrine.

2. The problem of the existence of *dharmas* (elements) in all times arises in connection with the origin and continuance of *anuśayas* (seeds of *kleśas* or passions, latent dispositions) in respect of present, past and future objects. The *anuśayas* are

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[1] 'All exists' means 'the *dharmas* (elements) of the three times—past, future and present—exist and are distinguished by means of function, and there are three unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) *dharmas*, viz. *ākāśa*, *pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* and *apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* which are eternal positive facts'. *Cf. Abhidharmadīpa* (verse 301) :

> icchaty adhvatrayaṃ yasmāt kṛtyataś ca dhruvatrayam.
> sarvāstivāda ityuktas tasmād (ādyaś caturvidhaḥ).

Cf. also *AK*, V. 25 c-d : tadastivādāt sarvāstivādā etāś (caturvidhāḥ).

[2] *Cf.* Vibhāṣayā dīvyanti caranti vā Vaibhāṣikāḥ. Vibhāṣāṃ vā vidanti Vaibhāṣikāḥ. ukthādiprakṣepāt ṭhak,—*Sphuṭārthā*, I. 3.

divided into six categories. Of these, the three, viz. *rāga* (attachment), *pratigha* (repulsion) and *māna* (pride) are called specific (*svalakṣaṇa*)[1] because they arise in respect of particular kinds of objects at a particular time; the other three, viz. *dṛṣṭi* (wrong view), *vicikitsā* (doubt) and *avidyā* (ignorance) are called general (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*)[2] because they arise in respect of worldly objects in general.

3. An individual is fettered (*saṁyuta*) by means of his past and present *rāga* (attachment), *pratigha* (repulsion) and *māna* (pride) with the objects (past, present and future) in respect of which those passions (viz. attachment etc.) arose in the past and have not ceased to continue.[3] He is fettered (potentially) by future mental (and not sensuous) *rāga* (attachment), *pratigha* (repulsion) or *māna* (pride) with objects of all times[4] and will be (actually) fettered by future sensuous *rāga* and *pratigha*[5] (provided they are destined to arise) with the objects of the same (*scil.* future) time,[6] because the five sensuous cognitions can cognize only the objects which are contemporaneous with them,[7] while the mental cognitions can cognize objects of all the three times. He is however fettered by the *anuśayas*, sensuous or mental, which are 'destined not to arise

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[1] *Cf.* svalakṣaṇaṃ sukha-vedanīyādi vastu : tatra rāgaḥ sukha-vedanīyam eva vastv ālambyo 'tpadyata iti svalakṣaṇakleśa ity ucyate. tena sukha-vedanīyena vastunā'lambyamāneno' 'nnatir bhavatī 'ti māno 'pi svalakṣaṇa-kleśaḥ. tathā duḥkha-vedanīyaṃ vastv ālambya pratigha utpadyata iti pratigho 'pi svalakṣaṇa-kleśa ity ucyate. *Sphuṭārthā*, V. 23.

[2] *Cf.* dṛṣṭi-vicikitsādayaḥ sāmānyāḥ sāmānyena vā kleśāḥ sāmānya-kleśāḥ. ete hy aviśeṣeṇa sukha-vedanīyādike vastuni utpadyanta iti. atas tad ālambyo 'tpannāḥ sāmānya-kleśā ity ucyante. —*Ibid.*

[3] *AK*, V. 23 : rāgapratighamānaiḥ syād atītapratyupasthitaiḥ.
yatrotpannāprahīṇās te tasmin vastuni saṃyuṭaḥ.

[4] sarvatrānāgatair ebhir mānasaiḥ...... *AK*, V. 24 a-b.

[5] Here *māna* is not included because it is exclusively mental. See *Sphuṭārthā*, V. 24.

[6] svādhvike paraiḥ.—*AK*, V. 24 b.

[7] vartamāna-viṣayatvāt pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānām.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 24.

at any time' with the objects of all the three times.[1] The *anuśayas* which are destined not to actualize at any time will ever remain in the domain of the pure unrealizable future though their objects may arise and enter the domain of past time. Like sun-flower (*suvarcalāvat*), the future *anuśayas* (seeds of passions or latent dispositions) which will not arise at any time have their faces ever turned towards their objects, though the objects, like the sun, may arise, ascend and sink, without being objects of those *anuśayas*. Such *anuśayas* fail to arise, not because their objects do not arise, but because the conditions of their origin are not fulfilled.[2] In other words, there are some latent dispositions which remain unrealized potentialities for ever owing to the lack of the complete assemblage of conditions, though their relevant objects come into being and pass away. The complete assemblage of conditions however, it should be noted, is effective in respect of the change of states (*avasthā*) and not the novel production of essence (*dravya*),[3] which is impossible.

4. As regards the general *anuśayas* (latent dispositions), viz. *dṛṣṭi* (wrong view), *vicikitsā* (doubt) and *avidyā* (ignorance), it is laid down that an individual may be fettered by these *anuśayas* with objects of all the three times.[4]

II. The Testimony of Scripture and Reason

5. The Sautrāntika here raises the question "If the *anuśayas* and their relevant objects—past and future—really exist, it would follow that they are unconditioned eternal entities; how could then these be styled as conditioned (*saṃskṛta*)? Is it not a case of self-contradiction?" But the Vaibhāṣika poses

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[1] ajaiḥ sarvatra......*AK*, V. 24c. *Cf.* also: anutpatti-dharmibhiḥ sarvatra vastuni traiyadhvike saṃyuktaḥ.—*Sphuṭārthā* on it.

[2] na hy ālambanānutpattita eva teṣām anutpattiḥ, kiṃ tarhi pratyaya-vaikalyāt.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 24 c.

[3] avasthā-phalaṃ hi sāmagryaṃ, na dravya-phalam iti siddhāntaḥ.–*Ibid.*

[4] śeṣais tu sarvaiḥ sarvatra saṃyutaḥ.—*AK*, V. 24 c-d.

a counter question "How can an individual be fettered with or get rid of the *anuśayas* which are past and future, if the latter do not really exist ?" He maintains that the elements (*dharmas*) exist in essence (*dravyataḥ*) in all times, and yet they are not unchanging eternal entities, because they move through time, being subject to the four characteristics, viz. origination, decay, continuity and impermanence.[1] Transition through time, that is, change of temporal determination, accounts for their being conditioned (*saṃskṛta*), and continuance of their essence (*dravya*) in time—past, present and future—accounts for their existence in all times. The Vaibhāṣika substantiates his contention by means of arguments based on scripture and reason, which are as follows:

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[1] *Cf.* yasmāt saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇāni jātyādīni saṃskārāṇām artha-(? *adhva-*) sañcārāya pravartante, atas teṣām aśāśvatatvaṃ pratijñāyate. *Sphuṭārthā*, V. 25.

Cf. ye hi dharmāḥ saṃskārāṇām adhvasañcārāya pravṛttāstta eva sūtre lakṣaṇāny uktāni.–*AKB*, II. 45.

Cf. also *Yogabhāṣya, III. 13* : avasthā-pariṇāme kauṭasthya-prasaṅgadoṣah...nā 'sau doṣaḥ, kasmāt, guṇinityatve 'pi guṇānāṃ vimarda-vaicitryāt. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosopher believes in a constant substance (*guṇin*) which undergoes change and provides scope for one mode or quality (*guṇa*) to supersede the other, and thus establishes the possibility of its existence in all times without being unchangingly eternal. The Vaibhāṣika however does not explicitly admit any such unitary substance, and so he has to establish the existence of ever continuing discrete *dharmas*. The *dharmas* of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga can merge into their material cause and provide scope for the arising of other *dharmas* in their place. But this is not possible in the case of the Vaibhāṣika who has to keep the *dharmas* intact through all times and yet to account for their movement through time. This lands him in formidable logical difficulties. He however tries to solve the problem by regarding the *dharmas* as subject to the four characteristics, viz. origination, decay, continuity and impermanence.

An analysis of the concept of eternalness or permanence will not be irrelevant here. There are two categories of permanents—(i) what is constant, invariable and not susceptible to change, that is, *kūṭastha nitya*, like the *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya. (ii) A thing may change its modes and qualities and yet preserve its substantial identity. In its various transitions, gold may be made into a bangle or an ear-ring or a chain, and yet remain gold all the time. The permanents of this category may be characterized as variable constants (*pariṇāmi-nitya*). What the Vaibhāṣikas characterize as *saṃskṛta* (conditioned) belongs to the second category. It should be noted that the Vaibhāṣikas do not believe, like the Sautrāntikas, that an existent can be entirely defunct without leaving a residue (*niranvayavināśin*). The Jaina subscribes to the position of the Vaibhāṣikas. But he does not believe in an unchanging eternal principle like the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

5 (i). Our Master has explicitly (*kaṇṭhataḥ*) stated that an enlightened disciple (*ārya-śrāvaka*) becomes indifferent to the past and future material objects (*rūpa*) because the past and future material objects exist;[1] and the present material objects are too apparent to need any argument. From this assignment of the material objects (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), etc., to different periods of time, it follows that they exist in all the three times. Moreover, the supernormal vision of the *yogins*, which distinguishes past and future events, will be unaccountable, if the past and future events intuited by it were not true facts.[2]

5 (ii). The Master has also said the same thing implicitly in the scripture. He has said that all cognitions are produced by two factors—(1) the object and (2) the sense-organ or mind.[3] The sensuous cognition can cognize only the present objects, while the mental cognition can cognize the past and future objects as well. If the past and the future objects were non-existent, the cognition of them would not be produced by two factors. And this will be a contradiction of the scripture (*āgamavirodha*). The reality of the past and the future elements (*dharmas*) is thus implicitly postulated by the Master.

5 (iii). As a corollary of the preceding argument, it follows that a cognition cannot arise without a real object (*ālambana*). The mental cognition of the past and future objects arise. Therefore, the past and future objects are real.[4] Moreover, if the

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[1] See *Sphuṭārthā*, V. 25. Also see *Majjhima-Nikāya*, II. 188; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, XXII. 11. *TSP*, p. 505.

[2] *Cf. TS*, 1789 c-d: atītānāgate jñānaṃ vibhaktaṃ yogināṃ katham. See also the *Pañjikā*.

[3] See *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, II. 72. Also *TSP*, p. 505: dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānam utpadyata iti bhagavato 'ktam—katamad dvayam, cakṣūrūpāṇi yāvān manodharmā iti.

[4] *AKB*, V. 25 a-b. The *Yogabhāṣya* (IV. 12) also establishes the existence of past and future *dharmas* by a similar argument:

past and future objects were not real, the cognition of them will transpire to be non-cognition, because a cognition, in order to be cognition, must have a specific real as its object.[1]

5 (iv). The past moral or immoral *karmans* (acts), like the present ones, are really existent inasmuch as they, like the latter, become effective at the time of their fruition.[2] If causal efficiency is the criterion of reality, then the past, being as much causally efficient as the present, is as real as the latter. If the past were non-existent, it would not produce any effect. This will be tantamount to the denial of the moral law, as good or bad acts do not produce their effects immediately. So the continuity of these moral and immoral acts must be postulated as the condition of the moral law being effective.[3]

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yadi cai 'tat (trayam, viz. *atīta*, *anāgata* and *vartamāna*) svarūpato nā 'bhaviṣyan ne 'daṃ nirviṣayaṃ jñānam udapatsyata. tasmād atītānāgataṃ svarūpato 'stī 'ti.

[1] *Cf.* *TS*, 1788 a-b : atītājātayor jñānam anyathā 'viṣayaṃ bhavet. The *Pañjikā* (p. 505) on it says : prativastuvijñaptyātmakaṃ vijñānam, asati ca jñeye na kiñcid anena jñeyam ity avijñānam eva syāt.

[2] vidyamāna-svalakṣaṇaṃ śubhāśubham atītaṃ karma, vipaktikāla utpadyamānaphalatvād, vartamānadharmavat.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 25 a-b. *Cf.* also *TS*, 1789 a-b : karmātītaṃ ca niḥsattvaṃ kathaṃ phaladam iṣyate.

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosopher gives a similar argument for the establishment of the existence of future *dharmas*. If the future effects of acts (*karman*) were non-existent, none would do good acts for good effects. Nor can an absolutely non-existent effect come into being. The act, good or bad, is the efficient cause (*nimitta*) only of the appearance of the future effect (which lies latent in its material cause, *upādāna*), and not of its novel production out of nothing. *Cf.* *Yogabhāṣya*, IV. 12 : bhogabhāgīyasya vā 'pavargabhāgīyasya vā karmaṇaḥ phalam utpitsu yadi nirupākhyam iti taduddeśena tena nimittena kuśalānuṣṭhānaṃ na yujyeta. sataś ca phalasya nimittaṃ vartamānīkaraṇe samarthaṃ nā 'pūrvajanane. For the fundamental difference between the Vaibhāṣika and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, however, see footnote 1, § 5 (*supra*).

[3] Vasubandhu states the above four arguments, § 5 (i) to § 5 (iv), as follows :

sarvakālāstitoktatvād
dvayāt sadviṣayāt phalāt.
(tadastivādāt sarvāsti-
vādā etāś caturvidhāḥ).—*AK*, V. 25.

6. The Vaibhāṣika now concludes by differentiating Sarvāstivāda from Vibhajyavāda. The former affirms the existence of the elements (*dharmas*) in their essence in all the three times—past, present and future. The latter believes in the existence of the elements of the present, and only those elements (viz. moral or immoral acts) of the past which have not given their results.[1] It does not believe in the existence of the future elements. The Vaibhāṣika however emphatically asserts the existence of the elements in all the three times. The past and the future events, like the present, are, as shown, assigned to different times in the scripture and also fulfil the logical criterion of a real. Their essential reality therefore cannot be denied.[2] Thus both scripture and reason, the Vaibhāṣika is satisfied, are in support of his position.

7. The Vaibhāṣika however is faced with the problem of change. He has to keep the elements intact and yet to explain

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[1] *Vide AKB*, V. 25 c-d : ye tu kiñcid asti yat pratyutpannam adattaphalaṃ cā 'tītaṃ karma, kiñcin nāsti yad dattaphalam atītānāgatṃ ce'ti vibhajya vadanti te vibhajya-vādinaḥ.

It is interesting to note in this connection that Professor C. D. Broad has propounded a doctrine of the reality of the present and the past which is similar to Vibhajyavāda in some respects. He says: "When an event, which was present becomes past, it does not change or lose any of the relations which it had before ; it simply acquires in addition new relations which it could not have before, because the terms to which it now has these relations were then simply non-entities.

"It will be observed that such a theory as this accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world. The past is thus as real as the present. On the other hand, the essence of a present event is, not that it precedes future events, but that there is quite literally nothing to which it has relation of precedence."—*Scientific Thought* (1952), P. 66.

Cf. *Milindapañha* (Bombay, 1940), p. 52 (§ 34).

Cf. *Abhidharmadīpa* (p. 257), verse 299 :

sarvam asti pradeśo'sti sarvaṃ nā' stī 'ti cā 'paraḥ.
avyākṛtāstivādī'ti catvāro vādinaḥ smṛtāḥ.

Here, as in *AK*, V. 25 c-d, four different schools are recognized.

[2] *Cf.* na dravyāpohaviṣayā atītānāgatās tathā.
adhvasaṃgraharūpādibhāvāder vartamānavat.—*TS*, 1790.

the fact of change. Let us see how he attempts at getting over the difficulty by formulating different theories of change.

III. THE FOUR THEORIES OF CHANGE

8. Four distinct theories of change (*pariṇāma*), sponsored by different teachers of Sarvāstivāda, are recorded by Vasubandhu. They all agree in the conclusion that things are substantially permanent, and change relates to modes or qualities or states which do not affect the intrinsic unity of the substance or essence. Change as a fact is accepted by all. Their difference is due to their different views of change. The essences persist through change. Change belongs to the essences and yet does not corrode them. Sarvāstivāda upholds two kinds of reality—(1) essential or persistent (metaphysical) and (2) unessential or transitory (empirical)[1]—which are somehow related. The following

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[1] The Sarvāstivādin distinguishes a *paramārthasat* (metaphysical real) from a *saṃvṛtisat* (empirical real) in the following way When an entity is found to disappear, either on physical decomposition or on intellectual analysis (if physical decomposition is nopossible), it is regarded as an empirical real, that is, a real for the time it endures. But a metaphysical real is that which is found to persist for all time and in all circumstances. It is not liable to disintegration and repels even intellectual analysis into simpler components. A jar, for instance, is an empirical real because, when physically disintegrated into atoms, it is found to disappear. Water also is an empirical real because, when intellectually analysed as composed of simpler parts like colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*) and the like, it is found to disappear. On the other hand, an entity which stands physical decomposition and intellectual analysis is a metaphysical real. Colour (*rūpa*,) for instance, is a metaphysical real because, even when physically disintegrated into atoms, it continues to persist as colour. It also continues to persist as colour even when intellectually analysed and separated from the elements of taste (*rasa*), odour (*gandha*) and the like, which are admitted as physically inseparable from colour. Similarly, feeling (*vedanā*), volition (*cetanā*), idea (*saṃjñā*) and the like which always go together are metaphysical reals because each one of these is not liable to physical decomposition into simpler elements and continues to persist even when intellectually analysed and separated from the rest (*scil.* the remaining elements of the group, viz. volition, idea and the like). *Cf. AK*, VI. 4 :

> yatra bhinne na tadbhuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca, tat.
> ghaṭāmbuvat samvṛtisat paramārthasad anyathā.

See also the *Bhāṣya* and *Sphuṭārthā* on it.

is an account of the exposition of the problem of change by four reputed exponents of Sarvāstivāda, with comparative estimates of the analogous positions expounded in the *Yogabhāṣya.*

III (i) Dharmatrāta's Theory of Change as Transmutation of Modes

9. Bhadanta Dharmatrāta conceived change as transmutation of modes (*bhāvānyathātva*). In other words, difference in modes is the distinguishing characteristic of past, present and future. An element (*dharma*) remains identical in its essence *quâ* substance (*dravyataḥ*) through the three times, but its modes (*bhāva*), that is, form (structure) and quality, change.[1] Thus, a golden vessel, when broken, changes its form but its *rūpa* (material stuff) continues as such.[2] Similarly, milk, when transformed into

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[1] *Cf. Sphuṭārthā,* V. 26a-b: atītānāgata-pratyutpannasya bhāvasyā'nyathātvaṃ bhavati, na dravyasyā'nyathātvam. The *Sphuṭārthā* has included both *ākṛti* and *guṇa* under *bhāva*. The *Pañjikā* (p. 504) however includes only *guṇa* under it.

[2] *Cf.* Aristotle's *Metaphysica,* VII. 8: "Since anything which is produced by something (and this I call the starting-point of the production), and from something (and let this be taken to be not the privation but the matter;......), and since something is produced (and this is either a sphere or a circle or whatever else it may chance to be), just as we do not make the substratum (the brass), so we do not make the sphere, except incidentally, because the brazen sphere is a sphere and we make the former. For to make a 'this' is to make a 'this' out of the substratum in the full sense of the word (i. e. including form as well as matter). (I mean that to make the brass round is not to make the round or the sphere, but something else, i. e. to produce this form in something different from itself. For if we make the form, we must make it out of something else; for this was assumed. E. g. we make a brazen sphere; and that in the sense that out of this, which is brass, we make this other, which is a sphere.) If then, we also make the substratum itself, clearly we shall make it in the same way, and the processes of making will regress to infinity. *Obviously then the form also* (as well as the matter), or whatever we ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, *is not produced, nor is there any production of it, nor is the essence produced*; for this is that which is made to be in something else either by art or by nature or by some faculty. (Italics are ours). But that there is a *brazen sphere,* this we make. For we make it out of brass and the sphere; we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a brazen sphere. But if the essence of sphere in general is to be produced, something must be produced out

curds, changes its taste, digestibility, etc., but its *rūpa* (material stuff) continues. In like manner, a future *dharma* while passing to the past through present changes its mode only and not its essence which remains intact throughout. The material (*rūpa*) essence always remains material, that is to say, it cannot change into another kind of element such as feeling (*vedanā*) or the like.[1] The mode (*bhāva*) which consists of form (*ākṛti*) and quality (*guṇa*) passes away, but the matter (*rūpa*) which it

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of something. For the product will always have to be divisible, and one part must be this and another that ; I mean the one must be matter and the other form. If, then, a sphere is 'the figure whose circumference is at all points equidistant from the centre', part of this will be the medium in which the thing made will be, and part will be in that medium, and the whole will be the thing produced, which corresponds to the brazen sphere. It is obvious, then, from what has been said, that that which is spoken of as form or substance is not produced, but the concrete thing which gets its name from this is produced, and that in everything which is generated matter is present, and one part of the thing is matter and the other form."

Again, *ibid.*, VII. 9 : "For as the brazen sphere comes to be, but not the sphere nor the brass, and so too in the case of brass itself, if it comes to be, it is its concrete unity that comes to be (for the matter and the form must always exist before), so is it both in the case of substance and in that of quality and quantity and other categories likewise ; for the quality does not come to be, but the wood of that quality, and the quantity does not come to be, but the wood or animal of that size. But we may learn from these instances a peculiarity of substance, that there must exist beforehand in complete reality another substance which produces it, e. g. an animal if an animal is produced ; but it is not necessary that a quality or quantity should pre-exist otherwise than potentially."

We have made this long quotation because the fundamental position of Aristotle that substance *quâ* substance cannot be changed or made (making means producing a change) under pain of infinite regress bears striking similarity to the position of the Vaibhāṣika and Sāṃkhya-Yoga. Furthermore, the potentiality of quality in the substance as maintained by Aristotle is closely analogous to the position maintained by the Vaibhāṣika and Sāṃkhya-Yoga. Their doctrine of *satkāryavāda*, that is, the pre-existence of effect does not mean that the effect exists antecedently in the form in which it is produced by causal operation. The pre-existent quality differs from the quality produced as effect in that the former is latent or unmanifest and the latter is manifest. This also appears to be the position of Aristotle from the excerpt quoted by us.

[1] na rūpādi-svalakṣaṇasyā 'nyathātvam,—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 26 a-b.

characterizes does not cease to be. The examples of gold and milk given above refer to the transmutation of form and quality respectively[1] and show the continuity of the material essence through the three times.

10. Vasubandhu has characterized this view as the doctrine of *pariṇāma* of the Sāṃkhya school[2] which explains continuity (*santati*) as the manifestation, in the constant substance, of another *dharma* (entity) on the disappearance of any other *dharma*.[3] In fact, the *Yogabhāṣya* which gives an illuminating exposition of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrine of *pariṇāma* has explained *bhāvānyathātva* as change of the *bhāva* (which is explained by Vācaspati Miśra as the *saṃsthāna* 'form') of a *dharma* belonging to a *dharmin*, e. g. when a golden vessel is broken and given another shape, there occurs a change of one form into another form and not of gold itself which is the substratum (*dharmin*).[4] This kind of change is known as *dharmapariṇāma* in Yoga philosophy.[5] One *dharma* gives place to another *dharma* while the *dharmin*, their common substratum, remains constant.

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[1] suvarṇaṃ kṣīraṃ ce'ti dṛṣṭānta-dvayaṃ yathākramam ākṛti-guṇānyathātva-jñāpanārtham.—*Ibid*.

[2] *Cf*. *AKB*, V. 26 a-b : Sāṃkhya-pakṣe nikṣeptavyaḥ. See *TSP*, pp. 504—5, which records a brief refutation of the Sāṃkhya conception of *pariṇāma*. For a detailed criticism of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, see the section on *Prakṛtiparīkṣā*, *TSP*, pp. 16 ff.

[3] *Cf*. kā ce 'yaṃ santatir iti ? kiṃ yathā Sāṃkhyānām avasthita-dravyasya dharmāntara-nivṛttau dharmāntara-prādurbhāvaḥ. ……*Sphuṭārthā*, II. 36. *Cf*. *Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13 : avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivṛttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāma iti.

[4] *Cf*. dharmasya dharmiṇi vartamānasyai 'vā 'dhvasvatītānāgatavartamāneṣu bhāvānyathātvaṃ bhavati, na tu dravyānyathātvam, yathā suvarṇabhājanasya bhittvā 'nyathākriyamāṇasya bhāvānyathātvaṃ bhavati, na suvarṇasyā 'nyathātvam.—*Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13. See also the *Tattvavaiśāradī* on it.

Cf. Aristotle : "Generally things which come to be, come to be in different ways : (1) by change of shape, as a statue; (2) by addition, as things which grow; (3) by taking away, as the Hermes from thes tone; (4) by putting together, as a house; (5) by alteration, as things which 'turn' in respect of their material substance." *Physica*, 1. 7. 190 b.

[5] *Vide* *Yogasūtra*, III. 13, with *Bhāṣya*.

The *dharmas* disappear in their substratum and thus provide scope for the appearance of other *dharmas*. The postulation of a common substratum which is constant justifies the Sāṃkhya-Yoga conception of the existence of *dharmas* in the womb of the future and their conservation in the bosom of the past after they have enjoyed the actuality of the present. What was only possible in the future becomes *actual* in the present and is conserved as potential in the past. What is capable of self-manifestation but may or may not become manifest for lack of other conditions is the possible; what is manifest is the actual; and what has crossed the stage of actuality and has become an efficient force capable of actualizing the future[1] is the potential. There is no conflict between the possible, the actual and the potential and they can coexist in the same substratum. The possible is rather the presupposition of the actual which in its turn is the presupposition of the potential.

11. The Vaibhāṣika philosopher however cannot admit the reality of a unitary common substratum of the past, present and future *dharmas*, and so Dharmatrāta's doctrine of *bhāvānyathātva* should not be interpreted as *dharmapariṇāma* of the Yoga philosophy. The criticism of Vasubandhu therefore is to be accepted with precaution. It is of course difficult to know the exact implications of Dharmatrāta's doctrine in the absence of a fuller account. But as a doctrine upheld by an exponent of a school of Buddhist philosophy which is averse to all forms of the conception of substance, it ought to be considered as somewhat different from the Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrine. The Vaibhāṣika believes in *dharmas* as discrete essences or substances (*dravya*) which are conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) being subject to origination, decay, continuity, and impermanence, but which never pass into non-being. Dharmatrāta believes in the change of *bhāva* (form or quality) and not the passing away of the essence. Thus the material (*rūpa*) essence which now appears as milk may appear as curds in another moment, but the material essence always

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[1] *Cf.* sataś ca phalasya nimittaṃ vartamānīkaraṇe samartham.—*Yogabhāṣya*, IV. 12.

remains material essence. It cannot pass from being into non-being. The future is full of all possible kinds of conditioned *dharmas* which become present on the completion of the assemblage of conditions, and immediately pass into the past to continue there for ever and become the efficient cause of the origination of future *dharmas* in course of time. The conditioned character in the case of future *dharmas* which are devoid of the relation of 'before and after'[1] means their susceptibility of undergoing change from which the three unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) *dharmas*[2] are completely immune. The Vaibhāṣikas admit 'before and after' relation in the case of the past *dharmas* whose conditioned character consequently is easily understandable on account of their movement through the ever expanding past. The Yoga philosopher however does not accept the 'before and after' relation among the past *dharmas*.[3] The past *dharmas*, according to him, are integrated with their material cause as so many potencies which become effective in due course.

12. The *dharma* of the Vaibhāṣika has twofold function. It functions as the substratum of itself in its aspect of continuity and it is *bhāva* in its aspect of change. If thus viewed, the difference between the Vaibhāṣika and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga turns out to be only one of nomenclature. The *dharma* quâ continuant and the *dharma* quâ transitory have to be distinguished, and this is done explicitly in Sāṃkhya-Yoga by different names, *dharmin* and *dharma*. The Vaibhāṣika's use of *dharma* indiscriminately in the same two senses suffers from ambiguity and becomes misleading and confusing. The Vaibhāṣika can maintain this position by adopting the logic of *bhedābheda* (indeterminism) which is done in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Jaina schools of thought. The relation between substance and mode (form, quality) must be identity-in-difference. They are identical and at the same time different. The law of *anekānta* or *bhedābheda*,

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[1] *Cf. AKB*, II. 52b: anāgate cā 'dhvani pūrva-paścimatābhāvāt.

[2] *Vide supra*, § 1, footnote 1.

[3] *Cf. Yogabhāṣya*, III. 14 : yathā 'nāgatavartamānayoḥ pūrvapaścimatā naivam atītasya ; also III. 15 : pūrvaparatāyāṃ satyāṃ samanantaratvam, sā tu nāsty atītasya.

which means the same in essence, is not accepted by the logical purist like the Sautrāntika. The purist stands by the Law of Excluded Middle and the Law of Contradiction *in abstracto.* A is A and cannot be B (not-A), that is, AB. But the *bhedābheda* logic does not subscribe to this rigid exclusiveness if the two are found together in experience.[1] The Sautrāntika, by pursuing the dialectic of pure logic, ends in denying the possibility of substance and mode existing together. He concludes that there is no substance beyond the transitory modes, and the feeling of continuity is only an illusion caused by similarity. According to the Sautrāntika, the Vaibhāṣika is guilty of confounding similarity with sameness. We will see in due course[1] how the Vaibhāṣika philosopher had to admit the principle of *anekānta* or *bhedābheda.*

III (ii). GHOṢAKA'S THEORY OF CHANGE AS TRANSFORMATION OF TEMPORAL PHASES

13. Bhadanta Ghoṣaka conceived change as the transformation of one temporal phase into another (*lakṣaṇānyathātva*). The *dharma* as essence remains intact while its temporal phases vary, and our characterization of the *dharma* as future, present or past depends upon its temporal phase.[2] A *dharma,* passing through the times, is vested with a phase called 'past' when it is past and yet is not exclusive of its future and present phases.[3] This is true of the future and present phases as well. If the future were exclusive of the present and past, it would never become present or past, because what was not can never be (*nā 'bhūtvā bhāvaḥ*).[4] Similarly, if the past were exclusive of the

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[1] *Vide infra,* § 40 (ii) with footnotes.

[2] *Cf.* lakṣaṇānyathikasya lakṣaṇavṛttilābhāpekṣo vyavahāraḥ. ...*Sphuṭārthā,* V. 26a-b. See also *TSP*, p. 504.

[3] dharmo 'dhavasu pravartamāno 'tīto 'tīta-lakṣaṇayukto 'nāgatapratyutpannābhyāṃ lakṣaṇābhyām aviyuktaḥ.—*AKB,* V.26a-b.

[4] *Cf.* Vaibhāṣikāṇām etan matam—anāgataṃ vidyamānam utpadyata iti...-*Sphuṭārthā,* II. 52. Also *Cf.* *Milindapañha* (Bombay, 1940), pp. 55-6 (§ 39). This principle is accepted by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school also. See *Yogabhāṣya,* IV. 12: nā 'bhūtvā bhāvas trayāṇām adhvanām iti.

1 If two are found together with experience, then
according a particular system Nyaya, only one
between [illegible]

future and the present, it will not be possible to trace its rise from the future through the present. In like manner, if the present were exclusive of and incompatible with the future and the past, neither the future will become present nor the present will pass into the past.[1] The future, the present and the past phases are thus found to coexist together. A person attached (*raktaḥ*) to a particular woman may be not unattached (*viraktaḥ*) to others. The difference, if any, is only that his attachment is patent in the former case while it lies latent in the latter.[2] There is no conflict between the patent and the latent. Patent love may coexist even with latent hatred. One may not be equally attached to two women simultaneously, but there is no conflict between such attachments on two different occasions, the one lying latent while the other is patent. Similarly, there is no conflict betweent the three phases—future, present and past—coexisting together, provided the other two are conceived as latent while the third is patent.

14. Vasubandhu criticizes this doctrine as involving the commingling or confusion of the three times, because each *dharma* is conceived as possessed of the three temporal phases.[3] The *bhāvānyathātva* doctrine of Dharmatrāta attempted to explain change by attributing it to the modes (*bhāvas*) keeping the essence (*dravya*) intact. But it failed to explain the change of the modes themselves. In this doctrine of *lakṣaṇānyathātva*, the modes are conceived as changing on account of the three temporal phases (*lakṣaṇas*). Vasubandhu raises the problem of the incompatibility of the coexistence of one phase with the other two phases. The analogy of the simultaneous attachment to two different women is wide of the mark, inasmuch as the temporal phases cannot be distinguished as patent and latent.[4]

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[1] *Sphuṭārthā*, V. 26 a-b.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] adhvasaṃkaraḥ prāpnoti, sarvasya sarvalakṣaṇayogāt.—*AKB*, V. 26 a-b.

[4] *Cf.* puruṣasya tu kasyāñcit striyāṃ rāgaḥ samudācarati kasyāñcit kevalaṃ samanvāgama iti kim atra sāmyam.—*Ibid. Cf. TSP* (p. 505) : puruṣas tv arthāntarabhūta–samudācārād rakta ucyate 'viraktaś ca samanvāgamamātreṇa; na tu dharmasya lakṣaṇasamudā-

There is no antagonism between love latent and love patent. But the opposition is too obvious between a past and a present, and a present and a future. What is present is not future or past, and this is true of future and past as well *mutatis mutandis*. And so the example cited as illustrative of the lack of opposition is not apposite to the temporal differences.

15. The *Yogabhāṣya* conceives a category of change called *lakṣaṇapariṇāma* which is analogous to the *lakṣaṇānyathātva* of Bhadanta Ghoṣaka. In *dharmapariṇāma*, as we have seen, one *dharma* (form or quality) yields place to another *dharma* while the *dharmin* continues to remain the same. When the *dharma* called *clay-lump* passes off, the *dharma* called *clay-jar* arises, but the *dharmin* called *clay* remains constant. This sequence of change of *clay-lump* into *clay-jar* is known as *dharmapariṇāma-krama*.[1] But the two *dharmas*, in so far as they pertain to a constant *dharmin*, have an identity in that what was latent in one moment becomes patent in another moment. In clay, while the clay-lump is patent, the clay-jar is latent. In other words, while the clay-lump is *present*, the clay-jar is *future*. The clay--jar arises when the clay-lump has passed off. This temporal sequence of change between the future (latent) state of clay-jar and the present (patent) state of clay-jar (sic) as well as that between the present (patent) state of clay-lump and the past (that is, what has become latent) state of clay-lump is called *lakṣaṇapariṇāma-krama*,[2] the expression *lakṣaṇa* standing for the temporal characteristic of a *dharma*[3]. The ontological

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cāro lakṣaṇasamanvāgamo vā prāptilakṣaṇo 'sti, anyatvaprasaṃgāl-lakṣaṇasya prāptivad iti na sāmyaṃ dṛṣṭāntasya dārṣṭāntikena.

[1] *Cf.* piṇḍaḥ pracyavate, ghaṭa upajāyata iti dharmapariṇāma-kramaḥ.—*Yogabhāṣya*, III. 15.

[2] *Cf.* lakṣaṇapariṇāma-kramo ghaṭasyā'nāgatabhāvād varta-mānabhāva-kramas tathā piṇḍasya vartamāna-bhāvād atītabhāva-kramaḥ.—*Ibid.* There is no sequence in what has passed off, because there is no 'before and after' relation in the case of the past : nā'tī-tasyā 'sti kramaḥ, kasmāt, pūrvāparatāyaṃ satyāṃ samanantaratvam, sā tu nāsty atītasya.—*Ibid* .

[3] *Cf.* lakṣyate 'nene 'ti lakṣaṇaṃ kālabhedaḥ. tena hi lakṣitaṃ vastu vastvantarebhyaḥ kālāntarayuktebhyo vyavacchidyata iti.—*Tattvavaiśāradī* on *Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13.

[illegible]

sequence of change between two different *dharmas* occurring in succession is *dharmapariṇāma-krama,* whereas the temporal sequence between the future (latent) and the present (patent), or between the present (patent) and the past (i.e., what has become latent) states of the same *dharma* is *lakṣaṇapariṇāma-krama.*

16. As regards the illustration and implication of *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma,* the *Yogabhāṣya* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* are agreed *verbatim et literatim.* The *Yogabhāṣya* also raises the objection of commingling or confusion of times *(adhvasaṃkara),*[1] but attempts at a solution which is peculiar to Sāṃkhya-Yoga ontology. If a particular *dharma,* say the emotion of attachment, arises at a particular moment, it means that the attachment was lying latent prior to its appearance and will continue to exist even after it has apparently passed off, because neither the non-existent can arise nor the existent can perish.[2] This prior and posterior existence of a *dharma* proves its continuance through all times, and not only at the time of its rising. If the emotion of attachment did not lie latent in the mind at the time of the rising of the opposite emotion of repulsion, the latter could never have been followed by the former in the succeeding moment in the life of a person.[3] It is not postulated that the three temporal phases *(lakṣaṇas)*—viz. prior latency, present potency and posterior latency—are simultaneously active in a particular mental state, but it is admitted that these phases occur successively according as the conditions of their appearance are fulfilled.[4] There is however no conflict between the three phases existing (not acting) together. The three phases cannot be active

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[1] atra lakṣaṇapariṇāme sarvasya sarvalakṣaṇayogād adhvasaṃkaraḥ prāpnotī'ti parair doṣaś codyate.—*Yogabhāṣya*, II. 13.

[2] *Cf.* vartamānatai 'va hi dharmāṇām anubhavasiddhā tataḥ prākpaścātkālasambandham avagamayati. na khalv asad utpadyate, na ca sad vinaśyati.—*Tattvavaiśāradī*, III. 13.

[3] krodhottarakālaṃ hi cittaṃ rāgadharmakam anubhūyate. yadā ca rāgaḥ krodhasamaye 'nāgatatvena nāsīt katham asāv utpadyetā 'nutpannaś ca kathaṃ anubhūyete 'ti—*Ibid*.

[4] *Cf.* trayāṇāṃ lakṣaṇānāṃ yugapad ekasyāṃ (citta-) vṛttau nāsti sambhavaḥ, krameṇa tu svavyañjakāñjanasya bhāvo bhaved iti.—*Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13.

simultaneously. What is latent cannot be patent at the same time. The latent attachment however can coexist with the patent repulsion because there is no conflict between them. In this connection, the *Yogabhāṣya* quotes Pañcaśikhācārya's criterion of conflict, which may be expressed thus: There is mutual conflict between the patent states (*atiśaya*) of two opposite *dharmas*, but there is no such conflict between the latent state (*sāmānya*) of the one and the patent state (*atiśaya*) of the other.[1] Thus the patent attachment in respect of a certain woman does not preclude latent attachment in respect of another woman.

17. This Sāṃkhya-Yoga solution of the problem however cannot be acceptable to the Buddhist critic who does not believe in a constant *dharmin* as the substratum of the changing *dharmas*. In fact, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy which discards ontological absolutism[2] and believes in the *bhedābheda* relation of the *dharmas* with the *dharmin*[3] does not appeal to any philosopher of absolutist persuasion. The unbridgeable gulf between the standpoints of the Vedāntic Absolutist and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga non-absolutist[4] is an illustration in point. The *pariṇāmavāda* (doctrine of objective change) of the non-absolutist is discarded

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[1] Pañcaśikhācārya's text is as follows: rūpātiśayā vṛttyatiśayāś ca parasparena virudhyante, sāmānyāni tv atiśayaiḥ saha pravartante. For the full meaning of the text see *Tattvavaiśāradī* and *Yogavārtika*, II. 15 and III. 13. *Cf.* Aristotle's *Categoriae*, V: "To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself." The *Yogabhāṣya* also recognizes that ultimately the change of *dharma* is due to the change in the *dharmin*. It says: dharmivikriyai 'vâi 'ṣā dharmadvārā prapañcyata iti.—*Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13.

[2] *Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13: ekāntatānabhyupagamāt. Also see *Tattvavaiśāradī* on it.

[3] *Cf.* anubhava eva hi dharmiṇo dharmādīnāṃ bhedābhedau vyavasthāpayati...—*Tattvavaiśāradī*, III. 13.

[4] The non-absolutism of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school is restricted to the sphere of the *prakṛti* alone and is not extended to the principle of *puruṣa*. Universal application of non-absolutism in ontology is found only in the philosophy of the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas, though the latter do not extend it to word (*śabda*) which they regard as an unchanging eternal principle.

and replaced by *vivartavāda* (doctrine of change as illusion) in the absolutistic schools of philosophy.[1]

III (iii). VASUMITRA'S THEORY OF CHANGE AS VARIATION OF STATES

18. Bhadanta Vasumitra considers change as variation of states (*avasthānyathātva*). A *dharma* is designated as future when it does not exercise its *kāritra* (causal function); it is called present when it does exercise the same; and it is called past when it has already exercised it. In other words, a *dharma* derives its temporal aspects from the variation of the states (*avasthā*) of causal function, and not the variation of essence; just as, in an abacus, the selfsame ball put in the place of units, tens, and hundreds denotes the number one, ten, and hundred respectively, so also the *dharma* only acquires different significations while passing through different times but does not undergo any change of essence.[2]

19. Vasubandhu has approved this doctrine of change as the best of all (including the next, i. e. the fourth), on account of its determination of the three times by means of *kāritra* or causal function.[3] His criticism of the conception of *kāritra* and the other issues involved will be elaborately considered later on after the doctrine of change upheld by Bhadanta Buddhadeva has been dealt with.

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[1] *Cf.* vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmir
vedāntavāde pariṇāmavādaḥ.
vyavasthite 'smin pariṇāmavāde
svayaṃ samāyāti vivartavādaḥ.
—*Saṃkṣepaśārīraka*, II. 61.

[2] *Cf.* yasyām avasthāyāṃ sa dharmaḥ kāritraṃ na karoti tasyām anāgata ucyate; yasyāṃ karoti tasyāṃ vartamānaḥ; yasyāṃ kṛtvā niruddhas tasyām atīta ity avasthām avasthāṃ prāpyo 'nyo 'nyo nirdiśyate......avasthāntarato na dravyāntarata iti. yathai'kā gulikā ekāṃke nikṣiptā......ekam ity ucyate......śatāṃke śatam, sahasrāṃke sahasram ity ucyate avasthāntarāpekṣayā na punas tasyāḥ svabhāvānyathātvam, kiṃtarhi sthānāntaraviśeṣāt saṃkhyābhidyotakaṃ saṃjñāntaram utpadyata iti.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 26. Also see *TSP*, p. 504.

[3] (te bhāvalakṣaṇāvasthānyathānyathikasaṃjñitāḥ)
tritīyaḥ śobhano 'dhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ.
—*AK*, V. 26.

20. In the *Yogabhāṣya*, we find a category of change (*pariṇāma*) called *avasthāpariṇāma* which refers to change of the states of a *dharma*, say a jar, when it continues to appear as the same for a certain period of time (this period of time being relatively called present on account of the continuity of that *dharma*), though in fact the *dharma* is steadily moving towards a radical change at the end. Milk gradually turns into curds, though it is difficult to observe and measure the change at each moment. A jar or a seed gradually becomes old, but its gradual aging is inferred only when it is decomposed in course of time.[1] The *dharmin* or the substratum of change is timeless ; it is only the *dharmas* which pass through the three times.[2] Some of the *dharmas* are active (*lakṣita*), that is, manifest (present), while others are non-active, that is, unmanifest (future and past).[3] Of course, the active (that is, manifest and present) *dharmas*, while passing through different states (*avasthās*), are determined as different at different moments, on account of the difference of states and not on account of the difference of the substratum. So long as a jar continues to appear as jar, we take it as present on account of its capacity to function as jar. Causal function thus is the criterion of the presentness of a thing. The presentness however is found by inference to undergo gradual change of states at each moment. This change of the active or the present (*lakṣita* or *vartamāna*) is called *avasthāpariṇāma* in the *Yogabhāṣya* which illustrates it by the example of a digit (say '1') which acquires different values at different places—its value is *one* in the place of units, *ten* in the place of tens, *hundred* in the place of hundreds, and so on.[4] The implication is that the substratum assumes

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[1] *Yogabhāṣya*, III. 15 : tathā 'vasthāpariṇāmakramo 'pi. ghaṭasyā 'bhinavasya prānte purāṇatā dṛśyate. sā ca kṣaṇaparamparānupātinā krameṇā 'bhivyajyamānā parāṃ vyaktim āpadyata iti.—See *Tattvavaiśāradī* on it for the example of seed.

[2] na dharmī tryadhvā, dharmās tu tryadhvānaḥ—*Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13.

[3] lakṣitā abhivyaktā vartamānā iti yāvat. alakṣitā anabhivyaktā anāgatā atītā iti yāvat.—*Tattvavaiśāradī*, III. 13.

[4] *Cf*......lakṣitāḥ (vartamānāḥ) tāṃ tām avasthāṃ prāpnuvanto 'nyatvena pratinirdiśyante 'vasthāntarato na dravyāntarataḥ. yathai 'kā rekhā śatasthāne śataṃ daśasthāne daśai 'kā cai 'kasthāne. —*Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13.

different states and acquires different values at different moments of its existence, but does never forsake its substancehood or essence.

21. This brief account of *avasthāpariṇāma* of the *Yogabhāṣya* reveals its close affinity with the theory of *avasthānyathātva* of Bhadanta Vasumitra. This affinity should not however be understood as suggesting identity of the ontological outlooks of the two. *Avasthāpariṇāma* is *sadṛśapariṇāma*, that is, change of a *dharma* into its like, which is a kind of change from *sabhāgahetu* to *niḥṣyandaphala*[1]. Change, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, is occurring every moment, and this fact is sought to be explained by the different theories of change. *Avasthānyathātva* includes both homogeneous and heterogeneous changes, and is not, like *avasthāpariṇāma*, restricted to homogeneous change alone. It stands for change as only a variation of context, a simple movement from one position to another like the ball of an abacus, sliding on wires. The distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous changes, in the ultimate analysis, is one of quantity inasmuch as it is only the accumulated microscopic changes, slow or rapid, which finally find expression in a heterogeneous change at one particular moment. The distinction between *avasthāpariṇāma* and *avasthānyathātva* is consequently not fundamental and final, in spite of the radical difference in the ontological outlooks of the propounders of the two doctrines.

III (iv). BUDDHADEVA'S THEORY OF CHANGE AS TEMPORAL RELATIVITY

22. Bhadanta Buddhadeva upholds the doctrine of change as temporal relativity (*anyathānyathātva*). The purpose of a theory of change is to define future, present and past, and to distinguish them from one another, and also to show the duration of *dharmas* through the three times. According to this theory of change, a *dharma* is called differently as future or present or past with reference to the prior or the posterior

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[1] *Vide infra*, the relevant footnotes to § 26 (ii) and § 27 (i).

dharma.[1] Thus, the future is so called in relation to the past and the present which are prior to it; the present is so called in relation to the past which is prior to it and in relation to the future which is posterior to it; the past is so called in relation to the present and the future which are posterior to it.[2] The case of the same woman being designated as mother in relation to her daughter, and daughter in relation to her mother is an instance in point.

23. Vasubandhu has criticized this doctrine also as involving coincidence of the three times in any one time.[3] Take, for instance, the past. It is possible to distinguish any three successive moments in the past as past, present and future—the middle being the present and the moments anterior and posterior to it being the past and the future respectively. The past is thus found to be all three at once—past, present and future—a contingency which is a contradiction in terms.[4]

24. In the *Yogabhāṣya*, we find the case of the same woman being called mother with reference to her daughter, daughter with reference to her mother, and sister with reference to her brother, as an illustration of *avasthāpariṇāma*.[5] The implication is that the changing *dharmas* are differently designated with reference to their mutual relative position, their substratum being constant.

IV. A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF VASUMITRA'S THEORY OF CHANGE AS VARIATION OF STATES

25. Vasumitra, as we have seen, lays down *kāritra* or causal efficiency as the determinant of the distinction between

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[1] pūrvāparam apekṣyā 'nyonya ucyate.—*AKB*, V. 26. *TSP*, p. 504.

[2] pūrvam evātītaṃ vartamānaṃ vā 'pekṣyānāgata iti. pūrvaṃ vātītam aparaṃ vā 'nāgatam apekṣya vartmāna iti, aparam eva vartamānam anāgataṃ vā 'pekṣyātīta iti.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 26.

[3] *Cf.* ekasminn evādhvani trayo 'dhvānaḥ prāpnuvantī 'ti.—*AKB*, V. 26. *TSP*, p. 505.

[4] *Cf.* ekasminn evatīte 'dhvani pūrvāpara-kṣaṇa-vyavasthā'sti, tatra pūrvapaścimau kṣaṇāv atītānāgatau......madhyamaḥ pratyutpannaḥ.—*Ibid*.

[5] yathā cai 'katve 'pi strī mātā co'cyate duhitā ca svasā ce 'ti. —*Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13.

the three times. When a *dharma* is in the state of causal efficiency (*kāritra*), it is present; when it has crossed the state, it is past; and when it has not attained that state as yet, it is future.[1] The Sautrāntika has raised a number of objections against the criterion of *kāritra* formulated by the Vaibhāṣika, and we propose to discuss them below in the form of a dialogue between the two.

26 (i). Sautrāntika—What do you mean by *kāritra* or causal function? If you say "seeing is the causal function of the eye, hearing of the ear, and so on", then how do you account for the eye-facsimile (*tatsabhāga-cakṣuḥ*) being called present, when it is not exercising its causal function of seeing (*darśana*) in the states of slumber and the like.[2]

26 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—Seeing is not the only function of the eye. The capacity to become the condition of the concomitant factors in the present moment and a similar eye in the next moment is its function called *phalapratigraha* (literally, acquisition of effectivity) and the capacity to produce the concomitant factors at the present moment and a similar eye in the next moment is its function of *phaladāna* (literally, discharge of effectivity) which comprises *puruṣakāraphala*, *adhipatiphala* and *niḥṣyandaphala*.[3] Thus, although the eye is not doing its function

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[1] *TS*, 1792 : kāritre vartate yo hi vartamānaḥ sa ucyate.
kāritrāt pracyuto 'tītas tadaprāptas tv anāgataḥ.

[2] yady evaṃ pratyutpannasya tatsabhāgasya cakṣuṣah kiṃ kāritram.—*AKB*, V. 27 a . *Cf. TSP* (p. 506): evaṃ sati pratyutpannasya tatsabhāgasya cakṣuṣo nidrādyavasthāyāṃ kāritrābhāvād vartamānatā na syāt.

[3] *Puruṣakāraphala*—If the effect is due to the active function of the cause, it is called *puruṣakāraphala*.

Adhipatiphala—The effect of the *kāraṇahetu* (that is, a cause in the most general sense of the term) is called *adhipatiphala*. It is an effect in the most general sense of the term.

Niḥṣyandaphala—When the effect is similar to the cause in some important respect, it is called *niḥṣyandaphala*.

The *phalas* and the nature of *kāraṇahetu* will be elaborately discussed in a separate paper.

of seeing, it is performing its other two functions of *phalapratigraha* and *phaladāna* and so it can be determined as present.[1]

27 (i). Sautrāntika—If the function of *phaladāna* is also regarded as *kāritra* and as such a criterion of a *dharma* being present, then the 'past' *sabhāgahetu*, *sarvatragahetu* and *vipākahetu*[2] also on account of their function of *phaladāna* in future will pass as present—a contingency which entails confusion or commingling

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[1] *Cf.*......yady api darśana-kāritraṃ na karoti, anyat tu phalaṃ karotī 'ti tasya phaladāna-pari(?prati-)graha-sadbhāvāt tat pratyutpannam iti vyavasthāpyate.—*Sphuṭārthā*, II. 26.

Also *cf.* *TSP* (p. 506) : atha phaladānagrahaṇalakṣaṇaṃ kāritram, yathā cakṣuṣaḥ sahabhuvo dharmā jātyādayaḥ puruṣakāraphalam anantarotpannaṃ cakṣurindriyaṃ puruṣakāraphalaṃ adhipatiphalaṃ niḥṣyandaphalaṃ ca, etatphalaṃ jananāt (?janayat) prayacchaddhetubhāvāvasthānād gṛhṇac (?agṛhṇac) cakṣur vartamānam ucyata iti.

The criterion of being present, laid down in the above passage, is the possession of twofold capacity—(i) of becoming a cause (*phalapratigraha*, literally, acquisition of effectivity) and (ii) of being productive of some results (*phaladāna*, literally, discharge of effectivity). For example, the present eye, as soon as it is born, is vested with the capacity for producing a facsimile-eye in the next moment, and simultaneously (with its own birth) produces *jāti* (origination), *jarā* (decay) *sthiti* (self-maintenance), etc. This is the pattern of presentness—vesting itself with causality (capacity for producing effect and actual production of some concomitant effects). The past was vested with causality as soon as it was born, which (causality) however ceased with the cessation of the entity, that is, with its entering the phase of pastness. But because the effect has not yet been produced, the capacity for the production of the effect continues. In other words, the past retains the capacity for giving birth to its effects (*phaladāna*, literally, discharge of effectivity) though the function of acquiring causality (*phalapratigraha*, literally, acquisition of effectivity) is now defunct. It cannot be maintained that the past retains the power of acquiring causality, as that would amount to the fresh acquisition of causality which has already been acquired. It is futile to admit a second acquisition of the same.

[2] *Sabhāgahetu*—When its effect is like itself in some important respect, the cause is known as *sabhāgahetu*.

Sarvatragahetu—The term *sarvatraga* stands for a specific number of defiling elements together with their associates and characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*), which condition and influence similar elements. Such pre-originating *sarvatraga* elements are the *sarvatragahetu* of the post-originating similar elements in the same plane.

Vipākahetu—*Vipāka* means result of the past acts, moral or immoral. The cause of such result is called *vipākahetu*.

These *hetus* will be discussed elaborately in a separate paper.

of the determining characteristics (*lakṣaṇasaṃkara*) of the past and the present in the same *dharma*.[1]

27 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The objection is unwarranted. *Kāritra* means the joint presence of the functions of *phalapratigraha* and *phaladāna*. The past *hetus* have only one of these functions, viz. that of *phaladāna*, and so the criterion of *kāritra* is not applicable to them. The past *hetus* therefore cannot pass as present and consequently the contingency of confusion of characteristics is unwarranted.

28 (i). Sautrāntika—On account of the presence of one of the two constituent factors of *kāritra*, the past *dharma* (viz. *sabhāgahetu* or *vipākahetu* or the like) should at least be regarded as demipresent, and consequently as past-cum-present—a contingency which is not free from the same fault of confusion of characteristics.[2]

28 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—Let us then define *kāritra* as the capacity for *phalapratigraha* (also called *phalākṣepa*, acquisition of effectivity) and let this alone be the criterion of a *dharma* being called present. The past *dharmas* have no such capacity, and therefore they are not even demipresent. In other words, to be present is equal to 'to be vested with causality'. Actual production of effects sometimes coincide with the acquisition of causality (*phalapratigraha*, literally, acquisition of effectivity) as in the case of concomitant effects. But the capacity of producing actual results is not regarded as the distinctive

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[1] atītānām api tarhi sabhāga-hetvādīnāṃ phaladānāt kāritra-prasaṅgaḥ.—*AKB*, V. 26 : The *Sphuṭārthā* clarifies the sense as : tataś cai 'ṣāṃ sabhāga-hetvādīnām atītānāṃ vartamānatva-prasaṅgaḥ, vartamānavat kāritrasadbhāvād iti lakṣaṇasaṃkaraḥ. Also *cf.* *TSP* (p. 506) : evaṃ tarhy atītānām api sabhāga-sarvatraga-vipāka-hetūnāṃ phaladānābhyupagamād vartamānatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

[2] ardhakāritrasya vā (prasaṅgaḥ).—*AKB*, V. 26. The *Sphuṭārthā* clarifies the sense as : ardha-vartamānā iti vā te 'tītāḥ prasajyante, uparata-phalapari(?prati)graha-kāritratvād dhi te 'tīta-lakṣaṇa-yuktāḥ, vartamāna-phaladāna-kāritratvāc ca vartamāna-lakṣaṇa-yuktā iti, eṣa eva laksaṇa-saṃkara-doṣah. *Cf.* also *TSP* (p. 506) : atha samastam eva phaladānagrahaṇalakṣaṇaṃ kāritram iṣyate, evam atītasya sabhāgahetvāder ardhavartamānatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

feature of presentness as it is found in a past entity also. The contingency of confusion of characteristics is thus avoided.[1]

29 (i). Sautrāntika—Although you have now defined the present and established the distinction between the three times, the problem of the relation between the *kāritra* (causal function) and the present (*vartamāna*) *dharma* remains to be considered. What is the relation between the two ? Is it one of difference ? If so, the present *dharma*, like the *kāritra*, will transpire to be a momentary entity without futurity and pastness. Both the *dharma* and the *kāritra* are equally real and as such they should have a similar nature. Now, the *kāritra*, being exclusively the property of the present, has neither pre-existence (futurity) nor post-existence (pastness). And so the present *dharma* also will have neither of the two. The absence of pre-existence (futurity) and post-existence (pastness) of the present *dharma* follows also from an analysis of the nature of reals. A real, in order to be real, must have the nature of causeness (*hetutva*) and also the nature of effectness (that is, conditionedness, *saṃskṛtatva*). The causal character of a real negates its post-existence (existence as past), because a cause must produce its effect and cease to be; its character of being an effect of another cause precludes its pre-existence (futurity), because an effect must come into existence at a particular moment. The present *dharma*, like the *kāritra*, is therefore found to have neither pre-existence nor post-existence. In other words, it was non-existent in the future, and will also be non-existent when past, and is thus devoid of (past and future) being (*niḥsvabhāva*).[2]

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[1] *Cf. TSP* (p 506) : dharmāṇāṃ kāritram ucyate phalākṣepaśaktiḥ, na tu phalajananam. na cā 'tītānāṃ sabhāga-hetvādīnāṃ phalākṣepo'sti, vartamānāvasthāyam evā 'kṣiptatvāt. na cākṣiptasyākṣepo yukto 'navasthāprasaṃgāt. tasmād atītānāṃ na kāritra-sambhava iti nāsti laksaṇasaṃkaraḥ.

The *Pañjikā* attributes this revised definition of *kāritra* to Ācārya Sahantabhadra (?Saṃghabhadra). See *TSP*, p. 506, line 22. *Cf. Abhidharmadīpa* :

vartamānādhvasampātāt sāmagryā 'ṅgaparigrahāt.
labdhaśakteḥ phalākṣepaḥ kāritram abhidhīyate.

[2] *Cf. TS*, 1795 :

anyatve vartamānānāṃ prāg ūrdhvaṃ vā 'svabhāvatā.
ḥetutva-saṃskṛtatvādeḥ kāritrasye 'va gamyatām.

29 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—We do not admit that the *dharma* has no past and future being. The *dharma* continues to exist through the three times.

30 (i). Sautrāntika—The *dharma* then, according to you, is always existent in its own nature, and thus turns out to be an unchanging eternal, because eternality is nothing but continuity of a fact in its own nature.[1] But why should an eternal *dharma* exercise its causal function only on a particular occasion and not always ? What is the obstacle in the way of its exercising its function at all times ?[2]

30 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—A *dharma* does not function always because of the absence of the complete set of conditions. It can function only when the assemblage of the conditions of its functioning is complete.

31 (i). Sautrāntika—No. It is not proper on your part to imagine non-completion of the assemblage of conditions, because you have to admit the constant presence of all the conditions which, being eternal, do not cease to exist at any time.[3] Moreover, even when complete, the assemblage of eternal reals cannot produce any effect. An eternal cannot function as a cause either successively or at once ; nor is its character of being conditioned (*saṃskṛtatva*) which is admitted by you like the other Buddhists consistent with the nature of being eternal.[4] An eternal real can neither be a cause nor an effect. In other words, it is nothing.

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[1] *Cf. TS*, 1796 : anyathā nityatāpattiḥ svabhāvāvasthiteḥ sadā.
naitadrūpātiriktaṃ hi vidyate nityalakṣaṇam.

[2] *Cf. AKB*, V. 27 a : tenai 'vātmanā sato dharmasya nityaṃ kāritrakaraṇe ko vighno yena kadācit kāritraṃ karoti kadācin ne 'ti.

[3] *Cf. Sphuṭārthā*, V. 27 a : na pratyayānām asāmagryaṃ kalpayituṃ yujyate, yasmād iha bhavadbhir nityaṃ pratyayānām astitvam abhyupagamyate, satām avināśāt.

[4] *TS*, 1797 : nityasya hetutā pūrvaṃ kramākramavirodhataḥ
niṣiddhā saṃskṛtatvaṃ hi vyaktaṃ nitye nirāspadam.

Here *pūrva* refers to the section called *Sthirabhāvaparikṣā* (*TS*, verses 350-475). Also see *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, pp. 8ff., for a detailed consideration of the impossibility of successive or simultaneous exertion of the causal function by an eternal real.

31 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The assemblage of conditions is not complete without *kāritra* which is the determinant factor of production and presentness. A *dharma* does not function when it is wanting in *kāritra*. The *kāritra* is conceived as defunct (*uparata*) in the case of the past *dharma*, unrealized *aprāpta* in the case of the future *dharma* and realized-cum-non-defunct (*prāptānuparata*) in the case of the present *dharma*.[1]

32 (i). Sautrāntika—But this would imply that the *kāritra* itself has the three states, viz. past, future and present ; and this means that the *kāritra* has another *kāritra* as the determinant of its past, future and present existence—a contingency which entails fault of infinite regress.[2]

32 (ii). Vaibāṣika—It is admitted that the *kāritra* has no further *kāritra* as its temporal determinant, but it is past, present and future by virtue of itself (*svarūpasattāpekṣayā*).

33 (i). Sautrāntika—Then it will be more reasonable to admit the *dharmas* also as past, present and future by virtue of their own nature and reject the concept of *kāritra* as unnecessary.[3]

33 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The *kāritra* is admitted as neither past, nor present, nor future. In other words, it is admitted as free from temporal determinations.

34 (i). Sautrāntika—It would then transpire to be an eternal entity (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*) and consequently it will be illogical to say 'when a *dharma* does not exercise *kāritra* it is future, or, when it has readily exercised its *kāritra*, it is past, and

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[1] *Cf.* uparatakāritram atītam, aprāptakāritram anāgataṃ prāptānuparatakāritraṃ vartamānam iti—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 26d.

[2] *Cf.* kiṃ kāritrasyā'py anyat kāritram asti yatas tasyā 'tītāditvaṃ kathyate. yady asty anavasthāprasaṃgaḥ.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 27 d. *Cf. TSP* (p. 508) : atha...kāritrasyāpi kāritram abhyupagamyate...anavasthādoṣaḥ......(Although the context here is somewhat different, there is no essential difference of implication).

[3] *Cf.*......athā 'nāgatāditvaṃ kāritrasya svarūpasattāpekṣayā, evaṃ bhāvānām apy anāgatāditvaṃ bhaviṣyati, kiṃ kāritrakalpanayā. *Sphuṭārthā*, V. 27a. *Cf. TSP* (p. 508) : yathā kāritrasya svarūpasattāpekṣayā 'nāgatāditvaṃ vyavasthāpyate, evaṃ bhāvānām apy anāgatāditvaṃ bhaviṣyatī 'ti kiṃ kāritrakalpanayā.

so no', because *kāritra*, being eternal, will be incapable of being exercised.[1] Moreover, as *kāritra* quâ a real separate from *skandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu* is not admitted anywhere in the scripture, it is preposterous on your part to postulate its separate existence.[2]

34 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—Your objections are only imaginary. If we had postulated *kāritra* as an entity separate from the *dharmas*, the admission of a second *kāritra*, or an eternal *kāritra* would have been necessary. But we do not postulate *kāritra* as a separate entity over and above the *dharmas*.

35 (i). Sautrāntika—If *kāritra* is not separate from the *dharma*, then it is the very nature (*svarūpa* or *svabhāva*) of the *dharma*, and as such will transpire to be eternal, like the latter (that is, nature of the *dharma*).[3] And being eternal, it will fail to explain the division of time into past, present and future.[4]

35 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—What fault do you find in our position ? A *dharma* can be distinguished as future, present and past in the following way : A *dharma* which has not appeared as yet is called future; what, having appeared, has not disappeared is called present; and what has disappeared is called past.

36 (i). Sautrāntika—You have asserted that a *dharma* has the same nature in the past and the future as in the present, How do you then distinguish it as past and future ? What was lacking in it formerly when it was in future ? If you say 'it is *kāritra* which was lacking in it', then it will follow that the *dharma* itself was absent in future, because *kāritra* is identical with the *dharma*. And you thus fail to distinguish the existence of the *dharma* in the future. What, again, is lacking in the *dharma* after it has entered the past ? If you again say

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[1] *Cf.* ato na vaktavyaṃ yadā kāritraṃ na karoti dharmas tadā'nāgata iti, kāritrasya kartum aśakyatvaprāpteḥ.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 27 a.

[2] *Cf. TS*, 1798 : skandhādivyatiriktasya kāritrasyo'pavarṇane.
svasiddhāntavirodhaś ca durnivāraḥ prasajyate.

[3] *Cf. TS*, 1799 : ananyatve 'pi kāritraṃ dharmād avyatirekataḥ
svarūpam iva dharmasya prasaktaṃ sārvakālikam.

[4] *Cf. TS*, 1800 : tataś cā 'dhvavibhāgo 'yaṃ tadvaśān na prakalpyate
na hi tasya cyutiḥ prāptir aprāptir vā vibhāgataḥ.

'it is *kāritra* which is lacking in it' then it will follow that the *dharma* itself is absent in the past, because *kāritra* is identical with the *dharma*.[1]

Moreover, if you do not admit that a *dharma* comes into existence after having been nonexistent (*abhūtvā bhavati*, literally, having not been becomes) and also that a *dharma* does not exist after having been existent (*bhūtvā ca punar na bhavati*, literally, having been is not again), the existence of the three times will remain unestablished.[2] For the establishment of the existence of times, it is necessary that they should be distinguished from one another. And as there is no other way of distinguishing things other than defining them, the times should be defined in order to be distinguished. The definitions of the three times, that follow from our discussion, may be formulated thus: what is (existent) after not having been (existent) is present; what is not (existent) after having been (existent) is past; what is not (existent) after having been not (existent) is future. And these definitions establish, beyond doubt, the non-existence of *dharmas* in the past and future, and refute the Sarvāstivādin's fundamental axiom 'what was nonexistent cannot be existent' (*nā 'bhūtvā bhavatī'ti*). Moreover, the axiom 'what was nonexistent cannot be existent' implies that the *dharmas* are eternal, and this certainly goes against the basic Buddhist doctrine of the impermanence of all things, and smacks of Sāṃkhya-Yoga ontology.

36 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—Our principle 'what was non-existent cannot be existent' does not imply eternalism, because we admit all *dharmas* (except the *asaṃskṛtas*) as subject to the four

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[1] kim asya pūrvaṃ nāsīd anāgatāvasthāyam? yadi kāritram, ananyatvād dharma eva nāsīd ity uktaṃ bhavet. kiṃ ca paścān nāsty atītāvasthāyām? yadi kāritram, dharma eva nāstī 'ty uktaṃ bhaved, dharmakāritrayor ananyatvāt.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 27 b-c. *Cf. TS*, 1801:
kāritrāvyatirekād vā dharmaḥ kāritravad bhavet.
pūrvāparavyavacchinna-madhyamātraka-sarvavān.

[2] na sidhyati sarvathā'py adhvatrayaṃ yady abhūtvā bhavatī'ti neṣyate, bhūtvā ca punar na bhavatī'ti.—*AKB*, 27 b-c. See also *Sphuṭārthā*.

characteristics of the conditioned, viz. origination, decay, continuity and impermanence (*saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa-yogān na śāśvatatva-prasaṃgaḥ*). It is alone the essential nature of the *dharma* that is eternal, and not its apparent nature also, though there is no essential difference between the two natures.

37 (i). Sautrāntika—You cannot admit origination and cessation of *dharmas*, because all *dharmas*, according to your doctrine, exist through all the three times.[1] To say that the *dharmas* are eternal and also liable to origination and cessation is evidently a nonsensical proposition (*vācoyukti*) which is a contradiction in terms.[2]

As regards the two natures, essential (metaphysical) and apparent (empirical)[3], the Sautrāntika observes : "The essential-nature (*svabhāva*) of a *dharma* is existent in all times. The apparent-nature again is not different from the essential-nature. This is evidently a fiat of an almighty lord (monarch or despot)."[4]

37 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—We explain origination and cessation of a *dharma* by means of *kāritra*. The *kāritra* is not eternal and so it is subject to origination and cessation. The *kāritra* is also not different from the *dharma* and so its origination and cessation belong to the *dharma* as well.

38 (i). Sautrāntika—This defence also is as absurd as the preceding one. You do not admit *kāritra* as eternal ; the *dharma* however is admitted as eternal; the *kāritra* again is characterized as not different from the *dharma*; this is certainly a whim of an (irrational) god.[5]

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[1] *Cf.* yad apy uktaṃ saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇayogān na śāśvatatva-prasaṃga iti, tad idaṃ kevalaṃ vāṅmātram utpādavināśayor ayogāt.—*AKB*, V. 27 b-c.

[2] *Cf.* nityaṃ ca nāmā 'sti sa dharmo na ca nitya ity apūrvaiṣā vāco yuktiḥ.—*AKB*, V. 27 b-c. The *Sphuṭārthā* explains this as : pūrvāpara-virudhai 'ṣā vāco yuktir ityarthaḥ.

[3] *Vide supra*, § 8, footnote 1.

[4] svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cā'sti bhāvo nityaś ca neṣyate.
na ca svabhāvād bhāvo 'nyo vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam.—*AKB*, V. 27 b-c

[5] *Cf. TS*, 1802 :
kāritraṃ sarvadā nāsti sadā dharmaś ca varṇyate.
dharmān nā 'nyac ca kāritraṃ vyaktaṃ devaviceṣṭitam.

38 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—You have raised all these difficulties because of our admitting the *kāritra* as not different from the *dharma*. You insist that the *kāritra*, if it were not different from the *dharma*, will transpire to be the very nature (*svarūpa*) of the *dharma*, and hence eternal like the latter (*scil.* the nature of the *dharma*). But what is the harm if the *kāritra* is admitted as an attribute (*viśeṣa*) distinct from the nature (*svarūpa*) of the *dharma*, just like the property of resistance (*sapratighatva*), visibility (*sanidarśanatva*) and the like predicated of matter ?[1] The property of resistance and the like belong to matter and yet they are not counted as eternal reals like the nature (*svarūpa*) of matter. Similarly, the *kāritra* also belongs to the *dharma* and yet it need not be admitted as an eternal real like the nature (*svarūpa*) of the *dharma*, inasmuch as it is quite distinct from the nature (*svarūpa*) of the *dharma*. There is thus no contradiction in admitting the *kāritra* as being not different from the *dharma* and at the same time as being not eternal like the nature (*svarūpa*) of the *dharma*. Briefly speaking, although both the nature (*svarūpa*) and the *kāritra* belong to the *dharma* and as such are not different from it, the former (*scil. svarūpa*) is eternal while the latter (*scil. kāritra*) is transitory.

39 (i). Sautrāntika—There is no parity between the *kāritra* and the property of resistance (*sapratighatva*) and the like. You have admitted *kāritra* as only an occasional property of the *dharma*, e. g. when it (*scil.* the *dharma*) is present (*vartamāna*). But resistance is not an occasional property distinct from matter, because the latter is conterminous with the former (*scil.* property of resistance) and is never bereft of it.[2] It is therefore not reasonable to regard *kāritra* as on a par with the property of resistance and the like. The *kāritra* is considered by

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[1] *TS*, 1804 : svarūpād vyatirikto 'pi dṛṣṭaḥ sapratighatvavat.
viśeṣaś ced......

This argument also, like the revised definition of *kāritra* (see footnote to § 28 (ii), *supra*), is ascribed by the *Pañjikā* (p. 508) to Sahantabhadra (?Saṃghabhadra).

[2] *Cf. TS*, 1805 :
na hi sapratighatvādiḥ padārthasyā 'nugāminaḥ.
kādācitko mataḥ kaścid bhāvasyai 'va tathodbhavāt.

you as the differentiating characteristic of the present state of a *dharma* from the past and the future states of it. But the property of resistance and the like are not admitted as differentiating the states of the selfsame *dharma*, inasmuch as the latter is never bereft of the former (*scil.* the property of resistance and the like).

39 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—Of course, the property of resistance is not different from the nature (*svarūpa*) of matter. But is it not a fact that in common parlance we have the usage 'resistance of matter' (*rūpasya sapratighatvam*)—an usage which implies that even a characteristic which is not different from the nature of the characterized can differentiate the latter (*scil.* the characterized) from itself ?[1]

40 (i). Sautrāntika—No. The characteristic under reference does not differentiate the characterized from itself (*scil.* the characteristic) but it differentiates the characterized from things other than the characterized.[2]

40 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—Let us then approach the problem of the relation between the *kāritra* and the *dharma* in a different way.[3] The *kāritra* is not different from the *dharma*, because the nature of the *dharma* is not cognized as distinct from the *kāritra* ; nor is the *kāritra* simply the same as the *dharma* (*dharmamātra*) because the *kāritra* is not universally concomitant with the nature of the *dharma* ; nor is the *kāritra* not a distinct (novel) attribute, because it was nonexistent prior to its origination (*prāgabhāvāt*).[4] The concept of continuum (*santati*) is an

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[1] *Cf. TSP* (p. 509) : kathaṃ rūpasya sapratighatvam iti vyatirekī 'va vyapdeśo yadi svarūpāvyatirikto dharmo bhedako na bhaved iti.

[2] *Cf. TS*, 1806. We have given only the central idea of the text, and not its literal meaning.

[3] This novel approach to the problem is ascribed to Ācārya Sahantabhadra (? Saṃghabhadra). See *TSP* (p. 509). It admits *anekānta* or *bhedābheda* as the solution of the problem of relation. For other novelties introduced by the same Ācārya see footnote 1, § 38(ii) and footnote to § 28(ii), *supra*.

[4] Cf. *TSP* (p. 509) : na kāritraṃ dharmād anyat, tadvyatirekeṇa svabhāvānupalabdheḥ ; nā'pi dharmamātram, svabhāvāstitve 'pi kadācid abhāvāt ; na ca na viśeṣaḥ, kāritrasya prāgabhāvāt,

illustration in point. The origination of *dharmas* in unbroken succession is called continuum (*santati*). This continuum is not distinct from the *dharmas*, because it is not cognized as distinct from them ; nor is it simply the same as the *dharmas*, because in that case a single moment of *dharma* will transpire to be the continuum ; nor is it not existent, because we find it producing its effect (in the next moment). In other words, the *kāritra*, like the continuum, is neither identical with nor different from the *dharma*, and yet it is. The *kāritra* can thus be the criterion of the distinction of times much like the continuum which is admitted to produce effect although both the *kāritra* and the continuum are not as real as the *dharma*.[1]

41 (i). Sautrāntika—You now admit *kāritra* as neither identical with nor different from the *dharma*. This means that the *kāritra* is neither real nor unreal. It is thus only provisionally real (*sāṃvṛta*) and is a mere concept (*kalpita*). Being a mere concept, it cannot exert any causal function. As regards the continuum (*santati* or *santāna*), it has also no causal function as you suppose it to have. The *kāritra* therefore cannot be regarded as the criterion of the distinction between the three times.

41 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—Let the *kāritra* be only conceptually real (*prajñaptisat*), and consequently let the distinction between the three times have also a similar reality.

42 (i). Sautrāntika—No, this is not possible. You have defined *kāritra* as the function of *phalākṣepa* (also called *phalapratigraha*[2], literally, acquisition of effectivity), that is, capacity to become the condition of the effect, concomitant and otherwise, and how can that capacity be only conceptually

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[1] *Cf. TSP* (p. 509) : (Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra) āha ca :
santatikāryaṃ 'ce 'ṣṭaṃ na vidyate sā 'pi santatiḥ kācit.
tadvad avagaccha yuktyā kāritreṇā 'dhvasaṃsiddhim.
For other views of Bhadanta Sahantabhadra, see footnote 3, §40(ii) *supra*.

[2] *Vide supra*, § 26 (ii).

real? It must be essentially real and consequently the distinction of the three times should also be accepted real in essence.

Moreover, how can you assert that the past or the future fire is unqualifiedly (*nirviśiṣṭam*) the same as the present fire which alone is found to exercise the function of burning, cooking and the like?

42 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The *dharma* (say fire) is not unqualifiedly (*nirviśiṣṭam*) the same because while passing through the three times it appropriates a different state (*avasthā*) each time it gives up the previous one.[1]

43 (i). Sautrāntika—Are those states (*avasthās*) different from the *dharma*?

43 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—No, because if they (*scil.* the states) were different, the *dharmas* will be incapable of all causal function. It is due to the existence of these states that the causal function is possible.

44 (i). Sautrāntika—You admit identity between the *dharma* and its states. But how can these transitory states—which, after having not been, become and cease to be—be identical with the *dharma* which is regarded by you as always existent through the three times?[2] Their identity will result in either the eternality of the states or the pre-and post-nonexistence of the *dharma*—neither of which contingencies is desirable for you.

44 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—What is the difficulty if we assert that the *dharma* is always existent, and at the same time admit that it has no causal efficiency in its future and past states of existence and acquires such efficiency only in its present state of existence.

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[1] *Cf. TS*, 1814:
ekāvasthāparityāge parāvasthāparigrahāt.
nai 'vai 'tan nirviśiṣṭaṃ ced vastv adhvasv iti kalpyate.

[2] *Cf. TS.*, 1816:
abhedam anumanyante katham adhvasu vastunaḥ.
tā abhūtvā bhavantyaś ca naśyantyaś ca tadātmikāḥ.

45 (i). Sautrāntika—Only that is really existent which has the causal efficiency. What is causally efficient is not existent in the future and the past states. And what is existent in the future and the past states is incapable of any causal efficiency.[1] The future and the past existents therefore are mere names and nothing but nonentities.

45 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The past *sabhāgahetu* and the like have the capacity for *phaladāna* (discharge of effectivity)[2] and so your contention that what is existent in the past is incapable of causal efficiency is not valid.

46 (i). Sautrāntika—Your conception of the past is defective. You have to admit that the past comes into existence after having been nonexistent and consequently your 'past' transpires to be 'present'. What comes into existence after having been nonexistent, or, what is only an occasional event is 'present'; your 'past' satisfies this definition and therefore it is also 'present'.[3] What is produced by causes and conditions (*hetupratyayajanita*) is present, and what is only occasional (*kādācitka*) must be produced by causes and conditions. The conclusion therefore follows that what is occasional is present, and conversely what is present is occasional.

Moreover, if all the *dharmas*—past, present and future—are always existent in essence, how are they to be distinguished from the *asaṃskṛta* (unconditioned) *dharmas* such as the *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*[4] and the like which are postulated by you as eternal entities. Your defence[5] of the conditioned *dharmas* as not eternal on account of their being subject to the four characteristics of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*), viz. *jāti* (origination), *jarā* (decay), *sthiti* (continuity) and *anityatā* (impermanence) is also futile. What peculiar factor (*viśeṣa*) does *jāti* produce in the *dharma*, which (*scil.* peculiar factor) is responsible for it (*scil.* *jāti*) being called originator.[1] Is that peculiar factor different from the *dharma*, or identical with it? It is certainly not identical with the *dharma*; because that will make the peculiar factor eternal and hence incapable of being produced. Nor can it be different from the *dharma*, because in that case the of-relation between them (*scil.* the peculiar factor and the *dharma*) will remain unestablished, that is to say, it will be improper to assert that the peculiar factor belongs to that *dharma* and not to anything else. Relation between two terms can be only of two kinds, viz. identity between them (*tādātmya*) or production of the one from the other (*tadutpatti*). You cannot admit any of these relations between the *dharma* and the peculiar factor. You cannot admit the relation of mutual identity, because you regard the one as different from the other. Nor can you admit the production of the peculiar factor from the *dharma*, because it (*scil.* the peculiar factor) is admitted by you to have been produced by the characteristic, viz. *jāti* (origination or originator). If, on the other hand, you admit the production of the peculiar factor from the *dharma*, the former (*scil.* the peculiar factor) will be produced eternally by the *dharma* (because the *dharma* is eternal), and consequently your postulation of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa* called *jāti* will be futile.[2] Moreover, your postulation of fresh production of the peculiar factor involves the admission of an effect which was nonexistent prior to its production.[3] The characteristic of *jāti* is thus found to be a futile postulate. The other three characteristics, viz. *jarā* (decay), *sthiti* (continuity) and *anityatā* (impermanence) can also be proved to be futile by similar arguments based on the relation between the *dharma* and the peculiar factors produced by these characteristics.

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[1] *Cf. TS*, 1821 :
sa eva bhāviko bhāvo ya evā 'yaṃ kriyākṣamaḥ.
sa ca nāsti tayor yo'sti na tasmāt kāryasambhavaḥ.

[2] *Vide supra* § 26 (ii).

[3] *Cf. TS*, 1822 :
atītaś ca padārtho 'yam abhūtvā bhavanāt sphuṭam.
vartamāno 'nyavat prāptaḥ kādācitkatayā 'pi ca.

[4] *Vide supra*, § 1, footnote 1.

[5] *Vide supra*, footnote 1 in § 5, and § 36 (ii).

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[1] *Cf. TSP* (p. 513) : tatra jātis tāvat kaṃ viśeṣaṃ janayantī satī asya rupāder janike 'ty abhidhīyate.

[2] *Cf. TSP* (p. 513) : atha tadutpattir abhyupagamyate, tanmātrabhāvino viśeṣasya nityotpattiprasaṃgāj jātiḥ kiṃkarī syāt.

[3] *Cf. TSP* (p. 514) : kiṃ ca tasyā 'tiśayasya pūrvam asattvād asatkāryam abhyupagataṃ bhavet.

46 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—We do not take *jāti* and the other characteristics of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*) in the sense in which you have taken them to be. What transfers the *dharmas* from their futurity to presentness is *jāti*.[1] The functions of *jarā*, *sthiti* and *anityatā* are also to be similarly understood. These four characteristics again have the characteristics of *jāti-jāti*, *jarā-jarā*, *sthiti-sthiti* and *anityatā-anityatā* respectively, which are called sub-characteristics (*anulakṣaṇa*). These eight together with the *dharma* form an aggregate of causally related factors, and their causal relation is as follows: The *jāti* produces the other eight factors, while the *jāti-jāti* produces the *jāti* alone; similarly the *jarā* produces the other eight factors, while the *jarā-jarā* produces the *jarā* alone; and so on.[2] These eight factors are as real as the *dharma*, and are causally related with one another and the *dharma* in the way just stated. The contingency of the production of a peculiar factor and the consequential issue therefore do not arise at all.

47 (i). Sautrāntika—The *jāti*, you say, is as real as the *dharma*. It must then be existent in all times—future, present and past. Why do not then the future *jātis* produce all the future *dharmas* at once and make them give up their futurity and become present ?[3]

47 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—*Jāti* means power of production. It cannot produce its effect without the assemblage of the relevant *hetus* (causes) and *pratyayas* (conditions).[4]

48. Sautrāntika—You should then admit the assemblage alone of the relevant causes and conditions as efficient enough to produce the effect. What is then the necessity of admitting *jāti* as a separate factor ?

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[1] *Cf. AKB*, II. 45c-d. jātir hi yā saṃskārān anāgatād adhvanaḥ pratyutpannam adhvānaṃ saṃcārayati.

[2] *Cf. AKB*, II. 46b : ātmanā navamo hi dharma utpadyate sārdhaṃ lakṣaṇānulakṣaṇair aṣṭābhiḥ tatra jātir ātmānaṃ virahayyā 'nyān aṣṭān dharmān janayati. jātijātiḥ punas tām eva jātim..... ...

[3] *Cf. AKB*, II. 46c-d : api ca yady anāgatā jātir janyasya janikā, kimarthaṃ sarvam anāgataṃ yugapan no'tpadyate.

[4] *Cf. AK*, 46 c-d : janyasya janikā jātir na hetupratyayair vinā.

Moreover, there are other general difficulties in your position. Are the past and future *dharmas* momentary or not? If they are momentary, each of them will have three states—future, present and past; the moment of origination will be the present and the preceding and the following moments will respectively be the future and the past states. This certainly involves confusion of times. If, on the other hand, they are admitted to be eternal, you will be repudiating the fundamental scriptural principle that all *dharmas* are momentary.[1]

There is yet another problem which you have to solve in order to establish the reality of the past and future *dharmas*. Do these past and future *dharmas* have any causal efficiency? If they have, they transpire to be present, because it is the present alone which have causal efficiency. If, however, you do not admit them to be present, then, being devoid of causal efficiency, the past and future *dharmas* will turn out to be pure nonentities like sky-flower.[2] If, on the other hand, the past and future *dharmas* are admitted by you to have no causal efficiency, then they are absolutely futile and unreal on your own admission, and deserve no consideration.[3]

49. So far the Sautrāntika had been advancing arguments in order to prove the nonexistence of the past and future *dharmas* and now he addresses himself to the task of refuting the proofs, if any, in favour of the existence of the past and future *dharmas*, and introduces the problem as follows:[4] "The existential probanses can prove the probanda if the subject of the two (*scil.* probanses and probanda) is real; such probanses prove—if they prove anything at all—the presentness alone (and not

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[1] *Vide TS*, 1831-33.

[2] *Vide TS*, 1835-6.

[3] *Cf. TS*, 1842: atha nā 'rthakriyāśaktis teṣām abhyupagamyate.
yady evam ata evai 'ṣām asattvaṃ vyomapuṣpavat.

[4] *Cf. TSP* (p. 516): evaṃ tāvad atītānāgatānām asattāsādhakaṃ pramāṇam abhidhāya sattāsādhakaṃ pramāṇam apākartum āha hetava ityādi.

hetavo bhāvadharmās tu nā 'siddhe siddhibhāginaḥ
vartamānatvasiddher vā viruddhā dharmibādhanāt.
—*TS*, 1843. See also the *Pañjikā* on it.

futurity and pastness) of the *dharmas* and thus have the probative force only in respect of the opposite conclusion, inasmuch as they repudiate the intended subjects (viz. the past and future *dharmas*)." The Vaibhāṣika philosopher's intention is to prove the reality of the past and future *dharmas*, and he advances existential probanses in favour of his position. But the probanses can belong to the past and future *dharmas* if the latter are proved to be real in advance. The Sautrāntika contends that the Vaibhāṣika seeks to prove that eternal facts exist and also the so called conditioned *dharmas* exist through the three times, that is, eternally. Apart from the technical distinction between the two categories—which reminds one of the Sāṃkhya's distinction between the unchanging eternal, viz. *puruṣa* and the changing eternal, viz. *prakṛti* (primordial matter)—it should be stated at the outset that no amount of argument can prove the existence of a fact. Dharmakīrti has shown that all such arguments are bound to be fallacious. The probans, if it be of existential character, will be unproved because it can belong only to an *existent* subject whose existence is being sought to be inferred. If the probans be nonexistential, it will only prove the nonexistence of the subject. If it be neither definitely existential nor nonexistential, but indefinite, it will prove nothing, that is, neither existence nor nonexistence.[1] The existential propositions proceed from the postulate that existence is an attribute like white or black or sweet or sour. The proposition 'the cat exists' is only a pseudo-proposition.

50. As has been shown by Professor Broad, the affirmative existential propositions are bound to be platitudes if analysed like affirmative characterizing propositions.[2] Such propositions

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[1] *Cf.* nā'siddher bhāvadharmo 'sti vyabhicāry ubhayāśrayaḥ.
dharmo viruddho 'bhāvasya sā sattā sādhyate katham.
—*Pramāṇavārttika*, III. 190-1.

[2] *Cf.* "Now consider the two affirmative propositions *Cats scratch* and *Cats exist*. On the conditional interpretation the former would be expressed by the sentence 'If there were any cats, none of them would fail to scratch'. On the instantial interpretation it would be expressed by the sentence 'There are cats, and none of them fail to scratch'. Suppose you try to express the affirmative existential proposition in the same way. On the first alternative it would be

however are certainly not mere platitudes. They are substantial propositions which might very well be denied by persons who do not believe in the objects whose existence they seek to prove. These propositions are not about the objects, but about the characteristics of those objects. Thus the proposition 'The past and future objects exist' means 'The defining characteristics of past and future objects apply to something'; similarly, 'The unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) elements exist' is equivalent to 'The defining characteristics of the unconditioned elements apply to something'; and so on.[1]

51. The Vaibhāṣika philosopher now revives his first argument[2] based on scriptural texts in order to prove the existence of past and future *dharmas*.

V (i). THE FIRST ARGUMENT

52 (i). Vaibhāṣika—How do you explain the assignment of the elements to the three times by our Master? How do you also justify our Master's statement[3] 'the past act is, the future fruit is'? Good and bad acts done in the past will produce good and bad fruits in the future. How do you explain the function of the past act and the origination of the future fruit unless you admit the real existence of the past and the future elements?

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expressed by the sentence 'If there were any cats, none of them would fail to exist'. On the second alternative it would be expressed by the sentence 'There are cats, and none of them fail to exist'. Now both these sentences are mere platitudes."—Broad: *Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research* (New York, 1953), p. 182.

[1] This interpretation is based on the following passage from Professor Broad (*op. cit.*, p. 183): "These propositions (*Cats exist, Dragons do not exist*) are not about cats or dragons, i.e. about *things* which have the cat-characteristics or the dragon-characteristics. They are about these *characteristics* themselves. What they assert is that these characteristics do apply to something or that they do not apply to anything, as the case may be. 'Cats exist' is equivalent to 'The defining characteristics of the word 'cat' apply to something'. Again 'Dragons do not exist' is equivalent to 'The defining characteristics of the word 'dragon' do not apply to anything'."

[2] There are in total four arguments based on scripture and reason. *Vide supra*, § 5 (i) to § 5 (iv).

[3] Saṃyukta, XIII. 21. See *Poussin*, Chapitre V, p. 58, footnote 2.

52 (ii). Sautrāntika—'Past' means what has already occurred and 'future' means what will occur on the occurrence of the conditions.[1] 'The past act is' means 'the past act happened', 'the future fruit is' means 'the future fruit will occur'. The meaning of the expression 'is' is to be variously understood according to the context and not uniformly as implying the real existence of what has occurred in the past and what will occur in future.[2] The past and future therefore are not existent in the sense in which the present is existent. The existence of the present is factual, while the existence of the past and the future is only conceptual.

53 (i). Vaibhāṣika—We do not maintain that the past and future exist in the same sense in which the present is said to exist.

53 (ii). Sautrāntika—If they do not exist like the present, how do they exist ?

54 (i). Vaibhāṣika—The past exists as past and the future exists as future.[3]

54 (ii). Sautrāntika—Why do you call them past and future if they always exist ?[4] The statement of the Buddha 'the past (act) is, the future (result) is', therefore, is to be understood in a different sense. The Master said 'the past is' in order to refute the doctrine which denied the causal efficiency of good and bad acts done in the past, and he said 'the future is' in order to refute the doctrine that the good and bad results are not the fruits of good and bad acts.[5] In fact, 'the past is' means 'the

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[1] atītaṃ tu yad bhūtapūrvam, anāgataṃ yat sati hetau bhaviṣyatī'ti.—*AKB*, V. 27c. *Cf. TS*, 1844 :

bhūtvā yad vigataṃ rūpaṃ tad atītaṃ prakāśitam.
sati pratyayasākalye bhāvi yat tad anāgatam.

[2] evaṃ ca kṛtvā 'stīty ucyate, na tu punar dravyataḥ.—*AKB*, V. 27c. *Cf. TS*, 1846.

[3] atītānāgatāmanā—*AKB*, V. 27c.

[4] kathaṃ tad atītam anāgataṃ co 'cyate yadi nityam asti.—*Ibid.*

[5] bhūtapūrvasya ca hetor bhāvinaś ca phalasya bhūtapūrvatāṃ bhāvitāṃ ca jñāpayituṃ hetuphalāpavāda-dṛṣṭi-pratiṣedhārtham uktaṃ bhagavatā 'asty atītam anāgatam iti'.—*AKB*, V. 27c, See also the *Sphuṭārthā*.

past was' and 'the future is' means 'the future will be'; this is due to the peculiar usage of the expression 'is' which, in the present context, is a particle standing for any of the three tenses.[1] In common parlance, people say "there is pre-nonexistence of light (before it has been kindled); there is post-nonexistence of light (when it is extinguished); there is the extinguished (*niruddha*) light which was not extinguished by me".[2] These usages of 'is' however do not imply the real existence of the pre-nonexistence of light or the post-nonexistence of light or the extinguished light. The Buddha used the expression 'is' in a general sense and not in order to establish the eternal existence of the past act and the future result.

55 (i). Vaibhāṣika—We admit that the light, even when extinguished, is, and so the usages mentioned are representative of the true states of things.[3]

55 (ii). Sautrāntika—Yes, it is, but it is not as light. The existence (is-ness) of past and future is also to be understood in this way. They do not continue to exist (be) in the sense in which the present exists, because in that case the past and future would be identical with the present and consequently their identity would vanish.[4]

56 (i). Vaibhāṣika—Why did then our Master, addressing the Laguḍaśikhīyaka ascetics in connection with the perpetration of an *ānantarya* act (murder of a *bodhisattva*), declare: "The act is past, is done, is finished, is gone, has ceased, but nevertheless, it *is*"? Did they deny that the act was really done

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Cf. TS, 1852 a-b: ucchedadṛṣṭināśāya cai 'vaṃ śāstrā prakāśitam. This is however said in *TS* in connection with the fourth argument based on the causality of *karman*.

[1] *Cf.* āsīd atītaṃ bhaviṣyaty anāgatam iti vaktavye 'stī'ti vacanam astiśabdasya nipātatvāt. trikāla-viṣayo hi nipātaḥ. āsīdarthe bhaviṣyadarthe 'pi vartate.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 27c.

[2] yathā 'sti dīpasya prāg abhāvo 'sti paścād abhāva iti vaktāro bhavanti; yathā cā'sti niruddhaḥ sa dīpo na tu mayā nirodhita iti.—*AKB*, V. 27c.

[3] *Cf.* nanu ca Vaibhāṣikasya niruddho 'py asāv astīti.—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 27c.

[4] (In continuation of the passage of footnote 2) evam atītānāgatam apy astī 'ty uktam. anyathā hy atītānāgatabhāva eva na sidhyet.—*AKB*, V. 27c. The *Sphuṭārthā* says: yadi tenai 'va lakṣaṇena vidyetā 'tītānāgata eva na sidhyet.

in the past ?[1] They certainly admitted that the act was done in the past, but they did not admit that the act continued to exist in its essence. It is only to impress upon the ascetics the *real existence of the past act* that our Master addressed them thus. The past act therefore exists in essence (*svabhāvena*).

56 (ii). Sautrāntika—You have misunderstood the intention of the Master. 'The past act is' is intended to mean 'the retributive force generated by the past act in the continuum (i.e. the individual who committed the act) is'.[2] The past good or bad act has produced a mental disposition which does not become entirely defunct. It leavens every consciousness–moment and produces its facsimile in the series of consciousness–moments, each moment anew. The moral force becomes extinct only when its consequence, good or bad, is actually produced. It does not mean the persistence of the identical disposition (*vāsanā*). A repetition of similar disposition squarely meets the demands of the moral law. As has been repeatedly shown, the admission of an identical unvariant fact is repugnant to the fundamental doctrine of the Buddha. The past act cannot continue to exist bodily, because that would imply its eternal presence and denude it of its pastness, and consequently the past will be a hollow concept. This is the only way in which the above declaration of the Master can be properly understood, because the Master has said in the *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra* : "The eye, O Monks, being born, does not come from anywhere ; perishing, it does not accumulate anywhere. Thus, O Monks, the eye, having not been, becomes; and, having been, ceases"[3]—a

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[1] yat tarhi Laguḍaśikhīyakān parivrājakān adhikṛtyo 'ktaṃ bhagavatā yat karmā 'bhyatītaṃ kṣīṇaṃ niruddhaṃ vigataṃ vipariṇataṃ tad astī'ti kiṃ te tasya karmaṇo bhūtapūrvatvaṃ necchanti sma ?—*AKB*, V. 27c-d. See also the *Sphuṭārthā*.

[2] *Cf.* tatra punas tadāhitaṃ tasyāṃ santatau phaladānasāmarthyaṃ sandhāyo 'ktam.—*AKB*, V. 27b-c.

[3] itthaṃ cai 'tad evaṃ yataḥ *Paramārthaśūnyatāyām* uktaṃ bhagavatā 'cakṣur bhikṣava utpadyamānaṃ na kutaścid āgacchati. nirudhyamānaṃ na kvacit saṃnicayaṃ gacchatī 'ti hi bhikṣavaś cakṣur abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca prativigacchatī 'ti.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b. See *Poussin*, Ch. V, p. 59, footnote 3. *Cf. TS*, 1852 c-d : anyathā *Śūnyatāsūtre* deśanā nīyate katham. See the *Pañjikā* where the text is quoted.

declaration which explicitly denounces the future and past existence of things.

57 (i). Vaibhāṣika—Can we not interpret the clause 'having not been, becomes' as 'having not been *in the present time*, becomes present' ?[1] Thus interpreted, the text will imply the existence of the eye in the future.

57 (ii). Sautrāntika—No. Time is not an entity different from the thing.[2] What we call present time is the same as the present thing (*ya eva vartamāno 'dhvā sa eva bhāvaḥ*). 'Having not been in the present time' will therefore mean 'having not been in the present thing'. This is evidently a contradiction in terms.

58 (i). Vaibhāṣika—Can we not then interpret the proposition 'having not been, becomes' as 'having not been in itself, becomes (*svātmany abhūtvā bhavati*)' ?

58 (ii). Sautrāntika—This will go against yourself, because this will establish beyond doubt the nonexistence of the eye in the future.[3]

Moreover, if all the good and bad acts and their fruits were eternal, their causal relation will be abrogated and the truths of suffering (*duḥkha*) and its cause (*samudaya*), along with the other two truths (vig. *mārga* and *nirvāṇa*) will transpire to be vain concepts. And this will evidently mean the total denial of all spiritual values promulgated by the Master.[4]

59. The Vaibhāṣika now revives the second part of the first argument.

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[1] vartamāne 'dhvany abhūtvā bhavatī'ti cet.—*AKB*, V. 27a-b. *Cf. TSP* (p. 518) : vartamāne 'dhvany abhūtvā bhavatī' ti cet.

[2] na. adhvano bhāvād anarthāntaratvāt.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b.

[3] atha svātmany abhūtvā bhavati, siddham anāgataṃ cakṣur nāstī 'ti.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b.

Cf. TSP (pp. 518-9) : atha svātmany abhūtvā bhavati, tathā siddham anāgataṃ cakṣur nāstī 'ti.

[4] *Cf. TSP* (p. 519) : api ca ṡadāvasthitatve saṃskārāṇām...... sādhvī. *Cf.* also *TS*, 1841 :

svargāpavarga-saṃsarga-yatno'yam aphalas tataḥ.
īhāsādhyaṃ na kiñciddhi phalam atro 'palakṣyate.

59 (i). Vaibhāṣika—But how do you explain the distinction of the past and the future elements in the supernormal vision of the *yogins ?*

59 (ii). Sautrāntika—The *yogins* intuit the present as the direct-cum-indirect effect and cause of the past and the future respectively.[1] And afterwards, by means of pure yet mundane (*śuddha-laukika*) knowledge which is conceptual (*vikalpānugata*) and as such without any real epistemological object, they enter into the causal past and the resultant future, and their sermons regarding the past and future events owe their origin to this process.[2] The sermons of the *tathāgata* however reveal themselves automatically without any conscious effort on the part of the *tathāgata,* because his intuition is free from all kinds of conceptual ideation (*kalpanā*) and as such cannot be the source of sermons which are *ipso facto* imperfect.[3]

V (ii). THE SECOND ARGUMENT

60. The Sautrāntika has now refuted the first argument of the Vaibhāṣika based on scriptural texts. Now he takes up his second argument which is also, like the first, based on scriptural texts for cosideration. The necessity of two factors, viz. the sense-organ or mind on the one hand, and the object on the other, is laid down in the scripture with reference to objective (*sālambana*) cognitions alone. But objectless cognition also is possible.[4] And so the contention of the Vaibhāṣika is baseless. The Sautrāntika's refutation of the Vaibhāṣika view is as follows :

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[1] pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā kāryakāraṇatāṃ gatam.
yad rūpaṃ vartamānasya tad vijānanti yoginaḥ.—*TS*. 1853.

[2] *Cf.* anugacchanti paścāc ca vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ.
śuddhalaukikavijñānais tattvato 'viṣayair api.
taddhetuphalayor bhūtāṃ bhāvinīṃ cai'va santatim.
tām āśritya pravartante 'tītānāgatadeśanāḥ.—*TS*, 1854-5.

[3] *Cf.* samastakalpanājāla-rahita-jñānasantateḥ.
tathāgatasya vartante 'nābhogenai 'va deśanāḥ.—*TS*, 1856.

The *vikalpa* in verse 1854 and *kalpanā* in verse 1856 stand for *avidyā*, though we have translated them as conceptual knowledge and ideation for want of a better equivalent. *Cf. TSP* (p. 519) :
vikalpaḥ svayam evāyam avidyārūpatāṃ gataḥ.
svākāraṃ bāhyarūpeṇa yasmād āropya vartate.

[4] *Cf. TSP* (p. 517) : dvividhaṃ hi vijñānaṃ sālambanam anālambanaṃ ca. yat sālambanaṃ tad abhisandhāya dvyāśraya-vijñānadeśanā bhagavataḥ.

61. The second argument based on an analysis of the epistemological situation on the authority of the scriptural texts is also, according to the Sautrāntika, not convincing. Cognition is caused by two factors—(i) the cognizing sense-organ or mind and (ii) the epistemological object, sensuous or mental (technically known as *dharma*). We are here concerned with the cognizing mind and the mental object. The Vaibhāṣika's contention is that whatever can cause mental cognition has objective existence. His argument is: the mental cognition is caused by the mind and its object which is called *dharma*; the mind has objective existence and similarly the object (past or future or present) of the mental cognition must also have objective existence. But is the mental object (i.e. the object of mental cognition), past or future or present, the cause of the mental cognition in the same sense in which the mind is the cause of the latter (*scil.* mental cognition)? Certainly it is not. The mind is the generator (*janaka*) condition of the mental cognition; but the mental object is merely the epistemological datum (*ālambanamātra*) of it. How can an object that will occur in the remote future or will never occur at all be the generator condition of the cognition?[1] How can the effect (viz. the mental cognition) precede the cause (viz. its object which will arise later on)? Similarly *nirvāṇa* which puts stop to all sorts of activity cannot be *ipso facto* a generator condition of the mental congition of itself (*scil. nirvāṇa*), though it can be the epistemological datum of the latter (*scil.* mental cognition under reference).[2] It follows therefore that the past and future objects and *nirvāṇa*, though they can be the epistemological data of a mental cognition, are not its generator conditions and as such do not enjoy objective existence like the mind which is a generator condition of such cognition. Their

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[1] yan manaḥ pratītya dharmāṃś co 'tpadyate manovijñānam, kiṃ tasya yathā mano janakaḥ pratyaya evaṃ dharmā āhosvid ālam-
banamātraṃ dharmā iti. yadi tāvaj janakaḥ pratyayo dharmāḥ, kathaṃ yad āgataṃ kalpasahasreṇa bhaviṣyati vā na vā tad idānīṃ vijñānaṃ janayiṣyati.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b.

[2] nirvāṇam ca sarvapravṛttinirodhāj janakaṃ no 'papadyate.—*Ibid.*

status is thus quite different from what are objectively existent facts. They are mere epistemological data. There is no difficulty in admitting past and future objects as mere epistemological data bereft of any ontological status.[1]

62 (i). Vaibhāṣika—If the past or the future object does not exist how can it function even as an epistemological datum ?

62 (ii). Sautrāntika—It exists in the manner in which it functions as the epistemological datum.[2]

63 (i). Vaibhāṣika—What is the manner in which it functions as an epistemological object ?

63 (ii). Sautrāntika—It is cognized as past and as future (*abhūd bhaviṣyati ce'ti*), that is, as object which became present in the past or which will become present in the future.[3]

64 (i). Vaibhāṣika—How do you know that it is cognized as past and future and not as present ?

64 (ii). Sautrāntika—Because nobody perceives a past *rūpa* (material form) or feels a past *vedanā*, while remembering it, as present (*astī'ti*), but he always cognizes it as past (*abhūd iti*).[4] Similarly the future is cognized as what will be and not as what is.

Moreover, if the past and the future *rūpas* were cognized as present and also if they exist in the same manner in which the present exists, then they would turn out to be present (and not past and future) ; and if they do not exist in the manner of the present and are thus nonexistent, it will follow that the nonexistent may also function as the epistemological object (*ālambana*).[1]

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[1] *Cf.* athā 'lambanamātraṃ dharmā bhavanti, atītānāgatam apyālambanaṃ bhavatī 'ti brūmaḥ.—*Ibid.*

[2] yathā tad ālmbanaṃ tathā 'sti.—*Ibid.*

[3] *Cf.* abhūd bhavisyati ce 'ti.—*Ibid.* The *Sphuṭārthā* explains it as : yad vartamānāvasthāyāṃ rūpam abhūd bhaviṣyati ca tad ālambanam ity arthaḥ.

[4] *Cf.* na hi kaścid atītaṃ rūpam vedanāṃ vā smarann astī'ti paśyati, kiṃ tarhi abhūd iti. yathā khalv api vartamānaṃ rūpam anubhūtaṃ tathā tad atītaṃ smaryate. yathā cā 'nāgataṃ vartamānaṃ bhaviṣyati tathā buddhyā gṛhyate.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b.

65 (i). Vaibhāṣika—Is it not possible to say that the present itself, in its state of disintegration (*vikīrṇam*), is called past and future ?[2]

65 (ii). Sautrāntika—No, because we do not cognize the disintegrated atoms (*vikīrṇasyā 'grahaṇāt*). We do never apprehend that the *rūpa* which was not disintegrated before has become disintegrated now. Moreover, if it is admitted that the same *rūpa* which is a conglomerate at present had been and will be in a state of disintegrated atoms and so is unamenable to perception when it is past or future, that will involve the postulation of eternal atoms. This will simply be an acceptance of the Ājīvika view which postulates mere integration and disintegration of atoms without any real origination or cessation.[3] Such eternalism also goes against the following declaration of the Master : "The eye, O monks, being born, does not come from anywhere; perishing, it does not accumulate anywhere. Thus, O monks, the eye, having not been, becomes; and, having been, ceases."[4] Besides, you cannot admit disintegration of the non-material factors, such as feeling (*vedanā*), idea (*saṃjñā*) and the like, which are not conglomerates of atoms.[5] These (*scil. vedanā* and the like) are however remembered as having been originated and perceived in the past.[6] Your theory, therefore, that the present itself, when disintegrated, is called past and future, does not explain the nature of the past and future non-material factors. And consequently you have to admit that the episte-

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[1] *Cf.* yadi ca tat tathaivāsti, vartamānaṃ prāpnoti ; atha nāsti asad apy ālambanaṃ bhavatī'ti siddham.—*Ibid.*

[2] tad eva tad vikīrṇam iti cet.—*Ibid.* The *Sphuṭārthā* explains it as : yad eva tad vartamānaṃ tad eva vikīrṇam atītānāgatam.

[3] *Cf.* yadi ca tat tad eva rūpaṃ kevalaṃ. paramāṇuśo vibhaktam, evaṃ sati paramāṇavo nityāḥ prāpnuvanti. parmāṇu-sañcaya-vibhāga-mātraṃ cai 'vaṃ sati prāpnoti, na tu kiṃcid utpadyate nā 'pi nirudhyata ity *Ājīvikavāda* ālambito bhavati.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b.

[4] *Vide supra*, §56 (ii), footnote 3.

[5] aparamāṇusañcitānāṃ vedanādīnāṃ kathaṃ viprakīrṇatvam.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b.

[6] te'pi ca yathotpannānubhūtāḥ smaryante.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b,

mological objects of memory and prevision are either (i) as they appear when present, that is, eternal or (ii) nonexistent.[1]

V (iii). THE THIRD ARGUMENT

66. The Sautrāntika now takes up the third argument, which is a corollary of the second, of the Vaibhāṣika for refutation.

67. The Sautrāntika has sought to prove that the past and future objects are nonexistent and yet they can function as epistemological data. He will then have to admit, according to the Vaibhāṣika, a thirteenth *āyatana* consisting of those nonexistent objects functioning as epistemological data, in addition to the twelve *āyatanas*[2] propounded in the scriptural texts. He however tries to avoid the contingency by postulating the possibility of an objectless cognition. This will become apparent from the following discussion.

68 (i). Sautrāntika—What is, according to you, the object of the cognition expressed by the judgment 'there is no thirteenth *āyatana*' ?

68 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The object (*ālambana*) here is the very name 'thirteenth *āyatana*'.[3]

69 (i). Sautrāntika—In that case the name itself should have been cognized as nonexistent.[4] But this is not the fact. And consequently you have to admit that pure nonexistence can be an object of cognition—an admission which goes against your fundamental position that the nonexistent cannot be the object of cognition.

Besides, what is the object (*ālambana*) of the cognition which cognizes the pre-nonexistence of sound ?[5]

69 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The sound itself is the object (*śabda evā 'lambanam*).

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[1] yadi ca te tathai'va santi, nityāḥ prāpnuvanti. atha na santi, asad apy ālambanam iti siddham.—*Ibid.*

[2] *Vide The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 6 ff, on the nature of *āyatanas.*

[3] etad eva nāmā 'lambanam.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b.

[4] evaṃ tarhi nāmai 'va nāstī' ti pratīyeta.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b.

[5] yaś ca śabdasya prāgabhāvam ālambate, kiṃ tasyālambanam ?—*Ibid.*

70 (i). Sautrāntika—If so, the cognition which has the pre-nonexistence of sound as its object will have sound as its object, which is a contradiction in terms. This will further imply that a person who intends to enjoy silence (absence of sound) should make noise (sound) itself.[1] This is certainly fantastic.

70 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The sound in its future state (*anāgatāvasthā*) is the epistemological object, and so your objection is only imaginary.

71 (i). Sautrāntika—If the sound in its future state, which is a positive fact, is the object, why does the cognition appear to have a negative fact, viz. the pre-nonexistence of sound, as its object ?[2]

71 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—Because the positive fact has also a negative aspect, viz. its nonexistence in the present time (*vartamāno nāstī'ti*).

72 (i). Sautrāntika—No, the negative aspect is identical with the positive fact and there is no *raison d'être* for the origination of the cognition of a negative fact.[3]

72 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The negative aspect is not identical with the positive fact. The future sound is a positive fact. But its nonexistence at the present moment, which is called its pre-nonexistence, is a negative aspect. That negative aspect disappears when the sound becomes present. The negative aspect is thus quite distinct from the positive fact.

73. Sautrāntika—You then admit that the pre-nonexistence of sound disappears when the sound becomes present. In other words, you aver that the future sound is divested of its pre-nonexistence when it becomes present. This certainly involves the admission of an ontological distinction between

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[1] evaṃ tarhi yaḥ śabdābhāvaṃ prārthayate tasya śabda eva kartavyaḥ syāt.—*Ibid.*

[2] sati kathaṃ nāsti-buddhiḥ ?—*Ibid.*

[3] *Cf.* na ekatvāt.—*Ibid.* The *Sphuṭārthā* explains this as follows : yad eva tad anāgataṃ tad eva vartamānaṃ bhavati, na tasmād anyad iti. kathaṃ tasminn eva vartamāne nāstibuddhir bhavatī 'ti.

future and present sound and implies the principle 'a *dharma*, having not been (existent), becomes (existent)'.[1] A further consequence of this admission on your part is the establishment of the fact that the nonexistent also can be the object of cognition. The future sound is nonexistent at the present moment and its nonexistence is the object of the cognition 'there is pre-nonexistence of sound'.

The Vaibhāṣika here raises another problem.

74 (i). Vaibhāṣika—If it is possible to cognize the nonexistent also, how would you explain the following declaration of the *bodhisattva* : "It is not possible that I shall cognize what is nonexistent in the world" ?[2]

74 (ii). Sautrāntika—The declaration does not mean that the nonexistent cannot be an object of cognition. The implication of the declaration is : "There are arrogant (deluded) ascetics who (falsely) find in themselves an illumination (*avabhāsa*) which in fact is nonexistent (*asat*) in them. I however see in myself an illumination which is really existent in me".[3] Moreover, if all cognitions had only the existent things as their objects, why should a thought like the above arise in the mind of the *bodhisattva* ?[4] There must be deluded people who see as existent what in fact is nonexistent. And it is only to differentiate himself from such people that the *bodhisattva* made the above declaration. The declaration thus is found to establish the contrary conclusion that the non-existent things can also become the objects of our cognition. In fact, it is the cognition of the nonexistent objects by the deluded persons, that differentiates them from the enlightened ones who see the objects in their true nature.

[1] *Cf.* yāvatā tasya viśeṣas tasyā 'bhūtvābhāva-siddhiḥ.—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b. The *Sphuṭārthā* explains this as : tasya viśeṣasyābhūtvā pūrvaṃ paścād bhāvaḥ, tasya siddhir iti.

[2] *Cf.* yal loke nāsti taj jñāsyāmi vā drakṣyāmi vā ne 'daṃ sthānaṃ vidyata iti.—*AKB*, V. 27a-b.

[3] apare ābhimānikā bhavanty asantam apy avabhāsaṃ santaṃ paśyanti. ahaṃ tu santam evā 'stī'ti paśyāmī 'ty ayaṃ tatrā 'bhiprāyaḥ.—*Ibid*.

[4] itarathā hi sarvabuddhīnāṃ sadālambanatve kuto'sya vimarśaḥ syāt, ko vā viśeṣah, ittham cai 'tad evam.—*Ibid*.

Our contention that both the existent and the nonexistent can be the objects of cognition is also corroborated by the following scriptural text: "(My disciple) will know the existent as existent, and the nonexistent as nonexistent."[1]

75. Vaibhāṣika—Granted. But what about positive cognitions? Such cognitions, in order to be cognitions, must have specific reals as their object.

The Sautrāntika here poses a counter question.

76 (i). Sautrāntika—What is the object of the cognition expressed by the judgment 'There is God'? You do not believe in God who according to you is a nonentity.

76 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The expression or name 'God' is the object.

77. Sautrāntika—No, this is not possible. The exponent of the conception of God has an idea of Him as 'eternal being', 'universal cause', and so on. The judgment 'There is God' is meant to express that idea. And hence the mere expression or name 'God' is not the object intended.[2]

78. Vaibhāṣika—Let us then admit that the image (*nimitta*) that is before the mind of the speaker when he says 'There is God' is the object of the judgment.

79. Sautrāntika—No, this is also absurd. The image has no essential bearing on the idea of God. The judgment 'There is God' is thus found to have no real entity as its subject. In other words, the cognition expressed by the judgment 'There is God' is objectless (*nirālambana*).

80. The Vaibhāṣika denies that God, Time etc. which are impossible fictions have a meaning. They are mere names. This is the nominalistic position. But though ontologically the meanings of these words may not have any recognizable status, it is not a fact that we do not have any idea of what they

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[1] sac ca satto jñāsyaty asac cā 'sattaḥ.—*Ibid.* For the full text, *vide Poussin*, Chap. V, p. 63, footnote 1.

[2] *Cf. TSP* (p. 517): tasye 'śvarāder ākāro nityatva-sakala-hetutvādir yas tayā buddhyā 'dhyavasīyate, tenā 'kāreṇa viyogaḥ śabdasya nāmno vā viprayuktasaṃskāraviśeṣasya.

mean. They certainly give rise to certain concepts and ideas (*vikalpas*)[1] which are without any reference to an objective fact. The Sautrāntika thus adopts the conceptualistic attitude. The realist of course does not believe in pure concepts (*vikalpas*). But curiously the Vaibhāṣika who is a realist adopts a nominalistic attitude in respect of certain principles, and the Sautrāntika is a frank conceptualist, though he believes that our ideas of empirical facts have objective affiliation. The Jaina who is a realist curiously endorses the Sautrāntika position. He believes that we may have pure ideas and concepts without objective counterpart.[2] According to Udayana, the fictions cannot be objects of cognition. The so-called fictions are not mere ideas but a wrong combination of real elements.

81 (i). Vaibhāṣika—How can a cognition which is objectless be called a cognition at all ? A cognition is so called because it cognizes an object, and if the object is wanting, what remains of the cognition ?[3]

81 (ii). Sautrāntika—A cognition (*vijñāna*) is so called merely on account of its continuing to have the nature of illumination (*bodhānugati*).[4]

82 (i). Vaibhāṣika—Let us regard the illumination (*bodha*) itself as the object.[5]

82 (ii). Sautrāntika—No. 'Continuing to have the nature of illumination' (*bodhānugati*) means 'continuing to maintain the non-material nature' (*ajaḍarūpatva*). On account of the absence of any real object to be illumined and also absence of another illuminer to illumine itself, the pure non-material character of the cognition is called its nature of illumination.[6]

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[1] *Cf. Yogasūtra*, I. 9 : śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ.

[2] *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, III. 28.

[3] *Cf. TŚP* (p. 518) : vijānātī'ti vijñānam iti gīyate, asati ca vijñeye kiṃ vijñānaṃ syād iti.

[4] *TS*, 1849 a-b : bodhānugatimātreṇa vijñānam iti co'cyate.

[5] *Cf. TSP* (p. 518) : bodhānugamo'pi vinā bodhena na sambhavatī'ti cet.

[6] *TS*, 1849 c-d : sā cāsyā'jaḍarūpatvaṃ prākāśyāt parikalpitam. See also the *Pañjikā* on it.

83. According to the conceptualist, we may have purely subjective conceptions, but they are not contentless. Such a cognition and its content are equally subjective. It is not necessarily true that all cognitions must have objective reference. Pure conceptions and ideas also have their contents, though they (*scil.* the contents) may not have an objective counterpart in the external world.

84. The third argument of the Sarvāstivādin, based on his preconception that our cognition can have only existent things as its object, is thus found untenable.

V (iv). THE FOURTH ARGUMENT

85. The Sautrāntika now examines the fourth argument of the Vaibhāṣika, based on the causality of past *karman.* Let us start with the Sautrāntika philosopher's view of the case.

86. The Vaibhāṣika asserts that the future fruit presupposes the existence of the past act. But the Sautrāntikas do not admit that the fruit is born directly from the past act.[1] The Vaibhāṣika therefore initiates the discussion.

87 (i). Vaibhāṣika—How is the fruit produced then ?

87 (ii). Sautrāntika—The fruit does not originate from the past good or bad act directly. The act influences (literally, perfumes) the consciousness-continuum and the fruit arises in the continuum, thus influenced (*vāsita*), in due course.[2] That original influence (*vāsanā,* literally, perfume) in the consciousness-continuum was referred to by our Master when he said 'the past act is'. His statement was only metaphorical. In common parlance also we speak about the persistence of the

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[1] *TS*, 1850 a-b: vipākahetuḥ phalado nā 'tīto 'bhyupagamyate.

[2] *Cf.* yad apy uktṃ phalād iti, nai 'va hi Sautrāntikā atītāt karmaṇaḥ phalotpattiṃ varṇayanti, kiṃ tarhi tatpūrvakāt santānaviśeṣād ity ātmavādapratiṣedhe sampravedayiṣyāmaḥ. yasya tvatītānāgataṃ dravyato'sti tasya phalaṃ nityam evā'stī 'ti kiṃ tatra karmaṇaḥ sāmarthyam ?—*AKB*, V. 27 a-b.

Cf. also *TS*, 1850 c-d : sad-(? tad)-vāsitāt tu vijñāna-prabandhāt phalam iṣyate.

Cf. Broad : "It is impossible that an event which ends at a certain date should contribute to cause an event which begins at a later date unless the period between the two dates is occupied in one or material cause together with its effect, though in fact no cause can continue with its effect.[1]

Moreover, you affirm the real existence of the past and the future, and therefore the fruit also, according to you, should be pre-existent from all eternity. How do you then account for the causal relation between the cause and the effect, both of which are admitted by you as eternally existent facts ?

88. Vaibhāṣika—We admit the causal efficiency of the act in the production of the fruit.

89 (i). Sautrāntika—You then admit that the *production* becomes existent after having been nonexistent.[2] But this goes against your fundamental principle of the existence of all *dharmas* in all times.

89 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The production itself also pre-exists.

90 (i). Sautrāntika—If the cause (viz. the act), the effect (viz. the fruit) and the production of the effect are all present, what cause is efficient in respect of what effect ?[3] In other words, if the cause, the effect and the production of the effect are eternally existent, the concept of causal efficiency becomes redundant. You have now only to join the school of Vārṣagaṇya, which admits neither the production of what was not existent nor the cessation of what was existent.

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other of the following ways : (i) The earlier event initiates a process of change which continues throughout the period and at the end of it contributes to initiate the later event. Or (ii) the earlier event initiates some kind of structural modification which persists throughout the period. This begins to co-operate at the end of the period with some change which is then taking place, and together they cause the later event."—*Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research*- (New York, 1953), p. 9. Of these two alternatives proposed by professor Broad, the first approximates to the Sautrāntika and the second to the Vaibhāṣika view of the continuity of a cause.

Cf. Milindapañha (Bombay, 1940), pp. 52-4 (§ 35-7), where the causal continuum, its original source and stages are clearly stated.

[1] *TS*, 1851 : tām eva vāsanāṃ cetaḥsantatāv adhikṛtya tat.
asti karme 'ti nirdiṣṭaṃ bhaktyā mūlāvināśavat.

[2] utpādas tarhy abhūtvā bhavatī'ti siddham.—*AKB*, V. 27 c.

[3] *Cf.* atha sarva eva cā'sti kasyedānīṃ kva sāmarthyam.-*Ibid.* *Cf. TSP* (p. 516) : kasye'dānīṃ kva sāmarthyam.

90 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—Causal efficiency means 'making present' (*vartamānīkaraṇa*).[1]

91 (i). Sautrāntika—What do you mean by 'making present' ?

91 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—It means 'drawing towards another place' (*deśāntarākarṣaṇa*).[2]

92 (i). Sautrāntika—If the effect is simply drawn towards another place, it turns out to be eternal, because no new production is implied. Secondly, the meaning is not applicable to the case of incorporeal effects such as feeling (*vedanā*) and the like which, being incorporeal, cannot be drawn from one place to another.[3] Thirdly, the act of drawing had been absent before it was done and as such lends support to our view that a *dharma*, having been not existent, became existent (*abhūtvā bhūtam*).

92 (ii). Vaibhāṣika—The cause simply modifies the nature of the effect (viz. fruit) which was already existent.

93. Sautrāntika—You should then admit that the modification was absent previously, and came into existence later on. This obviously establishes the fresh production of 'modification' which was nonexistent previously.[4]

Consequently, the Sarvāstivāda which affirms the real existence of the past and the future is not commendable. Good Sarvāstivāda consists in affirming the dictum 'All exists' strictly in the sense in which it is used in the scriptural texts.

94 (i). Vaibhāṣika—In what sense has the dictum 'All exists' been declared in the scriptural texts ?

[1] vartamānīkaraṇe tarhi sāmarthyam.—*AKB*, V. 27c. *Cf. TSP* (p. 516) : vartamānīkaraṇasāmarthyam iti cet.

[2] deśāntarākarṣaṇaṃ cet.—*AKB*, v. 27c. *Cf. TSP* (p. 516) : deśāntarākarṣaṇaṃ cet.

[3] nityaṃ prasaktam, arūpiṇāṃ ca kathaṃ tat.—*AKB*, V. 27c. *Cf. TSP* (p. 516) : arūpiṇāṃ vedanādīnāṃ niṣkriyatvāt katham ākarṣaṇaṃ bhavet.

[4] *siddham abhūtvā* viśeṣaṇasya *bhavanaṃ* prādurbhāva iti—*Sphuṭārthā*, V. 27c.

94 (ii). Sautrāntika—'All exists' means 'the five *skandhas*, the twelve *āyatanas* and the eighteen *dhātus* exist'.[1]

95 (i). Vaibhāṣika—What about the three times ?

95 (ii). Sautrāntika—We have already defined them.[2]

VI. The Past and Future *Kleśas*

The Vaibhāṣika now revives his original problem of past and future *kleśas* and *anuśayas*.

96 (i). Vaibhāṣika—If the past and future *kaleśas* and objects are not existent, how can a person be fettered by those *kleśas* and attached to those objects ?[3]

96 (ii). Sautrāntika—A person is said to be fettered by the past *kleśa* because he is possessed of the *anuśaya* or seed (*bīja*) born of the past *kleśa* ; he is said to be fettered by the future *kleśa* because he is possessed of the *anuśaya* or seed (*bīja*) which is the cause of the future *kleśa*.[4] He is attached to the past and future objects because of the presence in him of the *anuśaya* or seed of the *kleśas* in respect of the past and future objects.[5]

97. Vaibhāṣika—The past and future *dharmas* are eternally existent in essence. It is not possible to establish their existence by pure logic and reasoning because the nature of things is profound indeed.[6] This however does not mean that it is absolutely impossible of being established. There are apparently contradictory scriptural statements and popular verbal usages which sometimes speak of the continuity of *dharmas* and on other occasions of their novel production. These state-

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[1] *Cf. TSP* (507) : tathāhi bhagavato'ktam—sarvaṃ sarvam iti brāhmaṇa yad uta pañca skandhā dvādaśāyatanāni aṣṭādaśa dhātava iti.

[2] *Vide supra*, § 36 (i) and § 52 (ii).

[3] asaty atītānāgate kathaṃ tena tasmin vā saṃyukto bhavati.—*AKB*, V. 27c. The *Sphuṭārthā* explains : kathaṃ tenā 'tītānāgatena kleśena tasmin vā 'tītānāgate vastuni kathaṃ saṃyukta iti.

[4] tajja taddhetv-anuśaya-bhāvāt kleśena.—*AKB*, V. 27c. See also the *Sphuṭārthā*.

[5] tadālambane kleśānuśayabhāvād (atīte 'nāgate ca) vastuni saṃyukto bhavati.—*AKB*, V. 27c. Also see the *Sphuṭārthā*.

[6] gambhīrā khalu dharmatā.—*AK*, V. 27d. The whole verse is :

ko vighnas tat kathaṃ nā 'nyad adhvāyogas tathā sataḥ.
ajātanaṣṭatā kena gambhīrā khalu dharmatā.

ments and usages are to be understood as made from different standpoints. Thus when the substantial identity of a thing through the three times is recognized, origination and cessation are predicated of the same thing.[1] Similarly, when the futurity and presentness of a thing are meant to be distinguished, origination and cessation are predicated of two different modes, and we say—the future entity originates and the present entity ceases to exist, yielding place to it.[2] In such usages the modal differences of the thing are intended to be emphasized. Sometimes we speak of the origination of time itself, assuming the identity of the temporal phases with the things to which they belong.[3] The things are again characterized as coming out of time as their source, and in this usage the future is conceived as a totality of moments, which is the material cause of things.[4] The non-recognition of the aspects of substantial identity, modal difference and the temporal phases of things by the Sautrāntika is the reason why he fails to appreciate the merits of the Vaibhāṣika view of things.

VII. CONCLUSION

98. The controversy between the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika is bound to be interminable, since neither party is prepared to give up his position and admit the justice in the contention of the other. The Vaibhāṣika is evidently a follower of the logic of *anekānta*, which is adopted by all who believe in identity-in-difference. The Vaibhāṣika, for instance, believes that substantially things are eternally existent, though their modes and relational qualities and their temporal characteristics are bound to be transitory phases. The relation

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[1] *Cf.* asti paryāyo yad utpadyate tan nirudhyate. rūpam utpadyate rūpaṃ nirudhyate.—*AKB*, V. 27 d. The *Sphuṭārthā* explains this as : rūpam utpadyate rupaṃ nirudhyate, dravyānanyatvāt.

[2] *Cf.* anāgatam utpadyate vartamānaṃ nirudhyate.—*AKB*, V. 27 d.

[3] *Cf.* adhvā 'py utpadyate. utpadyamānasyā 'dhvasaṃgṛhītatvāt.—*Ibid.*

[4] *Cf.* adhvano 'py utpadyate, anekakṣaṇikatvād anāgatasyā 'dhvanaḥ—*Ibid.* The *Sphuṭārthā* explains this as : *adhvano 'py* upādānarūpād *utpadyate* dharmaḥ, kasmād ity āha—*anekakṣaṇikatvād anāgatasyā 'dhvana* iti. yasmād anekeṣāṃ kṣaṇānām anāgatānāṃ rāśirūpāṇāṃ kaścid eva kṣana utpadyate. ato 'dhvano 'py utpadyata ity ucyate.

between these changing attributes and the unchanging substance cannot be determined by the logical process of dichotomy. The Sautrāntika insists that these attributes must be related by way of identity or non-identity. The admission of the first alternative will make the predication of attributes impossible, since the subject and the predicate are identical. As regards non-identity, that is no relation at all. If the attributes are numerically different from the substance like the infinite number of unrelated attributes, how can the former be predicated of the substance? And if they are asserted to be real attributes, though there is no relation between them, it is passing strange that the other attributes should not be amenable to predication.

This line of argument is adopted by the Sautrāntika and the idealists. Only simple reals are possible. Qualities, relations, actions etc. are mere fictions of the understanding. But the believers in *bhedābheda*, identity-in-difference, are not convinced by this logic. They think that the objections proceed from pure abstraction, and abstractions are fictions. They are got by partial analysis of the experienced object and erected into reals. A thing is believed to have a pure identity without any difference of attributes. But a pure identical substance without any attribute belonging to it is never encountered in experience. Things are to be accepted as they are found to be by uncontradicted experience. In experience, we see things are possessed of qualities, and in spite of the change of qualities the substance remains the same. The substance out of relation with qualities is only an ideal abstraction. The arguments of the Sautrāntika therefore cut no ice with the Vaibhāṣika who is in the respectable company of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosopher who believes in identity-in-difference as the characteristic of *prakṛti* (primordial matter) and its modifications, and a host of other philosophers like Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, the Mīmāṃsaka and the Jaina—all of whom believe in *anekānta*. The Vaibhāṣika is a believer in the *anekānta* logic and this is clear from Saṃghabhadra's assertions noticed in the course of our dissertation.[1]

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[1] *Vide supra*, §40 (ii), footnote 3,

ABBREVIATIONS.

Abhidharmadīpa...Under publication from K. P. J. Research Institute, Patna.

AK...Abhidharmakośa.

AKB...Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya, under publication from K. P. J. Research Institute, Patna.

Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (The)...By Dr Satkari Mookerjee, Calcutta University Publication.

Central Conception of Buddhism (The)...By Stcherbatṣky.

Madhyamakavṛtti...Commentary called Prasannapadā on the Mūlamadhyamaka-Kārikās (edited by Poussin).

Pañjikā...See TSP.

Poussin...L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, traduit et annote par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris.

Sphuṭārthā...Yaśomitra's Vyākhyā on AKB.

Tattvavaiśāradī...Vācaspati Miśra's commentary on Yogabhāṣya.

TS...Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāṇtarakṣita, with Pañjikā (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXX).

TSP...Pañjikā on TS.

Yogabhāṣya...Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra of Patañjali.

Yogasūtra...Yogasūtra of Patañjali.

THE *AVYĀKṚTAS* OR INDETERMINABLES

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THE *AVYĀKṚTAS* OR INDETERMINABLES[1]

I. INTRODUCTORY

1. The subject chosen for the present discourse is a vexed question which has received variant interpretations from different scholars, both European and Indian. Dr. T. R. V. Murti's exposition seems the latest in the field. The solutions propounded by scholars are naturally coloured by personal equations and temperamental idiosyncrasies. It must be stated at the outset that no explanation, however scrupulous and eminent the scholar offering it, can be universally acceptable as the exact exposition of the reason of Buddha's refusal to answer the questions. The reason of his silence was sometimes given out by him. But the reason is as elusive as the problem. It is expedient to formulate the questions seriatim before we attempt to give our interpretation.

I (a). THE QUESTIONS

The questions are fourteen in number and grouped in four sets as shown below :

i (a) *Śāśvato lokaḥ*—Is the world eternal ?
(b) *Aśāśvato lokaḥ*—Is the world not eternal ?
(c) *Śāśvataś cā 'śāśvataś ca lokaḥ*—Is the world both eternal and not eternal ?
(d) *Nuiva śāśvato nā 'śāśvataś ca lokaḥ*—Is the world neither eternal nor not eternal ?

ii (a) *Antavān lokaḥ*—Is the world finite ?
(b) *Anantavān lokaḥ*—Is the world not finite ?

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[1] These are *ten* according to the enumeration in the Pāli canon (see *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Suttas 63, 72) and *fourteen* according to the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti (p. 446, Poussin's edition). Questions i (c), i (d), ii (c) and ii (d) are not found in the Pāli canon in the present context though the same are available in other parts of the canon in a different context. The number is elastic as the fourth set also can be expanded into one of four alternatives, like the first three sets.

(c) *Antavāṃś cā 'nantavāṃś ca lokaḥ*—Is the world both finite and not finite ?

(d) *Naivā 'ntavān nā 'nantavāṃś ca lokaḥ*—Is the world neither finite nor not finite ?

iii (a) *Bhavati tathāgataḥ paraṃ maraṇāt*—Does the Tathāgata, the Enlightened One, exist after death ?

(b) *Na bhavati tathāgataḥ paraṃ maraṇāt*—Does the Tathāgata, the Enlightened One, not exist after death ?

(c) *Bhavati ca na bhavati ca tathāgataḥ paraṃ maraṇāt*—Does the Tathāgata, the Enlightened One, both exist and not exist after death ?

(d) *Naiva bhavati na na bhavati ca tathāgataḥ paraṃ maraṇāt*—Does the Tathāgata, the Enlightened One, neither exist nor not exist after death ?

iv (a) *Sa jīvas tac charīram*—Is the individual identical with the body ?

(b) *Anyo jīvo 'nyac charīram*—Is the individual different from the body ?

II. THE FIRST TWO SETS OF QUESTIONS EXAMINED

2. The import of these questions is not free from ambiguity. Unfortunately in the commentaries on the Pāli canon, Buddhaghosa does not analyse or define the meanings of words with unmistakable clarity or logical precision. It is however quite refreshing that Candrakīrti in the *Prasannapadā* has given definitive interpretation of each of the term. We are persuaded to think that Candrakīrti is faithful to tradition and his interpretation is logically intelligible. It deserves to be noted that these questions have bearing upon the issue of profound religious interest, viz. religious discipline with a view to *nirvāṇa*. I regret my inability to agree with the spatial interpretation given by some scholars regarding the finitude

and infinitude of the world.[1] Candrakīrti definitely asserts that the two sets of questions regarding *śāśvata* (eternal) and *antavān* (finite) have only reference to time and not space.[2] Even if we suppose that the number of physical worlds are infinite, it does not seem intelligible how can this have any relevancy to the question of emancipation (*nirvāṇa*) or bondage. The existence of the brute world does not seem to have a moral or religious significance. Accordingly we feel that Candrakīrti's interpretation should be accepted as setting forth the correct import and purpose of these questions. Though both eternity and finitude have reference only to divisions of time, past and future, and so the first two sets of questions seem identical in import, Candrakīrti draws a line of subtle demarcation. He says that the subject *loka* (world) in the first set is to be taken in a general sense comprehending all the individuals and perhaps also the world process with reference to the question of eternity and non-eternity ; and the subject *loka* (world) in the second set of questions regarding finite (*antavān*) and infinite (*anantavān*) is to be understood in respect of any particular individual as the subject, and here *loka* means any particular individual without any reference to the world process.[3] It is not far from probable to surmise that the questions regarding *śāśvata* and *antavān* with their antinomic opposites were conventional problems with more verbal than material difference.

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[1] The set of questions regarding the finitude and infinitude of the world has been interpreted in terms of spatial dimension by some scholars. There is a passage in the *Brahmajālasutta* (*Dīgha-Nikāya*, Sutta 1), which speaks of *antānantika* sages and thinkers who hold the doctrines of spatial finitude, infinitude and finitude-cum-infinitude (that is, finitude in one direction and infinitude in another). These doctrines however have no bearing on the indeterminables under consideration ; nor do they exhibit the kind of opposition which is necessary for dialectic.

[2] *Prasannapadā*, p. 536 : ātmano lokasya vā 'nāgatam utpādam apaśyann antavān loka ity evaṃ kalpayann aparāntam ālambya pravartate, evam anāgatam utpādaṃ paśyann anantavān loka iti pravartate......ātmano lokasya vā 'tītam utpādaṃ paśyan śāśvato loka iti pratipadyate, apaśyann aśāśvata iti pratipadyate......

[3] *Cf. Prasannapadā* 572 : tatra śāśvato loka ity etad abhūvam atītam adhvānam ity etasmān nā 'tibhidyate, atha vā 'yaṃ viśeṣo yac chāśvato loka ity eśā dṛṣṭiḥ *sāmānyena* pūrvāntam āśritā abhūvam atītam adhvānam ity eṣā tv *ātmana eva* pūrvāntaparāmarśena pravṛttā na sāmānyene 'ti, evam anyāsv api dṛṣṭiṣu viśeṣo vaktavyaḥ.

3. Let us now probe the problem why the Buddha declined to tackle these questions. Though it is not expressly stated, the career of the individual should be understood *sub specie temporis* as without a definite beginning, which is the tacit and express assumption of all schools of Indian philosophy except the materialists. The problem of creation of the world has only a secondary importance in Indian philosophy in that it only serves as the stage in which the individuals have to play out their roles. If the individual sentient beings cannot be supposed to begin their career at a definite date however remote and incalculable, the world process as an auxiliary condition of the individual's career should also be without a beginning. The world process and the course of transmigration are thus intimately bound up with one another. The doctrine of *karman* is supposed to furnish the explanation of the diversity of world conditions and of the individuals born therein. If the world process were a historical event without any antecedent moral condition, creation would be an arbitrary event. God *quâ* the creator of the world would be guilty of despotic abuse of power. It is undeniable that all sentient beings are not equally happy or gifted with equal amount of intelligence and moral endowment. If God were responsible for this unequal distribution of intellectual, moral and physical advantages and disadvantages, he would be guilty of cruelty and partiality. The inequalities of the world order are explained by reference to the moral deserts of individuals, and God is supposed to be the dispenser of justice.[1] In Indian philosophy the law of *karman* or moral justice is the ruling and determining principle of creation and is postulated to account for the administration of justice. Those schools which do not believe in a Personal God as the dispenser of the fruits of moral activities (*karmaphaladātā*), e. g.

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[1] vaiṣamya-nairghṛṇye na sāpekṣatvāt.—*Brahmasūtra*, II. 1. 34.

Buddhism and Jainism and also some of the orthodox systems, viz. Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā and perhaps ancient Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools, have no room for an operator of the moral law. The law of *karman* (moral justice) is supposed to be autonomous and self-operative without reference to an intelligent moral operator, viz. God.

II (a). FUTILITY OF THE QUESTIONS

4. These questions of the beginning and end of the world have been discussed in almost all the Indian schools of philosophy. The Jaina and Mīmāṃsaka philosophers do not believe in the creation and destruction of the physical world. With them the world is an eternal accomplished fact. So the question of historical creation or end of the world is dismissed by them as entirely irrelevant nonsense. There is no reason to suppose that the Buddha believed in personal God. But it is definite that he believed in the law of *karman* as self-operative and autonomous force in common with all other systems which leave out God. Now we have already observed that *loka* as the logical subject in the questions stands for particular individuals or all individuals as a class. Have they got a definite date in the past as first commencement of their career ? The later Buddhist philosophers are all agreed that the individual's career is without beginning (*anādi*). But it was assumed that its career could come to an end. The Buddha however declined to answer these questions and it is surmised that the reason for dismissal of these metaphysical and eschatological problems lay in a pragmatic consideration of moral value. He did not want to be involved in full-fledged controversy which always ended in antithetically opposite results. His interest was practical. He knew that the present condition of misery and imperfection of the individual could be ended by one's own exertion. A speculative answer to the question of beginninglessness of individual's career would not be of any practical value so far as the escape from the miserable condition (*duḥkha*) of worldly existence was considered. The present bondage can be ended. There is cessation of misery (*duḥkha-nirodha*) and there is also a way

(*mārga*) to it. The Buddha of course insists that there is misery and imperfection and there is a cause of it (*duḥkha-samudaya*) and this should be clearly understood. He, in common with almost all the schools of Indian philosophy, is convinced that the present condition of the individual and the world is imperfect and full of suffering and the cause of this lies in the moral weakness of individual beings. The causes are ignorance (*avidyā*) and craving (*tṛṣṇā*) for self-weal and its consequences. All these are however derived from the belief in the reality of ego (*ahaṃkāra*) and the possessions of the ego (*mamakāra*), in plain language, belief in the reality of 'I' and 'mine'. These notions must be transcended in order to achieve perfect freedom. The attainment of freedom which is called *nirvāṇa* was the supreme passion of the Buddha and he regarded all other speculations which have no bearing on freedom as idle futilities. This has been given in the Pāli canon as the reason for the Buddha's refusal to engage in metaphysical speculations.

5. The Buddha also regarded these speculations as not only idle fancies but also positively harmful to the attainment of freedom which is the solvent of all problems consequent on the individual's bondage. Thus when he asked his interlocutor Māluṅkyaputta "Would the practices of the holy discipline be possible if a man were persuaded that his career was without an end ?" the interlocutor answered 'No.'[1] The implications of the questions and answers have not been brought out by the commentators. The Buddha's questions are rhetorical. The implication seems to be this. If the individual's career was without a beginning and would be without an end, that is to say, an eternal unalterable fact, no amount of exertion would be of any avail. It will, on the contrary, be sheer waste of time. The worldly career cannot be eternal. If, on the other hand, it had a definite beginning and a definite end as natural events, the pursuit of holy life would be abortive.[2] The escape from misery

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[1] *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Sutta 63.

[2] See *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, verses 54-5 with auto-commentary (ed. by Johnston and Kunst). Also *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, XXIV. 18-30.

will be effected automatically as an inevitable event exactly as the present life is ended by death. So both these alternatives are untenable and the beliefs would be fraught with terrible consequences, as the Buddha has said "The result will be an unending prolongation of birth, aging, dying, grief, etc."[1]

6. Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, after faithful exposition of the consequences of these perverted beliefs, declare that these questions are pure nonsense. The individual has no self-being (*niḥsvabhāva*). It is as unreal as a barren woman's son, though it is a fact that the individual appears to exist and suffer. The end of this state can be achieved only by the realization of the vacuity and voidness of the individual and also of the world order. Whether the end of the individual means its merger in Infinite Being or disappearance in Infinite Non-Being need not deter us. That will involve us in the tangled problem whether Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatā* is a positive Universal Being like the *Brahman* of the Upaniṣads or Pure Negation. It is however undeniable that the Buddha was perfectly convinced of the possibility of the end of the worldly career of the individual. This he has made abundantly clear. But his refusal to answer this question categorically to this effect seems to be inspired by the apprehension that it will be regarded as a natural process and event. The bondage will be perpetuated if there would be no moral exertion. One must live the holy life in order to attain this consummation. There is another consideration which has been urged by Candrakīrti. If the individual be a real entity it is metaphysically difficult to suppose that the one and the same individual undergoes this transmigration. In every birth the individual is changing and so it is never the same rigid identity. Furthermore, it is also not determinable whether there is an ontological principle underlying the individual, separate from or identical with the changing conditions such as the physical body or the mind. To the Śūnyavādin, the individual is a metaphysical fiction and the Vedāntist

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[1] *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Sutta 63.

believes that the finite individual is only an appearance in and over the Absolute. So the question of the identity of the transmigratory individual will not admit of a unanimously agreed solution. But the ethical discipline necessary for freedom was universally regarded as a necessary expedient. And this was accepted by all the followers of the Buddha.

II (b). The Problem of Universal Redemption

7. Neither the Buddha nor any of his interlocutors is seen to be interested in the question of universal redemption. What would happen to the world as a physical objective fact, if all individuals attained *nirvāṇa* ? Is universal redemption a possibility ? The question is neither asked nor answered. However, this question engaged the minds of later philosophers of India. In the *Yogabhāṣya*, the question is posed and parried. The author of the *Yogabhāṣya* was acquainted with the Buddhist philosophical tenets and their methodology. He classifies questions under three heads:[1] (i) there are questions which admit of a clear definitive answer (*ekāntavacanīya*); (ii) there are questions which are answerable only by division (*vibhajyavacanīya*); (iii) there are questions which are unanswerable (*avacanīya*). "Will all souls be saved ? What will then be the condition of *prakṛti* ?" The creative process must come to an end because it is motivated by the moral necessity of providing the experience of good and evil, pleasure and pain, by the individual *puruṣas* (spirits) in conformity with their moral deserts. Universal redemption will mean the exhaustion of all moral forces (*karman*), in which eventuality creation will come to a halt. "What will then be the function of *prakṛti* ?" The *Bhāṣya* replies that this question is unanswerable. The answer can be given part by part. The world will become non-existent to the individual who has achieved *kaivalya* (final emancipation). It will function in relation to individuals who are in bondage. "Is it possible for an individual to attain emancipation ?" The question admits of a simple answer: "Yes". Perhaps the Buddha would have dismissed the question of universal redemption as unanswerable (*avyākaraṇīya*). But in later Mahāyāna, universal redemption is not only a possibility but a passion of the *bodhisattva*. All souls must be saved. It matters little to the enlightened *bodhisattva* as to what will be the fate of the world after this consummation.

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[1] *Bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra*, IV. 33. For the Buddhist counterpart of four kinds of questions, see *Dīgha-Nikāya*, Sutta 33; *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*, II, p. 46 (PTS); *Abhidharmakośa*, V. 22, with *Bhāṣya*.

This is also the logical upshot of Candrakīrti's interpretation of the first set of questions.

8. The question of universal redemption has a pointed reference to the question "Is the world eternal or not eternal ?" It may therefore not be out of place to refer to the controversy which later on arose regarding the possibility of universal redemption in Nyāya and also Vedānta. Śrīdhara, the author of the *Nyāyakandalī*, and Śrīvallabha, the author of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, were definitely of the view that the world process is eternal. In other words, there will be some souls who will never attain emancipation, though it is admitted there will be some souls who will attain this blessed condition. Udayana, in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, and Citsukha, in the *Tattvapradīpikā* (also known as *Citsukhī*, Ch. IV), maintain that all souls will be saved, however long may be the course of time. In this final event, the creation will come to an end. The constituents of the world will remain as dead matter like the spent-up volcano. According to Citsukha who is a monistic Vedāntist, the world will cease to exist altogether. In one sense, the end of the world process may be looked upon as the Kingdom of Heaven, barring the theological implication of the Christian belief. The Jainas do not believe in the possibility of universal redemption. The number of souls is infinite and their redemption will take infinite time. Besides, there are reprobate (*abhavya*) souls who will never attain redemption from bondage.

9. Udayana however poses a question : "If there are a number of degraded souls who will never attain emancipation, the suspicion will naturally arise in each individual whether he

is one of the condemned lot." It may be answered : "Well, the individuals who are found to be possessed of dispassion and taste for spiritual life must be presumed to be destined to reach the blessedness of emancipation ; but the other individuals, who have no such inclination, are attached to the ephemeral goods of the world and are selfish and enamoured of sinful ways, may be presumed to belong to the opposite camp." The semitic doctrines of eternal hell and eternal heaven are near analogues of the doctrine. Udayana observes that this is a dangerous heresy. Moral excellence is not an accidental product. It presupposes a course of moral exertion. Why should a person feel the incentive to cultivate moral upliftment if he is not sure that he is a blessed and privileged soul ? There is no guarantee that his moral efforts will not ultimately fail. It is found that even saintly persons suffer moral downfall and sinners turn out a virtuous career. So these empirical observations do not hold out any assurance either way. The belief in the possibility of universal redemption is thus the necessary prerequisite of spiritual life. Every soul will be saved provided it observes the moral discipline and elect to go through the grind.

10. The Buddha is regarded as a pessimist and so also most of the Indian philosophers who hold that the existing world order is bad and has to be transcended. But it is ignored that even the most optimistic meliorist must admit that the individual must reach perfection. This belief presupposes dissatisfaction with the present order. This is also the motive of the Indian philosophers. Of course, the concept of final emancipation as total extinction which some Buddhists[1] seem to hold or as lifeless unconscious condition[2] comparable to the state of the dead body does not appear attractive to many with justification. But there are many philosophers who hold that final emancipation is a state of perfect bliss. It is also not a settled fact that the Buddha's *nirvāṇa* is eternal death.

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[1] The Mādhyamikas and Sautrāntikas.

[2] This is held by the Vaibhāṣika and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Schools.

11. We have made a digression, but perhaps not without relevancy. The question of the end of the world process and the worldly career of individuals as a class involves this very issue. The Buddha did not give a categorical answer perhaps in anticipation of the controversy and divergence of opinion which his definitive answer would have given rise to. The Buddha had a practical mission as all prophets have. He showed the way to ultimate freedom from all bondage, subjective and objective, and exhorted one and all to adopt this course of life which is the necessary precondition of ultimate blessedness.

III. THE THIRD SET OF QUESTIONS

12. We have practically dealt with the first two sets of questions. We have seen that they are leading questions and the Buddha did not fall into the trap. By his counter questions he exposed the unwarranted preconceptions involved in them. But the most important question is whether the Tathāgata, the Enlightened One, continued to exist after death or not. The Buddha's silence is naturally liable to be misunderstood. Indeed as a matter of historical fact, it has given rise to a storm of controversy and no two solutions appear to agree. The question is naturally bound up with the major problem of the nature of *nirvāṇa* which has been set forth as the ultimate goal and the objective of spiritual life. By careful examination of relevant passages dealing with *nirvāṇa*, we are persuaded that *nirvāṇa* is not a state of extinction. There is of course extinction of personality. This is evident from the comment of Buddhaghosa that the subject of the interrogative proposition "Does the Tathāgata, the Enlightened One, exist after death" means *sattva*[1], that is, Tathāgata as the individual we see in the lifetime. Certainly all the schools of Buddhist thought are unanimous on the point that the individual does not survive irrespective of the question whether *nirvāṇa* is a positive state or not. It is also

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[1] tathāgato 'ti satto.—Aṭṭhakathā on *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Sutta 63 (Cūla-Māluṅkyasutta).

a leading question whether the Tathāgata, the Enlightened One, after death of the physical body is merged in the Infinite. The Buddha himself has characterized *nirvāṇa* as deep, infinite, unfathomable, comparable to the great ocean.[1] There is also a characteristic simile of the great ocean in which the individual rivers enter and shed their individuality. The emancipated individual while entering into *nirvāṇa* also sheds his individuality.[2] If any body asks "Does the river exist after entering the ocean ?" the direct simple answer will only give a distorted picture. The river certainly does not exist as river with a limited quantity of water and a circumscribed course in a well defined channel. But it will be far from true to say that the river has become extinct. Such is the case with the individual self. The individual loses its individuality and finitude and becomes merged in infinite *nirvāṇa*. There is another momentous assertion of the Buddha which will rebut the charge that he advocates nihilism. The famous text of the *Udāna*[1] and the *Itivuttaka*[2] which speaks of the unborn (*ajāta*), unbecome (*abhūta*), unproduced (*akata, akṛta*) and unconstituted (*asaṃkhata, asaṃskṛta*) state as the guarantee of deliverence from the phenomenal world which is born, become, produced and created is not to be lightly brushed aside. Buddhaghosa makes it the cardinal basis of his dissertation on *nirvāṇa*. He adduces this text in support of his position that *nirvāṇa* is a positive condition.[3] Whatever be the differences among the representative exponents of the schools it is absolutely undeniable that *nirvāṇa* is depersonalized state.

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[1] ....tathāgato gambhīro appameyyo duppariyogāḷho seyyathā'pi mahāsamuddo, upapajjatī 'ti na upeti, na upapajjatī 'ti na upeti, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatī 'ti na upeti, neva upapajjati na na upapajjatī 'ti na upeti.—Aggi-Vacchagotta-sutta, *Majjhima-Nikāya* (Sutta 72). Also see Avyākatasaṃyutta, *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* (Saṃyutta 44). See also *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Sutta 44 (PTS, I, p. 304), where the ultimate nature of *nirvāṇa* is stated as indescribable much in the same way as is done in the dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Gārgī Vācaknavī in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat*, III. 6. The passages under reference are given below :

"nibbānassa panā 'yye, kiṃ paṭibhāgo" ti ?

"accasar 'āvuso Visākha pañhaṃ, nā 'sakkhi pañhānaṃ pariyantaṃ gahetuṃ, nibbānogadhaṃ hi, āvuso Visākha, brahmacariyaṃ nibbānapārāyanaṃ nibbānapariyosānaṃ ākaṃkhamāno ca tvaṃ, āvuso Visākha, bhagavantaṃ upasaṃkamitvā ekamantaṃ puccheyyāsi, yathā ca te bhagavā vyākaroti tathā naṃ dhāreyyāsī 'ti."—*Majjhima-Nikāya*, Sutta 44 (PTS, I, p. 304).

kasmin nu khalu prajāpatilokā otāś ca protāś ce 'ti, brahmalokeṣu Gārgī 'ti, kasmin nu khalu brahmalokā otāś ca protāś ce 'ti. sa ho 'vāca Gārgi mā 'tiprākṣīr mā te mūrdhā vyapaptad, anatipraśnyāṃ vai devatām atipṛcchasi Gārgi mā 'tiprākṣīr iti. tato ha Gārgī Vācaknavy upararāma.—*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat*, III. 6.

[2] seyyathā 'pi bhikkhave yā ca loke savantiyo mahāsamuddaṃ appenti, yā ca antalikkhā dhārā papatanti, na tena mahāsamuddassa ūnattaṃ vā pūrattaṃ vā paññāyati, evam eva kho bhikkhave bahū ce pi bhikkhū anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyanti, na tena nibbānadhātuyā ūnattaṃ vā pūrattaṃ vā paññāyati.—*Cullavagga* (Roman Edition), p. 239. *Cf.*

yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre
'staṃ gacchanti nāmarūpe vihāya.
tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ
parāt paraṃ puruṣam upaiti divyam.—*Muṇḍakopanṣiat*, III. 2. 8.

13. Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti seem to advocate the voidity of the individual not excepting the Tathāgata, the

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[1] P. 80 (PTS).

[2] P. 37 (PTS). Also see *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, IV. pp. 360-372 (PTS).

That the Buddha was not an advocate of nihilism is proved by the following texts : *Pārājika* (PTS, p. 3) and *Majjhima-Nikaya* (Sutta 22), p. 140 (PTS), where the Buddha disowns the epithet *venayika* which appears from the context to stand for 'nihilist'.

[3] *Visuddhimagga*, XVI, 62-74 (Kosambi's Edition). See also *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Sutta 49 (PTS. I, 329-30) where signless, infinite all-shining consciousness is posited against the charge of absolute voidity (*rittakaṃ tucchakaṃ*). The passage of the *MajjhimaNikāya* under reference is as follows (PTS, I, pp. 329-30) :

........sabbaṃ kho ahaṃ, Brahme, sabbato abhiññāya yāvatā sabbassa sabbattena ananubhūtaṃ tad abhiññāya sabbaṃ nā 'hosiṃ sabbasmiṃ nā 'hosiṃ, sabbato nā 'hosiṃ, sabbaṃ me ti nā 'hosiṃ, sabbaṃ nā 'bhivadiṃ........

sa ce kho, mārisa, sabbassa sabbattena ananubhūtaṃ, tad abhiññāya mā he 'va te *ritakam* eva ahosi, *tachhakam* eva ahosī 'ti

viññāṇam anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbatopabham, taṃ paṭhaviyā paṭhavattena ananubhūtaṃ, āpassa āpattena ananubhūtaṃ........ sabbassa sabbattena ananubhūtaṃ.

Buddhaghosa's interpretation of *viññāṇa* in this passage as *viññātabba* is forced and inappropriate. See *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* on *Digha-Nikāya* (PTS, I, p. 223), which says : viññātabbaṃ ti viññāṇaṃ, nibbānassa nāmaṃ.

Enlightened One. To them all entities are pure undiluted appearance without any base. It seems that *nirvāṇa*, according to these thinkers, is a state of absolute non-being and this is said to be the nature of all that appears to exist. The Sautrāntika is represented to believe in extinction of the individual in *nirvāṇa* like the extinction of the lamp's light by a blast of wind.[1] We are inclined to accept the interpretation by Asaṅga[2] and Vasubandhu[3] of the nature of *nirvāṇa* as Infinite Being which is identical with pure contentless unconditioned consciousness and bliss. In *nirvāṇa* the enlightened individual becomes totally identical with infinite pure being and pure consciousness. So it is not unjustifiable to characterize it as a state of negation because the individual ceases to continue as individual. But it cannot be roundly denied that the individual continues to exist because he has become merged in the infinite ocean of being. It is not thus a case of simple dichotomy.[4] The Buddha ceases to be a finite individual but he is transfigured as Infinite. The limitations and imperfections are dropped and this is the *raison d'être* of the negative description of *nirvāṇa*. But the loss is only the condition of gain. The finite becomes infinite. So it is a positive state of bliss and perfection.

14. Nāgārjuna's characterization of *nirvāṇa* in negative terms as pure *śūnyatā* is denied by Asaṅga. He contends with irrefutable justification that pure negation is an impossibility.

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[1] See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, II. 55 (discussion on *visaṃyoga*).

[2] *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, XI. 13 :
tattvaṃ yat satataṃ dvayena rahitaṃ bhrānteś ca saṃniśrayaḥ
śakyaṃ nai'va ca sarvathābhilapituṃ yac cā 'prapañcātmakam.
jñeyaṃ heyam atho viśodhyam amalaṃ yac ca prakṛtyā mataṃ
yasyākāśa-suvarṇavāri-sadṛśī kleśād viśuddhir matā.

[3] *Triṃśikā*, verse 30 :
sa evā 'nāsravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ.
sukho vimuktikāyo 'sau dharmākhyo 'yaṃ mahāmuneḥ.

[4] Cf. na bhāvo nā 'pi cā 'bhāvo
buddhatvaṃ tena kathyate.
tasmād buddhatathāpraśne
avyākṛtanayo mataḥ.
—*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, IX. 24.

It can be understood only in the background of positive being. Negation is relative and not absolute. The Negativist contends that the question whether the Buddha exists after death or not is irrelevant regarding a fact which is a pure nonentity *per se.* The Buddha is a metaphysical nonentity and so the issue of his continuity of existence is out of the question and nonexistence is simply an uncalled for and meaningless tautology. In fact nonexistence is not understandable without reference to existence. But when a thing has no existence at all the question of its nonexistence is simply absurd. The heroic explanation of *nirvāṇa* as pure absolute non-being by Nāgārjuna cannot be a satisfying account.[1] Asaṅga's interpretation perfectly squares with all aspects of the question, and gives satisfaction to an ardent enquirer of truth. If pure negation were the essential nature of things including the Tathāgata, it would have been more straightforward and simple for the Buddha to declare that the question of existence was entirely irrelevant. He ought to have adopted the attitude of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti without any ambiguity. The concept of *śūnyatā* as pure negation has not appealed to serious and honest scholars like Professor Suzuki, Stcherbatsky and Murti. Murti goes one step further and equates *śūnyatā* with *prajñā.*[2] But unfortunately Candrakīrti denies the possibility of specific or generic cognition regarding *śūnyatā.*[3] Prajñākaramati gives an elaborate discourse on the issue and denies the possible survival of *jñāna* in *nirvāṇa* which is the equivalent of *śūnyatā.*[4]

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[1] For the identification of the Mādhyamikas with the Nāstikas, see *Prasannapadā*, pp. 368-9.

[2] *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 264.

[3] *Prasannapadā*, p. 533 :......na tat-tāvad vijñānenā 'lambyate, jñānenā 'pi na jñāyate.........

[4] *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, pp. 389-418. On p. 397 : ....tato niḥsvabhāvatayā na kathañcid api svasaṃvedanasiddhiḥ. On pp. 417-18 :

yadā na bhāvo nā'bhāvo
mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ,
tadā 'nyagatyabhāvena
nirālambā (?nirāśrayā) praśāmyati.—IX. 35. (P.T.O.)

15. We are conscious of the difficulties attendant on the problem of *nirvāṇa*. In fact pure being and pure non-being are indistinguishable so far as concerns the irrelevancy or incompatibility of adjectives qualifying them. Pure being is an unqualifiable fact and so also pure non-being.[1] It is perhaps this consideration which led Hegel to equate pure being with pure non-being. Hegel of course goes too far and J. S. Mill seems perfectly justified in combating his position. The Buddha was too cautious and his description of *nirvāṇa* is far too negative. So the issue cannot be adjudged in a forthright way which will satisfy all scruples and remove all doubts. Professor Murti rather inclines in his appraisal of the Mādhyamika conception of *śūnyatā* to the view of Asaṅga. Whatever be the metaphysical position, the logical impossibility of the survival of the Buddha as he is understood to be a person has been explicated by us in intelligible language.

IV. THE FOURTH SET OF QUESTIONS

16. Now let us address ourselves to the consideration of the last set of questions : "Is the individual identical with the body or not ?" It may appear to an unsophisticated man who believes in the post-mortem existence of the individual that the question is too simple. If the individual survives death of the body, he must be different from the latter. The implications of this question have not been brought out in clear and sufficient detail in the commentaries. But the question certainly is not so simple as it may appear on the surface. The silence of the Buddha is significant enough to show that it has got deeper

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Pañjikā—yadā na bhāvaḥ paramārthasatsvabhāvo *mater* buddheḥ *saṃtiṣṭhate puro* 'grataḥ, *nā'bhāvaḥ* nā 'pi bhāvavirahitalakṣaṇo 'bhāvo yadā mateḥ saṃtṣṭhate puraḥ, *tadā 'nyagatyabhāvena* vidhipratiṣedhābhyāṃ gatyantarābhāvād, ubhayānubhayapakṣayor etaddvayavidhipratiṣedhātmakat vād, ābhyām avyatiriktatayā 'nayoḥ saṃgrahe tāv api saṃgṛhītāv iti *nirāśrayā* sadasator ālambanayor ayogād buddhiḥ *praśāmyati* upaśāmyati, sarvavikalpopaśamān nirindhana-vahnivan nirvṛtim upayātī 'tyarthaḥ.

[1] *Cf. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, IX. 78 :
yā 'vidyamānatā sai'va paramā vidyamānatā.
sarvathā 'nupalambhaś ca upalambhaḥ paro mataḥ.

import and consequences. We are inclined to believe that the Buddha did not believe in the ultimacy of the individual ego. The ego is a false notion. The individual is analysed into five aggregates (*skandhas*). The *rūpaskanda* (physical organism) is an essential constituent of it. The *skandhas* are undergoing change and the dissociation of the gross body does not mean an entirely disembodied existence. Not only in the *kāmadhātu* (gross world), but in the *rūpadhātu*, and even in the *arūpadhātu*, the individual has got an embodied existence. It is only in *nirvāṇa* there is the total dissolution of the *skandhas* as the formative elements of the individual. It is therefore difficult to answer the question categorically. The individual is inseparable from the body, material or mental. But the Buddha also was not prepared to commit himself to the position that the body is identical with the individual. That would rather sound as the endorsement of the materialist position. It is a leading question like the preceding ones. It involves the question of the ultimate nature of the individual and that of *nirvāṇa* in which the individual attains his real state. It is most probably definite that the Buddha did not believe in the reality of the ego unlike the Jaina, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya, the Mīmāṃsaka *et hoc genus omne.* There seems to exist almost total agreement between the Buddha and the Vedānta. Vedānta holds that the individual is only a distorted appearance of the Absolute Self. The *Ātman* of the Upaniṣads is not an individual but the universal oversoul. In *nirvāṇa*, the individual loses his petty individuality and realizes his infinite being. He becomes the great soul (*mahān ātmā*). *Nairātmya* is quivalent to *māhātmya*.[1] This interpretation happily agrees with the import of all crucial texts, both in the Pāli canon as well as the Mahāyāna texts.

V. OTHER INTERPRETATIONS

17. We have not dealt with the different interpretations proposed by modern exponents. Keith is of the opinion that

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[1] śūnyatāyāṃ viśuddhāyāṃ nairātmyātmāgralābhataḥ.
buddhāḥ śuddhātmalābhitvād gatā ātmamahātmatām.
—*Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, IX. 23. See also IX. 78 where Pure Non-Being is equated to Universal Being. (See footnote 1, § 15 *supra*).

the Buddha was not a metaphysician but a man of common sense with practical ethical interest, and so these questions were parried by him.[1] Another explanation is that the Buddha was an agnostic. Agnosticism implies lack of definite knowledge of the ultimate truth. These explanations do not appeal to us. The Buddha was more like Socrates. His counter questions are reminiscent of the later Socratic method. This has been emphasized by Dr T. W. Rhys Davids.[2] In our judgment the Buddha was a rationalist who was however fully conscious of the limitations of the human reason. As Professor Murti has rightly observed, the Buddha's position was definite and his views were unwavering which ill accords with agnosticism.[3]

VI. STRUCTURE OF THE QUESTIONS

18. As regards the structure of the questions, I feel inclined to agree with Professor Murti regarding his conception of the dialectic. Thought moves by dialectic, which means that every thesis is countered by an antithesis. This creates a deadlock which cannot be an enduring mood. The deadlock is resolved in the synthesis. The Buddha's dialectic essentially differs from that of Hegel as he does not seem to believe in a synthesis of which the thesis and the antithesis are moments. The Buddha's *nirvāṇa* or ultimate reality is transcendental like the Upaniṣadic Absolute or *Brahman*. It is not a system consisting of related parts. Though the immanence of the Absolute has been set forth in Vedānta and Nāgārjuna equates

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[1] *Cf*. *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 63.

[2] *Cf*. "In depth of philosophic insight, in the method of Socratic questioning often adopted, in the earnest and elevated tone of the whole, in the evidence they afford of the most cultured thought of the day, these discourses (of the *Digha*- and *Majjhima-Nikāya*) constantly remind the reader of the Dialogues of Plato."—T. W. Rhys Davids : *Buddhism* (American Lectures), 1896, p. 59.

[3] *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 47 : "Buddha's silence, then, cannot be construed as agnosticism; for this is an attitude of doubt and despair; but Buddha's answer is decisive........ Nor is it ignorance of metaphysics. He was not only conversant with philosophical speculations of the time, but was himself a metaphysician of no mean order."

śūnyatā with *saṃsāra*, that is, the phenomenal world, the concept of immanence seems to be a concession. It is not ultimate.[1] *Saṃsāra* and *śūnyatā* can be identified only because the former is an illusory appearance, and the latter is the true essence.

19. Each set of questions, excepting the last, is put in four disjunctive propositions. The first and second propositions in each set are contradictorily opposed. The third is dismissed by Nāgārjuna as a case of self-contradiction. It infringes the Law of Contradiction. The fourth is in violation of the Law of Excluded Middle. The Buddha however does not entertain any of these questions as legitimate because the presuppositions are false or unwarranted assumptions and we have sought to lay bare the preconceptions in the course of our article.

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[1] Vide footnote 2 in § 13, *supra*.

THE VUTTODAYA

(The Pali Prosody)

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वुत्तोदयं

नमो तस्स भगवतो अरहतो सम्मासम्बुद्धस्स

पठमो परिच्छेदो

परिभासा निद्देसो

१. नमत्थु जनसन्तान तमसन्तान भेदिनो
धम्मुज्जलन्त रुचिनो मुनिन्दोदात रोचिनो।

२. पिंगला'चरियादीहि छन्दं यमुदितं पुरा
सुद्धमागधिकानं तं न साधेति यथिच्छितं।

३. ततो मागधभासाय मत्तावण्णविभेदनं
लक्ख लक्खण संयुत्तं पसन्नत्थपदक्कमं।

४. इदं वुत्तोदयं नाम लोकियच्छन्द निस्सितं
आरभिस्समहन्दानि तेसं सुखविबुद्धिया।

५. सब्बग्लाम्नादिग्लहु भ्या मज्झन्त गरू जसा
मज्झन्तला रते'तठु गणा गो गरु लो लहु।

६. भजसा सब्बग्लहु पंचिमे सण्ठिता गणा
अरिया'दिम्हि विञ्ञेय्या गणो इध चतुक्कलो।

७. संयोगादि च दीघो च निग्गहीत परो च यो
गुरु वंको पदन्तो वा रस्सो'ञ्ञो मत्तिको लुजु।

८. परे पादादि संयोगे यो पुब्बो गरुवक्खरो
लहु स क्वचि विञ्ञेय्यो तदुदाहरणं यथा—

९. दुस्सन-रसानुभवने निबद्ध गेधा जिनस्स' यं जनता
विम्हय जननी संयत क्रियानुकन्नातु' रंजयति।

१०. विञ्ञेय्या लोकतो सञ्ञा समुद्दो'सुरसादिनं
पादो ञेय्यो चतुत्थंसो पदच्छेदो यतिञ्भवे।

११. सममद्धसमं वुत्तं विसमं चापरं तिधा
समा लक्खणतो पादा चत्तारो यस्स तं समं।

१२. यास्सन्तिमेन दुतियो ततियेना'दिमो समो
तदद्धसममञ्ञन्तु भिन्नलक्खण पादिकं।

१३. पादमेक'क्खरारब्भ याव छब्बीसत'क्खरो
भवे पादेहि तं छन्दं नाना नामोदितं ततो।
१४. दण्डका चण्डवुठ्यादि पादेहि छहि तीहि तु
गाथा ति च परत्थेवं छन्दो सञ्ञा पकासिता।
१५. अनन्तरोदितं चा'ञ्ञमेतं सामञ्ञनामतो
गाथा मिच्चेव निद्दिट्ठा मुनिन्दवचने पन।
१६. विसेसनामतो किंचि गहेत्वा सब्बथो' चितं
दस्सयिस्सामहन्तेत्थ नामाना'विभविस्सरे।

इति वुत्तोदये छन्दसि सञ्ञा परिभासा निद्देसो समत्तो

दुतियो परिच्छेदो

मत्तावुत्ता निद्देसो

अरिया जातयो।

१. छट्ठोखिललहु जो वा गयुताञ्ञे छग्गणा न जो विसमे
अरियाय'न्तड्ढे लो—छट्ठो'न्ते गो गणा छ'ञ्ञे।
२. पठम'ड्ढे छट्ठो चे सब्बलहेत्थादि लहुनि भवति यति
तप्परकोन्ते'पि सचे चरिमे पि भवति चतुत्थो'न्ते।
३. अरिया सामञ्ञं चे पुब्बोदितलक्खणं भवे यस्सा
आदिममथ पादयुगं यस्सा त्यंसेहि सा पथ्या।
४. यत्थ गणत्तयमुल्लंघियो'भयत्थादिमो भवे विपुला।
५. गुरु मज्झगो जकारो चतुत्थको दुतियको चपला।
६. चपलागताखिलं चे दलादिमं लक्खणं भवति यस्सा
पथ्या लक्खणमञ्ञं मुखचपला नाम सा भवति।
७. पथ्याय लक्खणं चे पठम'ड्ढे लक्खणन्तु चपलाय
दुतिये दले'थ यस्सा पकित्तिता सा जघनचपला।

गीति जातयो

१. सब्बं पठमदले यदि लक्खणमरियाय वुत्तमुभयेसु
यस्सा दलेसु युत्तं वुत्ता सा गीति वुत्तयति ललिता।
२. अरियायं दुतिय'ड्ढे गदिता'खिल लक्खणं यं तं
भवति दलेसु'भयेसु'पि यस्सा सा'यमुपगीति।

३. अरियाय'द्ध द्वितयं पुब्बोदित लक्खणू'पेतं
विपरिययेना'भिहितं – यस्सा सम्भवति चे'ह सोग्गीति।

४. अरिया पुब्ब'द्धं यदि गुरुनेकेना'धिकेन निधने युत्तं
यदि पुब्ब'द्ध समानं दलमितरं चोदिताय मरिया गीति।

वेतालीय जातयो

१. विसमे छ सियुं कलामुखे समेता'ट्ठरलगा ततोपरि
वेतालीयन्तमुच्चते लहु छक्कं न निरन्तरं समे।

२. वेतालियो'पमं मुखे तं ओपच्छन्दसिकं रया यदन्ते।

३. आपातलिका कथिता'यं भग्गा'न्ते यदि पुब्बमिव'ञ्ञं।

४. यदादितो दक्खिणन्तिका ठिते'त्थ पादे सा'खिलेसु जो।

५. उदिच्चवुत्ती'ति वुच्चते जो चा'दो विसमेसु सण्ठितो।

६. पुब्बत्थ समेसु चे गजा पच्चवुत्ति रुदिते'ति सण्ठिता।

७. समासमा'त्रादिनं समा संयुता भवति तं पवत्तकं।

८. अस्स या समकता' परान्तिका।

९. तदञ्ञजा चारुहासिनी।

मत्तासम जातयो

१. द्विक विहत वसु लहु रचलधितिरिह।

२. मत्तासमकं नवमोल्गन्ते।

३. जोन्लाथ' वा'ण्ण वा विसिलोको।

४. तद्द्वयतो वानवासिका'ख्या।

५. पंचट्ठनवसु यदि लो चित्रा।

६. गल्या'ट्ठहि चे सा वुपचित्रा।

७. यमतीत लक्खणविसेसयुता
मत्ता समादि पादाभिहिता।
अनियतवुत्त परिमाण सहिता
पथिता जनेसु पादाकुलका।

६. विना वण्णेहि मत्ता गा विना वण्णा गुरूहि तु
विना लहूहि गुरवो दले पथ्या'दिनो मता।

इति वुत्तोदये छन्दसि मत्तावुत्त निद्देसो समत्तो

—:०:—

ततियो परिच्छेदो

समवुत्त निद्देसो

गायत्ति :—

१. त्या चे तनुमज्झा ।

उण्ही :—

१. कुमार-ललिता ज्-स्-गा ।

अनुट्ठुभा :—

१. चित्रपदा यदि भा-गा ।
२. मो मो गो गो विज्जुम्माला ।
३. भा त-ल-गा मानवका ।
४. ग्ला समानिका र-जा च ।
५, पमाणिका ज-रा ल-गा ।

ब्रहती :—

१. रा न सा यदि हलमुखी ।
२. भुजगसुसुहता ना-मो ।

पन्ति :—

१. म् सा ज्-गा सुद्धविराजितं मतं ।
२. म्ना यो गो यदि पणवो ख्यातो
३. भ्-मा स्-ग-युत्ता रुम्मवती सा।
४. ञेय्या मत्ता म-भ-स-ग-युत्ता ।
५. न-र-ज-गेहि सा मनोरमा।
६. उब्भासकं तं चे तो म·रा गो ।
७. त्-जा गा गरुनायमुपट्ठिता ।

तुट्ठुभा :—

१. इन्दा'दिका ता वजिरा ज-गा गो ।
२. उपा'दिका सा'व ज-ता ज-गा गो ।

३. अनन्तरोदीरित लक्खणा चे
पादा विमिस्सा उपजातयो ता
एवं किरञ्ञासु'पि मिस्सितासु
वदन्ति जातिस्विदमेव नामं ।

४. स-ज-जा ल-गा गदिता सुमुखी ।

५. दोधकमिच्छति चे भ-भ-भा गा ।

६. वेदस्सेहि म्-ता त-गाग् सालिनी सा ।

७. वातोम्मी सा यति सा म्-भा त-गा गो ।

८. भा त-न-गा गो सुरससिरी सा ।

९. रो न-रा इध रथोद्धता ल-गा ।

१०. स्वागतेति र-न-भा गुरुका द्वे ।

११. न-न-र-लहु-गुरूहि भद्दिका ।

जगति :—

१. वदन्ति वंसट्ठमिदं ज-ता ज-रा ।

२. सा इन्दवंसा खलु यत्थ ता ज-रा

३. इध तोटकमम्वुधिसेहि मितं ।

४. दुतविलम्वितमाहु न भा भ-रा ।

५. वसु-युग विरती ना-म्या पुटो'यं

६. न य सहिता न्या कुसुमविचित्ता ।

७. भुजंगप्पयातं भवे वेदयेहि ।

८. न भ ज-रेहि भवतिप्पियंवदा ।

९. वुत्ता सुधीहि ललिता त भा ज-रा ।

१०. पमित-क्खरा स-ज-स-सेहुदिता ।

११. न-न-भ-रसहिताभिहितुज्जला ।

१२. पंचास्सच्छिन्ना वेस्सदेवी म-मा या ।

१३. वदति हि तामरसं न-ज-जा यो ।

१४. कमलाति ञ्ञेय्या स-य-सेहि यो चे ।

अतिजगति :—

१. म्ना ज्-रा गो तिदसयतिप्पहासिनी सा ।

२. चतुग्गहेहि'ह रुचिरा ज-भा स-जा गो ।

सक्करी :—

१. न-न-र-स-लहु-गा सरेहि'पराजिता ।
२. न-न-भ-न लगितिप्पहरणकलिका ।
३. वुत्ता वसन्ततिलका त-भ-जा ज-गा गो ।

अतिसक्करी :—

१. द्विहतहय लहु रथगिति ससिकला ।
२. वसु हय यतिरिध मनिगुणनिकरो ।
३. न-न-म-य-य-युतायं मालिनी भोगिसीहि ।
४. भवति न-जा म-जा रसहिता पभद्दकं ।

अट्ठि :—

१. न-ज-भ-ज-रा यदा भवति वाणिनी ग-युत्ता ।

अच्चट्ठि :—

१. य-मा नो सो भ-ल्-गा रस हर विरामा सिखरिणी ।
२. रसयुगिसितो नो सो म्-रा स्-ला ग् यदा हरिणी तदा ।
३. मन्दाक्न्ता म-भ-न त त गा गो युगुत्वस्सकेहि ।

धुति :—

१. मो तो नो यो या कुसुमितलतावेल्लिताक्खुत्विसिहि ।

अतिधुति :—

१. रसुत्वस्सेहि य् मा न-स-र-र गुरू मेघ विप्फुज्जिता सा ।
२. अक्कस्सेहि यदि म्स-जा स-त-त गा सद्दूल विक्कोलितं ।

कति :—

१. वुत्तमीदिसन्तु नामतो रजा-रजा-रजा गुरुलहु च ।

पकति :—

१. म्रभ्-ना यो योत्रयेनन्ति मुनि यतियुता सद्धरा कित्तितायं ।

आकति :—

१. भ्रा नरना रना'थ च गुरुद्दसक्कं विरमा हिभद्दकमिदं ।

इति वुत्तोदये छन्दसि समवुत्त निद्देसो समत्तो

चतुत्थो परिच्छेदो

अद्धसमवुत्त निद्देसो

१. विसमे यदि सा सलगा समे
भत्तयतो गुरुका उपचित्रा ।

२. भत्तयतो यदि गा द्रुतमज्झा
यदि पुनरेव भवन्ति नजा ज्या ।

३. यदि सत्तितयं गुरु युत्तं
वेगवती यदि भत्तितया गा ।

४. तो जो विसमे रतो गुरु चे
मसा जूगा भद्दविराजमेत्थ गो चे ।

५. विसमे सजा सगुरुयुत्ता
केतुमती समे भरनगा गो ।

६. आख्यानिको ता विसमे जगा गो
जवा जगा गो तु समेथ पादे ।

७. जता जगा गो विसमे समे तु
ता जो गगा चे विपरीत पुब्बा ।

८. ससतो सलगा विसमे समे
नभ भरा भवति हरिणप्लुता ।

९. यदि ननरलगा नजा जरा
यदि च तदापरवन्त मिच्छति ।

१०. विसममुपगता नना रया चे
नज जरगा समके च पुप्फितग्गा ।
(द्वयमिदं वेतालियप्पभेदो)

११. सा यवादिका मती रजा रजा तु
समे समे जरा जरा गुरु भवेय्युं ।

इति वुत्तोदये छन्दसि अद्ध समवुत्त निद्देसो समत्तो

पंचमो परिच्छेदो

(वत्तप्पभेदो)

विसम वुत्त निद्देसो

१. नट्ठक्खरेसु पादेसु स्नादिम्हा योण्णवा वत्तं ।
२. समेसु सिन्धुतो जेन पथ्यावत्तं पकित्तितं ।
३. ओजेसु जेन सिन्धुतो तमेव विपरीतादि ।
४. नकारो चे जलधितो चपलावत्त मिच्चेतं ।

५. समे लो सत्तमो यस्स विपुला पिंगलस्स सा।
६. सेत वस्साखिले स्वपि।
७. भेनण्णवा तब्बिपुला।
८. एवमञ्ञा रो चतुत्था।
९. नो'ण्णवा चे नविपुला।
१०. तोण्णवा तथाञ्ञा सिया।
न दिस्सतेत्थ यं छन्दं—पयोगे दिस्सते यदि
विसमक्खर पादं तं—गाथा सामञ्ञ नामतो।

इति वुत्तोदये छन्दसि विसमवुत्तनिद्देसो समत्तो

छट्ठो परिच्छेदो

(छप्पच्चय विभागो)

१. पत्थारे सब्बगे पादे पुब्बगाधोल्परे समा
पुब्बे गुरुत्वेवमिमे कत्तब्बा याव सब्बलो।

२. नट्ठस्स यो भवेय्यंको तस्मिं लो'द्धिकते समे
विसमे त्वेक सहिते भवेय्य'द्धि कते गुरु।

३. एकादिनुक्कमेनंके पुब्बाधो दिगुणे लिखे
मिस्सितेहि लहुट्ठे हि सेकेहुद्दिट्ठकं भवे।

४. वुत्तक्खरसमा संख्या लिख्य सेकोपरूपरि
एकेक हीन'मेकादिन नुट्ठाने सब्बगा'दिकं।

५. गुरुक्रियांकसन्दोहे भवे संख्या विमिस्सिते
उद्दिट्ठंक समाहारो सेकोचेमं समानये।

६. संख्येव दिगुणे'कूना वित्थारायाम सम्भवो
वुत्तस्सद्धन्तरानं चगरुलानंच अंगुलं।

इति संघरक्खितथेरपाद विरचिते वुत्तोदये छन्दसि
छप्पच्चयविभागो समत्तो

वुत्तोदयं समत्तं

THE VUTTODAYA

The Vuttodaya (Vutta = Sk. Vṛtta, Metre + Udaya, i. e. Exposition) i. e. Exposition of Metres, is the second treatise written in Ceylon during the 12th century A. D. by the Pali Grammarian, Moggallāna under the Priest-name (title) of Saṅgharakkhita Thera. It is the only work on Pali Prosody extant, and it is founded on the Vṛitta-Ratnākara, a Sanskrit work on Post-Vedic Metres by Kedāra Bhaṭṭa. It contains 106 stanzas or portions of stanzas, divided into six Chapters and treats the following subjects :—

Chapter I—Technical Terms of Symbols in Prosody.

Chapter II—Metres regulated by time (Jāti).

Chapter III—Metres with quarter verses similar (Sama-Vutta).

Chapter IV—Metres with half line similar (Aḍḍhasama Vutta).

Chapter V—Metres with quarter line verses dissimilar (Visama Vutta).

Chapter VI—The Six Problems (Chappaccayā).

CHAPTER I

Vutta is a stanza whose metre is governed by the number and arrangement of syllables in each verse or quarter.

Vuttas are divided into three classes, viz.—

(a) Sama-Vutta i. e. the component quarters of which are all similar.

(b) Aḍḍhasama-vutta i. e. the alternate quarters of which are alike.

(c) Visama-vutta i. e. component quarters (Pāda) of which are all dissimilar.

In a regular Vutta number of syllables varies from 1—26 in each quarter.

AKKHARA : Akkhara or a syllable is a single vowel sound, or it is a consonant or a group of consonants having one vowel sound. If the vowel is long the syllable is regarded as long (—). If the vowel is short the syllable is regarded as short (◡). But a short vowel is regarded as long if it is followed by a conjunct consonant or a Niggahīta (Anusvāra or Vindu). Further, for the exigency of the Metre (Chanda) a short vowel is to be regarded as long if it is at the end of a quarter, and a long vowel can, similarly, be regarded as short if it is at the end of a quarter.

JĀTI : Jāti is a stanza whose metre is governed by the number of syllabic instants or morae (Mātrā) in each 'Pāda' or quarter. In such metres one instant or 'Mātrā' is allotted to a short syllable and two 'Mātrās' or instants to a long one.

GAṆA : For the convenience of counting syllables in scanning a metre syllables are taken in groups of 3. These groups are known as Gaṇas. There are 8 such '*Gaṇas*' each with a symbolic name as follows :—

Syllablic name	Groups of syllables
Ma—gaṇa	— — —
Ya—gaṇa	◡ — —
Ra—gaṇa	— ◡ —
Sa—gaṇa	◡ ◡ —
Ta—gaṇa	— — ◡
ja—gaṇa	◡ — ◡
Bha—gaṇa	— ◡ ◡
Na—gaṇa	◡ ◡ ◡

A long syllable is 'Guru' and is denoted by 'Ga'; a short syllable or brève is 'Lahu' and is denoted by 'La'. Thus :—

Go Go or Gā	— —
Lo Lo or Lā	⌣ ⌣
Go Lo or Ga–Lā	— ⌣
Lo Go or La–Gā	⌣ —

CHAPTER II

MATTĀ (MĀTRĀ) METRES.

This Chapter describes Pali metres regulated by time (Mattā-Vutta) which go by the general class name of 'Jāti' consisting of four principal types, viz. Ariyā, Gīti, Vetālīya and Mattā-samaka. Gīti is merely a sub-division of the first.

There are only five Gaṇas in these (Ariyā etc.) metres, Viz.: Bha-gaṇa (—⌣⌣); Ja-gaṇa (⌣—⌣); Sa-gaṇa (⌣⌣—); Ma-gaṇa(— —); and Na-gaṇa (⌣⌣⌣⌣). These matres have four Kalās or Mātrās (measurements). A short syllable indicates one Mātrā and a long syllable two Mātrās.

I. ARIYĀ (ĀRYĀ) JĀTI

The first and the third of this metre must contain twelve syllabic instants, and the second eighteen and the fourth fifteen, i. e. 12 : 18
12 : 15

Example (with description) :—

Paṭhamaddhe chaṭṭho ce / sabbalahetthādi lahuni bhavati yati /
⌣⌣—, — —, — —/ —⌣⌣, — —, ⌣(:) ⌣⌣⌣⌣⌣⌣—/
tapparakontepi sace / carimepi bhavati catutthonte /
—⌣ ⌣, — —, ⌣ ⌣—/ ⌣⌣—(:) ⌣⌣⌣⌣, ⌣ — — — /

The following divisions are included in the Ariyā Jāti :— (a) Pathyā, (b) Vipulā, (c) Capalā, (d) Mukha-capalā, and (e) Jaghana-capalā.

II. Gīti Jāti

1. (a) Gīti : The odd verses i.e. the first and the third quarters must contain twelve syllabic instants and the even verses i. e. the second and the fourth eighteen,

i. e. 12 : 18
12 : 18

Gīti has the following divisions or branches; (a) Upagīti, (b) Uggīti (Udgīti), and (c) Ariyāgīti (Ārīyā-gīti).

(a) Upagīti—the odd verses of this metre must contain twelve syllabic instants and the even fifteen :—

i. e. 12 : 15
12 : 18

Example (with description) ;—

Ariyāyaṁ dutiyaddhe / gaditākhilalakkhaṇaṁ yaṁ taṁ /
⏑⏑—, —⏑⏑, — — / ⏑⏑—, ⏑⏑—, ⏑— —, — /
bhavati dalesubhayesu pi / yadi yassā sāyamupagīti /
⏑⏑⏑, —⏑⏑, —⏑⏑ / ⏑⏑—, — —, ‘⏑’ ⏑⏑— — /.

(b) Uggīti (Udgīti) : The first and the third quarters of this metre contain twelve syllabic instants, and the second fifteen and the fourth eighteen :

i. e. 12 : 15
12 : 18

Example (with description) :—

Ariyāyaddha dvitayaṁ / pubbodita lakkhaṇūpetaṁ /
⏑⏑—, — —, ⏑ ⏑ — / — —, ⏑⏑ —, ‘⏑’ — —, — /
vipariyayenābhihitaṁ / yassā sambhavati ceha soggīti /
⏑⏑⏑⏑, — —, ⏑⏑ — / — —, — ⏑⏑, ⏑—⏑, — —, — /.

(c) Ariyā-gīti : The first and the third of this metre contain twelve syllabic instants, and the second and the fourth quarters twenty each :

i. e. 12 : 20
12 : 20

Example (with description) :—

Ariyā pubbaddhaṁ yadi/garunekenādhikena nidhane yuttaṁ
◡◡—, — —, —◡◡ / ◡◡—, — —, ◡—◡, ◡◡—, — —/.
yadi pubbad hasamānaṁ / dalamitarañcoditayamariyāgīti /
◡◡—, —◡◡, — — / ◡◡◡◡, — —, ◡—◡, ◡◡—, ——/.

III. VETĀLĪYA (VAITĀLĪYA) JĀTI.

VETĀLĪYA : The first and the third of this metre must contain six syllabic instants, and the second and the fourth eight each followed in each case a Ra-gaṇa (—◡—) and one short and one long syllable : i. e. 6+R. : 8+R.
6+R. : 8+R.

Example (with description) :—

Visame cha siyuṁ kalā mukhe / sametaṭṭha Ra-La Ga tatopari /
◡◡—◡◡, —◡—, ◡— / ◡— — ◡◡◡, —◡—, ◡, — /
Vetālīyantamuccate / lahu chakkaṁ na nirantaraṁ same/
— — —, — ◡ —, ◡, —/
◡ ◡ — — ◡ ◡, — ◡ —, ◡, —/

The following are the metres included in the Vetālīya division or branch :—(A) Opacchandasika (Aupacchandasaka), (b) Āpātalikā, (c) Dakkhiṇantikā (Dakṣiṇantikā), (d) Udiccavutti (Udicya-vṛitti) (e) Pacca-vutti (Prācya-vṛitti), (f) Pavattakā (Pravṛittakā), (g) Aparāntikā, and (h) Cāruhāsinī.

IV. MATTĀ (*MĀTRĀ*) SAMAKA JĀTI

Mattāsamaka (Mātrāsamaka) :—There are sixteen syllabic instants in each quarter-verse, the ninth instant being composed of a short syllable, and there being a long syllable at the end :
Example (with description) :—

Mattā samakaṁ navamoLGante/
— — ◡ ◡ —, '◡' ◡ — ◡ '—'/

Example (Sk.) :—

Punarapi jananaṁ 'pu'narapi maraṇaṁ/
punarapi jananī 'ja'ṭhare śayanaṁ/

iha saṁsāre 'Bha'va dustāre/
kṛipayā pāre 'pā'hi murāre/.

N. B.: In the fourth quarter verse the ninth syllabic instant is long which is against the rule. The long instant, 'pā' in Pali ought to have been represented by two short instants.

CHAPTER III

This chapter describes those metres the quarters of which are similar (Samavutta), giving in each instance the characteristic of one quarter which answers for the remaining three. Stanzas having syllables in each quarter six to twenty-two (6-22) quarters are dealt with in this chapter; those varying from 1-5 are omitted, as not being practicable.

The classes of metre dealt with are as follows :—

Nos.—I, II, III, IV and V omitted, as not being practical it does not have any value for the purposes of poetic exposition.

GĀYATTI (GĀYATRĪ)

VI. **Gāyatti**, which has six syllables to the quarter. Of its many varieties the one named 'Tanumajjhā' is important.
Tanumajjhā (Tanumadhyā) : — — ◡, ◡ — — (T.Y.)
Definition :—"T.Yā ce Tanumajjhā".

Tr. In each quarter if there are one Ta-gaṇa and one Ya-gaṇa, the metre is called Tanumajjhā.

Example :—

Ñānaṁ dasamaddhe/
ñeyye tava satthā/
vitthāritamāse/
saṅgetara bhāgā/.

UṆHĪ (UṢṆĪ)

VII. **Uṇhī (Uṣṇī)** : which has seven syllables to the quarter
The following is the important variety :
Kumāra-lalitā : ◡ — ◡, ◡ ◡ —, — (J. S. G.)
Definition : "Kumāralalitā Ja.S. Gā".

Tr. If there are one Ja-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa and one long syllable in each quarter, the metre is known as Kumāra·lalitā.

Example :

Tayā sadisa khettaṁ/
na lokataramasmiṁ/
padakkamanumattaṁ/
vipaccati menaṁpi/.

ANUṬṬHUBHA (ANUṢṬUP)

VIII. **ANUṬṬHUBHA (ANUṢṬUP)**, having eight syllables in each quarter.

The following are the important varieties :—

1. Cittapadā (Citrapadā) : —◡◡,—◡◡,— — (2Bh. 2G)

Definition : "Cittapadā yadi Bhā Gā".

Tr. The metre is known as Cittapadā if there are two Bha-gaṇas and two long syllables exist.

Example :—Satyakulappara candaṁ /
tittiyapannakavindaṁ /
sañcanapañcadinandaṁ /
sādhunamesamanindaṁ /

2. **VIJJUMMĀLĀ (VIDYUNMĀLĀ)** : — — —,— — —,— —

Definition : "Mo. Mo-Go-Go. Vijjummālā." (2 M. 2 G.)

Tr. The metre is known as Vijjummālā, if it consists of two Ma-gaṇas and two long syallables.

Example :— Jāte Buddhā vijjabbhūte /
loke dhammaṁ loke niccaṁ /
mohadhittaṁ hitvā sattā /
pattā santaṁ yogakkhemaṁ /

3. **MĀNAVAKĀ (MĀNAVAKRĪḌITAKA)** :
— ◡ ◡,— — ◡, ◡ — (Bh. T. L. G.)

Definition : "Bhā Ta-La-Gā Mānavakā."

Tr. The metre is known as Mānavakā if it consists one each of Bha-gaṇa, Ta-gaṇa and one long and one short syllable.

Example :— Ānanaverīkamalaṁ /
pañcayakete Bhagavā /
yānasakhā haṁsavara /
sūcayate vassupadaṁ / .

4. **SAMĀNIKĀ :** — ◡ — , ◡ — ◡ , — ◡ . (R. J. G. L. or 4 G. L.)
Definition : "G.Lā Samānikā Ra-Jā ca".

Tr. The metre is known as Samānikā if each quarter consists of one long and one short syllable followed by one Ra-gaṇa and one Ja-gaṇa.

Example :—Ānanena te Muninda /
tulyaminna sobhadāni /
locanena keravāni /
tosate samakkhayāta / .

5. **PAMĀNIKĀ :** ◡ — ◡ , — ◡ — , ◡ — (J. R. L. G. or 4 L. G,)
Definition : "Pamānikā Ja-Rā La-Gā".

Tr. The metre is known as Pamānikā if each quarter consisis of one Ja-gaṇa and one Ra-gaṇa followed by a short and a long syllable. Or there will be four short syllables followed one each by long ones.

Example :— Saroruhā muninda te /
sasāmi vaṁsajattanaṁ /
paṭicca sampatītiyā /
iti vade padassitā / .

Signs of the Anuṭṭhubha Metre collected together :—

1. Cittapadā	— ◡ ◡ , — ◡ ◡ , — —
2. Vijjummālā	— — — , — — — , — —
3. Mānavakā	— ◡ ◡ , — — ◡ , ◡ —
4. Samānikā	— ◡ , — ◡ — , ◡ — ◡
5. Pamānikā	◡ — ◡ , — ◡ — , ◡ —

BRAHATĪ (BṚIHATĪ)

IX. **BRAHATĪ (BRIHATĪ)**, having nine syllables to each quarter.

The following are the important varieties :—

1. Halamukhī : — ◡ — , ◡ ◡ ◡ , ◡ ◡ — (R.N.S.)

Definition : "Rā-Na-Sā-yadi Halamukhī".

Tr. The metre is known as Halamukhī if a Ra-gaṇa is followed by one Na-gaṇa and one Sa-gaṇa.

Example :—

Uttamā gamayati ayaṁ/
majjhago dalina-tilako/
kesara sakala-bhuvano/
sāmakā khalu yuvatisu/.

2. **BHUJAGA-SUSUHATĀ (BHUJAGA-ŚIŚUSṚITĀ) :**

◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, — — —. (N.N.M. or 2N.M.)

Definition : "Bhujagasusuhatā Nā Mo".

Tr. The metre is known as Bhujaga-susuhatā if two Na-gaṇas are followed by a Ma-gaṇa.

Example :—

Vivarita-m-amatadvāraṁ/
suvihata-bhava sañcāraṁ/
kavivara-nuta-saccāraṁ/
panamarakhara-satthāraṁ/.

PANTI (PAṀKTI)

X. **PANTI (PAṀKTI)** having ten syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties :—

1. **SUDDHAVIRĀJITA (ŚUDDHAVIRĀṬA) :**

— — —, ◡ ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, —. (M.S.J.G.)

Definition : "M.Sā J-Gā Suddhavirājitaṁ mataṁ".

Tr. The metre consisting in a quarter, one each of Ma-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa and a long syllable, is known as Suddhavirājita.

Example :—

Majjhābhakkha-yugopamakkhaṇo/
dittaggī-jala-khagga-dhārino/
kodha bhakkhapaṭuṭṭhadāṭhako/
kopete abhibhū tu sattamo/.

2. PAṆAVA : — — —, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ — —, —. (M.N.Y.G.)

Definition : "M.Nā Yo Go yadi Paṇavo khyāto".

Tr. The metre consisting one each of Ma-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa, Ya-gaṇa and a long syllable is known as Paṇava.

Example :—

Nissaṅkho bhavakhaludā danto/
bhātiṁ bhāpaya maraṇe sassā/
jātīsaṁtava parisuddhā vo/
sīlādīhi guṇadharo satthā/.

3. RUMMAVATĪ (RUKMAVATĪ) :—

— ◡ ◡, — — —, ◡ ◡ —, —. (Bh.M.S.G.)

3. * CAMPAKAMĀLĀ (DIPAKAMĀLĀ) :—

— ◡ ◡, — — —, ◡ ◡ —, —. (Bh.M.S.G.)

*N. B.—In the Vṛitta-Ratnākara the Campakamālā is known as Dīpakamālā replacing Ja-gaṇa for Sa-gaṇa in the third quarter.

Definition : "Bh.Mā Sa-Ga-yuttā Rummavatī sā".
„ "Campakamālā ce Bh-Ma-Sā Go".

Tr. The metre is known as Rummavatī or Campakamālā if it consists of one Bha-gaṇa, one Ma-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa and a long syllable.

Example :—

Thoka-dhanānaṁ kintu-nidānaṁ/
thenika-bhāvaṁ jāti-surobhaṁ/
dhañña-dhanānaṁ bhāgiya-bhāvaṁ/
jātisu tesaṁ dāna-nidānaṁ/.

4. **MATTĀ** : — — —, — ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ —, —. (M.Bh.S.G.)

Definition : "Ñeyyā Mattā Ma-Bha-Sa-Ga-yuttā".

Tr. The metre is known as Mattā if it consists one each of Ma-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa and long syllable.

Example :—

Māyādevi-sutamarahantaṁ/
dhammassāmiṁ varachalabhiññaṁ/
niccaṁ saddhā yuta-manasāhaṁ/
vande suttaṁ bahuguṇayuttaṁ/

The following are the other three metres included in the PANTI though they are not much in use.

5. **MANORAMĀ** : ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ — ⏑, —. (N.R.J.G.)

Definition : "Na-Ra-Ja-Gehi sā Manoramā".

Tr. The metre Manoramā consists one each of Na-gaṇa, Ra-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa and long syllable.

6. **UBBHĀSAKA (UDBHĀSAKA)** :

— — ⏑, — — —, — ⏑ —, —. (T. M. R. G.)

Definition : "Udbhāsakantaṁ ce To Ma-Rā Go".

Tr. The metre is known as Ubbhāsaka when it consists of one Ta-gaṇa, one Ma-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa and a long syllable.

7. **UPAṬṬHITĀ (UPASTHITĀ)** :— —⏑, ⏑—⏑, ⏑—⏑, —. (T.J.J.G.)

Definition : "T.Jā J.Gā garunāyaṁ Upaṭṭhitā".

Tr. The metre is known as Upaṭṭhitā when it consists of one Ta-gaṇa, two Ja-gaṇas and a long syllable.

Example :—

Jumbhā vimalā paṭibhāti sā/
phullā viṭapī vakulādayo/
satthā karuṇāya vasaṁgato/
mārassa cagā suradhītaro/.

Signs of the PANTI metre collected together :

Names of Metre	Each quarter consists of 10 syllables			
1. Suddhavirājita	— — —,	◡ ◡ —,	◡ — ◡,	—.
2. Paṇava	— — —,	◡ ◡ ◡,	◡ — —,	—.
3. Rummavatī & Campakamālā	— ◡ ◡,	— — —.	◡ ◡ —,	—.
4. Mattā	— — —,	— ◡ ◡,	◡ ◡ —,	—.
5. Manoramā	◡ ◡ ◡,	— ◡ —,	◡ — ◡,	—.
6. Ubbhāsaka	— — ◡,	— — —,	— ◡ —,	—.
7. Upaṭṭhitā	— — ◡,	◡ — ◡,	◡ — ◡,	—.

TUṬṬHUBHA (TRIṢṬUBHA)

XI. **TUṬṬHUBHA** ; having eleven syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties :—

1. **INDAVAJIRĀ (INDRAVAJRĀ)** : — — ◡, — — ◡, ◡ — ◡, — —.
(2T. J. 2G.)

Definition : "Indādikā Tā Vajirā Ja-Gā Go".

Tr. The metre is known as Indavajirā when each quarter consists of two Ta-gaṇas, one Ja-gaṇa and two long syllables.

Example :—

Āvāsa-dānassa panānisaṁsaṁ/
ko nāma vattuṁ puriso samattho/
aññatra Buddhā pana lokanāthā/
yutto sahassena mukhena vāpi/.

2. UPENDAVAJIRĀ (UPENDRAVAJRĀ):

◡ — ◡, — — ◡, ◡—◡, — —, (J. T. J. 2 G.)

Definition: "Upādikā sā'va Ja-Tā Ja-Gā Go".

Tr. The metre is known as Upendavajirā when each quarter consists of one Ja-gaṇa, one Ta-gaṇa, then again a Ja-gaṇa and two long syllables.

Example:—

Balena mettāya citāya satthu/
vihāra sāmanta vanābhivāso/
migāpi vāḷā sahitāramaññaṁ/
cariṁsu yogīva samāhitattā/.

3. UPAJĀTI: When quarter verses of Indavajirā and Upendavajirā are mixed together the metre is called Upa-jāti.

Example:—

Nisinnamatte Vajirāsanasmiṁ/
tilokanāthe sanarāmarehi/
vidhīyamānesu mahāmahesu/
samārasena samupāgamāsi/.

In this verse the middle two quarters are of Indavajirā metre and rest two i. e. the first and the fourth quarters belong to Upendavajirā.

There are fourteen varieties of mixed metres of Indavajirā and Upendavajirā i. e. so called Upajāti. The varieties set up for the metre stand as follows horizontally.

"i" stands for Indavajirā, and "u" stands for Upendavajirā.

Upa-jāti.	Ist quarter.	2nd quarter.	3rd quarter.	4th quarter.
1.	i	u	u	u
2.	u	i	i	i
3.	i	i	u	i
4.	u	u	i	u
5.	i	u	i	u
6.	u	i	u	u

Upa-jāti	1st quarter	2nd quarter	3rd quarter	4th quarter
7.	i	i	i	u
8.	u	u	u	i
9.	i	i	u	u
10.	u	u	i	i
11.	u	i	u	i
12.	i	u	i	i
13.	i	u	u	i
14.	u	i	i	u

4. **SUMUKHĪ** : ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ — (S.2J.L.G.)

Definition : Sa-Ja-Jā-La-Gā gaditā Sumukhī"

Tr. The metre is known as Sumukhī if it consists of one Sa-gaṇa, two Ja-gaṇas and one each of short and long syllable.

5. **DODHAKA (DODHAKA)** :

— ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, —, —. (3Bh. 2G.)

Definition : "Dodhakamicchati ce Bha-Bha-Bhā Gā".

Tr. If a metre is to be called Dodhaka then each quarter must consist three Bha-gaṇas and two long syllables.

Examples :—Sajjana mānasakañju vikāsaṁ /
dujjana-tittiya.saṅka patāpaṁ /
lokanabhuggata-mārajisūraṁ /
mohatimīsahataṁ paṇamāmi /.

6. **SĀLINĪ (ŚĀLINĪ)** : — — —, — — ⏑, — — ⏑, — —.
(M. 2 T. 2 G.)

Definition : "Vedassehi M.Tā Ta-Gā-G Sālinī sā".

Tr. N. B. Veda stands for four (from the four Vedas) and Assa stands for seven (streach goes to the Sun's chariot). Therefore "Veda'ssehi" means with a pause (or Yati) after the fourth or the seventh syllable; and when metre consists of a Ma-gaṇa, two Ta-gaṇas and two long syllables, then it is known as Sālinī.

Example :—Suddhā sāmā suppasannāyatakkhī /
pīṇassoṇī dakkhiṇā vattanābhi /
saṁkhittaṁ sā nāti lomācitaṅgi /
dhaññā kaññā sālinī vāndhavānaṁ /

7. VĀTOMMĪ (VĀTORMĪ) :

— — —, — ⏑ ⏑, — — ⏑, — —. (M.Bh.T.2G.)

Definition : "Vātommī sā yati sā M.Bhā Ta-Gā-Go".

Tr. The metre consisting of one Ma-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa, one Ta-gaṇa, two long syllables along with a pause either after the fourth or the seventh syllable, is known as Vātommī.

Example :—Hatthe vatthaṁ pharusā citta-gattaṁ /
vāsā suddhammalinañceva gattaṁ /
te taṁ sukkā adharaṁ rāgahīnaṁ /
etaṁ cittaṁ vasagānaṁ sabhāvaṁ / .

8. SURASA-SIRĪ (KUDMALADANTĪ-ŚRI) :

— ⏑ ⏑, — — ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — —. (Bh.T.N.2G.)

Definition : "Bhā Ta-Na-Gā Go Surasa-sirī sā".

Tr. The metre is known as Surasa-sirī if it consists one each of Bha-gaṇa, Ta-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa and two long syllables in a quarter.

9. RATHODDHATĀ :

— ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ —. (R.N.R.L.G.)

Definition : "Ro Na-Rā idha Rathoddhatā La-Gā".

Tr. If each quarter of a metre consists of one Ra-gaṇa and one Na-gaṇa followed by another Ra-gaṇa, and one short and one long syllable then the metre is known as Rathoddhatā.

Example :—Yassa pādakiraṇarunūgataṁ /
dārukhaṇḍamapi paṭihāriyaṁ /
dasayitvā sumanañcane akaṁ /
tassa atthamiha ko silāghaye / .

10. SVĀGATĀ :

— ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, — —. (R.N.Bh.2G.)

Definition : "Svāgatehi Ra-Na-Bhā Gurukā dve".

Tr. The metre is known as Svāgatā if it consists one each of Ra-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa and two long syllables.

11. BHADDIKĀ (BHADRIKĀ) :

⏑ ⏑ ⏑ , ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ , — ⏑ — , ⏑ — (2N.R.L.G.)

Definition : "Na-Na-Ra-Lahu Gurūhi Bhaddikā".

Tr. The metre is known as Bhaddikā if a quarter consists of two Na-gaṇas, one Ra-gaṇa, one short and one long syllable.

Signs of the Tutthubha metres collected together :

Name of metre	Each quarter consists of 11 syllables			
1. Inda-vajirā	— — ⏑,	— — ⏑,	⏑ — ⏑,	— —
2. Upenda-vajirā	⏑ — ⏑,	— — ⏑,	⏑ — ⏑,	— —
3. Upa-Jāti	Mixed metres of Inda-vajirā & Upenda-vajirā are 14 in number.			
4. Sumukhī	⏑ ⏑ —,	⏑ — ⏑,	⏑ — ⏑,	⏑ —
5. Dodhaka	— ⏑ ⏑,	— ⏑ ⏑,	— ⏑ ⏑,	— —
6. Sālinī	— — —,	— — ⏑,	— — ⏑,	— —
7. Vātommī	— — —,	— ⏑ ⏑,	— — ⏑,	— —
8. Surasa-sirī	— ⏑ ⏑,	— — ⏑,	⏑ ⏑ ⏑,	— —
9. Rathoddhatā	— ⏑ —,	⏑ ⏑ ⏑,	— ⏑ —,	⏑ —
10. Svāgatā	— ⏑ —,	⏑ ⏑ ⏑,	— ⏑ ⏑,	— —
11. Bhaddikā	⏑ ⏑ ⏑,	⏑ ⏑ ⏑,	— ⏑ —,	⏑ —

JAGATI

XII. **JAGATI**—verses having twelve syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties :—

1. **VAṀSAṬṬHĀ (VAṀŚASTHĀ) :**

⏑ — ⏑, — — ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑ —. (J.T.J.R.)

Definition : "Vadanti Vaṁsaṭṭhamidaṁ Ja-Tā Ja-Rā".

Tr. The metre is said to be Vaṁsaṭṭhā if it consists each one of Ja-gaṇa and Ta-gaṇa followed by another Ja-gaṇa and finally by one Ra-gaṇa, to a quarter.

Example :—

Sasīva tārāgana saṁpurakkhato /
girīva meruṁ paribhaṇḍamantare /
saro suphullambujā kantikūpamo /
vasī jino jetavane pabhaṅkaro /

2. **INDAVAṀSĀ (INDRAVAṀŚĀ) :**

— — ⏑, — — ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑ —. (2T.J.R.)

Definition : "Sā Indavaṁsā khalu yattha Tā Ja-Rā".

Tr. The metre is known as Indavaṁsā if a quarter of a verse consists of two Ta-gaṇas, one Ja-gaṇa and one Ra-gaṇa.

Example :—

Luddhāsavā nekatikā guṇagghayā /
kāmāturā santhapanā durāsadā /
vajjā narā sabbhirutā hite ratā /
yenāpi vaṁsappabhavā guṇaññuhi /

3. **TOṬAKA :** ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ —. (4 S.)

Definition : "Idha Toṭakambudhi sehi mitaṁ".

Tr. The metre is known as Toṭaka if all the four (Ambudhi = Ocean) are Sa-gaṇas to the quarter.

Example :—

Karuṇā taruṇī ramaṇī ramate /
hadaye satataṁ satiyā sahitā /
samunī sadhano munino vacane /
ramate ramate pavare pavane /.

4. **DUTAVILAMBITA (DŪTAVILAMBITA) :**

◡◡◡, —◡◡, —◡◡, —◡—. (N.2Bh.R.)

Definition : "Dutavilambitamāhu Na-Bhā Bha-Rā".

Tr. The metre is known as Dutavilambita if it consits of one Na-gaṇa, two Bha-gaṇas and one Ra-gaṇa to the quarter.

5. **PUṬA :** ◡◡◡, ◡◡◡, ———, ◡——. (2N.M.Y.)

Definition : "Vasu-yuga-viratī Na-Myā Puṭoyaṁ".

Tr. The metre is known as Puṭa if each quarter consists of two Na-gaṇas, one Ma-gaṇa and one Ya-gaṇa with pauses on eighth (Vasu = world) and fourth (yuga = wheel) syllables.

6. **KUSUMAVICITTĀ (KUSUMAVICITRĀ) :**

◡◡◡, ◡——, ◡◡◡, ◡——. (N.Y.N.Y.)

Definition : "Na-Ya sahitā N.Yā Kusumavicittā".

Tr. The metre is known as Kusumavicittā if it consists of one Na-gaṇa and one Ya-gaṇa followed by again one Na-gaṇa and one Ya-gaṇa.

Example :—

Ratipati jammaṁ jitamuni dhammaṁ/
sivapatha sālaṁ Munijana mālaṁ/
tibhuvana-ketuṁ subhaguṇa hetuṁ/
bhajatha janā bho samiha sulābho/.

7. **BHUJAṄGAPPAYĀTA (BHUJAṄGAPRAYĀTA) :**

◡——, ◡——, ◡——, ◡——. (4Y.)

Definition : "Bhujaṅgappayātambhave veda-Yehi".

Tr. The metre is known as Bhujaṅgappayāta if it consists of all the four (= Vedas) Ya-gaṇas to the quarter.

Example :—

Munindo virāgāya vindassa kando/
dinandadvayānaṁ sandosasando/
nabbhindampi' nibbindakatthena nindaṁ/
virājeti rājinda kundo'bhacando/

8. PIYAṀVADĀ (PRIYAṀVADĀ):

⌣ ⌣ ⌣, — ⌣ ⌣, ⌣ — ⌣, — ⌣ —. (N.Bh.J.R.)

Definition: "Na-Bha-Ja-Rehi bhavatippiyaṁvadā".

Tr. The metre is known as Piyaṁvadā if it consists one each of Na-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, Ja-gana and Ra-gaṇa to the quarter.

Example :—

Khagagaṇehi vitataṁ manoharaṁ/
sakamalehi sarasī vibhūsitaṁ/
migagaṇehi vicarīta-bhūtalaṁ/
yati janādharamayāti pāvanaṁ/.

9. LALITĀ: — — ⌣, — ⌣ ⌣, ⌣ — ⌣, — ⌣ —. (T.Bh.J.R.)

Definition: "Vuttā sudhīhi Lalitā Ta-Bhā Ja-Rā".

Tr. The metre Lalitā consists one each of Ta-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa and Ra-gaṇa to the quarter.

10. PAMITĀKKHARĀ (PRAMITĀKṢARĀ):

⌣ ⌣ —, ⌣ — ⌣, ⌣ ⌣ —, ⌣ ⌣ —. (S.J.2S.)

Definition: "Pamitākkharā Sa-Ja-Sa-Sehuditā".

Tr. The metre is known as Pamitākkharā if it consists of one Sa-gaṇa and one Ja-gaṇa followed by another two Sa-gaṇas to the quarter.

Example :

Mada-māna-mohabhujagāvasathaṁ/
kavayādaneka–kuṇapāvasathaṁ/
pilakādi sattu nilayaṁ karajaṁ/
vasaro karoti vasamāvasathaṁ/.

11. UJJALĀ (UJJVALĀ):

⌣ ⌣ ⌣, ⌣ ⌣ ⌣, — ⌣ ⌣, — ⌣ —. (2N.Bh.R.)

Definition: "Na-Na-Bha-Ra-sahitābhihitujjalā".

Tr. The metre is known as Ujjalā if it consists of two Na-gaṇas, one Bha-gaṇa and one Ra-gaṇa.

12. VESSADEVĪ (VAIŚYADEVĪ):

— — —, — — —, ⌣ — —, ⌣ — —. (2M. 2Y.)

Definition: "Pañcassacchinnā vessadevī Ma-Mā Yā".

Tr. The metre is known as Vessadevī if there are two Ma-gaṇas and two Ya-gaṇas with pauses on the fifth and the seventh syllable, to the quarter.

13. **TĀMARASA:** ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ — —.

(N. 2J. Y.)

Definition: "Vadati hi Tāmarasaṁ Na-Ja-Jā Yo".

Tr. The metre is known as Tāmarasa if it consists of one Na-gaṇa, two Ja-gaṇas and one Ya-gaṇa, to the quarter.

14. **KAMALĀ:** ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ — —, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ — —. (S.Y.S.Y.)

Definition: "Kamalāti ñeyyā Sa-Ya-Sehi Yo ce".

Tr. The metre is known as Kamalā if it consists of one Sa-gaṇa and one Ya-gaṇa followed again by one Sa-gaṇa and one Ya-gaṇa.

Sings of Jagati metres collected together

Names of metre	Each quarter = 12 syllables.			
1. Vaṁsaṭṭhā	⏑ — ⏑	— — ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	— ⏑ —
2. Indavaṁsā	— — ⏑	— — ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	— ⏑ —
3. Toṭaka	⏑ ⏑ ∸	⏑ ⏑ —	⏑ ⏑ —	⏑ ⏑ —
4. Dutavilambita	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ —
5. Puṭa	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	— — —	⏑ — —
6. Kusumavicittā	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	⏑ — —	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	⏑ — —
7. Bhujaṅgappayāta	⏑ — —	⏑ — —	⏑ — —	⏑ — —
8. Piyaṁvadā	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	— ⏑ —
9. Lalitā	— — ⏑	— ⏑ ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	— ⏑ —
10. Pamitākkharā	⏑ ⏑ —	⏑ — ⏑	⏑ ⏑ —	⏑ ⏑ —
11. Ujjalā	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ —
12. Vessadevī	— — —	— — —	⏑ — —	⏑ — —
13. Tāmarasa	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	⏑ — —
14. Kamalā	⏑ ⏑ —	⏑ — —	⏑ ⏑ —	⏑ — —

ATIJAGATI

XIII. ATIJAGATI—Verses having thirteen syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties :—

1. **PAHĀSINĪ (PRAHARṢIṆĪ) :**

— — —, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ — ◡, — ◡ —, —. (M.N.J.R.G.)

Definition : "M-Nā Ja-Rā Go tidasayatippahāsinī sā".

Tr. The metre is known as Pahāsinī when it consists each one of Ma-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa, Ra·gaṇa and long syllable with the yati (pauses) after the third and the tenth syllables, to the quarter.

Example :—

Satthāiā, bhavasalilākarāmaparā/
loko'yaṁ' ariyapathattharena sāraṁ/
nibbāna, matthaparatīrakhema bhūmi/
sannito' vipula dayāya coditena/

2. **RUCIRĀ :** ◡ — ◡,— ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ —,◡ — ◡, —
(J. Bh. S. J. G.)

Definition : "Catuggahehiha Rucirā Ja-Bhā Sa-Jā G".

Tr. The metre Rucirā consists one each of Ja-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa, again one Ja-gaṇa and a long syllable with pauses after the fourth and the ninth (gaha = planet) syllables, to the quarter.

N. B. There are three other varieties of the Atijagati, metres, viz. (a) Khamā, which is named by some scholars as Candrikā, but according to Piṅgala it is the 'Kuṭilagati' metre. Definition :

(a) "Na-Na-Ta-Ta.Gurukā'sso'tu chinnā khamā"
(2N. 2T. G.)

(b) Cañcarikāvalī :
"Ya-Mā Rā vikhyāta Cañcarikāvalī Go". (Y,M.2R.G.)

(c) Mañjubhāsinī :
Sa-Ja-Sā Ja-Gā bhavati Mañjubhāsinī" (S, J. S. J. G.)

In the Commentary it is mentioned as 'Vijaya-nandinī' Because there is another metre with the same name, some scholars called it as 'Sunandinī', but according to Piṅgala it is 'Kanaka-prabhā', metre.

SAKKARĪ (ŚARKARĪ)

XIV. **Sakkarī**–verses having fourteen syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties :—

1. **Aparājitā :**

⏑ ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ — (2N.R.S.L.G.)

Definition : "Na-Na-Ra-Sa-Lahu-Gā sarehi' Parājitā".

Tr. The metre is known as Aparājitā if it consists of two Na-gaṇas, and one each of Ra-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa, short and long syllables with a pause after the seventh syllable.

2. **Paharaṇakalikā (Praharaṇakalitā) :**

⏑ ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ — (2N. Bh. N. L. G.)

Definition : "Na-Na-Bha-Na-La-Gitippaharaṇakalikā".

Tr. The metre Paharaṇakalikā consists of two Na-gaṇas and one Bha-gaṇa, again one Na-gaṇa, one short and one long syllable to the quarter.

Example :—

Surapurakamalā, samanīla yamati/
varapati kamalā, karasasisavibhu/
tathariva kamalā, nicasati pasite/
sacarane kamalā, vahati yatipati/

3. **Vasantatilakā :** — — ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ —.
(T. Bh. 2J. L. G.)

Definition : "Vuttā Vasantatilakā Ta-Bha-Jā Ja-Gā Go".

Tr. The metre is known as Vasantatilakā when it consists of one Ta-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa, two Ja-gaṇas with one short and one long syllable to the quarter.

Example :—

Dhammo tiloka-saraṇo paramo rasānaṁ/
dhammo mahagga-ratano ratanesu loke/
dhammo hava tibhava-dukkha-vināsa-hetu/
dhammaṁ samācaratha jāgarikānuyuttā/.

N. B. It is also named as 'Uddharṣinī' by Piṅgalas.

ATISAKKARĪ (ATIŚARKARĪ)

XV. ATISAKKARĪ—having fifteen syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties :—

1. SASIKALĀ (CANDRĀVARTĀ):

⏑⏑, ⏑⏑, ⏑⏑, ⏑⏑, ⏑⏑, ⏑⏑, ⏑⏑, —.

(2 L × 7 = 14 L. G.)

Definition : "Dvihata-haya-Lahu-rathagiti Sasikalā".

Tr. If there is a long syllable after counting seven pairs of short syllable i. e. if there is a long syllable after fourteen short syllables, then the metre is called as Sasikalā.

Example :—

Parahitamabhirata-dasabalamatulo/
piyatama ruciyaniya tanuja piyatā/
amitavaradhana sipita-subhanayane/
guṇodhanapatidha divimala matimā/

2. MANIGUṆANIKARA :

⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑/⏑, ⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑, —. (14L. G.)

Definition : "Vasu-haya-yatiridha Maniguṇanikara".

Tr. If there is a pause after the seventh or the eighth syllable in the (same Sasikalā) metre, then it is known as Maniguṇanikara.

3. MĀLINĪ : ⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑, ——/—, ⏑——, ⏑——.

(2N. M. 2Y)

Definition : "Na-Na-Ma-Ya-Ya-yutāyaṁ Mālinī bhogisīhi".

Tr, The metre is known as Mālinī if it consists of two Na-gaṇas, one Ma-gaṇa and two Ya-gaṇas with a pause either after the seventh or the eighth syllable.

Example :

Satata-vitata-kittiṁ dhasta-kandappa-dappaṁ/
tibhava-hitvavidhānaṁ sabbalokekaketuṁ/
amita-matimanagghaṁ santidaṁ merusāraṁ/
Sugatamahamudāraṁ rūupasāraṁ namāmi/.

4. **PABHADDAKA (PRABHADRAKA) :**

◡◡◡, ◡—◡, —◡◡, ◡—◡, —◡◡. (N.J.Bh.J.R.)

Definition : "Bhavati Na-Jā Bha-Jā Ra-sahitā Pabhaddakaṁ".

Tr. The metre is known as Pabhaddaka if there are one each of Na-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa Bha-gaṇa and again one Ja-gaṇa and one Ra-gaṇa.

AṬṬHI (AṢṬI)

XVI. **AṬṬHI :** having sixteen syllables to the quarter. The Vāṇinī is the important variety :—

1. **VĀṆINĪ :** ◡◡◡, ◡—◡, —◡◡, ◡—◡, —◡—, —. (N. J. Bh. J. R. G.)

Definition : "Na-Ja-Bha-Ja-Rā yadā bhavati Vāṇinī Ga-yuttā".

Tr. The metre is known as Vāṇinī when it consists one each of Na-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, again one Ja-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa and a long syllable.

ACCAṬṬHI (ATYAṢṬI)

XVII. **ACCAṬṬHI**—having seventeen syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties :—

1. **SIKHARIṆĪ :**

◡——, ———, ◡◡◡, ◡◡—, —◡◡, ◡—. (Y.M N.S.Bh.L.G.)

Definition : "Ya-Mā No So Bha-L.Gā rasa-hara virāmā Sikhariṇī".

Tr. The metre is known as Sikhariṇī if consisting one each of Ya-gaṇa, Ma-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, short and long syllables with pauses after the sixth (rasa) and eleventh (hara) syllables.

Example :—

Nataṃ cittaṃ yante, samita-sakala-klesa phalina/
bhoyo ti jasa te, bhavakasirito mocanamayo/
vanéke kim si tvaṃ, savadhaka-posutam
jinante pacceke, samobhinivisariṇābha pavaro/.

2. HARIṆĪ :

◡◡◡, ◡◡—, ———, —◡—, ◡◡—, ◡—.

(N.S.M.R.S.L.G.)

Definition : "Rasa-yugisite No So-M.Rā S.Lā Gā yadā Hariṇī tadā".

Tr. The metre is known as Hariṇī if it consists one each of Na-gana, Sa-gaṇa, Ma-gaṇa, Ra-gaṇa, again Sa-gaṇa, and short and long syllables with pauses after the sixth (rasa), fourth (yuga) and seventh (ṛiṣi) syllables.

3. MANDĀKKANTĀ (MANDĀKRĀNTĀ) -

———, —◡◡, ◡◡◡, ——◡, ——◡, ——.

(M.BH.N.2T.2G.)

Definition : "Mandākkantā Ma-Bha-Na-Ta-Ta-Ga Go yugutvassakehi".

Tr. The metre is known as Mandākkantā if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa, one Na-gaṇa, and two Ta-gaṇas and finally two long syllables to the quarter, with pauses after the fourth (yoga), sixth (Ṛitu) and seventh (aṣva = horse) syllables.

DHUTI (DHṚITI)

XVIII. DHUTI verses having eighteen syllables to the quarter. Kusumita-latā-vellitā is the important variety.

1. KUSUMITALATĀ VELLITĀ : ———, ——◡, ◡◡◡, ◡——. ◡——, ◡——, ◡——. (M.T.N.3Y.)

Definition : "Mo To No Yo Ya Kusumitalatā-vellitākkhutvisihi".

Tr. The metre is known as Kusumitalatā-vellitā-if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa, one Ta-gaṇa, one Na-gaṇa and three Ya-gaṇas with pauses after the fifth, sixth or the seventh syllables,

ATIDHUTI (ATIDHṚITI)

XIX. ATIDHUTI—verses having nineteen syllables to the quarter. Important varieties are Meghavipphujitā and Saddūlavikkīlita,

1. MEGHAVIPPHUJJITĀ (VIMBĀ) ⌣ — —, — — —, ⌣⌣⌣, ⌣⌣ —, ⌣ — ⌣, ⌣ — ⌣, —. (Y. M. N. S. 2R. G.)

Definition : "Rasutvassehi Y.Mā Na-Sa-Ra-Ra-Gurū Meghavipphujjitā sā".

Tr. The metre is known as Meghavipphujjitā if it consists one each of Ya-gaṇa Ma-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa along with the two Ra-gaṇas and one long syllable with a pause after the sixth (rasa) or the seventh (aśva) syllables, to the quarter.

2. SADDŪLAVIKKIḶITA ŚĀRDŪLAVIKRĪḌITA) :

— — —, ⌣ ⌣ —, ⌣ — ⌣, ⌣ ⌣ —, — — ⌣, — — ⌣, —.
(M. S. J. S. 2T. G.)

Definition : "Akkassehi yadi M.Sa-Jā Sa-Ta-Ta-Gā Saddūlavikkīḷitā".

Tr. The metre is known as Saddūlavikkīḷitā if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa again one Sa-gaṇa, two Ta-gaṇas and one long syllable with pauses after the seventh (aśva) and the twelfth (akka-arka) syllables.

Example :—

Māyānekati-luddnarakkhasi-vasaṃ, yā te mana sekadā
yo samyattikā-vānije dasasata,-ddhaddhedayitvānabhā/
vaho' pissa lilākaraṃ samabhilam-, ghitvāna khemābhini/
Sammā pesi kimbhuta-samadhunā, sabbaññutatthe dayā/.

KATI (KṚITI)

XX. KATI—verses having twenty syllables to the quarter the important variety being Vutta.

1. VUTTA (VṚITTA) : — ⏑ —, ⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑. (R. J. R. J. R. J. G. L.)

Definition : "Vuttamīdisantu nāmato Ra-Jā Ra-Jā Ra-Jā Gurū Lahū Ca".

Tr. The metre Vutta consists of three pairs of Ra-gaṇa and Sa-gaṇas followed by one each of long and short syllables, to the quarter.

PAKATI (PRAKṚITI)

XXI. PAKATI—Verses having twenty one syllables to the quarter, the important variety being Saddharā.

1. SADDHARĀ (ŚRAGDHARĀ) :— — — —, — ⏑ —, — ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ — —, ⏑ — —, ⏑ — —. (M. R. Bh. N. 3Y)

Definition : "M. Ṛa-Bh. Nā Yo Yā trayenantimuni yatiyutā Saddharā kittitāyaṁ".

Tr. The metre is known as Saddharā if it consists one each of Ma-gaṇa, Ra-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa and three Ya-gaṇas with pauses after three—seventh (Muni) syllables or each seventh syllables i. e. after seventh, fourteenth and twenty-first syllables.

Example :—

Āvelā vilājālā, silāsilā manujo/ tarohiccabhedā
kiṇti niggammadehā/tibhuvanakuharaṃ/tetilokekanāthā/
sambhusento va nāṇā-/vidhi ratanamayā nekamālūhi
sammā/
sandhavatyā bhavaggaṁ/niravadhi karuṇa/ñāṇatam
sucayantā/.

ĀKATI (ĀKṚITI)

XXII. ĀKATI—verses having twenty two syllables to the quarter, the important variety being Bhaddaka.

1. BHADDAKA (BHADRAKA) :— — ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, —.
(Bh. R. N. R. N. R. N. G.)

Definition : "Bh.Rā Na-Ra-Nā Ṛa-Nā'th ca Gurūddasakka-viramāhi Bhaddakamidaṁ".

Tr. The metre is known as Bhaddaka consisting of a Bha-gaṇa followed by three pairs of Ra-gaṇa and Na-gaṇas and one long syllable with pauses after the tenth and the twelfth (akka-arka) syllable, to the quarter.[1]

CHAPTER IV

ADDHASAMA-VUTTA

This Chapter describes those metres the alternate quarters of which are alike i. e. similarity exists between the first and the third, and between the second and the fourth. Upacitrā etc. metres are included in this chapter and they have been shown by the first and the second or the odd and even verses mostly of ten to twelve syllables.

1. UPACITRĀ : Odd : ◡◡—, ◡◡—, ◡◡—, ◡—.

(3S. L. G.)

Even : —◡◡, —◡◡, —◡◡, ——. (3Bh. 2G.)

Definition : "Visame yadi Sā Sa-La-Gā, same"/
"Bha-ttayato Gurukā, Upacitrā"/.

Tr. In the odd quarters of a verse (i.e. the first and the third lines) if there are three Sa-gaṇas and one short and one long syllable, and in that of the even quarters (i.e. the second and the fourth lines) three Bha-gaṇas and two long syllables then the metre is known as Upacitrā.

2. DUTAMAJJHĀ (DRUTAMADHYĀ :

Odd quarters : —◡◡, —◡◡. —◡◡, ——.

(3Bh. 2G.)

Even quarters : ◡◡◡, ◡—◡, ◡—◡, ◡——.

(N. 2J. Y.)

Definition : "Bha-ttayato yadi Gā Dutamajjhā/
"yadi punareva bhavanti Na-Jā J.Yā/.

Tr. The metre is known as Dutamajjhā if odd quarters consist of three Bha-gaṇas and two long syllables, and the even quarters consist of one Na-gaṇa, two Ja-gaṇas and one Ya-gaṇa.

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[1] The twenty-third to twentysixth syllabic quarters may be noted in metres collected from the commentory of the Vuttodaya mentioned in the Chapter VII.

3. **VEGAVATĪ :**

Odd quarters : ◡ ◡ — , ◡ ◡ — . ◡ ◡ — , — . (3S. G.)

Even Quarters : — ◡ ◡ , — ◡ ◡ , — ◡ ◡ , — — .
(3Bh, 2G.)

Definition : "Yadi Sa-ttitayaṁ Guru-yuttaṁ/
Vegevatī yadi Bha-ttitayā Gā."/

Tr. The metre is known as Vegavatī if the odd quarters consist of three Sa-gaṇas and a long syllable and the even quarters consist of three Bha-gaṇas and two long syllables.

4. **BHADDAVIRĀJA (BHADRAVIRĀJA) ;**

Odd quarters ; — — ◡ , ◡ — ◡ , — ◡ — , — .
(T. J. R. G.)

Even quarters : — — — , ◡ ◡ — , ◡ — ◡ , — — .
(M. S. J. 2G.)

Definition : To Jo visame Ra-to Gurunce/
M.Sā J. Gā Bhaddavirājamettha Go ce"./

Tr. The metre is known as Bhaddavirāja if the odd quarters consist one each of Ta-gaṇa. Ja-gaṇa, Ra-gaṇa, and one long syllable, and the even quarters consist one each of Ra-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa and two long syllables.

5. **KETUMATĪ :**

Odd quarters : ◡ ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, ◡ ◡ —, — .
(S. J. S. G.)

Even quarters : — ◡ ◡, — ◡ —, ◡ ◡ ◡, — — .
(Bh. R. N. 2G.)

Definition : Visame Sa-Jā Sa-Guruyutā /
Ketumatī same Bha-Na-Ra-Gā Go"./

Tr. The metre is known as Ketumatī if the odd quarters of the same consist one each of Sa-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa, again a Sa-gaṇa, and long syllable, and the even quarters consist one each of Bha-gaṇa, Ra-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa and two long syllables.

6. ĀKHYĀNIKĀ :

Odd quarters : — — ⏑, — — ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, — — .

(2T. J. 2G.)

Even quarters : ⏑ — ⏑, — — ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, — — .

(J. T. J. 2G.)

Definition : Ākhyānikā Tā visame Ja-Gā Go /
Ja-Tā Ja-Gā Go tu same'th pāde"./

Tr. The metre is known as Ākhyānikā odd quarters of which consist of two Ta-gaṇas, one Ja-gaṇa and two long syllables and the even quarters consist of a Ja-gaṇa, a Ta-gaṇa, again a Ja-gaṇa and two long syllables.

7. VIPARĪTĀKHYĀ :

Odd quarters : ⏑ — ⏑, — — ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, — — .

(J. T. J. 2G.)

Even quarters : — — ⏑, — — ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, — — .

(2T. J, 2G.)

Definition : "Ja-Tā Ja-Gā Go visame, same tu /
Tā Jo Ga-Gā ce Viparītapubbā"./

Tr. The metre is known as Viparītākhyā if the odd quarters consist of a Ja-gaṇa, a Ta-gaṇa, again a Ja-gaṇa and two long syllables, and the even quarters consist of two Ta-gaṇas one Ja-gaṇa and two long syllables,

8. HARIṆPLUTĀ :

Odd quarters : ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ — .

(3S. L. G.)

Even quarters : ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ — .

(N. 2Bh. R.)

Definition : "Sa-Sato Sa-La-Gā visame, same /
Na-Bha-Bha-Rā bhavati Hariṇaplutā /

Tr. The metre is known as Hariṇaplutā if in the odd quarters there are three Sa-gaṇas with a short and a long syllable, and in the even quarters there is a Na-gaṇa, two Bha-gaṇas and a Ra-gaṇa.

9. APARAVATTA (APARAVAKTRA):

Odd quarters : ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, — ◡ —, ◡ —.

(2N. R. L. G.)

Even quarters : ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ — ◡, ◡ — ◡, — ◡ —.

(N. 2J. R.)

Definition : "Yadi Na-Na-Ra-La-Gā, Na-Jā Ja-Rā/
yadi ca tadāparavattamicchati"/.

Tr. In the odd quarters if there are two Na-gaṇas followed by one each of Ra-gaṇa, short and long syllables, and in the even quarters there is a Na-gaṇa followed by two Ja-gaṇas and a Ra-gaṇa then the metre is known as Aparavatta.

10. PUPPHITAGGĀ (PUṢPITĀGRA):

Odd quarters : ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, — ◡ —, ◡ — —.

(2N. R. Y.)

Even quarters : ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ — ◡, ◡ — ◡, — ◡ —, —.

(N. 2J. R. G.)

Definition : "Visamamupagatā Na-Nā Ra-Yā ce/
Na-Ja-Ja-Ra-Gā samake ca Pupphitaggā"/.

Tr. The metre is known as Pupphitaggā if the odd quarters consist of two Nagaṇas, one Ra-gaṇa, and a Ya-gaṇa and the even quarter consists of a Nagaṇa, two Ja-gaṇas, one Ra-gaṇa and a long syllable.

N. B. The above two metres belonged to the Vetālīya metre.

11. YAVAMATĪ (AS NAMED BY PIṄGALĀCĀRYA):

Odd quarters : — ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, — ◡ —, ◡ — ◡.

(R. J. A. J.)

Even quarters : ◡ — ◡, — ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, — ◡ —, —.

(J. R. J. R. G.)

Definition : "Sā yavādikāmatī Ra-Jā Ra-Jā tu/
same'same Ja-Rā Ja-Rā Guru bhaveyyuṁ"/.

Tr. The metre is known as Yavamatī (of Piṅgala) if the odd quarters consist of a Ra-gaṇa and a Ja-gaṇa followed by another pair of Ra-gaṇa and Ja-gaṇa, and the even quarters consist of a Ja-gaṇa and a Ra-gaṇa followed by another pair of Ja-gaṇa and Ra-gaṇa along with a long syllable.

Signs of Addhasama-vutta (half-line similar) collected together :—

Names of metre	Qrts.	Syllables of the metre			
1. Upacitrā	Odd	◡◡—	◡◡—	◡◡—	◡—
	Even	—◡◡	—◡◡	—◡◡	——
2, Dutamajjhā	Odd	—◡◡	—◡◡	—◡◡	——
	Even	◡◡◡	◡—◡	◡—◡	◡——
3. Vegavatī	Odd	◡◡—	◡◡—	◡◡—	—
	Even	—◡◡	—◡◡	—◡◡	——
4. Bhaddavirāja	Odd	——◡	◡—◡	—◡—	—
	Even	———	◡◡—	◡—◡	——
5. Ketumatī	Odd	◡◡—	◡—◡	◡◡—	—
	Even	—◡◡	—◡—	◡◡◡	——
6. Ākhyānikā	Odd	——◡	——◡	◡—◡	——
	Even	◡—◡	——◡	◡—◡	——

Name of metre	Qrts.	Syllables of the metre			
7. Viparītakhyā	Odd	⏑ — ⏑	— — ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	— —
	Even	— — ⏑	— — ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	— —
8. Hariṇaplutā	Odd	⏑ ⏑ —	⏑ ⏑ —	⏑ ⏑ —	⏑ —
	Even	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ —
9. Aparavatta	Odd	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ —	⏑ —
	Even	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	— ⏑ —
10. Pupphitaggā	Odd	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	— ⏑ —	⏑ — —
	Even	⏑ ⏑ ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	⏑ — ⏑	—⏑—,—
11. Yavamatī	Odd	— ⏑ —	⏑ — ⏑	— ⏑ —	⏑ — ⏑
	Even	⏑ — ⏑	— ⏑ —	⏑ — ⏑	—⏑—,—

CHAPTER V

VISAMA-VUTTA

This chapter describes metres with quarter verses dissimilar (Visama-vútta). In this chapter the author of the Vuttodaya quotes Vatta etc. eight syllable metres only. He avoids one to seven and nine to twenty-six syllable metres here.

VATTAPPABHEDA (VṚITTA-PRABHEDA)

1. VATTA(VAKTRA) :

Ist quarter : — — ◡ , — ◡ — , — —.

(After fourth syllable Y)

2nd „ : — — — , — ◡ — . — —.

Definition : "Naṭṭhakkharesu pādesu/
Snādimbā yoṇṇavā Vattaṁ"/.

Tr. In the eight syllabic metres if there are no Sa-gaṇa and Na-gaṇa after the first syllable but there occur Ya-gaṇas after the fourth (aṇṇava) syllables in both quarters, then the metre is known as Vatta.

2. PATHYĀVATTA (PATHYĀVAKTRA) :

Ist quarter : ◡ — ◡ , — ◡ — , — — — :

(In even quarters after 4th Syl. J.)

2nd quarter : — — — — , ◡ — ◡ , — .

Definition : "Samesu sindhuto Jena/
Pathyāvattaṁ pakittitaṁ"/.

Tr. The metre is known as Pathyāvatta if there is a Ja-gaṇa in the even quarter after fourth (sindhu) syllable from the beginning.

3. VIPARĪTA-PATHYĀVATTA :

Ist quarter : — — ◡ , — ◡ — ◡ — .

2nd quarter : ◡ — ◡ , ◡ ◡ — ◡ .

Definition : "Ojesu Jena sindhuto/
tameva Viparītādi".

Tr. The metre is known as Viparīta-Pathyāvatta if in the odd quarter occurs the Ja-gaṇa after the fourth (sindhu) syllable.

4, CAPALĀVATTA :

Ist quarter : ◡ — — — , ◡ ◡ ◡ , — .

(N. after 4th syllable
in the odd quarters.)/

2nd quarter : ◡ ◡ — , — ◡ — , — — .

Definition : "Na-kāro ce jaladhito/
Capalāvattamiccetaṁ"/.

Tr. The metre is known as Capalāvatta if in the odd quarters the Na-gaṇa occurs after the fourth (Jaladhi) syllables.

5. Vipulā (of Piṅgala) :
Ist quarter : ◡ — — , — ◡ — , — — — .
2nd quarter : ◡ ◡ — , — ◡ — , '◡' , — .
Definition : "Samulo sattamo yassa/
Vipulā Piṅgalassa sā"/.

Tr. The metre is known as Vipulā of Piṅgalācarya if in the even quarter the seventh syllable is a short one.

6. Vipulā (of Setava) :
Ist quarter : — ◡ — , — ◡ — , '◡' — .
(Seventh syllable short
in all quarters)
Definition : "Setavassākhilesvapi"./

Tr. If the seventh syllables are short ones in all the quarters, the metre is known as the Vipulā (of Śvetava).

In addition to the above two Vipulā metres, there exist four more of the same, viz., (a) Bha-Vipulā, (b) Ra-Vipulā, (c) Na-Vipulā, and (d) Ta-Vipulā according to the position of respective "Gaṇas" after the fourth syllable, in all quarters :—

7. (a) Bha-Vipulā : — — ◡ — , — ◡ ◡ , — . (Bh. after the 4th syllable)
Definition : "Bhenaṇṇavā Bha-bbipulā".

Tr. The metre is known as "Bha" Vipulā if there is a Bha-gaṇa after the fourth (Aṇṇava=Sea) syllable.

8. (b) Ra-Vipulā : — ◡ — — , — ◡ — , — .
(R. after the 4th syllable)
Definition : "Evamaññā Ro catutthā".

Tr. The metre is known as "Ra" Vipulā if there is a Ra-gaṇa after the fourth syllable in all quarters.

9. (c) Na-Vipulā : — ◡ — — — '◡ ◡ ◡' — .
(N. After 4th syllable)
Definition : "Noṇṇavā ce Na-Vipulā".

Tr. The metre is as "Na" Vipulā if there is a Na-gaṇa after the fourth (Aṇṇava) syllables in all quarters.

10. (d) TA-VIPULĀ : — ◡ — ◡, '— — ◡' —.

(T. after the 4th Syllable)

Definition: "Toṇṇavā tathāññā siya".

Tr. The metre is known as "Ta" Vipulā if there is Ta-gaṇa after the fourth sylable, in all quarters.

N. B. The metre which cannot be traced in the Vuttodaya, but if it is noticed in use some where (in the Pali literature), then the verse of uneven syllabic quarters is also known, in general name, as a "Gāthā".*

Signs of Vattajātiya (Dissimilar = Visama) metres collected together.

Name of metre		Ist letter	Ist Gaṇa	2nd Gaṇa	Last Syllables
1. Vatta	Even	No restriction imposed	Any Gaṇa except S. and N.	◡ — —	No restriction imposed
	Odd			◡ — —	
2. Pathyāvatta	Even	"	"	◡ — —	"
	Odd			◡ — ◡	
3. Viparīta Pathyavatta	Even	"	"	◡ — ◡	"
	Odd			◡ — —	
4. Capalāvatta	Even	"	"	◡ ◡ ◡	"
	Odd			◡ — —	
5. Vipulā of Piṅgala	Even	"	"	◡ — —	"
	Odd			◡ — ◡	
6. Vipulā of Setava	Even	"	"	◡ — ◡	"
	Odd			J. or Y.	

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*"Na dissate tha yaṁ chandaṁ payoge dissate yadi,
visamakkharapādaṁ taṁ gāthā sāmaññanāmato."

Name of metre		1st letter	1st Gaṇa	2nd Gaṇa	Last Syllables
7. Bha-Vipulā	Even	No restriction imposed	Any Gaṇa except S. and N.	— ⌣ ⌣	No restriction imposed
	Odd			J. or Y.	
8. Ra-Vipulā	Even	”	”	— ⌣ —	”
	Odd			J. or Y.	
9. Na-Vipulā	Even	”	”	⌣ ⌣ ⌣	”
	Odd			J. or Y.	
10. Ta-Vipulā	Even	”	”	— — ⌣	”
	Odd			J. or Y.	

CHAPTER VI.

CHAPPACCAYĀ (ṢAṬPRATYAYA)

1. Patthāre sabbage pāde—pubbagādholpare samā,
pubbe garutvevamime—kattabbā yāva sabba lo.

To spread (Patthāra = Sk. Prasthāra) a quarter consisting of only long (—) syllables, the following method will have to be adopted :

In the beginning put the metre in question, i. e. of three syllables of all longs (— — —). In the second line put one short sign (⌣) just below the first long syllable of the first line and similar signs as the above will follow on the right hand side. In the third line again put a short sign just below the second long sign of the second line. Rest of the signs will follow as before similar to the signs in the right hand side and the remaining signs on the left hand side will be long ones. This procedure is to be followed until all short signs appear in the last line.

It will have to be remembered that all the signs on the left hand side of the introductory short sign will be long ones and those of the right hand side will be similar to the immediate preceeding line.

The metre consisting of one syllable will contain two lines, that of two syllables shall contain four lines, that of the three syllables will contain eight lines and that of the four syllables will contain sixteen lines, and so forth.

The following is the chart of different varieties consisting of three syllabic lines of a metre :—

Line	3 syllabic metres of a samavutta
1.	— — —
2.	⏑ — —
3-	— ⏑ —
4.	⏑ ⏑ —
5.	— — ⏑
6.	⏑ — ⏑
7.	— ⏑ ⏑
8.	⏑ ⏑ ⏑

2. Naṭṭhassa yo bhaveyyaṅko tasmiṁ lodhikate same,
visame tvekasahite bhaveyyadhikate guru.

Put the number in ascending order beginning from one (1), i. e. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ……… Then put the number of the lost line. If the number is even, the sign will be a short (◡) one and if it is odd the sign will be a long (—) one. Thereafter divide the number by two (2) again if the quotient is even, and add number one (1) to the quotient if the number in question is odd and then divide the same. In all cases if the quotient is even the sign will be short and if it is odd the sign will be long one.

Each time quotient should be divided in the same manner as stated above until the requisite metre takes its own shape. It is important to remember that each time even and odd numbers will produce short (◡) and long (—) signs respectively.

Thus in the case of the 10th line of the Patiṭṭhā (Four syllabic) metre the following procedure will have to be followed :—

1. 10 = ◡
2. $10 \div 2 = 5$ = —
3. $5 + 1 = 6 \div 2 = 3$ = —
4. $3 + 1 = 4 \div 2 = 2$ = ◡

3. Ekādinukkamenaṅke pubbādho dviguṇe likhe,
nissitehi lahuṭṭhehi seke huddiṭṭhakaṁ bhave.

If the signs are known and the number of the line is to be found out the following method is to be adopted :—

Write the particular metre putting numbers under each sign in geometrical order beginning from one (1) i. e. 1, 2, 4, 8 etc.

Now collect numbers from under the short signs, add them together with an extra number one (1), finally coming out the desired number.

As for example, let us take a metre of four syllables, Patiṭṭhā :—

◡	—	—	◡
1	2	4	8

Now let us sum up numbers put under the short signs, e. g., $1+8=9$. Adding extra 1 (one) with 9 (nine) the number stands $9+1=10$.

Therefore the required No. of line is 10.

4. Vuttakkharsamasaṅkhyā likhya sekoparūpari,
ekekahīna mekadinuṭṭhāne sabbagādikaṁ.

The following method is to find out the number of specific varieties, both long and short, in a class of metre.

To ascertain all-long, one-long, two-long etc. quarters in a metre, put number 1 (one) from down to upwards horizontally as many times as the number of metrical signs, adding one more 1 (one) to it and similarly write 1 (one) as many times as the number of the metrical sign on the right hand side of the number 1 (one) in the extreme down. In this way there will be some additional numbers in the right hand side of the horizontal lines reducing each time by one number. Add numbers of the next horizontal and parallel lines together and place it on the parallel line on the right hand side of the number placed horizontally, deduct number 1 (one) each time from the last number of the line beginning from the top. Continuing in this way one gets the necessary result.

The following is the example of the four syllabic Patiṭṭhā metre :—

1	...		...		... ...	all-long metred	1	line
1	4		...		(4–1)=3 i. e.	3 long metred	4	lines
1	3	6	...		(3–1)=2 i. e.	2 long metred	6	lines
1	2	3	4		(2–1)=1 i. e.	1 long metred	4	lines
1	1	1	1	1	(1–I)=0 i. e.	0 long metred	1	line

N. B. In the last line there is no long syllable at all and it consits only of short syllables.

5. Gurukriyaṅka sandohe bhave saṁkhyā vimissite,
uddiṭṭhaṅkasāmahāro sekovemaṁ samānaye.

The following are the two methods of finding out the number of different varieties possible in a class of metre :

(a) Adding together all numbers placed as the last ones on the right hand side of the Paccayas of the No. 4 immediately preceding to this one, i. e. all-long, one-long, etc. metres.

The Puñña metre of the Patiṭṭhā class, for example, is as follows :

(— ◡ — —)

e. g., 1+4+6+4+1=16. (according to the 4th Paccaya).

(b) Adding together all numbers plus (+) 1 (one) as indicated in the No. 3 (Paccaya).

i. e. — ◡ — —
1 2 4 8

e. g. 1+2+4+8+1=16. (According to the Paccaya No. 3).

6. Saṅkhyeva dviguṇekūna vitthārāyāma sambhavo,
vuttassaddhantarānañca garulānañca aṅgulaṁ.

This is a method to ascertain the necessary area for spreading a class of metre. It is to be noted that the area is to be measured by an inch or digit.

With the help of the (Paccaya) No. 5 the measurment of the area becomes easier. The number (16) as mentioned above is to be made double, and subtracting 1 (one) from the total number.

e. g. the Patiṭṭhā metre requires :

(16 / 2)—1=31 i. e. 31 inches or digits of area for its accomodation.

APPENDIX

CHAPTER—VII

(As a matter of fact the Vuttodaya is ended after the sixth chapter. In addition to the metres mentioned in the book there are some more metres noticed in the commentry of the Vuttodaya. In this chapter those metres are collected together which are nothing but the corollary of the metres included in the chapter III).

UTTĀ

I. UTTĀ (UKTĀ)—having one syllable to the quarter. The following is the important variety.

1. SIRI (ŚRĪ) : — (G.)

Definition : "Go Siri"

Tr. The metre is known as Siri (Śrī) if there is one long syllable in a quarter.

Example— Khambhūtedhī, etc.

ACCUTTĀ

II. ACCUTTĀ (ATYUKTĀ)—having two syllables to the quarter.

The following is the important variety.

1. ITTHI (STRĪ) : — — (2 G)

Definition : "Gā' tthī"

Tr. The metre is known as Itthi (Strī) if there are two long syllables to the quarter.

Example— Khanti/
Yasmiṁ/
Sāve/
Bhūsā/. etc

MAJJHĀ

III. MAJJHĀ (MADHYĀ)—having Ra-gaṇa (i.e. three syllables) to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties

1. MIGĪ (Mṛgī) : — ⏑ —. (R.)

Definition : "Ro Migī."

Tr. The metre is known as migī if it consists of a Ra-gaṇa

Examples :— Pātuvo/
Satthuno/
Kesarī/
Vikkamaṁ/. etc.

2. KUMĀRĪ (RAMANA) : ⏑ ⏑ —. (S.)

Definition ;—"So kumārī."

Tr. The metre is known as Kumāri when it consists of a Sa gaṇa to the quarter.

Examples— Gahaṇe/
Kurari/
Muditā/
Carati/. etc.

PATIṬṬHĀ

IV. PATIṬṬHĀ (PRATIṢṬHĀ)—having four syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important Varieties.

1. PUÑÑĀ (PRIYĀ) : — ◡ —, —. (R. G.)
Definition :— "Ra-Gā Puññā."

Tr. The metre is known as Puññā if it consists of a Ra-gaṇa and a long syllable to the quarter.

Examples— Cakkhumantā/
Dibbayānaṁ/
Tassa vande/
Pādarāgaṁ/. etc.

2. SATĪ : ◡ ◡ ◡, — (N. G.)
Definition— "Nagi Satī."

Tr. The metre is known as Satī when it consists of a Na-gaṇa and a long syllable.

Examples :— Vatananā/
Yatijanā/
Pamuditā/
Marujanā/, etc.

SUPPATIṬṬHĀ

V. SUPPATIṬṬHĀ (SUPRATIṢṬHĀ)—having five syllables to the quarter.

The following is the important variety.

1. BHĀMINĪ : — ◡ — ◡, —. (R.L.G.)
Definition—"Bhāminī Ra-La-Gā."

Tr. The metre is known as Bhāminī if a quarter consists of each one of Ra-gaṇa, short and long syllable.

Examples :—Matta kunjaraṁ /
Nacca go bhayaṁ /
Tuṭṭha nāgaraṁ /
Rājate puraṁ / etc.

GĀYATTI

VI. GĀYATTI (GĀYATRĪ)—having six syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties.

1. MUKULITĀ : ⏑⏑⏑, ⏑— — (N.Y.)

Definition :—"N.yā Mukulitā".

Tr. The metre is known as Mukulitā if it consists of one Na-gaṇa and one Ya-gaṇa.

Examples :—Sumukulitā vā /
Kusumalatāyā /
Bhavati khaṇenaṁ /
Yuvatīsusobhā / etc.

2. SUCIMUKHĪ : ⏑⏑— — —, —. (S.M.)

Definition :—"Sa-Mā Sucimukhi".

Tr. The metre is known as Sucimukhī if it consists of a Sa-gaṇa and a Ma-gaṇa.

Examples :—Khaṇakhopīrodī /
Atha kasmā hāso /
Apagacche lakkhī /
Yadi sā sūvattā / etc.

3. SIKHAṆḌINĪ : ⏑— —, — — — (Y.M.).

Definition :—"Ya-Mā Sikhaṇḍinī".

Tr. The metre is known as Sikhaṇḍinī if it consists of one Ya-gaṇa and one Ma-gaṇa.

Examples :—Surindāyādūnaṁ /
Narindū pūjīnaṁ /
Munindā thomīnaṁ /
Namo sabbaññūnaṁ / etc.

UNHĪ

VII. UNHĪ (UṢNĪ)—having seven syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties.

1. ĀROHANA : — ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, — (2Bh.G.)

Definition :—"Ārohaṇaṁ Bha-Bha-Gā".

Tr. The metre is known as Ārohaṇa if it consists of two Bha-gaṇas and a long syllable.

Examples :—Jātimahambudhinā /
tārayitātu janaṁ /
kāruṇiko Bhagavā /
Natthi gatī jagato /.

2. UDDHATĀ : — ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ —, —. (R.S.G.)

Definition :—Uddhatā Ra-Sa-Gā."

Tr. The metre is known as Uddhatā when there are one Ra-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa and a long syllable.

Examples :—Issaro kurute ce /
Pāpakānakhīlāni /
Tattha bhitti niveso /
Kaṁ guṇā na samekkhā /.

ANUṬṬHUBHA

VIII. ANUṬṬHUBHA (ANUṢṬUBHA)—having eight syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties.

1. HAMSARUTĀ : — ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, — — (2Bh. 2G.)

Definition :—"Du-Bha-Du-Ga."

Tr. The metre is known as Haṁsarutā if the metre consists of two Bha-gaṇas and two long syllables.

Examples :—Chappadavundavikiṇṇo /
Kokilnāditasākho /
Bhāminī bhāti ca santo /
Çūtadumo kusumaḍḍho /.

2. PADUMINĪ (PADMINĪ) :— ◡ —, — ◡ —, — —.
(2R. 2G.)

Definition :—"Dū-Ra-dū-Gā-Padminī".

Tr The metre is known as Paduminī if the metre consists of two Ra-gaṇas and two long syllables to the quarter.

Example— Sītavārīhi sampuṇṇo/
thullakokāsasogandhā/
aṇḍajehākulārammā/
kañjanā rājate bhumyā/

BRAHATĪ

IX. BRAHATĪ—having nine syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties.

1. TARANGAVATĪ : — ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, — ◡ — (R.J.R.)

Definition :—"Ra-Ja-Rā Taraṅgavatī."

Tr. The metre is known as Taraṅgavatī if there is one each of Ra-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa and again Ra-gaṇa, to the quarter.

Example— Yaṁ taraṅagbubbulopamaṁ/
taṁ manussataṁ hi dullabhaṁ/
pāpamodane narādhamo/
nottamotrā sabbapāragu/

2. MAṆIMAJJHĀ (MANIMADHYĀ) :
— ◡ ◡, — — —, ◡ ◡ —. (Bh. M. S.)

Definition—"Bha-Ma-Sā Maṇimajjhā".

Tr. The metre is known as Maṇimajjhā if it consists of one Bha-gaṇa, one Ma-gaṇa and one Sa-gaṇa.

Example— Vyāyatanettaṁ pekkhasivaṁ/
puṇṇasasaṅko līnamado/
cārutarante vattamidaṁ/
bhamiṇīlīṇo toyadhare/

PANTI

X. PANTI (PAṄKTI)—having ten syllables to the quarter. The following are the important varieties.

1. MAYŪRASĀRIṆĪ : — ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, — ◡ —, —.

(R. J. R. G.)

Definition—Ra-Ja-Ra-Gā Mayūrasāriṇī.”

Tr. The metre is known as Mayūrsāriṇī if there is one Ra-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa and again a Ra-gaṇa and a long syllable.

Example— Rāga-dosa-moha-māna-diṭṭhī/
eva mādinekapāparāsī/
atthahetukattahīnajāsā/
dukkhabhāramubbahanti pacchā/.

2. VILASITĀ : — — —, — ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ —, —.

(M. Bh. S. G.)

Definition—“Ma-Bha-Sa-Gā Vilasitā”

Tr. The metre is known as Vilasitā if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa and a long syllable.

Example— Channākāraṁ yadi tu varaṅgaṁ/
nettāsāmā kamaladalābhā/
vattaṁ pītaṁ karacaraṇā vā/
mattālakkhī vilasati tasmiṁ/

3. EKARŪPĀ : — — —, ◡ ◡ ◡, — ◡ —, —.

(M. N. R. G.)

Definition—“Ma-Na-Ra-Gā Ekarūpā.”

Tr. The metre is known as Ekarūpa if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa one Na-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa and a long syllable to the quarter.

Example— Rūpādīhi chahi gocarehi/
kittiṁ te upagameti cittaṁ/
dhīro taṁ na vasago bhave ce/
dukkhaṁ khepayati so bhavesu/

TUṬṬHUBHA

XI. TUṬṬHUBHA (TRIṢṬUBHA)—having eleven syllables to the quarter. The following are the important varieties.

1. BHAMARAVILASITĀ (BHRAMARAVILASITĀ) :
— — —, — ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ —. (M. Bh. N.L.G.)

Definition —"Ma-Bha-Na-La-Gā Bhamaravilasitā."

Tr. The metre is known as Bhamaravilasitā if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa, one Na-gaṇa with one short and one long syllable.

Example— Muttākesa paviralakusumā/
kaṇṇāsattaṁ kuvalayamasinaṁ/
vāsaṁ cekaṁ sasadharanibhavaṁ/
veso tesammagayati maranaṁ/

2. Sesī (ŚYENĪ) —◡—, ◡—◡, —◡—, ◡—.
(R. J. R. L. G)

Definition—"Ra-Ja-Ra-La-Gā Sesī"

Tr. The metre is known as Sesī if it consists of one Ra-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa, again one Ra-gaṇa followed by one short and one long syllable.

Example:—Pādapāḍitāsinūpurābbiyā/
hemamekhalābhināditā hi vā/
satthu santikāgatā palobhita/
tāsu vītarāgavāsapātuvo/.

3. SAṄGATĀ: ◡—◡, ◡◡—, ◡——, ◡—.
(J. S. Y. L. G)

Definition—"Ja Sa-Ya-La-Gā Saṅgatā".

Tr. The metre is known as Saṅgatā if it consists of one Ja gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa, one Ya-gaṇa followed by one short and one long syllables.

Example:—Mahī asitasaddapambocutā/
jaloghā vata tīragā sindhavo/
ghanohitabharā cutā pabbatā/
ghanagamagamevavaṁ vattate/.

4. LAKKHĪ (KUḌMALADANTĪ):
—◡◡, ——◡, ◡◡◡, ——. (Bh. T. N. 2G.)

Definition: "Bha-Ta-Na-Ga-Gā Lakkhī ta".

Tr. The metre is known as Lakkhī if it consists of one

Bha-gaṇa, one Ta-gaṇa, one Na-gaṇa and two long syllables with a pause on the fifth syllable.

Example :—Ābhavaloke ravisasivattiṁ/
pālayā sammākhila janarāsiṁ/
attani dhammaṁ kuru nirvajjaṁ/
bhūpatiloke iti bhava sammā/.

JAGATI

XII. JAGATI—having twelve syllables to the quarter. The following are the important varieties :—

1. CANDAVUTTI (CANDRAVARTMA)

— ⌣ —, ⌣ ⌣ ⌣, — ⌣ ⌣, ⌣ ⌣ —. (R. N. Bh. S.)

Definition :—"Ra-Na-Bha-Sā Candavutti".

Tr. The metre is known as Candavutti if it consists one each of Ra-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa Bha-gaṇa and Sa-gaṇa to a quarter.

Example : —Tāpaso'pi vipine guṇadhanako/
tatvagocarakataṁ sakanayanaṁ/
nāri uppalavane vigatamano/
jhānato patati kobhivirahitaṁ/.

2. PAMUDITAVADANĀ (PAÑCALĀKṢIKĀ)

⌣ ⌣ ⌣, ⌣ ⌣ ⌣, — ⌣ —, — ⌣ —. (2 N. 2 R.)

Definition : DuNa-DuRā Pamuditavadanā".

Tr. The metre is known as Pamuditavadanā if it consists of two Na-gaṇas and two Ra-gaṇas having a pause on the seventh syllable.

Example :—Pulinagahitate mano temiyā/
pavanamayapavaṭṭhitaṁ vattitaṁ/
gahapahakaraṇatthamujjotituṁ/
payatamivatanassabhāte tuvaṁ/.

3. PUṬA : ⌣ ⌣ ⌣, ⌣ ⌣ ⌣, — — —, ⌣ — —.

(2 N. M Y.)

Definition : "Na-Na-Ma-Yā Puṭobhā".

Tr. The metre is known as Puṭa if it consists of two Na-gaṇas, one Ma-gaṇa and one Ya-gaṇa with a pause on the eighth syllable to a quarter.

4. JALODDHATAGATI :

⌣ — ⌣, ⌣ ⌣ —, ⌣ — ⌣, ⌣ ⌣ —. (J. S. J. S.)

Definition :—"Ja-Sa-Ja-Sā Jaloddhatagati".

Tr. The metre is known as Jaloddhatagati if it consists of one Ja-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa followed again by a pair of Ja-gaṇa and Sa-gaṇa with a pause on the sixth syllable, to the quarter.

5. SAGAVIṆĪ (SRAGVIṆĪ)

— ⌣ —, — ⌣ —, — ⌣ —, — ⌣ —. (4 R.)

Definition :—"Caturehi Sagavinī tā".

Tr. The metre is known as Sagavani if it consists of four Ra-gaṇas with a pause on the seventh syllable to a quarter.

6. NAVAMĀLIṆĪ

⌣ ⌣ ⌣, ⌣ — ⌣, — ⌣ ⌣, ⌣ — —. (N. J. Bh. Y.)

Definition : –"Na-Ja-Bh-Yā Navamālinī".

Tr. The metre is known as Navamālinī if it consists one each of Na-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa and Ya-gaṇa to the quarter.

V. SODĀVINĪ (JALADHARMĀLĀ).

— — —, — ⌣ ⌣, ⌣ ⌣ —, — — —. (M. Bh. S. M.)

Definition :—"Ma-Bha-Sa-Mā Sodāvinī".

Tr. The metre is known as Sodāvinī if it consists one each of Ma-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa followed by another Ma-gaṇa with a pause either on the fonrth or the sixth syllable.

Example :—Nāgāsante jalamadanāga selā /
selāyante sisidisinīlā meghā /
meghānikehupahatarūpā tārā /
tārāyante disidisi sodamiññe /,

ATIJAGATI

XIII. ATIJAGATI—having thirteen syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties.

1. PASAṀSINĪ (RUCIRĀ) :

◡ — ◡, — ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, —. (J. Bh. S. J. G.)

Definition :—"Ja-Bh-Sa-Ja-Gā Pasaṁsinī".

Tr. The metre is known as Pasaṁsinī if there are one Ja-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa followed by again one Ja-gaṇa and one long syllable and having a pause on the third syllable to the quarter.

Example :—Vasī jino kusumitavālapādapo /
madhubbato pamuditamattakokilo /
susītale sakamalavāpi dīghate /
sapāralī vataṁiva nandane vane /.

2. MATTAMAYŪRA.

— — —, — — ◡, ◡ — —, ◡ ◡ —, —. (M. T. Y. S. G.)

Definition : —"Ma-Ta-Ya-Sa-Gā Mattamayūraṁ".

Tr. The metre is known as Mattamayūra if it consists each one of Ma-gaṇa, Ta-gaṇa, Ya-gaṇa and Sa-gaṇa followed by a long syllable.

Example :—Mattā yodhā vammavatā tekavikumbho /
katvā ynddhaṁ sabbanisāyaṁ ripumajjhe /
santāsīse dhuttanarā eva nibhuddhā /
niddāyante dvīsatha tasmiṁ tu nibaddhā /.

3. VIJAYANANDINĪ :

◡ ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, ◡ ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, — (S. J. S. J. G.)

Definition :—"Sa-Ja-Sa-Ja-Gā Vijayanandinī."

Tr. The metre is known as vijayanandinī if it consists of one Sa-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa followed by another pair of Sa-gaṇa and Ja-gaṇa and a long syllable.

Example :—Sujanā jano jayati yenakeṇaci /
savaṇena pāti lapitaṁ subhāsubhaṁ /
vacanena uggarati tesu sādhukaṁ /
udaragginā ḍahati ce asādhukaṁ /.

4. Bhaddasa :

— — —, — ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ — —, — (M.Bh.N.Y.G.)

Definition :—"Ma-Bha-Na-Ya-Gā Bhaddasā."

Tr. The metre is known as Bhaddasā if it consists each one of Ma-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa, Ya-gaṇa and a long syllable having a pause on the fourth syllable of a quarter.

Example :—Thūlo thūlo iti vadati janoko yaṁ /
thūlo thūlo nahi pisitavasā deho /
pañño pañño yamadasamahito vāgī /
svayaṁ thūlo nikhilaguṇavasā loke /,

SAKKARĪ (ŚARKARĪ)

XIV. **Sakkarī (Śarkarī)**,—having fourteen syllables to the quarter. The following are the important varieties.

1. Asambādhā :

— — —, — — ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ —, — —

(M. T. N. S. 2G.)

Definition :—"Ma-Ta-Na-Sa-Ga-Gā',Sambādhā."

Tr. The metre is known as Asaṁbādhā if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa, one Ta-gaṇa, one Na-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa and two long syllables with a pause on the fifth syllable of quarter.

Example :—

Bhatthāvattambu mukamidamanalaṅkāraṁ/
sassussāso bhākuṭatavirahito netto/
seraṁ vāsīnā pavadasinvasaṁ bhāvaṁ
ko te sambhāvosutanumadhicirappatte/.

2. Mattāsī :

— ◡ —, ◡ ◡ —, — — ◡, — ◡ ◡, — —

(R. S. T. Bh. 2G.)/

Definition : "Ra- Sa- Ta- Bha- Ga- Gā Mattāsī."

Tr. The metre is known as Mattāsī if it consits of one Ra-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa, one Ta-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa and two long syllables having a pause on the seventh syllable of a quarter.

3. **BHAMARAPANTI, (BHRAMARAPANTI) :**

— ◡ —, ◡ — ◡, — ◡, —, ◡ —, ◡ ◡ —

(R. J. R. J. L. G.)

Defnition : "Ra- Ja- Ra- Ja- La- Gā Bhamarapanti".

Tr. The metre is known as Bhamarapanti if it consists of one Ra-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa followed by another pair of Ra-gaṇa & Ja-gaṇa and one short and a long syllable with a pause on the eighth syllable to the quarter.

Example :—

Candasūrasaññatāya mānatuṁdakataṁ/
vijjupaṅkjānavenirādacākajanī/
bhāminīvinonathītthitthivena sohi bhave/
bhikkhave apesalosayāni mādihikā/.

4 **VILĀSINĪ :**

— ◡ ◡, ◡ — ◡, ◡ ◡ —, ◡ ◡ ◡, — —

(Bh. J. S. N. 2G.)

Definition : "Bha- Ja- Sa- Na- Ga- Gā Vilāsinī".

Tr. The metre is known as Vilāsīni if it consists one each of Bha-gaṇa, Ja-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa. Na-gaṇa and two long syllables with a pause on the ninth syllable.

Example :—

Kuñjarakaro supabhujānanamanūnaṁ/
mandarasilātalasamo rasamudāraṁ/
añjananibhekaruhakuñjitasukesaṁ/
tañjinamavāñjitakaliṁ sugatamiddhe/.

ATISAKKARĪ (ATIŚARKARĪ)

XV. **ATISAKKARĪ (ATIŚARKARĪ)**—having fifteen syllables to the quarter.

The following are the important varieties :

1. **CANDĀVATTĀ (CANDRĀVARTTĀ) :**

◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ —

(4N. Ṣ.)

Definition : "Catu Ṇa-Sā Çandāvattạ".

Tr. The metre is known as Candāvattā consisting of four Na-gaṇas to the quarter.

Example :—

Atirucirasikhara-samasidadasanaṁ/
vikasitakamaladala-ruciramadharaṁ/
tavamukhakamaladamanasita nayanaṁ/
panayatisutanumamamadanamatulaṁ/.

2. MĀLĀ, (ALSO KNOWN AS MAṆIGUṆANIKARA ELSEWHERE) :

⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑ —.

(4N. S.)

Definition :—"Sa-cachahi Mālā".

Tr. The difference between Candāvattā and Mālā metres is that in the latter there must be a pause either on the sixth or on the ninth syllable where as it is lacking in the former.

Example :—

Sasinibhamukhita tava bhavati hasamayā/
kanakarucira tanutanupari kalaho/
satavaramaṇikimaparicita imavaṁ/
samasitapharusayayatipharusayajano/.

3. KALĀ (CANDRALEKHĀ) :

— — —, — ⏑ —, — — —, ⏑ — —, ⏑ — —

(M. R. M. 2Y.)

Definition :—"Ma- Ra- Myā- Yā Kalā".

Tr. The metre is known as Kalā if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa followed by another Ma-gaṇa and two Ya-gaṇas and with a pause on the seventh syllable to the quarter.

3. KESARĀ (PRABHADRAKA) :

⏑⏑⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑ —.

(V.J.Bh.J.R.)

Definition : "Na-Ja-Bha-Ja.Rāsu Kesarā"

Tr. The metre consisting of one Na-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa followed by another Ja-gaṇa and one Ra-gaṇa is known as Kesarā.

Example :—

Jalacaragumbakīḷitasubhammahodikaṁ /
pamuditanekasārasakulehi sevitaṁ /
bhamaragaṇehi sevita suphulla-sārasiṁ /
saramadigayhavāsamupagato soyati /.

5. SAKVIṆĪ :

— ◡ — , ◡ — ◡ , — ◡ — , ◡ — ◡ . ◡ ◡ —.

(R.J.R.J.S.)

Definition : "Ra-Ja-Ra-Ja-Sā Sakvinī"

Tr. The metre having one Ra-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa again one Ra-gaṇa. one ka-gaṇa and one Sa-gaṇa with a pause on the seventh syllable is known as Sakviṇī.

Example : –

Bāhukūṭasevitaṁ migindakhaggavimalaṁ /
bhīmabhīrugacchitaṁ bhayānakānanatalaṁ /
sattu bhattamuddhaniṁ ratikkhyāhasikako /
mānamedapubbahetave savīrapavaraṁ /.

AṬṬI (AṢṬI)

XVI. Aṭṭī (Aṣṭi)—having sixteen syllables to the quarter. The following are the important varieties.

1. USABHAGATIVILASITA (ṚISABHAGAJAVILASITA)

— ◡ ◡ , — ◡ — , ◡ ◡ ◡ , ◡ ◡ ◡ . ◡ ◡ ◡ , — .

(Bh.R.3N.G.)

Definition : —"Bha-Ra-ti Na-Gā Usabhagativilasitā"

Tr. The metre is known as Usabhagativilasita if it consists of one Bha-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa, three Na-gaṇas and a long syllable with a pause on the seventh syllable, to the quarter.

Example :—

Esā saro pasannamanavasitakhagakulo /
kañjakakuttarīyamubhayatataruhavane /
sārasa-haṁsa-chappadakula nija nija gaho /
dhammahato varovilasatiyatinavacane /.

2. LALANĀ :

— ⏑ — , ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ . ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ , ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ , ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ , — .

(R.4N.G.)

Definition—“Ra-catu Na-Gā Lalanā.”

Tr. The metre is known as Lalanā if it consists of one Ra-gaṇa, four Na.gaṇas and a long syllable with a pause on the fourth syllable to the quarter.

Example :—

Khārubhīrunisitasuhasitasamadasanaṁ /
lokalocanaharamabhinavakamalanibhaṁ /
bhātibhāvinitavakuvalayadalanayanaṁ /
sūrusubbhavadamanamatisubhamidamamalaṁ /

3. CANDALEKHĀ (GARUḌARUTA) :

⏑ ⏑ ⏑ , ⏑ — ⏑ , — ⏑ ⏑ , ⏑ — ⏑ , — — ⏑ , — .

(N.J.Bh.J.T.G.)

Definition : “Na-Ja-Bha-Ja-Ta-Gā Candalekhā”

Tr. The metre is known as Candalekhā when it consists of one Na-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa. one Bha-gaṇa, followed by another Ja-gaṇa. one Ta-gaṇa and a long syllable.

Example :—

Suvisitacandalekha-muditanisāyaṁ bahu /
taruṇi vahābhaketumuṇisobhatātāvade /
vaṇṇamatibhātikundakusumāmudālikulaṁ /
suvatiparojanotidukhitā sato yā pare /.

4. CANDANIKA (VĀṆINĪ) :

⏑ ⏑ ⏑ , ⏑ — ⏑ , — ⏑ ⏑ , ⏑ — ⏑ , — ⏑ — , —.

(N,J.Bh.J.R.G.)

Definition : ,‘Na-Ja-Bha.Ja-Ra-Gā Candanikaṁ”

Tr, The metre is known as Candanika if it consists of one Na-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa, followed by another Ja-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa and a long syllable.

5. CITTABHĀGĀ (NĀRĀCA, PAÑCACĀMARA):

⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑ —. ⏑ — ⏑, —.

(J. R. J. R. J. G.)

Definition— "Ja-Ra-Ja-Ra-Ja-Gā Cittabhāga."

Tr. The metre is known as Cittabhāgā if it consists of one Ja-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa followed by another pair of Ja-gaṇā and Ra-gaṇa still followed by another Ja-gaṇa and a long syllable.

Example:

Suphullapādapehi cātatuṅga-pabbatehi ca/
pahūta paṅkajehi channasītale sarehi ca/
navamhi tāpasā vasanti sāmusākhabhakkhino/
satasayiṁ yahiṁ tikāhi kinnarāya hāyakā/.

ACCAṬṬHI (ATYAṢṬI)

XVII. ACCAṬṬHI (ATYAṢṬI)—having seventeen syllables, to the quarter.

Following are the important varieties.

1. VAṀSAPATRAPATITA (VAṀŚAPATRAPATITA).

— ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ —.

(Bh. R. N. Bh. N. L. G.)

Definition: "Bha-Ra-Na-Bha-Na-La-Gā Vaṁsapatrapatitaṅga."

Tr. The metre is known as Vaṁsapatrapatitā if it consists of one Bha-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa, one Na-gaṇa followed by another Bha-gaṇa, one Na-gaṇa and one short and one long syllable.

2. DHARAṆĪ (PṚITHVĪ):

⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ — —, ⏑ —.

(J.S.J.S.Y.L.G.)

Definition— "Ja-Sa-Ja-Sa-Ya-La-Gā Dharaṇī."

Tr. The metre is known as Dharaṇī if it consists of one Ja-gaṇa and Sa gaṇa, one Ya-gaṇa, one short and one long syllable having a pause on the eighth syllable.

Example :

Visajja sasarandhanuṁ sapadi sampatī pañcasu/
vasanti gajamunnataṁ samadhituṁganaṭṭhaṁkusaṁ/
jagatyanusaraṁ varoruhadayesu nārī vato/
hinattinavasindu vāra tarumañjarītomarā/.

DHUTI (DHṚITI)

XVIII. Dhuti (Dhṛiti)—having eighteen syllables, to the quarter.

The following is the important variety.

1. Kamalā.

⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, — ⏑ ⏑, — — ⏑

(S. N. J. N. Bh. S.)

Definition : "Sa-Na-Ja-Na-Bha-Sā Kamalā."

Tr. The metre is known as Kamalā if it consists of one Sa-gaṇa, one Na-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa followed by another Na-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa again one Sa-gaṇa, to the quarter.

Example :

Surabhīkatamudusītala-jalagāravapatane/
rutakokilanikarā karamadamodita pavane/
sanarāmaramahitāmuni vasate saha sagaṇe/
amatositajanatāvuta-bhagavā isipatane/.

ATIDHUTI (ATIDHṚITI)

XIX. Atidhuti (Atidhṛiti)—having nineteen syllables, to the quarter.

The following is the important variety.

1. Vāyuvegā,

— — —, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ —, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, —.

(M. S. J. S. 2N. G.)

Definition— "Ma-Sa-Ja-Sa-Na-Na-Gā Vāyuvegā".

Tr. The metre is known as Vāyuvegā if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa, followed by another Sa-gaṇa, two Na-gaṇas and a long syllable with a pause on the twelveth syllable of the quarter.

Example :

Nilevijjumalaṅkatorusikhare vipula-jaladharo/
khamhicchannamudāradhiraninadekharadamanalavo/
kekāravamatho vimuñcati mudābhujaripukusalaṁ/
sampatte jaladāgemeti sisiro visarati pavano/,

SAPTAKATI (SEVEN KṚITIS)

KATI (KṚITI)

XX. (a) KATI (KṚITI)—having twenty syllables to the quarter. The following are the two important varieties.

1. SUVADANĀ

— — —,— ◡ —,— ◡ ◡,◡ ◡ ◡,◡ — —,— ◡ ◡,◡ —.

(M.R.Bh.N.Y-Bh.L.G·

Definition :

"Ma-Ra-Bha-Na-Ya-Bha-La-Gā Suvadanā."

Tr. The metre is known as Suvadanā if it consists one each of Ma-gaṇa, Ra-gaṇa, Bha-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa, Ya-gaṇa followed by another Bha.gaṇa, one short and one long syllable, to the quarter.

Example :

Yampitaṁ bhanti saññam kalusayati ca buddhimhimayati /
lajjādīcchindanātīmatimavaharatīrosaṁ janayatī /
mosenti pītimaggaṁ malinayatikulaṁ vuttantulasati /
taṁ tammopānasaññā yadi pivati naromaccu sa pivati /.

2. Devacaratā

— ◡ ◡,— ◡ —,◡ ◡ ◡,— ◡ ◡, — ◡ —, ◡ ◡,◡ —.

(Bh. R. N. Bh. R. S. L. G.)

Definition :—"Bha-Ra-Na-Bha-Ra-Sa-La·Gā Devacaratā".

Tr. The metre is known as Davacaratā if it consists of one Bha-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa, one Na-gaṇa followed by another pair of Bha-gaṇa and Ra-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa and one short and one long syllable.

(b) PAKATI (PRAKṚITI)

XXI. **Pakati** (**Prakṛiti**)—having twenty one syllables to the quarter.

The following is the important variety.

1. **Lapopamā**

◡ ◡ ◡,◡ — ◡,— ◡ ◡,◡ — —,◡ ◡ —,◡ — ◡,— ◡ —.

(N. J. Bh. Y. S. J. R.)

Definition : "Na-Ja-Bha-Ya-Sa-Ja-Rehi Lapopamā".

Tr. The metre is known as Lapopamā if it consists of one Na-gaṇa, one Ja-gaṇa, one Bha-gaṇa, one Ya-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa followed by another Ja-gaṇa, and one Ra-gaṇa, to the quarter.

ĀKATI (ĀKṚITI)

XXII. (c) **Ākati** (**Ākṛīti**)—having twentytwo syllables to the quarter.

The following is the important variety.

1. **Mādhurikā** (**Madraka as mentioned in chapter III**)

— ◡ ◡ , — ◡ — , ◡ ◡ ◡ , — ◡ — , ◡ ◡ ◡ ,
— ◡ — , ◡ ◡ ◡ , — . (Bh.R.N.R.N.R.N.G.)

Definition—"Bha-ti-Ra-Na-Gā Mādhurikā."

Tr. The metre is known as Mādhurikā if it consists of one Bha-gaṇa, one Ra-gaṇa followed by two pairs of Na-gaṇa and Ra-gaṇas and finally a long syllable, to the quarter.

Example :

Maccuparāyane paramadubbale jāti toyabubbulasame/
vyādhijarāttake vyasanabhājane ruditasokasallavigato/
nanditumadhabāhuravaso bhaṭṭhitvamiha yatra tambhayagataṁ/
tatrasanavyatho visayagocare bhamayasindiyāninasame/

VIKATI (VIKṚITI)

XXIII. (d) **Vikati** (**Vikṛiti**)—having twenty three syllables to the quarter.

The following are the two important varieties—

1. Assallita (Aśvalalita)

◡◡◡, ◡—◡, —◡◡, ◡—◡, —◡◡,
◡—◡, —◡◡, ◡—. (N.J.Bh.J.Bh.J.Bh.L.G.)

Definition : Na-Ja-Bha-Ja-Bhā Ja-Bha-La-Gehi Assallitepitakkaṁ."

Tr. The metre is known as Assallita if it consists of one Na-gaṇa followed by three pairs of Ja-gaṇa and Bha-gaṇas with one short and one long syllables having a pause on the eleventh syllable, to the quarter.

2. Mattakkīla (Mattakrīḍā)

———, ———, ——◡, ◡◡◡, ◡◡◡,
◡◡◡, ◡◡◡, ◡—. (2M. T. 4N. L. G)

Definition : "Ma-Ma-Ta-catu Na-La-Gā Mattakkīlaṁ gaṇā"

Tr. The metre is known as Mattakkīla when it consists of two Ma-gaṇas one Ta-gaṇa four Na-gaṇas one short and a long syllable with a pause either on eighth or the fifth syllable.

Example :

Vijjuṁ naṭṭham kānaṭṭhaṁ kā kasasurapatinusupahatajalagato/
pātasanyādālīselā dutambapalavivaranipatita-salilo/
sārūkampocaddho vātam tāyaparipatitasisiraphusītanayute/
phenasuttātiṇṇanajjo tiṇa-va salilasuvisaramupahanaṭā/

SAṄKATI (SAṀKṚITI)

XXIV. (e) Saṅkati (Saṁkṛiti)—having twenty four syllables to the quarter.

The following are the two important varieties.

1. Tanaviṇanā (Tanvī)

—◡◡, ——◡, ◡◡◡, ◡◡—, —◡◡,
—◡◡, ◡◡◡, ◡——. (Bh.T. N.S. 2Bh. N.Y.)

Definition : "Bha-Ta-Na-Sa-Bha-Na-Yā Tanaviṇanā."

Tr. The metre is known as Tanaviṇanā if it consists one each of Bha-gaṇa, Ta-gaṇa, Na-gaṇa, Sa-gaṇa, followed by two

Bha-gaṇas, one Na-gaṇa and one Ya-gaṇa with a pause either on the fifth, seventh or the twelvth syllable.

2. MEGHAMĀLĀ

⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑, —⏑—, —⏑—, —⏑—,
—⏑—, —⏑—, —⏑—. (2N. 6R)

Definition : "Dvi-Na-cha-Rā Meghamālā."

Tr. The metre, Meghamālā consists of two Na-gaṇas followed by six Ra-gaṇas with a pause on the ninth syllable, to the quarter.

Example :

Balakisalayasobhitā sokasālāpiyālambapuṇṇāganāgādihi/
naruhiruruhirujjalammantapuṁkokilo nāditaṁ
bhūsitaṁ kānanaṁ/
vikasitakamaluppalāmodakandhakkaṭo vātayonak-
khiṇāto nilo/
tavȧ sutanutamāgatokāsasandīpane kāla esopi yassūnarī/.

ABHIKATI (ABHIKṚITI)

XXV. (f) ABHIKATI (ABHIKṚITI)—having twentyfive syllables to the quarter.

The following is the important variety.

1. KOÑCAPĀDĀ (KRAUÑCAPĀDĀ)

—⏑⏑, — — —, ⏑⏑—, —⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑,
⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑. —. (Bh. M. S. Bh. 4N. G.)

Definition :—"Bha-Ma-Sa-Bha-catu Na-Gā Koñcapādā."

Tr. The metre is known as Koñcapādā if it consists of one Bha-gaṇa, one Ma-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa followed by another Bha-gaṇa, four Na-gaṇas and a long syllable.

UKKATI (UTKṚITI)

XXVI. (g) UKKATI (UTKṚITI)—having twenty six syllables to the quarter.

The following are the two important varieties.

1. BHUJAṄGA-VIJJUMBHĪTĀ (BHUJAṄGA VIJṚIMBHITĀ):

— — —, — — —, — — ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡,
◡ ◡ ◡, — ◡ —, ◡ ◡ —, ◡ —. (2M. T. 3N. R.S.L.G.)

Definition: "Ma-Ma-Ta-ti Na-Ra-Sa-La-Gā Bhujanga Vijjumbhītā".

Tr. The metre is known as Bhujanga-Vijjumbhītā if it consists of two Ma-gaṇas one Ta-gaṇa, three Na-gaṇas one Ra-gaṇa, one Sa-gaṇa one short and one long syllable having a pause either on the seventh or the eleventh syllable.

2. APAVĀHAKA.

— — —, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ ◡,
◡ ◡ ◡, ◡ ◡ —, — —. (M. 6N. S. 2G.)

Definition: "Ma-cha-Na-Sa-Ga-Gā-Apavāhakaṁ".

Tr. The metre is known as Apavāhaka if it consists of one Ma-gaṇa, six Na-gaṇas, one Sa-gaṇa and two long syllables.

THE METHODOLOGY OF VIBHANGAPPAKARAṆA

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INTRODUCTORY

During his ministry of forty five years Lord Buddha delivered discourses on various topics to various persons on various occasions. They have been collected and compiled in what is known as the Sutta-Piṭaka.

Among these discourses there are some which have got only a temporary and local value. For instance the discourses on the caste system and similar topics belong to this category. But others, which are greater in number, have got a universal and permanent value. In fact, it is these discourses that embody the real message of the Tathāgata as a world teacher.

The discourses in question, among others, deal with such topics as cattāri ariyasaccāni or the four noble truths, ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo or the noble eight-fold path, pañcindriyāni or the five ethical faculties, pañcabalāni or the five ethical powers, cattāro āsavā or the four mental intoxicants, cattāro oghā or the four floods, cattāro yogā or the four fetters, and so on. According to the tradition there are as many as eighty four thousand dhammakkhandhas or doctrinal topics.[1]

On close observation it can be seen that most of these topics deal more or less with the same doctrinal points. For instance ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo is the same as magga-saccaṁ or the fourth noble truth. Balas and indriyas refer to the same subject matter. They are but two different presentations of the same doctrines suited for persons of different temperaments[2]. In the same way āsavas, oghas and yogas refer to another set of doctrines which are akusala or unwholesome in nature. They differ only in form and not in sense. This phenomenon was taken into consideration in the later analytical study of the dhammas.

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[1] *A. S.*, *BOS.*, PP. 16, 23 ; V. A., *HBS.*, P. 19 ; *S. P.*, *HBS*, P. 16 ; PPa. A., *VTP.*, p. 39 ; A. K. *Vyā.*, *COS.*, PP. 60-61.

[2] Imasmiṁ kiñcāpi atthato nānattaṁ natthi, desanāvilāsena pana tathābujjhantānaṁ vā puggalānaṁ ajjhāsayavasena vuttā—V. A., HBS., P. 26 ; A. S., P. 40 ; V. M., HBS., P. 85 ; Rāgadveṣa-moha-māna-driṣṭicaritāḥ nānā pudgalāḥ. Teṣāṁ pratipakṣa-niyāmena bhagavatā kathitāḥ dharmaskandhāḥ. A. K., ed. Rahul Sankrityayana, P, 12 ; Also vide. A. K. Vyā., P. 60.

After the mahāparinibbāna of the Master his disciples felt the necessity of giving a systematic form to his teachings. This could not be done without ascertaining what the essential principles of the Dhamma are. So they undertook an analytical study of the discourses of the Master. The result of this study, as proved by the researches of the modern scholars, was the Abhidhamma-Piṭak.

As a result of this analytical study all the eighty four thousand doctrinal points were boiled down to seventy two essential principles[1]. They were classified into the four divisions of mind or rather consciousness in general (cittaṁ), the fifty two psychic factors (cetasikā-dhammā)[2], the eighteen material qualities (rūpa-dhammā)[3] and nibbāna. Later on, for reasons now well-known, these essential principles came to be regarded as paramatthadhammas or the Ultimate principles[4].

The seventy two essential principles came to be studied under the three well-known groups of the five khandhas, the twelve āyatanas and the eighteen dhātus. All the dhammas in question were included in the latter two groups. But for reasons given by the commentators of both the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda, asankhata-dhamma or nibbāna was excluded from the first group[5].

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[1] *A. S.*, *VTP.*, P. 24; *V. T.*, *VTP.*, P. 123.

[2] Ibid. P. 4 &c; Ibid. P. 58 &c.

[3] Ibid. P. 21 &c; Ibid. P. 57 &c.

[4] Ibid. P. 39 &c.

[5] *V. A.*, PP. 1-2; A. K., Rahul, P. 9; Also vide. A. K. Vyā. P. 56. While the Theravādins speak of Nibbāna alone as asankhata, the Sarvāstivādins speak of three asankhata-dhammas—Pratisankhyā-nirodha, apratisankhyā-nirodha and ākāśa.

Certain Theras and Theris, mentioned in the Theragāthā and the Therīgāthā, refer to the study of the dhammas in terms of khandhas, āyatanas and dhātus[1]. But these early records do not show as to how many dhammas were in these groups. They point to one fact that during the life-time of the Master there were certain definite lines of the exposition of his doctrines, and the system of the Abhidhamma was evolved along those lines. When the commentaries[2] refer to the mātikas as laid down by the Master, they may be interpreted as referring to them.

It has been mentioned above that the analytical study of the doctrinal points led the Ābhidhammikas to the conclūsion that there are only seventy two essential principles. This discovery gave the student of the Dhamma a knowledge of the scope of his subject-matter.

Next they took up the study of these paramattha-dhammas with reference to the three aspects of their function, nature and inter-relation[3]. The results of this study were formulated and compiled in the Dhammasangaṇi, the first and the most important book of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka.

In the Dhammasangaṇi there are one hundred and twenty two mātikas or heads arranged in groups of three and two. There are twenty two mātikas of the tika or the three-fold group and hundred mātikas of the duka or the two-fold group. They constitute the contents of the Dhammasangaṇi.

A perusal of this text is necessary to give the student an idea of how comprehensive a system it is and how it reaches almost a point of mathematical precision and accuracy within its own scope. Here we are not directly concerned with the Dhammasangaṇi. It has been referred to in so far as it has got a close bearing on the Vibhanga whose methodology is the subject-matter of this study.

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[1] Theragāthā. Sinhalese edition by Dhammananda Thera, P. 281; Therīgāthā, Sinhalese edition by Dhammananda Thera, PP. 345, 349 & 381.

[2] A. S., BOS., P. 4; PPa. A., HBS. I, P. 80.

[3] Abhi. Phil., P. 32.

In their works several learned scholars have referred to the general nature of the Vibhanga[1]. So we do not propose to traverse the ground already covered up by them. The present study will be confined to those points whose clarification is essential for understanding the methodology of the Vibhanga. We are not going into the details. This will be an outline of the general method. Every student of Abhidhamma is expected to work out the details for himself or herself.

We have seen that Abhidhamma deals with seventy two paramattha-dhammas or essential principles with reference to one hundred and twenty two mātikas. With the formulation of this system the Abhidhamma came to have a technique of its own. In the Sutta-piṭaka we have the popular method, the method of the general student and in Abhidhamma, the technical method, the method of the scholar. Thus the Suttantikas and the Ābhidhammikas came to have two different methods of the exposition of the teachings of the Master.

The Suttantika method was the earlier of the two, and it goes back to the times of the Buddha himself. So it was upto the Ābhidhammikas to show the relation between the old method and the new method. In the Vibhangappakaraṇa they have performed this task and hence the importance of its methodology.

It has been already observed that the analytical study of the eighty four thousand dhammakkhandhas led to the conclusion that there are only seventy two essential principles. They present, in a nut-shell, the eighty four thousand doctrinal topics. Then again one hundred and twenty two mātikas, dealt with in the Dhammasangaṇi, give a comprehensive explanation of the seventy two dhammas. As such they, in their turn, were expected to cover up the various ways of explanation given in the discourses and, for that matter, in the Suttapiṭaka. Keeping the two-fold method in view, in the Vibhanga the Ābhidhammikas have made a study of some of the most important doctrinal topics, such as khandhas, āyatanas, dhātus, saccas, indriyas and so on. These topics have been presented with their Suttantika and Ābhidhammika expositions side by side. After going through them one cannot but come to the conclusion that the two methods, though they differ in their approach, reach one and the same conclusion. With these few introductory remarks we come to the subject-matter under discussion.

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[1] *Abhidhamma Philosophy*, II, J. Kashyap Thero; *The Guide through Abhidhamma*, Ñānātiloka Thero.

In the Vibhangappakaraṇa there are eighteen chapters :

1. Khandha-vibhanga
2. Āyatana ,,
3. Dhātu ,,
4. Sacca ,,
5. Indriya ,,
6. Paccayākāra ,,
7. Satipaṭṭhāna ,,
8. Sammappadhāna ,,
9. Iddhipāda ,,
10. Bojjhanga-vibhanga
11. Magga ,,
12. Jhāna ,,
13. Appamaññā ,,
14. Sikkhāpada ,,
15. Paṭisambhidā ,,
16. Ñāṇa ,,
17. Khuddaka ,,
18. Dhammahadaya ,,

Every chapter of the book, as pointed out by J. Kashyap Thera, is complete in itself.[1] So it would be more appropriate to call them so many treatises than chapters.[2]

The most of the vibhangas are in three parts: (a) Suttanta-bhājanīya, (b) Abhidhamma-bhājanīya and (c) Pañhāpucchaka. The first gives the Suttantika explanation of the dhammas. The second studies every dhamma individually with reference to the relevant tika and duka mātikas of the Dhammasangaṇi. The third studies the given Dhammas collectively, again, with reference to the relevant tikas and dukas. So while the first part gives the suttantika explanation, the second and the third give the Ābhidhammika explanation.

[1] *Abhi. Phil.*, P. 104.

[2] *Guide through Abhidhamma*, p. 17.

The above method has been followed upto the thirteenth vibhanga. In the fourteenth chapter the suttantika explanation has not been given. Again it has been applied in the fifteenth chapter. No distinction of the two expositions has been made in the sixteenth and the seventeenth chapters also. The eighteenth chapter follows the Ābhidhammika method of explanation, but its application is different. More than any other vibhanga it forms an independent treatise by itself. The special features of the vibhangas will be mentioned in their respective places.

KHANDHA-VIBHANGA—1.

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

The khandha-vibhanga begins with the statement—rūpakkhandho, vedanākkhandho, saññākkhandho, saṁkhārakkhandho, viññāṇakkhandho.

Then follows the explanation of every khandha. In order to give a general idea of the method of explanation we quote the text of the explanation of rūpakkhandha :

Tattha katamo rūpakkhandho ? yaṁ kiñci rūpaṁ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṁ ajjhattaṁ vā bahiddhā vā, oḷārikaṁ vā sukhumaṁ vā, hīnaṁ vā paṇītaṁ vā, yaṁ dūre santike vā, tadekajjhaṁ abhisaññuhitvā abhisankhipitvā ayaṁ vuccati rūpakkhandho.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ atītaṁ ? yaṁ rūpaṁ, atītaṁ, niruddhaṁ, vigataṁ, vipariṇataṁ, atthangataṁ, abbhatthangataṁ, uppajjitvā vigataṁ atītaṁ, atītaṁsena sangahītaṁ—cattaro ca mahābhūtā catunnañca mahābhutānaṁ upādāya-rupaṁ—idaṁ vuccati rupaṁ atītaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ anāgataṁ ? yaṁ rūpaṁ ajātaṁ, abhūtaṁ, asañjātaṁ, anibbattaṁ, anabhinibbattaṁ, apātubhū-

taṁ, anuppannaṁ, asamuppannaṁ. anuṭṭhitaṁ, asamuṭṭhitaṁ, anāgataṁ, anāgatamsena sangahītam cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnañca mahābhūtānaṁ upādāyarūpaṁ —idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ anāgataṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ paccuppannaṁ ? yaṁ rūpaṁ Jātaṁ , bhūtaṁ, sañjātaṁ, nibbattaṁ, abhinibbattaṁ, pātubhūtaṁ, uppannaṁ, samuppannaṁ. uṭṭhitaṁ, samuṭṭhitaṁ, paccuppannaṁ, paccuppannaṁsena sangahītaṁ—cattāro ca mahābhūtā cattunnañca mahābhūtānaṁ upādāyarūpaṁ—idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ paccuppanaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ ajjhattaṁ ? yaṁ rūpaṁ tesaṁ tesaṁ sattānaṁ ajjhattaṁ, paccattaṁ, niyakaṁ, pāṭipuggalikaṁ, upādinnaṁ—cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnañca mahābhūtānaṁ upādāyarūpaṁ—idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ ajjhattaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ bahiddhā ? yaṁ rūpaṁ tesaṁ tesaṁ parasattānaṁ parapuggalānaṁ ajjhattaṁ, paccattaṁ, niyakaṁ, pāṭipuggalikaṁ, upādinnaṁ—cattaro ca mahābhūtā catunnañca mahābhūtānaṁ upādāyarūpaṁ—idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ bahiddhā.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ oḷārikaṁ ? cakkhāyatanaṁ... ..... poṭṭhabbāyatanaṁ—idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ oḷārikaṁ.

Tatha katamaṁ rūpaṁ sukhumaṁ ? itthindriyaṁ... ..... kabalinkāro āhāro—idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ sukhumaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ hīnaṁ ? Yaṁ rūpaṁ tesaṁ tesaṁ sattānaṁ uññātaṁ, avaññātaṁ, hīḷitaṁ, paribhūtaṁ, acittīkataṁ, hīnaṁ, hīnamataṁ, hīnasammataṁ, aniṭṭhaṁ, akantaṁ, amanāpaṁ—rūpā saddā, gandhā, rasā, poṭṭhabbā—idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ hīnaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ paṇītaṁ ? yaṁ rūpaṁ tesaṁ tesaṁ sattānaṁ anuññātaṁ, anavaññātaṁ, ahīḷitaṁ, apribhūtaṁ, cittīkataṁ, paṇītaṁ, paṇītamataṁ, paṇītasammataṁ, iṭṭhaṁ. kantaṁ, manāpaṁ—rūpā, saddā, gandhā, rasā, phoṭṭhabbā—idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ paṇītaṁ. Taṁ taṁ vā pana rūpaṁ upādāyupādāya rūpaṁ hīnaṁ paṇītaṁ daṭṭhabbaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ dūre ? itthindriyaṁ.........kabaliṅkāro āhāro, yaṁ vā panaññampi atthi rūpaṁ anāsanne, anupakaṭṭhe, dure, asantike—idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ dūre.

Tattha katamaṁ rūpaṁ santike, ? cakkhāyatanaṁ.........poṭṭhabbāyatanaṁ, yaṁ vā panaññampi atthi rūpaṁ āsanne, upakaṭṭhe, avidure, santike—idaṁ vuccati rūpaṁ santike. Taṁ taṁ vā pana rūpaṁ upādāyupādāya rūpaṁ dūre santike daṭṭhabbaṁ.

After going through the text we can see that the rūpa dhammas included in the category of the rūpakkhandha are explained with reference to five groups of terms which show their different aspects of nature : (a) temporal nature—past, future or present ; (b) relative nature—internal or external ; (c) quantitative nature—gross or subtle ; (d) qualitative nature——lower or higher ; (e) nature of distance—far or near.

The meanings of the terms of the first groups, which explain the temporal nature of the rūpa-dhammas, are clear. The term internal, in the second group, refers to those rūpa-dhammas which constitute one's own body, and the term external refers to other rūpa-dhammas. In the third group, the term gross refers to the first five sense-organs and their respective objects, and the term subtle refers to those rūpa-dhammas which can be perceived by mind only. So the quantitative nature of the rūpa-dhammas is to be understood with reference to their nature of perceptibility. The qualitative nature, explained by the terms of the fourth group, is to be understood with reference to their affective nature. Accordingly those rūpa-dhammas which produce a feeling of unpleasantness are said to be lower and others which produce pleasantness are said to be higher. As regards the fifth group, here distance does not mean distance of space, but that of perceptibility. As such the subtle material qualities are said to be distant and gross material qualities near.

The remaining four khandhas constitute only the nāma-dhammas—vedanā, saññā, saṁkhāra and viññāṇa. The above method of explanation has been followed here also. So the khandhas in question have been explained in terms of the five groups already referred to. But it has to be noted that the meanings of certain terms differ according to the context. To make the point clear, they may be considered with reference to the vedanākkhandha and, for that matter, the dhammas included therein.

To take the terms of the first group, which explain the temporal nature, there is no change in their meanings. The two terms of the second group, which explain the relative nature, refer to one's own feelings and those of others respectively. The terms of the third group, which explain the quantitative nature, have to be understood with reference to the ethical nature of the feelings. Thus while feelings associated with immoral types of thought are gross in nature others associated with moral types of thought are subtle in nature. This explanation has been given in the case of these and other terms, and their permutations and combinations. Here it has to be noted that feeling is a psychic factor which is common to all the types of thought. It changes its nature according to that of the associated thought. So in lower planes it remains gross and in higher planes it becomes more and more refined.

The qualitative nature of the feelings has to be understood in the light of the above explanation. Those feelings which have been characterised as gross are also lower in nature and others which have been characterised as subtle are higher in nature.

The distance, explained by the terms of the fifth group, has to be understood according to their ethical nature. Thus those feelings which assciate with moral thoughts are said to be distant from those which associate with immoral thoughts. But feelings which associate with similar thoughts, moral, immoral and non-moral, are said to be near to one another. This explanation has been applied to different types of thought separately as well as to their permutations and combinations.

The above explanation has been given in the case of the remaining three nāma-dhammas also with necessary changes made in keeping with their individual characteristics.

In conclusion it has to be noted that this suttantika explanation has been given according to the traditional method of exposition of the Dhamma, generally made in three stages—uddesa, niddesa and paṭiniddesa. Uddesa is the statement of a certain fact.[1] Niddesa is the general explanation which defines the scope of the subject-matter with reference to the relevant terms.[2] Paṭiniddesa is the elaborate explanation of the same with reference to the details.[3] In the present case, the paṭiniddesa part of the explanation has been given with reference to the synonyms of the terms which occur in the niddesa.

This kind of exposition of terms is not found in the suttantas or in any commentary on them. It might have formed part of some oral tradition until it was recorded in the Vibhanga. Whatever it is, the remarkable thing is that its style is quite similar to that of the Ābhidhammikas. So it would not be far from the truth to say that it was this kind of suttantika explanation that later on gave rise to the Ābhidhammika explanation too.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

It also begins with the statement of the five khandhas and makes their exposition one by one as given in the table of contents and the niddesa.

1. RŪPAKKHANDHA.

The rūpakkhandha has been explained in a gradual numerical order. It begins with one-fold explanation and ends with eleven-fold explanation. This explanation of rūpakkhandha is the same as that given in the Dhammasangaṇi.

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[1] N. P., Sudassi Thero, P. 1 ; N. P. A., HBS, P. 13

[2] Ibid. P. 2 ; Ibid. P. 27.

[3] Ibid. P. 4 ; Ibid. P. 35

The rūpakaṇda of the Dhammasangaṇi runs into as many as forty pages. The Vibhangappakaraṇa presents it in a very abridged form in about two pages. The Dhammasangaṇi studies the rūpa-dhammas in so many groups classified under eleven principal mātikas. There are also some sub-mātikas. They differ only in form and not in content. So this elaborate study, made under eleven mātikas in the Dhammasangaṇi, has been reduced into eleven paragraphs here. This has been done in order to avoid unnecessary repetition.

The purpose of the Vibhanga is to present the suttantika and the Ābhidhammika expositions of certain doctrinal topics. In the present case rūpakkhandha is under discussion. We have already seen its suttantika explanation. As for the Ābhidhammika explanation, the student has to refer to the rupakaṇda of the Dhammasangaṇi. The Vibhanga only gives an outline of the same just to remind him of this fact. This has been indicated in the text itself.[1]

2. VEDANĀKKHANDHA.

Vedanākkhandha has been explained in four parts: i. dukamūlakavāro, ii. tikamūlaka-vāro, iii. ubhato-vaḍḍhaka-vāro and iv. bahuvidha-vāro. As so many small vāras or courses[2] are included in the four vāras concerned, they have been named as cattāro mahāvāra or the four big courses.

Before coming to the four vāras, it is necessary to understand the general explanation which has been given in all cases. For instance vedanā has been explained in a gradual numerical order beginning with the one-fold way (ekavidhena) and ending with the ten-fold way (dasavidhena).

The one-fold way is given in relation to phassa or contact.[3] The two-fold way is in relation to the presence or the absence of the hetus.[1] The Three-fold way is in relation to the moral, immoral and non-moral nature.[2] The four-fold way is in relation to the four planes—kāmāvacara, rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and apariyāpanna.[3] The five-fold way is in relation to the five kinds of feeling—sukha, dukkha, somanassa, domanassa and upekkhā[4]. These feelings have been expressed in terms of indriyas. The six-fold way is in relation to the six sense-organs as the bases of the origin of vedanā.[5] The seven-fold way is in relation to the six sense-organs and the manoviññāṇadhātu as sources of the origin of vedanā.[6] In the eight-fold way the two types of kāyasamphassajā-vedanā have been taken into consideration separately,[7] other things remaining the same as in the seven-fold way. In the nine-fold way the different types of consciousness—moral, immoral and non-moral included in the manoviññāṇadhātu—have been taken into consideration separately,[8] other things remaining the same as in the seven-fold way. In the ten-fold way the two types of kāyasamphassajāvedanā and the three divisions of the types of consciousness included in the manoviññāṇadhātu have been taken into consideration,[9] other things remaining the same as in the seven-fold way.

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[1] This is mentioned only in the Aṭṭhakathā and not in any existing text, including the Chaṭṭhasangāyanā edition. In fact this should have been mentioned for the sake of clarity.

[2] This seems to be the most appropriate term for vāra.

[3] ekavidhena phassasampayutto dassito.

This general explanation is the frame-work, so to say, within which the mahāvāras have been worked out.[10] So their nature may now be considered here.

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[1] Duvidhena sahetukāhetukato.

[2] Tividhena jātito.

[3] catubbidhena bhummantarato.

[4] Pañcavidhena indriyato.

[5] Chabbidhena vatthuto.

[6] sattavidhena tattha manosamphassajā bhedato.

[7] Aṭṭhavidhena tattha kāyasamphassajā bhedato.

[8] Navavidhena sattavidhabhede manoviññāṇadhātusamphassajā bhedato.

[9] dasavidhena aṭṭhavidhabhede monoviññāṇadhātusamphassajā bhedato.

[10] This is specially true of the first three vāras. In the case of the fourth vāra the numerical order changes.

i. Dukamūlaka-mahāvāra is so called because the relevant tikamātikas have been studied in relation to the relevant dukas.[1] There are fifty dukas and nineteen tikas applicable in the present case. Their combined study would give rise to as many as nine hundred and fifty vāras.[2] The last duka studied within the general plan in relation to the relevant nineteen tikas, when abridged, is as follows :

Ekavidhena vedanākkhandho – Phassasampayutto. Dividhena vedanākkhandho—atthi saraṇo, atthi araṇo. Tividhena vedanākkhandho—Atthi vipāko, atthi vipākadhammadhammo, atthi nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammo. Atthi upādinnupādāniyo............Atthi ajjhattārammaṇo, atthi bahiddhārammaṇo, atthi ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇo .... evaṁ dasavidhena vedanākkhandho.

When enlarged, it would run into a full printed page. So the working out of all the vāras concerned would occupy fairly two big volumes. Therefore the Saṅgītikāras have left them with necessary hints to be worked out by the student for himself or herself.

ii. Tikamūlaka-mahāvāra is so called because the relevant dukas have been studied in relation to the relevant tikas.[3] Here too the same number of dukas and tikas has been taken into consideration. The only difference is that here all the relevant dukas have been combined with every relevant tika. So the number of the vāras would also be the same.[4]

iii. The udbhatovaḍḍhaka-mahāvāra gives a combined study of the first relevant dukas and the nineteen tikas concerned within the general plan.[1] So there are altogether nineteen vāras in it, which have all been worked out in the texts.[2]

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[1] Tike ādāya dukesu pakkhipitvā desitavāro dukamūlako nāma. V. A., HBS., P. 26.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Duke ādāya tikesu pakkhipitvā desitavāro tikamūlako nāma.

[4] Ibid.

iv. Bahuvidha-mahāvāra includes the following four vāras : sattavidha-vāra, catuvīsatividha-vāra, tiṁsatividha-vāra and bahuvidha-vāra.[3]

In the sattavidha-vāra vedanākkhandha has been studied in relation to the four planes under the tika-mātikas. As all the relevant tikas have been taken into consideration separately, there can be nineteen vāras[4]. The first vāra is as follows :

Sattavidhena vedanākkhandho—atthi kusalo, atthi akusalo, atthi avyākato, atthi kāmāvacaro, atthi rūpāvacaro, atthi arūpāvacaro, atthi apariyāpanno, evaṁ sattavidhena vedanākkhandho.

Aparopi sattavidhena vedanākkhandho—atthi vipāko…… ……atthi ajjhattārammaṇo, atthi bahiddhārammaṇo, atthi ajjhatthabahiddhārammaṇo, atthi kāmāvacaro, atthi rūpāvacaro, atthi apariyāpanno. Evaṁ sattavidhena vedanākkhandho.

Only the first vāra has been given in the text and the remaining vāras have been abridged together with necessary hints for the students.

In the catuviṁsatividha-vāra vedanā, as given rise to by the six sense-contacts, has been studied with reference to the relevant nineteen tikas. Here every tika has been considered in relation to every sense-contact individually. Then the six sense-contacts have been considered separately also. So it gives the twenty four ways of study. In the text only the first vāra has been shown and the remaining have been abridged together with necessary hints.

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[1] Tike ca duke ca ubhato vaḍḍhetvā desitavāro ubhato vaḍḍhitako nāma. V.A., HBS., P. 26.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Sattavidhenāti ādivāro bahuvidha-vāro nāma-Ibid.

In the existing texts, including the sixth saṅgāyanā edition, no separate headings have been given to these vāras. In the aṭṭhakathā they have been put under one and the same heading which is directly applicable only to the last vāra. The aṭṭhakathācariya seems to have suggested this common heading in consideration of the similarity in the method of exposition followed in them.

[4] V. A., P. 27

In the tiṁsavidha-vāra, each of the six sense-contacts has been considered in relation to the four planes. Again, the sense-contacts have been considered separately. Hence the thirty ways of study.

In the bahuvidha-vāra the six sense-contacts have been considered individually in relation to the relevant tikas and the four planes together. As in the above cases, here too the sense-contacts have been considered separately. Only one vāra has been worked out in the text and others have been abridged together.

The aṭṭhakathā treates all the bahuvidha-vāras as one. Accordingly we can have the exact number of vāras referred to so far. In the first mahā-vāra there are nine hundred and fifty minor vāras, in the second also the same numbsr of vāras, in the third nineteen such vāras and in the fourth fifty eight vāras. So altogether there are nineteen hundred and seventy seven minor vāras. This gives an exhaustive study of the vedanākkhandha from the point of view of the Abhidhamma.

3. SAÑÑĀKKHANDHA.

In saññākkhandha beside the above mentioned dukas and tikas, sukhasahagata, na-sukhasahagata and upekkhāsahagata, na-upekkhāsahagata dukas as well as pītittika and sukhattika have been taken into consideration. So there are fifty two dukas and twenty one tikas applicable in the present case. Accordingly, other things remaining the same as in the first khandha, there is an increase of certain number of vāras.

In the dukamūlaka-mahāvāra there are one thousand and ninety two vāras, in the tikamūlaka-mahāvāra the same number of vāras, in the ubhatovaḍḍhaka-mahāvāra twenty one vāras and in the bahuvidha-mahāvāra sixty four minor vāras. So altogether there are twenty two hundred and sixty nine minor vāras in the study of saññākkhandha.

4. SANKHĀRAKKHANDHA.

In vedanākkhandha and saññākkhandha, one-fold way of explanation is given in relation to phassa or contact. Now phassa is one of the fifty cetasikas included in the sankhārakkhandha. As such it cannot be considered in the same relation. So in this study phassa has been replaced by citta. In this khandha hetu-duka has also been added to the number of dukas mentioned in saññākkhandha. Accordingly sankhārakkhandha has been studied in relation to fifty two dukas and twenty one tikas.

When all the results are taken into consideration, in the first mahāvāra there are eleven hundred and thirteen minor vāras, in the second also the same number of minor vāras, in the third twenty one minor vāras, and in the fourth sixty four minor vāras. So altogether there are twenty three hundred and eleven minor vāras in the study of the sankhārakkhandha.

5. VIÑÑĀṆAKKHANDHA.

There is no point in saying that Viññāṇakkhandha arises in relation to itself. Therefore only the respective types of consciousness have been taken into consideration in the places concerned without any reference to phassa or contact. So far as other things are concerned, it is the same as saññākhandha. Accordingly there are twenty two hundred and sixty nine minor vāras in the study of the viññaṇakkhandha.

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA.

In the Abhidhammabhājanīya an exhaustive study of all the five khandhas has been made individually. In the pañhāpucchaka section, all the five khandhas have been studied collectively with reference to the relevant tika and duka mātikās.

This study is in the usual form of the Dhammasangaṇi. Thus in the khandha-vibhanga we have the Suttantika and the Abhidhammika expositions of the five aggregates side by side.

ĀYATANA-VIBHANGA—2.

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here in the first place the twelve āyatanas have been enumerated and in the second place each āyatana has been explained with reference to the four terms—anicca, dukkha, anatta and vipariṇāmadhamma. These four terms refer to the general characteristics and hence the general nature of the sankhatadhammas or the composite things.

This explanation is found in many a suttanta. In some of them it is found in a very elaborate form. For the sake of brevity, only the representative terms of the explanation have been given here.

As regards the fourth term, namely, vipariṇāmadhamma, it is only a synonym for aniccatā. In view of its expressive nature, it has also been included here. Otherwise only the first three terms can be said to be representative in character and mostly they find mention together in the suttantas concerned.

With this brief explanation, the vibhanga passes on to the Abhidhamma explanation.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

In the skandha group seventy one essential dhammas were taken into consideration with the exception of Nibbāna. But in the āyatana group all the seventy two dhammas, including nibbāna, have been taken up for consideration.

In the skandha group dhammas were studied as so many aggregates in terms of five categories. Accordingly all the rūpa-dhammas were included in rūpakkhandha, the fifty two cetasikas were included in the three categories of vedanā, saññā and sankhāra, and all the types of consciousness were included in viññāṇakkhandha. This is the shortest analytical study of the dhammas from the subjective point of view.

In the āyatana group all the seventy two dhammas have been studied in terms of the six sense-organs and the six sense-objects. Accordingly the rūpa-dhammas, included in the rūpakkhandha, have been distributed in eleven āyatanas here. Thus oḷārika-rūpa-dhammas form the first five sense-organs and their respective objects. The sukhuma-rūpas along with fifty two cetasikas and nibbāna form dhammāyatana. Here manāyatana represents all the citta-dhammas included in the viññāṇakkhandha. So in the āyatana group practically the same dhammas, with the addition of nibbāna, have been studied from the subjective point of view. This study is more elaborate than the former one.

In this bhājanīya the twelve āyatanas have been explained one by one. In the case of the first five sense-organs and their respective objects i. e. cakkhu, sota, ghāna, Jivhā, kāya, rūpa, sadda, gandha, rasa, and phoṭṭhabba, only their introductory explanation has been given in the text. For instance the explanation of cakkhāyatana is as follows :

Tattha katamaṁ cakkhāyatanaṁ ? yaṁ cakkhuṁ catunnaṁ mahābhūtānaṁ upādāya pasādo attabhāvapariyāpanno anidassano sappaṭigho, yena cakkhunā anidassanena sappaṭighena rūpaṁ sanidassanaṁ sappaṭighaṁ passi vā passati vā passissati vā passe vā, cakkhumpetaṁ, cakkhāyatanampetaṁ, cakkhudhātupeso, cakkhundriyampetaṁ, lokopeso, dvāropeso, samuddopeso, paṇḍarampetaṁ, khettampetaṁ, vatthumpetaṁ, nettampetaṁ, nayanampetaṁ, orimaṁ tīrampetaṁ, suññogāmopeso—idaṁ vuccati cakkhāyatanaṁ.

This introductory explanation is more or less in the nature of a definition of cakkhāyatana. Here it has to be noted that in the Dhammasangaṇi this introductory explanation is immediately followed by other explanations which show the relation between cakkhāyatana and rūpāyatana, and how their interaction gives rise to the visual type of consciousness and its associated psychic factors. Further it has been explained with reference to the relevant tikas and dukas in different sections. This method has been followed in the case of the ten āyatanas in question. The introductory passage given in the text serves as a kind of clue. With the help of it the student has to pick up the thread and work out the details of the explanation with reference to the Dhammasangaṇi.

The manāyatana is the same as viññāṇakkhandha. So the explanation given in the case of viññāṇakkhandha has been repeated here also.

It has been observed that dhammāyatana includes the fifty two cetasikas, sukkhuma-rūpas and nibbāna. The fifty two cetasikas constitute the three Khandhas—vedanā, saññā and sankhāra. So in their case the explanations given in the khandha group have been repeated. The explanations given of the sukhuma-rūpas and nibbāna or the asankhata-dhātu, as it is known here, are the same as those given in the Dhammasangaṇi. As they are well-known to the students of Abhidhamma, they have only been referred to here.

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA.

Here all the twelve āyatanas have been studied together with reference to the relevant tikas and dukas. The text begins with the enumeration of the twelve āyatanas as follows:

Dvādasāyatanāni—cakkhāyatanaṁ, rūpāyatanaṁ, sotāyatanaṁ, saddāyatanaṁ, ghāṇāyatanaṁ, gandhāyatanaṁ, jivhāyatanaṁ, rasāyatanaṁ, kāyāyatanaṁ, phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṁ, manāyatanaṁ, dhammāyatanaṁ.

Then questions have been put regarding the relation of the twelve āyatanas to the tika and duka mātikas. In the text they have been abbreviated in the following manner :

Dvādasannaṁ āyatanānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā ....kati saraṇā, kati araṇā ?

In this abbreviation only the first tika and the last duka have been given. The remaining hundred and twenty mātikās have to be understood as included in the peyyāla.

Next follow the answers to the above list of questions in the numerical order. The answers to the first three questions are given as follow :

Dasāyatanā avyākatā, dvāyatanā siyā kusalā, siyā akusalā, siyā avyākatā. Dasāyatanā na vattabbā—sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi. Manāyatanaṁ siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ. Dhammāyatanaṁ siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā dukkhāya vedanāya samyayuttaṁ, siyā adukkhamasukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā na vattabbaṁ—sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi. Dasāyatanā nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammā, dvāyatanā siya vipākā, siyā vipākadhammadhammā, siyā nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammā.

It is clear from the text that the ten āyatanas which represent the gross material qualities (oḷārika-rūpadhammā) have been characterised as avyākatā and as such they are non-moral in character.

As regards manāyatana, all the types of consciousness have been included in it. Among them there are twenty one kusala-cittas, twelve akusala-cittas and fifty six avyākata-cittas[1]. So all the three terms of the first tika are applicable to it.

[1] Abhi. Phil. P. 39.

As for the dhammāyatana, the sukhuma-rūpas, the asankhatadhātu and the psychic factors are included in it. Among them the sukhuma-rūpas and the asankhataḍhātu are avyākata or non-moral in character. Out of the fifty two cetasikas, twenty five sobhana-cetasikas associate either with kusala-cittas or their corresponding vipākas and kiriyacittas which are non-moral in character. Accordingly they are characterised as kusala or avyākata as the case may be. There are fourteen cetasikas, known as akuṣala, which associate only with the immoral types of thought. So their character is definite. The seven sabbacittasādhāraṇa-cetaskas, which are common to all, take the character of the cittas with which they associate So they may also be kusala, akusala or avyākata according to the associating thoughts. This is true of the six Pakiṇṇaka-cetasikas also. So all the terms of the first tika are applicable to dhammāyatana also. In consideration of the same these two āyatanas i. e. manāyatana and dhammāyatana, have been characterised as moral, immoral and non-moral in character. In this manner the remaining tikas and dukas have to be explained. In working out the details, the student has to bear in mind the explanations that are given in the Dhammasangaṇi.

DHĀTU-VIBHANGA—3.

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

In the suttantas the dhātu group of eighteen categories is not found. The categories concerned can be traced in different suttantas. So the dhātus taken into consideration here are those of three groups, each of six categories, which find mention in so many suttantas. The following are the three groups concerned :—

Cha dhātuyo—paṭhavīdhātu, āpodhātu, tejodhātu, vāyo-dhātu, akāsadhātu, viññāṇadhātu.

Aparāpi cha dhātuyo—sukhādhātu, dukkhādhātu, somanassadhātu, domanassadhātu, upekkhādhātu, avijjādhātu.

Aparāpi cha dhātuyo—kāmadhātu, vyāpādadhātu, vihiṁsādhātu, nekkhammadhātu, avyāpādadhātu, avihiṁsādhātu.

All the categories of the three groups have been explained separately in the usual way. For instance the explanation of paṭhavīdhātu reads as follows :

Tattha katamā paṭhavīdhātu ? Paṭhavīdhātudvayaṁ—atthi ajjhattikā, atthi bāhirā. Tattha katamā ajjhattikā paṭhavīdhātu ? Yaṁ ajjhattaṁ paccattaṁ kakkhaḷaṁ, kharigataṁ, kakkhaḷattaṁ, kakkhaḷabhāvo, ajjhattaṁ, upādinnaṁ, seyyathīdaṁ—kesā, lomā, nakhā, dantā, taco, maṁsaṁ, nahāru, aṭṭhi, aṭṭhimiñjā, vakkaṁ, hadayaṁ, yakanaṁ, kilomakaṁ, pihakaṁ, papphāsaṁ, antaṁ, antaguṇaṁ, udariyaṁ, karīsaṁ, yaṁ vā panaññampi atthi ajjhattaṁ paccattaṁ kakkhaḷaṁ, kharigataṁ kakkhaḷattaṁ, kakkaḷabhāvo, ajjhattaṁ, upādinnaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati ajjhattikā paṭhavīdhātu.

Tattha katamaṁ bāhirā paṭhavīdhātu ? yaṁ bāhiraṁ kakkhaḷaṁ, kharigataṁ, kakkhaḷattaṁ, kakkhaḷabhāvo, bahiddhā anupādinnaṁ, seyyathīdaṁ ayo, lohaṁ, tipu sīsaṁ, sajjhaṁ, muttā, maṇi, veḷuriyo, sankho, silā, pavāḷaṁ, rajataṁ, jātarūpaṁ, lohitanko, masāragallaṁ, tiṇaṁ, kaṭṭhaṁ, bhūmi, pāsāṇo, pabbato, yaṁ vā panaññampi atthi bāhiraṁ kakkaḷaṁ, kharigataṁ, kakkhaḷattaṁ, kakkhaḷabhāvo, bahiddhā anupādinnaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati bāhirā paṭhavīdhātu. Yā ca ajjhattikā paṭhavīdhātu yā ca bāhirā paṭhavīdhātu, tadekajjhaṁ abhisaññuhitvā, abhisankhipitvā—ayaṁ vuccati paṭhavīdhātu.

Here paṭhavīdhātu has been explained as hardness. It is not to be conceived as a thing, but a quality. So it has been expressed in terms of kakkhaḷattaṁ or hardness and its synonyms. Further it has been illustrated with reference to internal and external objects in which it is predominant. This method has been followed in explaining the remaining categories also.

The commentary shows, with reference to the implications, how each of the three groups includes all the eighteen dhātus.

Thus paṭhavī, tejo and vāyo of the first group represent phoṭṭhabbadhātu. Āpo and ākāsa represent dhammadhātu. Viññāṇadhātu has a reference to manodhātu which precedes and succeeds the same in different forms in course of cognition. As regards other types of thought such as cakkhuviññāṇa and so on, there are references to them in the suttantas. Their respective sense-organs and objects have to be understood along with them. For instance visual consciousness is the result of the interaction that takes place between cakkhu and rūpa. So when cakkhuviññāṇa is mentioned, cakkhu and rūpa are also to be understood in the same relation. This is true of sotaviññaṇa, ghāṇaviññaṇa, jivhāviññāṇa and kāyaviññāṇa also.[1] Thus the six dhātus of the first group represent eighteen dhātus by implication. This method has been followed in working out the implications of the remaining two groups also.[2] As all the three groups represent, by implication, the same eighteen dhātus, they have to be treated together in the present study. The text refers to this fact in the following words :

Iti imāni tīṇi chakkāni. Tadekajjhaṁ abhisaññuhitvā abhisankhipitvā aṭṭhārasadhātuyo honti[3].

(b)

Abhidhamma-bhājanīya.

In the abhidhamma-bhājanīya the eighteen categories of the dhātu group have been taken into consideration. Just as in the case of the āyatana group., all the seventy two dhammas have been considered here also. In the āyatana group they were studied in terms of the six sense-organs and the sense-objects. In that group all the types of thought were included in manāyatana. In the present study they have been distributed in seven dhātus. So the same dhammas have been studied here in terms of eighteen categories. This is also a study of the dhammas from the subjective point of view.

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[1] Iti imāsu chasu dhātūsu pariggahitāsu aṭṭhārasadhātuyo pariggahitā va honti. Kathaṁ ? Paṭhavī-tejo-vāyo-dhātuggahaṇena tāva poṭṭhabbadhātu gahitā va hoti. apodhātu-ākāsadhātuggahaṇena dhammadhātu, viññāṇadhātuggahaṇena tassā purecārikapacchācārikattā manodhātu gahitā va hoti. Cakkhuviññāṇadhātu-ādayo sutte āgatā eva. Sesā nava āharitvā dassetabbā. Cakkhuviññāṇadhātuggahaṇena hi tassā nissayabhūtā cakkhudhātu, arammaṇabhūtā rūpadhātu ca gahitā va honti. Evaṁ sotaviññāṇadhātu-ādiggahaṇena sotadhātu-ādayo ti aṭṭhārasa pi gahitā va honti. V.A., P. 51.

[2] V.A., P. 52.

[3] Vibhanga, STG. P. 66.

The explanation of the ten dhātus, which represent the gross material qualities, is the same as that of their counterparts in the āyatana group. These categories differ only in form, but their content is the same.

As regards the first five viññāṇadhātus[1], in the first place it has been mentioned as to how they arise as a result of the interaction between the sense-organs and the sense-objects concerned, and then the general explanation of citta as given in the Dhammasangaṇi has been incorporated with the same. So the explanation of cakkhuviññāṇa reads as follows :

Tattha katamā cakkhuviññāṇadhātu ? cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cittaṁ mano mānasaṁ hadayaṁ paṇdaraṁ mano manāyatanaṁ manindriyaṁ viññāṇaṁ viññāṇakkhandho, tajjā cakkhuviññāṇadhātu—ayaṁ vuccati cakkhuviññāṇadhātu.

The remaining four viññāṇadhātus have been explained in the same manner with necessary changes.

As regards manodhātu, it includes three types of thought : two sampaṭicchana-cittas and pañcadvārāvajjana-citta. The two sampaṭicchanas have been referred to as those which arise immediately after the first five viññāṇadhātus, and pañcadvārāvajjana as the first contact (paṭhamasamannāhāra) that takes place in case of all the dhammas. Here the expression 'all the dhammas' refers to all the courses of cognition that take place in relation to the first five sense-organs.[1] Then the general explanation of citta has been incorporated. The text is as follows :

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[1] These five dhātus represent two types of thought each. Therefore they stand for ten types in all. For the same reason they are also known as dvipañcaviññāṇa or the twice five-fold viññāṇadhātus. Abhi. Phil. P. 119.

Tattha katamā manodhātu ? cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā uppajjitvā niruddhasamanantarā uppajjati cittaṁ mano mānasaṁ hadayaṁ paṇḍaraṁ mano manāyatanaṁ manindriyaṁ viññāṇaṁ viññāṇakkhandho tajjā-manodhātu. Sotaviññāṇadhātuyā......... Ghāṇaviññāṇadhātuyā............ jivhāviññāṇadhātuyā................ kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā uppajjitvā niruddhasamanantarā uppajjati cittaṁ mano mānasaṁ hadayaṁ paṇḍaraṁ mano manāyatanaṁ manindriyaṁ viññāṇaṁ viññāṇakkhandho tajjā-manodhātu ; sabbesu vā pana paṭhamasamannāhāro uppajjati cittaṁ...... . ... manodhātu—ayaṁ vuccati manodhātu.[2]

Dhammadhātu stands for all those dhammas—the subtle material qualities, asankhatadhātu and the psychic factors—which were included in the dhammāyatana in the āyatana group. Therefore their explanations are the same as those given in the āyatana-vibhanga. There is no difference in their content.

As regards manoviññāṇadhātu, it includes all the remaining seventy six types of thought. They have been referred to as those which arise immediately after manodhātu which, in its turn, arises immediately after the first five viññāṇadhātus. After referring to the types of manoviññāṇa that arise in pañcadvāravīthi or the course of cognition through the first five doors of senses, in the end reference has also been made to those types of manoviññāṇa that arise in manodvāravīthi or the course of cognition through the mind-door. It also incorporates the general explanation of citta. So the text reads as follows :

Tattha katamā manoviññāṇadhātu ? cakkhuviññaṇadhātuyā uppajjitvā niruddhasamanantarā uppajjati manodhātu.

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[1] Sabbadhammesu vā pana Paṭhamasamannāhāro ti etesu cakkhuviññāṇādisu sabbadhammesu uppajjamānesu paṭhamasamannāhāro ; cakkhuviññāṇadhātuādīnaṁ vā ārammaṇasankhātesu sabbadhammesu paṭhamasamannāhāro ti ayamettha attho veditabbo. V. A., P. 57.

[2] Vibhanga, STG, P. 67.

Manodhātuyā pi uppajjitvā niruddhasamanantarā uppajjati cittaṁ mano mānasaṁ hadayaṁ paṇḍaraṁ mano manāyatanaṁ manindriyaṁ viññāṇaṁ viññāṇakkhandho tajjāmanoviññāṇadhātu......Sotaviññāṇadhātuyā......Ghāṇaviññāṇadhātuyā......... Jivhāviññāṇadhātuyā..............Kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā uppajjitvā niruddhasamanantarā....uppajjati....manodhātu. manodhātuyā pi.........tajjā-manoviññāṇadhātu, manañca paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati cittaṁ...tajjā-manoviññāṇadhātu—ayaṁ vuccati manoviññaṇadhatu.[1]

(c)

PAÑHĀPUCCHAKA

The pañhāpucchaka begins with the enumeration of the eighteen dhātus in the usual manner. Then questions have been put with reference to all the tikas and dukas. Here also the list of questions has been abbreviated by giving only the first tika and the last duka. Then follow answers to the questions in their numerical order. The answers given to the questions relating to the first and second tikas are as follow :

Soḷasa dhātuyo avyākatā. Dve dhātuyo siyā kusalā, siyā akusalā, siyā avyākatā. Dasa dhātuyo na vattabhā—sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya samapayuttāti pi. Pañca dhātuyo adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā. Kāyaviññāṇadhātu siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā. Manoviññaṇadhātu siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā. Dhammadhātu siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā na vattabbā—sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi.[2]

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[1] *Vibhaṅga*, STG, P. 68.

[2] Ibid. P, 69.

Here out of the eighteen dhātus sixteen, namely, the ten dhātus representing the gross material qualities, the first five viññāṇadhātus and manodhātu are always non-moral in nature. Dhammadhātu and manoviññāṇadhātu are of a miscellaneous nature. To take the dhammadhātu first, sukhumarūpas, asankhatadhātu and cetasikas are included in it. Sukhuma-rūpas and asankhatadhātu are non-moral in nature. Among the fifty two cetasikas fourteen akusala-cetasikas are immoral in nature, twenty five sobhana cetasikas are moral or non-moral according to the nature of the associating thoughts, and the thirteen aññasamānas are also moral, immoral or non-moral according to their associates. So dhammadhātu is three-fold in nature—kusala, akusala and avyākata.

As regards manoviññāṇadhātu, it includes seventy six types of thought. Among them twenty one are moral, twelve are immoral and the remaining fourty three are non-moral. So manoviññāṇadhātu is also three-fold in nature—kusala, akusala, and avyākata. In consideration of their common nature these two dhātus have been explained together in the text.

The next answers are related to the vedanāttika. Vedanā is a psychic factor. A psychic factor can associate only with other psychic factors and cittas, but never with the rūpadhammas. So the ten dhātus, which represent the oḷārika-rūpas, have been characterised as not associating with any kind of feeling—sukha, dukkha, or adukkhamasukha.

The first four viññāṇadhātus and the manodhātu, which represent eleven types of thought, do not associate with sukha or dukkha. As such they are upekkhā in nature. In the text this has been expressed as adukkhamasukhāvedanā.

The kāyaviññāṇadhātu represents two types of thought—one associated with sukha-vedanā and the other associated with dukkha-vedanā.

As regards the manoviññāṇadhātu, out of the hundred and eight types[1] included in it, sixty two types are associated with sukha, two types with dukkha and forty four with upekkhā.[2] So it has been characterised as three-fold in nature.

As regards the dhammas included in the Dhammadhātu, the three kinds of feelings—sukha, dukkha and adukkhamasukha—associate with the relevant cetasikas and cittas. But they do not associate with the sukhumarūpas and the asankhatadhātu. For the same reason dhammadhātu has been characterised as both associated with and not associated with the feelings in question. This method has to be followed in working out the details of the answers given to the remaining tikas and dukas.

SACCA-VIBHANGA—4

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here in the beginning the four noble truths have been given and then their full explanation as found in satipaṭṭhāna and so many other suttantas. This presentation may be said to be the most representative, exhaustive and systematic explanation of the four noble truths from the the Suttantika point of view.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

This study has been made in terms of three vāras or courses. These three vāras are the result of a three-fold study of the ariyamagga or the noble path. Every sacca or truth has been considered in five different combinations in every vāra.

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[1] Here the number of cittas has been taken into consideration according to the second classification of hundred and twenty one types.

[2] Dhammasangaṇi, BOS., P. 288.

They are known as so many koṭṭhāsas. So according to the three vāras there are fifteen koṭṭhāsas in each case. In this connection several points have to be noted:

In the first place, in consideration of the causal order which is also the logical order, samudayasacca has been stated first and dukkhasacca next. In the second place, in view of the Ābhidhammic treatment which is different from the Suttantika treatment, the term ariya has been dropped. In the Suttantika explanation taṇhā has been stated as the cause of dukkha. But according to the Abhidhamma taṇhā is only one among so many cetasikas or psychic factors which function together. So in this study all those psychic factors and types of thought have been taken into consideration which arise, exist and cease along with taṇhā. These relevant dhammas have been combined in five different ways. When arranged together the five-fold combination would read as follows:

Tattha katamo dukkhasamudayo? Taṇhā—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhasamudayo

Tattha katamo dukkhasamudayo? Taṇhā ca avasesā ca kilesā—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhasamudayo

Tattha katamo dukkhasamudayo? Taṇhā ca avasesā ca kilesā avasesā ca akusalā dhammā—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhasamudayo.

Tattha katamo dukkhasamudayo? Taṇhā ca avasesā ca kilesā avasesā ca akusalā dhammā tīṇi ca kusalamūlāni sāsavāni—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhasamudayo.

Tattha katamo dukkhasamudayo? Taṇhā ca avasesā ca kilesā avasesā ca akusalā dhammā tīṇi ca kusalamūlāni sāsavāni avasesā ca sāsavā kusalā dhammā—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhasamudayo.

These five koṭṭhāsas have been repeated in the case of the remaining two vāras also.

Dukkhasacca is explained with reference to the upādānakkhandhas or the five aggregates of attachment. In this study it is explained in terms of those upādānkkhandhas, and for that matter dhammas, which have not been included in samudayasacca. So the relevant five koṭṭhāsas of the second truth when arranged together would be as follow:

Tattha katamaṁ dukkhaṁ? Avasesā ca kilesā avasesā ca akusalā dhammā tīṇi ca kusalamūlāni sāsavāni avasesā ca sāsavā kusalā dhammā sāsavā ca kusalākusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ vipākā ye ca dhammā kiriyā neva kusalā nākusalā na ca kammavipākā sabbañca rūpaṁ—idaṁ vuccati dukkhaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ dukkhaṁ? Avasesā ca akusalā dhammā tīṇi ca kusalamūlāni sāsavāni avasesā ca sāsavā kusalādhammā sāsavā ca kusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ vipākā ye ca dhammā kiriyā neva kusalā nākusalā na ca kammavipākā sabbañca rūpaṁ—idaṁ vuccati dukkhaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ dukkhaṁ? Tīṇi ca kusalamūlāni sāsavāni avasesā ca sāsavā kusalā dhammā sāsavā ca kusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ vipākā ye ca dhammā kiriyā neva kusalā nākusala na ca kammavipākā sabbañca rūpaṁ—idaṁ vuccati dukkham.

Tattha katamaṁ dukkhaṁ? Avasesā ca sāsavā kusalā dhammā sāsavā ca kusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ vipākā ye ca dhammā kiriyā neva kusalā nākusalā na ca kammavipākā sabbañca rūpaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ dukkhaṁ? Sāsavā kusalākusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ vipākā ye ca dhammā kiriyā neva kusalā nākusalā na ca kammavipākā sabbañca rūpaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhaṁ.

These five koṭṭhāsas have been repeated in the remaining two vāras also.

As regards dukkhanirodhasacca, the third truth, in the suttantikanaya it has been explained as the cessation of taṇhā or desire. But in the Ābhidhammikanaya it has been explained as the cessation of desire and the associated dhammas which are so many cittas and cetasikas. In other words dukkhanirodhasacca has to be understood in terms of those dhammas which are given in samudayasacca. Accordingly the five koṭṭhāsas of the present case may be arranged together as follow :—

Tattha katamo dukkhanirodho ? Taṇhāya pahānaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhanirodho.

Tattha katamo dukkhanirodho ? Taṇhāya ca avasesānañca kilesānaṁ pahānaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhanirodho.

Tattha katamo dukkhanirodho ? Taṇhāya ca avasesānañca kilesānaṁ avasesānañca akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ pahānaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhanirodho.

Tattha katamo dukkhanirodho ? Taṇhāya ca avasesānañca kilesānaṁ avasesānañca akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ tiṇṇañca kusalamūlānaṁ sāsavānaṁ pahānaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhanirodho.

Tattha katamo dukkhanirodho ? taṇhāya ca avasesānañca kilesānaṁ avasesānañca akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ tiṇṇañca kusalamūlānaṁ sāsavānaṁ avasesānañca sāsavānaṁ kusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ pahānaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhanirodho.

These five koṭṭhāsas have been repeated in the remaining two vāras also.

As regards dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā, the fourth truth, it has been studied in three ways with reference to the maggangas. In the first study where all the maggangas—sammādiṭṭhi to sammāsamādhi—have been taken into consideration, the path is referred to as aṭṭhangiko. The relevant text, when abridged, would read as follows :—

Tattha katamā dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ? Idha bhikkhu yasmiṁ samaye lokuttaraṁ jhānaṁ bhāveti niyyānikaṁ apacayagāmiṁ diṭṭhigatānaṁ pahānāya paṭhamāya bhūmiyā pattiyā vivicceva kāmehi......paṭhamajjhānaṁ upasampajja viharati dukkhāpaṭipadaṁ dandhābhiññaṁ, tasmiṁ samaye aṭṭhangiko maggo hoti sammādiṭṭhi........sammāsamādhi—

ayaṁ vuccati dukkhanirodhagāminīpaṭipadā, avasesā dhammā dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya sampayuttā.

This explanation is given in relation to the first jhāna of the supramundane plane. Here all the eight maggangas have been explained one by one. The concluding words mention that in explaining the noble path not only the maggangas but also their associates (sampayuttadhammā) have to be included, but they have not been specified here. This is only one of the explanations of the aṭṭhangika-magga, which is given in relation to the first jhāna. The details of the remaining explanations have to be worked out with reference to the Dhammasangaṇi.

In the second study only five angas—Sammādiṭṭhi ..... sankappo......vāyāmo...sati...samādhi—have been taken into consideration. In the scriptures the following passage occurs.

'Pubbeva kho panassa kāyakammaṁ vacīkammaṁ ājīvo parisuddho hoti'.[1]

This passage refers to the yogāvacara who has already completed sīla as constituted by the three maggangas—sammāvācā, sammākammanto and sammā-ājivo. So when the path is referred to in the case of such a person it means the path of samādhi and paññā as constituted by these five angas. Hence this separate study of pañcangiko-maggo.

The relevant text, when abridged, would read as follows:

Tattha katamā dukkhanirodhagāminīpaṭipadā? Idha bhikkhu yasmiṁ samaye lokuttaraṁ jhānaṁ bhāveti niyyānikaṁ apacayagāmiṁ diṭṭhigatānaṁ pahānāya paṭhamāya bhūmiyā pattiyā, vivicceva kāmehi..... paṭhamajjhānaṁ upasampajja viharati dukkhāpaṭipadaṁ dandhābhiññaṁ, tasmiṁ samaye pañcangiko maggo hoti—Sammādiṭṭhi sammāsankappo......-sammāvāyāmo, sammāsati, sammāsamādhi—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā, avasesā dhammā dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya sampayuttadhammā.

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[1] V. A., P. 85.

In this explanation there are five angas instead of eight angas. This is the only difference. Other details are the same as those of the first explanation. Just as in the above case here the pañcangika-magga has been explained in relation to the first jhāna. The details of the remaining explanations have to be worked out with reference to the Dhammasangaṇi.

As regards the third study, it has been made with reference to the sampayuttadhammas or the associates of the maggangas. According to the Abhidhamma the above mentioned maggangas are only so many cetasikas or psychic factors. There are also so many other cetasikas and cittas which arise, exist and cease together with them. They are known as the sampayuttadhammas of the maggangas. In the third study only these sampayuttadhammas have been taken into consideration. The abridged text of this explanation would read as follows:

Tattha katamā dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā? Idha bhikkhu yasmiṁ samaye lokuttaraṁ jhānaṁ bhāveti niyyānikaṁ apacayagāmiṁ diṭṭhigatānaṁ pahānāya paṭhamāya bhūmiyā pattiyā vivicceve kāmehi......paṭhamajjhānaṁ upasampajja viharati dukkhā paṭipadaṁ dandhābhiññaṁ, tasmiṁ samaye phasso hoti......avikkhepo hoti—ayaṁ vuccati dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā.

In the first two explanations the sampayuttadhammas have only been referred to. In the present explanation they have been specified. Their further details have to be worked out with reference to the Dhammasangaṇi.

According to the commentary these fifteen koṭṭhāsas in the three vāras give only the outline of a study whose details could be worked out in terms of sixty thousand nayas. This has to be understood with reference to the relevant passages in the Dhammasangaṇi and the Aṭṭhasāilini where the method of working out one thousand nayas (sahassanaya) has been shown.[1]

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[1] Dhammasangaṇi, BOS., pp. 79-95; Aṭṭhasālini, PP. 175-194. Also refer to the introduction of the Dhammasangaṇi, pp. xiv-xv.

In this connection it has been shown that lokuttara or the supra-mundane cittas can be studied in relation to both the catukka and the pañcaka nayas.[1] These two nayas when associated with Suddhikapaṭipadā[2], suddhikasuññatā,[3], suññatamūlakapaṭipadā,[4] suddhika-appaṇihitaṁ[5] and appaṇihitamūlakapaṭipadā[6] give ten nayas. When these ten nayas are associated with twenty mahānayas,[7] they give two hundred nayas. When the two hundred nayas are associated with the four iddhipādas, they further give rise to eight hundred nayas. So the first lokuttaramagga, which is the sotāpattimagga, can be explained in terms of one thousand nayas.

Now to come to the fifteen koṭṭhāsas and the three vāras concerned, in the light of the above explanation, the study of the four maggas in relation to the first koṭṭhāsa of the first vāra means their study in terms of four thousand nayas. This study in relation to all the five koṭṭhāsas of the first vāra means twenty thousand nayas. So the three vāras together give sixty thousand nayas.[8]

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[1] The catukkanaya is according to the suttantikas and the pañcakanaya is according to the Ābhidhammikas· Vide-Dhammasaṅgaṇi, pp. 45-50.

[2] Dhammasaṅgaṇi, BOS., pp. 88, 90.

[3] Ibid. p. 90.

[4] Ibid- pp. 90-91.

[5] Ibid. p. 92.

[6] Ibid. p. 93.

[7] Ibid. pp. 79-94.

[8] Tattha aṭṭhangikavārassa taṇhāya ca avasesānañca kilesānaṁ pahānanti ādisu pañcasu koṭṭhāsesu paṭhamakoṭṭhāse tāva sotāpattimagge jhānābhinivese suddhikapaṭipadā suddhikasuññatā suññatapaṭipadā suddhika-appaṇihitaṁ appaṇihitapaṭipadā ti imesu pañcasu vāresu dvinnaṁ dvinnaṁ catukkapañcakanayānaṁ vasena dasa nayā honti. Evaṁ sesesupīti vīsatiyā abhinivesesu dve nayasatāni, tāni catūhi adhipatīhi catugguṇitāni aṭthasatāni, iti suddhikāni

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA

Here, in the first place, the four noble truths have been enumerated. Then follow questions relating to the tikas and dukas. Next they have been answered in their numerical order. The answers given to the first two tikas are as follow :—

Samudayasaccaṁ akusalaṁ, maggasaccaṁ kusalaṁ, nirodhasaccaṁ avyākataṁ, dukkhasaccaṁ siyā kusalaṁ, siyā akusalaṁ, siyā avyākataṁ. Dve saccā siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā. Nirodhasaccaṁ na vattabbaṁ sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi. Dukkhasaccaṁ siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā na vattabbaṁ sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi.

Samudayasacca represents taṇhā and its associates which are so many cittas and cetasikas. Therefore samudayasacca is always akusala in nature. Maggasacca represents eight angas of the ariyamagga and their associates which are also so many cittas and cetasikas. Therefore they are always kusala in nature. Nirodhasacca or nibbāna is always avyākata in nature. Dukkhasacca represents all the five khandhas of attachment (pañcupādānakkhandhā). Among them kusalacittas and the associated cetasikas are kusala in nature, akusalacittas and the associated cetasikas are akusala in nature. Cittas and cetasikas other than these and the rūpadhammas are avyākata in nature.

dve sādhipati aṭṭhāti sabbampi nayasahassaṁ hoti. Yathā ca sotāpattimagge evaṁ sesamaggesupīti cattari nayasahassāni honti. Yathā ca paṭhamakoṭṭhāse cattāri evaṁ sesesupiti aṭṭhangikavāre pañcasu koṭṭhāsesu vīsati nayasahassāni honti. Yathā pañcangikavāre sabbasangāhikavāre cāti sabbāni pi saṭṭhi nayasahassāni satthārā vibhattāni. Pāli pana sankhepato āgatā. V. A. H. BS., p. 86.

Two saccas, namely, samudayasacca and maggasacca are associated with both sukhavedanā and adukkhamasukhavedanā. Here samudayasacca has to be understood with reference to the eight akusalacittas which are associated with lobha that is taṇhā. Four of them are associated with somanassa and four with upekkhā. In the same way maggasacca has to be understood with reference to the lokuttarajhānas. Among them there are certain jhānas which are associated with sukhavedanā and others are associated with upekkhāvedanā. In the present study both somanassa and sukha have been introduced by sukhavedanā, and upekkhā by adukkhamasukhavedanā. Nirodhasacca is not associated with any kind of vedanā—sukha, dukkha or adukkhamasukha. Dukkhasacca represents all the five upādanakhandhas. Among them all cittas and cetasikas are associated with one of the three vedanās—sukha, dukkha or adukkhamasukha. But rūpadhammas are not associated with any of them. Hence they have been characterised as not associated with sukha, dukkha or adukkhamasukha. This method has to be followed in working out the details of the answers given to the remaining tikas and dukas also.

INDRIYA-VIBHANGA—5

(a)

In this vibbanga the suttantika explanation of the indriyas has not been given. The commentary explains this omission as due to the fact that in the suttantas the twenty two indriyas are not found together in any place, but are scattered here and there in many places.[1] Another probable reason is that the suttantika explanation would be almost the same as that given in the Abhidhammabhājanīya. So there was no necessity of giving a separate suttantika explanation.

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[1] Idha suttantahbājanīyaṁ nāma na gahitaṁ. Kasamā ? Suttante imāya paṭipāṭiyā dvāvīsatiyā indriyānaṁ anāgatattā. Suttantasmiñhi katthaci dve indriyāni kathitāni, katthaci tīṇi, katthaci pañca. Evaṁ pana nirantaraṁ dvāvīsati āgatāni nāma naṭthi. V. A., p. 87.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

It begins with the enumeration of the twenty two indriyas as follow :—

Bāvīsatindriyāni—Cakkhundriyaṁ, sotindriyaṁ, ghāṇindriyaṁ, jivhindriyaṁ, kāyindriyaṁ, manindriyaṁ, jīvitindriyaṁ, itthindriyaṁ, purisindriyaṁ, sukhindriyaṁ, dukkhindriyaṁ, somanassindriyaṁ, domanassindriyaṁ, upekkhindriyaṁ, saddhindriyaṁ, viriyindriyaṁ, satindriyaṁ, samādhindriyaṁ, pññindriyaṁ, anaññātaññassāmitindriyaṁ, aññindriyaṁ, aññātāvindriyaṁ.

Then their explanations have been given one by one. These explanations are the same as those given in the Dhammasangaṇi. The first five indriyas repesent the first five sense-organs which are among the oḷārika-rūpadhammas or the gross material qualities. In the āyatana group they have been presented as so many bases and in the indriya group as so many forces. While these different presentations emphasise different aspects with reference to their functions, they remain materially the same. Therefore their explanations have been abbreviated in the text with necessary suggestions for the student.

Manindriya is the same as viññāṇakkhandha in the khandha group, manāyatana in the ayatana group and the seven viññāṇadhātus in the dhātu group. Therefore the explanation of manindriya is the same as that of viññāṇakkhandha, manāyatana and the viññāṇadhātus.

Jīvitindriya is two-fold : rūpajīvitindriya and arūpajīvitindriya. Rūpajīvitindriya has been explained as the principle that maintains longevity of rūpadhammas and arūpajīvitindriya as the principle that maintains longevity of citta and cetasikadhammas.

Itthindriya and purisindriya represent two of the sukhuma-rūpas or the subtle material qualities. They have been explained as the two principles that maintain the feminine and masculine characteristics of the two sexes.

The next five indriyas—sukha, dukkha, somonassa, domanassa and upekkhā—represent so many feelings. The first two are physical and the last three are mental in nature.

The five indriyas—saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi, and paññā—represent so many ethical forces. They have been explained with reference to their synonyms.

The last three indriyas—anaññātaññassāmitindriya, aññindriya and aññātāvindriya—represent magganāṇa and phalañāṇa. They are but different forms of lokuttara-paññā. Accordingly they have been explained with reference to their synonyms.

The commentary explains the significance of the numerical order of the twenty two indriyas. According to this explanation the first six indriyas refer to the 'self' (ajjhattaṁ). So they have been given the first six places. Their longevity is maintained by jīvitindriya which comes next. One 'self' is distinguished from 'another' with refernce to itthindriya and purisindriya. Therefore they have been given the next two places. The feelings arise with reference to the above indriyas. As such the five kinds of feelings have been enumerated next. It is through the cultivation of the five ethical forces that the cessation of the above indriyas can be brought about. Hence they have been considered next. The cultivation of the five ethical forces leads to the attainment of the first magga first, then the next six maggas and phalas, and last of all the arahattaphala. Therefore the last three indriyas, which are related to them, have been given the last three places in this enumeration.[1]

[1] V.A., P. 88.

(c)

PÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA

Here also the twenty two indriyas have been enumerated first. Then questions have been put with reference to all the tikas and dukas. The list of questions has been abbreviated with the first tika and the last duka. Then answers have been given one by one. The answers given to the first and the second tika read as follow :

Dasindriyā avyākatā. Domanassindriyaṁ akusalaṁ. Anaññātaññassāmitindriyaṁ kusalaṁ. Cattārindriyā siyā kusalā, siyā avyākatā. Cha indriyā siyā kusalā, siyā akusalā, siyā avyākatā.

Dvādasindriyā na vattabbā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi, adukkhamasukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttāti pi. Cha indrīyā siyā sukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā. Tīṇindriyā siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā. Jīvitindriyaṁ siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṁ, siyā na vattbbaṁ—sukkhāya vednāya sampayuttanti pi, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttanti pi.

Ten indriyas, namely, cakkhu, sota, ghāṇa, jivhā, kāya, itthi, purisa, sukha, dukkha and aññātāvindriya are avyākata or non-moral in nature. Domanassindriya is immoral in nature. Anaññātaññassāmitindriya is kusala or moral in nature. Four indriyas, namely, saddhā, sati, paññā and aññindriya are both kusala or moral and avyākata or non-moral in nature. When associated with kusala cittas and cetasikas they are moral in nature, but when associated with vipākacittas, kiriyacittas and their psychic factors they are non-moral in nature. Six indriyas, namely, manindriya, somanassindriya, upekkhindriya, viriyindriya, samādhīndriya and jīvitindriya are moral, immoral and non-moral in nature. Among them manindriya includes all types of citta which belong to these three categories. The remaining five indriyas are cetasikas. As such they assume the character of their associates which belong to all the three categories in question.

Twelve indriyas, namely, cakkhu, sota, ghāṇa, jivhā, kāya, itthi, purisa, sukha, dukkha, somanassa, domanassa and upekkhā do not associate with sukha-vedanā, dukkha-vedanā or adukkhamasukha-vedanā. The first seven indriyas are so many rūpadhammas. Now rūpadhammas never associate with cittas and cetasikas. Hence they have been characterised so. The remaining five indriyas are cetasikas. They are in question. So there is no point in saying that they associate with themselves. For the same reason they have also been characterised as not associated with sukha, dukkha and adukkhamasukha. Six indriyas, namely, saddhā, sati, paññā, anaññātaññassāmit-indriya, aññindriya and aññātāvindriya associate with both sukha and adukkhamasukha. All the six indriyas in question belong to the sobhana group of cetasikas. As such they associate either with sukha-vedanā or adukkhamasukha-vedanā. Three indriyas, namely, manindriya, viriyindriya and samādhindriya associate with sukha, dukkha and adukkhamasukha. Jīvitindriya has been characterised as both associated with and not associated with sukha, dukkha and adukkhamasukha. The first characterisation refers to arūpajīvitindriya and the second to rūpajīvitindriya. The details of the answers to the remaining tikas and dukas have to be worked out in the same manner.

PACCAYĀKĀRA-VIBHANGA—6

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here, in the first place, dvādasangapaṭiccasamuppāda-naya or the law of the dependent origination of things, which has been explained with reference to the twelve links, has been stated. In the second place, all the terms of this naya have been explained one by one after their explanations of this naya given in the Mahānidāna sutta. This may be said to be the most comprehensive, though short, explanation of this naya given by the suttantikas. The traditional suttantika explanation, as given in the commentary, has worked out the details with reference to (1) the three successive periods (tayo addhā), (2) the twelve constituents (dvādasangāni), (3) the twenty modes (vīsatākārā), (4) the three junctions (tisandhi), (5) the four sections (catu-sankhepā), (6) the three rounds (tīṇi vaṭṭāni) and (7) the two roots (dve mūlāni).[1] This is the most exhaustive explanation of the subject-matter given in the exegetical literature.

An important point has to be noted in this connection. It can be observed that this explanation takes into consideration what is now generally known as the Ābhidhammika analysis of cittas, cetasikas and rūpa-dhammas. In view of this fact, can it be called a pure Suttantika explanation or did this analysis belong to a tradition which came to be followed by both the Suttantikas and the Ābhidhammikas ? This has yet to be ascertained.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA

It has been referred to how the suttanta-bhājanīya explains the cycle of birth and death, that is saṁsāra, in terms of the dvādasangapaṭiccasamuppādanaya or the law of the dependent origination of things in twelve links. This explanation takes into consideration all the relevant cittas or types of thought and other dhammas. They belong to different periods of time and hence to several temporal orders. They form so many cittakkhaṇas or moments of thought and as such they belong, to borrow a term from modern psychology, not to one psychosis but to so many psychoses. All the same they belong to the same logical order as represented by the twelve links.

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[1] V. A., HBS., pp. 91-139.

The Abhidhamma-bhājanīya studies as to how far the logical order of the angas is applicable in the case of one cittakkhaṇa or thought-moment. Here it has to be borne in mind that the dhammas involved in a certain type of citta, at a given moment, belong to one and the same temporal order. As such they rise together, exist together and cease together. They also form one psychosis and belong to the same psychological order.

In this study the subject-matter has been dealt with in as many as fifteen sections : i. Paccayacatukkaṁ (uddesa), ii. Hetucatukkaṁ (uddesa), iii. Sampayuttacatukkaṁ (uddesa), iv. Aññamaññacatukkaṁ (uddesa), v. Mātikā, vi. Paccayacatukkaṁ (niddesa), vii. Hetucatukkaṁ (niddesa), viii. Sampayuttacatukkaṁ (niddesa), ix, Aññamaññacatukkaṁ (niddesa), x. Akusalaniddeso, xi. Kusalaniddeso, xii. Avyākataniddeso, xiii. Avijjāmūlakaniddeso, xiv. Kusalamūlavipākaniddeso, xv. Akusalamūlavipākaniddeso.

1. *Paccayacatukkaṁ*—In the first section there are four vāras which may be abbreviated as follow :

Avijjāpaccayā sankhāro, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ, nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo....... ... evametassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Avijjāpaccayā sankharo, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ......... nāmapaccayā phasso... . ...evametassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Avijjāpaccayā sankhāro.........nāmarūpapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ......evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Avijjāpaccayā sankhāro, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṁ, nāmarūpapaccayā saḷayatanaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso......evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

These four vāras show the four ways of the application of Paṭiccasamuppādanaya in the case of one cittakkhaṇa.

In the paṭiccasamuppādanaya the term sankhārā has been used in the plural number whereas here it has been used as sankhāro in the singular number. The reason is that the former takes into consideration all the sankhāras—puññābhisankhāra, apuññābhisankhāra and aneñjābhisankhāra—in relation to the study of the bhavacakka or the cycle of birth and death. But in the case of one citta there can be only one sankhāra. Hence its use in the singular number.

In the first vāra, in the place of nāmarūpa there is only the mention of nāma and in the place of saḷāyatana only the mention of chaṭṭhāyatana. This is because in the study of one cittakkhaṇa nāma and rūpa do not come into the picture together. Although this vāra studies only one cittakkhaṇa yet both viññāṇa and chaṭṭhāyatana have been mentioned in the same khaṇa. This has been done just to show how the causal relation of a certain dhamma can vary according to the relative position it occupies at a given moment, and to maintain the formal order of the paṭiccasamuppādanaya intact. So their explanation is that in the case of viññāṇa sankhāra is the hetu and nāma is its phala whereas in the case of chaṭṭhāyatana nāma is hetu and phassa is phala.[1] In these vāras the terms beginning with soka have not been mentioned as they do not associate with every cittakkhaṇa. As regards jāti, jarā and maraṇa, their presence in sankhatadhammas is understood. All the same they have been included here just to keep the number of twelve angas complete.[2] In view of its number of angas this vāra is known as aparipuṇṇa-angadvayayutto dvādasangika-vāro. As this vāra is valid in any plane where citta functions, it is also known as sabbasangāhika-vāro.

As regards the second vāra, the chaṭṭhāyatana has also been dropped. This is for two reasons. In the first place, it shows that phassa is related not only to chaṭṭāyatana and for that matter citta but also to vedanā, saññā and sankhāra which constitute nāma. In the second place, it illustrates a paṭiccasamuppādanaya as given in the Mahānidāna-suttanta.[1] In view of the number of angas, this vāra is known as aparipuṇṇa-ekangayutto ekādasangika-vāro.[2]

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[1] V. A., p. 141.

[2] Ibid.

As regards the third vāra, nāmarūpa is mentioned in full. Here again, in the place of saḷāyatana, only chaṭṭhāyatana has been mentioned. Here the question may be raised as to why rūpa has been introduced in this vāra. This has been done in order to show the purejāta and nissaya relations of rūpa, as given in the paṭṭhānanaya, to citta. This reference does not disturb the paṭiccasamuppādanaya explanation of one cittakkhaṇa. In this connection it has to be remembered that while the first two vāras hold good specially in arūpa-loka and generally in kāma-loka or rūpa-loka, the third vāra holds good in the case of gabbhaseyyakas. By introducing rūpa that was absent in the first vāra one anga has been completed. Hence this vāra is known as paripuṇṇa-ekangayutto dvādasangika-vāro.

As regards the fourth vāra, here saḷāyatana has been introduced in relation to nāmarūpa. But, as this is a study of one cittakkhaṇa, only chaṭṭhāyatana has been mentioned in relation to phassa. This vāra holds good in the case of the opapātika beings. In consideration of the complete number of the angas, this vāra is known as paripuṇṇa-dvādasangika-vāro.[3]

Here it has to be borne in mind that paṭṭhānanaya is the special feature of the Abhidhammika exalanation of paṭiccasamuppāda. So in a study of the present nature this fact has also to be taken into consideration. This text has only implied them and the commentary has made them explicit by giving the paccaya relations of the relevant angas. Thus avijjā is related to sankhāra in seven ways—sahajāta, aññamañña, nissaya, sampayutta, atthi, avigata and hetu. Out of these seven paccayas three—avigata, sampayutta and aññamañña—have been separately considered in the three catukkas immediately following. So in the first catukka only four puccayas have to be taken into consideration. This method has been followed in the study of the paccaya-relations between the remaining angas also.[1] The only difference is that the number of paccayas differs according to the nature of the anga concerned.

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[1] V. A., p. 140.

[2] There are other explanations in the aṭṭhakathā regarding the four vāras.

[3] There are other explanations in the aṭṭhakathā regarding the four vāras.

11. *Hetucatukkaṁ*—Here the term hetu has been used in the sense of avigatapaccaya. As such, in consideration of its special importance, this catukka studies the avigata relation between the angas concerned. This relation exists only between the angas upto upādāna. It does not hold good in the case of the remaining angas. So it has not been mentioned in relation to them. The first vāra of this catukka reads as follows :

Tasmiṁ samaye avijjāpaccayā sankhāro avijjāhetuko, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ sankhārahetukaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmanāmaṁ viññāṇahetukaṁ, nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ nāmahetukaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso chaṭṭhāyatanahetuko, phassapaccayā vedanā phassahetukā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā vedanāhetukā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ taṇhāhetukaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ, evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Tattha katamā avijjā ? yaṁ aññāṇaṁ adassanaṁ...... avijjā langi moho akusalamūlaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati avijjā.

Tattha katamo avijjāpaccayā sankhāro avijjāhetuko ? yaṁ cetanā sañcetanā cetayitattaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati avijjāpaccayā sankhāro avijjāhetuko.

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[1] V.A., pp. 141—142.

Tattha katamaṁ sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ sankhārahetukaṁ ? yaṁ cittaṁ mano mānasaṁ......tajjā manoviññāṇadhātu—ayaṁ vuccati sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ sankhārahetukaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ viññāṇahetukaṁ ? vedanākkhandho saññākkhandho sankhārakkhandho—idaṁ vuccati viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ viññāṇahetukaṁ.

Tattha katamaṁ nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ nāmahetukaṁ ? yaṁ cittaṁ mano mānasaṁ......tajjā manoviññāṇadhātu—idaṁ vuccati nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ nāmahetukaṁ.

Tattha katamo chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso chaṭṭhāyatanahetuko ? yo phasso phusanā samphusanā samphusitattaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso chaṭṭhāyatanahetuko.

Tattha katamā phassapaccayā vedanā phassahetukā ? Yaṁ cetasikaṁ sātaṁ cetasikaṁ sukhaṁ cetosamphassajaṁ sātaṁ sukhaṁ vedayitaṁ cetosamphassajā sātā sukhā vedanā—ayaṁ vuccati phassapaccayā vedanā phassahetukā.

Tattha katamā vedanāpaccayā taṇhā vedanāhetukā ? yo rāgo sarāgo........cittassa sarāgo—ayaṁ vuccati vedanāpaccayā taṇhā vedanāhetukā.

Tattha katamaṁ taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ taṇhāhetukaṁ ? yā diṭṭhi diṭṭhigataṁ......vipariyesagāho—idaṁ vuccati taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ taṇhāhetukaṁ...tena vuccati evametassa kevalassa dukkhakhandhassa samudayo hoti.

The above method has been applied in the case of the remaining three vāras also.

iii. *Sampayutta-catukkaṁ*—This catukka studies the sampayutta relation between the angas concerned. In this connection it has to be noted that this paccaya relation exists only between cittas and cetasikas. As such in course of this study rūpadhammas, so far considered in the third and fourth

vāras of the previous catukkas, have been dropped here, and only the relevant nāmadhammas have been taken into consideration. The first vāra of this catukka is as follows :

Tasmiṁ samaye avijjāpaccayā sankhāro avijjāsampayutto, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ sankhārasampayuttaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ viññāṇasampayuttaṁ, nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ nāmasampayuttaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso chaṭṭhāyatanasampayutto, phassapaccayā vedanā phassasampayuttā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā vedanāsampayuttā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ taṇhāsampayuttaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ, evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Then follows the explanation of the angas concerned as in the previous catukkas. This method has been followed in the remaining three vāras also.

iv. *Aññamañña-catukkaṁ*—This catukka studies the aññamañña relation between the angas concerned. This mutual relation exists between angas upto upādāna only. So it has not been mentioned in the case of the remaining angas. The first vāra of this catukka is given here :

Tassmiṁ samaye avijjāpaccayā sankhāro sankhārapaccayā pi avijjā, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ viññāṇapaccayā pi sankhāro, viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ nāmapaccayā pi viññāṇaṁ, nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā pi nāmaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso phassapaccayā pi chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ, phassapaccayā vedanā vedanāpaccayā pi phasso, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā taṇhāpaccayā pi vedanā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ upādānapaccayā pi taṇhā, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ, evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Then follows the explanation of the angas. This method has been followed in the case of the remaining three vāras also.[1]

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[1] As much of the explanation is common to all the four catukkas, the commentary has treated them together.

All the four catukkas considered so far belong to the avijjāmūlakanaya. It is so called because avijjā has been treated as the first anga in the same.

v. *Mātikā*—Now in one cittakkhaṇa, avijjā need not be treated as the first anga. Other terms can also be treated so. In fact there are eight other terms—sankhāra, viññāṇa, nāma, chaṭṭhāyatana, phassa, vedanā, taṇhā, and upādāna—which can be treated in the same position. This means eight more nayas. As such there could be as many as nine nayas in all.

This section shows how to work out these nayas by giving an abbridged form of the first vāra in each naya. At the end of the section the first vāra of the first catukka has been mentioned again. This has been done just to show the place of one cittakkhaṇa in the paccayākāracatukka or what is generally known as the law of the dependent origination of things. The abbreviated text of this section reads as follows :

Sankhārapaccayā avijjā . ...viññāṇapaccayā avijjā...... nāmapaccayā avijjā.........chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā avijjā......... phassapaccayā avijjā......vedanāpaccayā avijjā......taṇhāpaccayā avijjā......upādānapaccayā avijjā.. ...avijjāpaccayā sankhāro, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ, nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ, evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

In summing up the results of the above five sections, it has to be borne in mind that in every naya there are four catukkas and sixteen vāras. So in the nine nayas there are altogether one hundred and forty four vāras.

(vi-ix.) *Paccayacatukkaniddesa to Aññamaññacatukkaniddesa*—The first five sections, already mentioned, only supply a kind of general frame-work, so to say, within which all the types of cittas are to be worked out. Unlike in the Dhammasangaṇi, in this study akusala-cittas have been considered first. So in the four sections under review the first type of akusala-citta has been worked out within the general frame-work. The following is the abbreviated form of the method adopted in the text :

vi. Katame dhammā akusalā ? yasmiṁ samaye akusalaṁ cittaṁ uppannaṁ hoti somanassasahagataṁ diṭṭhigatasampayuttaṁ rūpārammaṇaṁ vā......dhammārammaṇaṁ vā yaṁ yaṁ vā pana ārabbha tasmiṁ samaye avijjāpaccayā sankhāro, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ, nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ, evametassakevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Tattha katamā avijjā ? yaṁ aññāṇaṁ adassanaṁ anabhisamayo ananubodho appaṭivedho asangāhanā apariyogāhanā asampekkhanā apaccavekkhanā apaccakkhakammaṁ dummejjhaṁ bālyaṁ asampajaññaṁ moho pamoho sammoho avijjāyogo avijjānusayo avijjāpariyuṭṭhānaṁ avijjālangi moho akusalamūlaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati avijjā.

In the same manner the remaining terms of the above formula have been explained one by one. Then the remaining three vāras of this catukka have been given with necessary changes.

vii. Tasmiṁ samaye avijjāpaccayā sankhāro avijjāhetuko, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ sankhārahetukaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ viññāṇahetukaṁ, nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ nāmahetukaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso chaṭṭhāyatanahetuko, phassapaccayā vedanā phassahetukā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā vedanāhetukā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ taṇhāhetukaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ, evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Then follows the explanation of the terms of the formula one by one as in the case of the above four catukkas of the paccayaniddesa. This method has been applied in the case of the remaining three vāras with necessary changes.

viii. Tasmiṁ samaye avijjāpaccayā sankhāro avijjāsampayutto, sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṁ sankhārasampayuttaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ viññāṇasampayuttaṁ, nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ nāmasampayuttaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso chaṭṭhāyatanasampayutto, phassapaccayā vedanā phassasampayuttā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā vedanāsampayuttā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ taṇhāsamapayuttaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ, evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Then follows the explanation of the terms. The same method has been applied in the remaining three vāras with necessary changes.

ix. Tasmiṁ samaye avijjāpaccayā sankhāro sankhārapaccayā pi avijjā, sankhārapaccyā viññāṇaṁ viññāṇapaccayā pi sankhāro, viññāṇapaccayā nāmaṁ nāmapaccayā pi viññāṇaṁ, nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā pi nāmaṁ, chaṭṭhāyatanapaccayā phasso phassapaccayā pi chaṭṭhāyatanaṁ, phassapaccayā vedanā vedanāpaccayā pi phasso, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā taṇhāpaccayā pi vedanā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ upādānapaccayā pi taṇhā, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ, evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Then follows the explanation of the terms. The same method has been applied in the case of remaining three vāras also.

After going through the relevant text it can be seen that more or less the same method has been followed in the four catukkas concerned. Here, in the first place, the explanation of the first akusala-citta has been given after that of the Dhammasangaṇi. In the second place, the factors concerned have been arranged in the form of the paṭiccasamuppādanaya. In the third place, these factors have been explained one by one. With the application of the nine nayas to the first citta, there can be as many as thirty six catukkas and one hundred and forty four vāras.[1] The necessary changes and modifications made in course of this explanation, have all been referred to in the commentary.[2]

X. *Akusalamūla-niddesa*—In this section the remaining akusalacittas have been included. They have been given in an abridged form with necessary hints for the students to work out the details. The method of the explanation of these cittas is the same as that of the first citta already referred to. As this section deals with akusala-cittas alone, each form of the paṭiccasamuppādanaya begins with avijjā. Then again, sabbacittasādhāraṇacetasikas and akusalasādhāraṇacetasikas have been repeated in each case. The difference in their forms has to be noted with reference to the factors particular to them.

In case of all the cittas of this section except one, namely, vicikicchā-citta, there can be nine nayas, sixteen catukkas and one hundred and forty four vāras. As regards the vicikicchā-citta, there is no upādāna in it. Hence there cannot be a naya after this anga. So in the case of this citta there can be only eight nayas, thirty two catukkas and one hundred and twenty eight vāras.[3]

xi. *Kusala-niddesa*—This section takes into consideration all the kusala-cittas—Kāmāvacara, mahaggata and lokuttara. Just as in the case of the akusala-cittas in the previous chapters, so also here the kusala-cittas have been studied in three parts. In the first there is the general explanation of a type of citta according to the Dhammasangaṇi. Then there is the arrangement of the factors involved in a type of citta according to the paṭiccasamuppādanaya. Last of all, there is the explanation of the terms of the paṭiccasamuppāda formula one by one after the Dhammasangaṇi.

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[1] yathā ca ayaṁ catucatukko soḷasavārappabhedo avijjāmūlako paṭhamanayo etasmiṁ paṭhamakusalacitte pakāsito, evaṁ sankhāramūlakādayo aṭṭhanayā pi veditabbā—evameva tasmiṁ paṭhamakusalacitte yeva nava nayā chattiṁsacatukkāni catucattāḷīsādhikañca vārasataṁ hotī ti veditabbaṁ. V. A. P. 147.

[2] V. A., pp. 145-146.

[3] Sabbacittesu ca paṭhamacitte vuttanayeneva nayacatukkavārappabhedo veditabbo. kevalañhi vicikicchāsampayutte upādānamūlakassa nayassa abhāvā aṭṭha nayā dvattiṁsa catukkāni aṭṭhavīsādhikañca vārasataṁ hoti. V. A., P. 147.

In the case of kāmāvacara and mahaggata kusala-cittas, after their paṭiccasamuppāda explanation, the following remark has been made—evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti. This remark has been made just to show the place of the dhammas concerned in the over-all-picture of dukkha or suffering given rise to by the cycle of birth and death that is Saṁsāra.

In the case of the paṭiccasamuppādanaya explanation of the lokuttara-cittas the remark made is—evametesaṁ dhammānaṁ samudayo hoti. So unlike in the case of the kāmāvacara and mahaggata kusala-cittas, here there is no reference to dukkha. The reason is that the dhammas involved in the lokuttara-cittas function as magga-dhammas which lead to the cessation and not the arising of dukkha. Hence this special treatment of the lokuttara-cittas.

In the study of this section it has to be noted that in one kusala-cittakkhaṇa there is no place for avijjā. So it has been substituted by kusalamūlas—alobha, adosa and amoha. In the same way taṇhā and upādāna have been substituted by pasāda and adhimokkha respectively.

As regards other details, they are the same as those explained in the previous chapters. So with the necessary indications the explanations of the kusala-cittas have been given in an abridged form.

xii. *Avyākata-niddesa*—This section takes into consideration all the non-moral cittas both vipāka and kiriya. In the study of the avyākata-cittas several points have to be noted. In the first place, in the case of the eighteen ahetuka-cittas there is no moha or avijjā. As such in the paṭiccasamuppādanaya of these cittas, there is no mention of avijjā. But in the case of the sahetuka-cittas kusala-hetus are available. All the same they have also not been mentioned for the sake of uniformity. Accordingly eleven of the ahetuka-cittas can give rise to six nayas with the following—sankhāra, viññāṇa, nāma, chaṭṭhāyatana, phassa and vedanā. In the case of the remaining ahetuka-cittas adhimokkha is also available. So they give rise to seven nayas with the addition of adhimokkha. In the case of the sahetuka-cittas both pasāda and adhimokkha are available. So with the addition of these two factors they give rise to eight nayas.

As regards the number of vāras, only the first two vāras are applicable in the case of the first eleven ahetuka-cittas, but in the text only the first vāra has been shown. The last two vāras are not applicable to them, for they are not able to give rise to the rūpa-dhammas which are involved in them. Then again in the arūpa planes there is no matter. So only two vāras are applicable in the case of their avyākata-cittas also. As for the remaining cittas of this section, all the four vāras are applicable to them. But for maintaining uniformity they have not been mentioned. Therefore the three types of nayas—chaṭṭhanaya, sattanaya and aṭṭhanaya—should be studied in relation to the available vāras of the four catukkas.

xiii. *Avijjāmūlaka-kusalaniddesa*—This section shows the relation of avijjā to kusala-cittas. In this connection it has to be borne in mind that avijjā or ignorance can be totally destroyed only on the attainment of arahathood. So, though avijjā does not come into the picture when the kusala-cittas of one khaṇa are considered, all the same it keeps on excercising its influence on them from the back-ground, so to say. Therefore in the over-all-picture of these dhammas concerned, avijjā has to be taken into consideration. So in the study of one cittakkhaṇa this relation between avijjā on the one hand and kusalacittas on the other is not to be lost sight of. The purpose of this section is to point out this fact to the student.

In this connection it has to be further noted that here avijjā is related to the kusala-cittas by way of upanissaya-paccaya. The relations of avigata, sampayutta and aññamañña do not exist between them. So only the four vāras of the first catukka are applicable to them.

xiv—xv. *Kusalamūlaka-vipākaniddesa and akusalamūlaka-vipākaniddesa*—In these two sections the relation of the kusala-hetus and akula-hetus to kusala-vipāka and akusala-vipāka cittas respectively has been shown. These hetus in question are related to their respective cittas by way of upanissaya and nānākkhaṇika-kammappaccaya relations. As such only the four vāras of the first catukka alone are applicable in their case. As regards kiriya-cittas, these hetus are not available in them. So they have not been mentioned.

(c)

There is no mention of the pañhāpucchaka-bhājanīya in this vibhanga. The reason is that the dhammas considered in the paṭiccasamuppāda-vibhanga are the same as those included in the three groups of khandha, āyatana and dhātu. In those vibhangas an elaborate study of the dhammas in question was made in terms of the duka and tika mātikas. Their consideration here again would only be a repetition. Hence the omission of the respective pucchakas in this vibhanga.

SATIPAṬṬHĀNA-VIBHANGA—7

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here the explanation of the four satipaṭṭhānas has been given after the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-suttanta of the Dīghanikāya. This may be said to be the most comprehensive explanation of the subject-matter from the suttantika point of view.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA

In this bhājanīya the saṭipaṭṭhānas have been explained in relation to the lokuttara-jhānas So this explanation is the same as that given in the Dhammasangaṇi. The only difference is that it is a special application of the explanation of lokuttara-cittas to the group of dhammas called satipaṭṭhānas. They have been explained with reference to both the kusala and vipāka cittas or magga and phala cittas as they are generally known.

The text gives only an outline of the possible explanations whereas the commentary indicates how to work out the details of the same. In this connection it has to be remembered that sotāpattimaggacitta alone can be explained according to one thousand nayas. So according to the four maggas there would be four thousand nayas. Again they would be twenty thousand nayas when the four maggas are considered in relation to the five jhānas. In this context magga-cittas are known as kusala-cittas. As regards phala-cittas, which are known as vipāka-cittas, there would be another twenty thousand nayas. Again, when they are considered in relation to the three vimokkhas, there would be sixty thousand nayas. So altogether there would be eighty thousand nayas[1].

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA

The method adopted in this pucchaka is the same as in the preceding ones. In the first place the four satipaṭṭhānas have been stated. Then questions have been put relating to all the tikas and dukas. Next they have been answered one by one. So the abridged form of this section with the questions based on the first tika and the last duka, and answers given to the same would read as follow:

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[1] Tattha nayabhedo veditabbo. Kathaṁ? kāyānupassanāya tāva sotāpattimagge......nayasahassaṁ hoti. Tatha vedanānupassanādisu suddhikasatipaṭṭhāne cāti sotapattimagge pañcanayasahassāni. Yathā ca sotapattimagge evaṁ sesamaggesupīti kusale vīsatinayasahassāni suññatappaṇihitānimittādibhedesu pana tato tiguṇe vipāke saṭṭhinayasahassānīti evameva sakiccasādhakānañceva saṁsiddhikakiccānañca kusalavipākasatipaṭṭhānānaṁ niddesavasena duvidho kāyānupassanādivasena ca suddhikavasena ca kusale pañcannaṁ vipāke pañcannanti dasannaṁ niddesavārānaṁ vasena dasappabhedo asītinayasahassapatimaṇdito. V.A., P. 202.

Cattāro satipaṭṭhānā—idha bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṁ, vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṁ, citte cittānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṁ, dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṁ.

Catunnaṁ satipaṭṭhānānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā......kati saraṇā, kati araṇā ?

Siyā kusalā, siyā avyākatā...... ..... . siyā araṇā.

When the nature of satipaṭṭhāna is understood, the answers given to the list of questions become quite clear. Satipaṭṭhāna means presence of mind or mindfulness. It refers to the mindfulness as related to the four topics of meditation—kāyānupassanā, vedanānupassanā, cittānupassanā and dhammānupassanā. So in the final analysis all the four satipaṭṭhānas represent but one sati. Sati is one of the sobhanacetasikas. In the present case it associates with both the maggacittas and phalacittas. Maggacittas are kusala or moral in nature whereas phalacittas are avyākata or non-moral in nature. For the same reason satipaṭṭhānas are said to be either kusala or avyākata. Sati does not associate with akusala-cittas. Hence no mention has been made of it in the same relation.

As regards the answers given to the last two dukas—whether they are saraṇā or araṇā—it has to be remembered that saraṇā-dhammā refer to lobha. dosa, moha and their associates. Sati being a sobhanacetasika it does not associate with them. Hence they are known as araṇā. This method has to be followed in working out the details of the remaining answers also.

SAMMAPPADHANA-VIBHANGA—8

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA

Here the four sammappadhānas have been stated and explained after the suttantikanaya. In this explanation also the evidence of a common tradition can be traced out.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here, in the first place, there is a short explanation of the four sammappadhānas as found in the suttantas. Then their explanation is given in relation to lokuttara-cittas—kusala and vipāka—just as in the case of the satipaṭṭhānas. In other words it is a special application of the general explanation given in the Dhammasaṇgaṇi. Last of all there are explanations of the necessary terms, again, according to the Dhammasaṅgaṇi.

While commenting on this bhājanīya, the Aṭṭhakathā explains the application here of the sahassanaya. So just as in the case of the satipaṭṭhānas, the kusalacittas in question here can also be explained in terms of twenty thousand nayas. The function of the sammapadhānas ends with the magga-cittas. They do not play any part in phala-cittas. As such, in the case of the vipāka-cittas, they have not been considered in relation to the sahassanaya.

(c)

PAÑHĀP-UCCHAKA.

Here the four sammappadhānas have been explained with reference to the relevant tikas and dukas. The abridged text with the questions relating to first tika and answers given to the same would read as follow :

Cattāro sammappadhānā—idha bhikkhu anuppannānaṁ pāpakānaṁ akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ anuppādāya chandaṁ janeti vāyamati viriyaṁ ārabhati cittaṁ paggaṇhāti padahati, uppannānaṁ pāpakānaṁ akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ pahānāya……

anuppannānaṁ kusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ uppādāya......uppannānaṁ kusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ ṭhitiyā asammosāya bhiyyobhāvāya vepullāya bhāvanāya pāripūriyā chandaṁ janeti vāyamati viriyaṁ ārabhati cittaṁ paggaṇhāti padahati.

Catunnaṁ sammappadhānānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā ?......kati saraṇā, kati araṇā ? Kusalāyeva...... araṇāti.

It has to be noted here that sammappadhāna is the same as viriya-cetasika, and the four sammappadhānas are so many applications of this cetasika. So in answering the questions of the tika and duka groups this cetasika and its relation to the magga and phala dhammas have to be taken into consideration.

Viriya functions only in relation to the attainment of maggas. Phalas follow as a matter of course from the same without any effort. So viriya does not play any part in relation to phala. For the same reason in the present context sammappadhānas are said to be only kusala in answer to the questions based on the first tika. As regards the last duka, viriya in the form of sammappadhānas associates only with the kusala-cittas and cetasikas. So in answer to the questions related to the last duka sammappadhānas are said to be only araṇā.

IDDHIPĀDA-VIBHANGA—9

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

This is a comprehensive explanation of the four iddhipādas according to the suttantikanaya.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

In this bhājanīya the four iddhipādas have been explained in eight catukkas. They have all been explained with reference to the lokuttara-cittas after the Dhammasangaṇi. The four catukkas represent the special application of the Dhammasangaṇi explanation to the four iddhipādas. In these four catukkas the place of the iddhipādas, among so many other dhammas which function in lokuttara-cittas, has been shown. In the second catukkas the role of the iddhipādas has been emphasised and other dhammas have been mentioned as their sampayuttas or associates.

The Aṭṭhakathā explains the relation of the sahassanaya to the iddhipādas. In this connection all the eight catukkas have been taken into consideration. As already mentioned in another context, one iddhipāda in relation to the first stage of sainthood can be studied in terms of one thousand nayas. This means four thousand nayas in relation to the four stages of sainthood. So the iddhipādas in the eight catukkas can be studied in terms of thirty two thousand nayas.

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA

As usual, here the four iddhipādas have been studied in relation to the relevant tikas and dukas. When abridged with the first tika and the last duka the text would read as follows:

Cattāro iddhipādā—idha bhikkhu chandasamādhipadhānasankhārasamannāgataṁ iddhipādaṁ bhāveti, viriyasamādhi.... cittasamādhi... vimaṁsāsamādhipadhānasankhārasamannāgataṁ iddhipādaṁ bhāveti.

Catunnaṁ iddhipādānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā?...kati saraṇā, kati araṇā? Kusalāyeva...araṇāti.

The four iddhipādas function only in relation to maggas and not phalas for the reasons above explained. Therefore they can only be kusala in nature. Then again with reference to the questions of the last duka, they can be characterised as araṇā as they associate only with the kusala-cittas and cetasikas. This method has to be followed in working out the details of the answers to the remaining questions also.

BOJJHANGA-VIBHANGA—10

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here the suttantika explanation of the seven bojjhangas has been given.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here, in the first place, the explanation of all the bojjhangas has been given together. In the second place, the explanation of each bojjhanga has been given separately. All these explanations are after the Dhammasangaṇi. The two methods of explanation have been applied in the case of both the magga-cittas and phala-cittas or kusala-cittas and vipāka-cittas as they have been referred to in the text.

Here again, the Aṭṭhakathā shows the application of the sahassanaya. Thus where the seven bojjhangas are taken together, as in the case of the first method, they can be explained in terms of sahassanaya. Where they are considered separately, as in the case of the second method, each can be explained in terms of four thousand nayas. This means twenty eight thousand nayas for the seven bojjhangas. So in the case of the kusala-cittas there would be thirty two thousand nayas in all.

The bojjhangas function in the case of the vipāka-cittas also. Here, as the three vimokkhas are taken into consideration, there would be thrice as many nayas as in the case of the kusala-cittas. In other words there would be ninety six thousand nayas here. So altogether there are one hundred and twenty eight thousand nayas in the two types of cittas.

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA

Here the seven bojjhangas have been studied with reference to the relevant tikas and dukas. When abridged the text would read as follows;

Sattabojjhangā—satisambojjhango, ;dhammavicayasambojjhango, viriyasambojjhango, pītsambojjhango, passaddhisambojjhango, samādhisambojjhango, upekkhāsambojjhango.

Sattannaṁ bojjhangānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā ?...kati saraṇā, kati araṇā ? Siyā kusalā, siyā avyākatā......siyā araṇāti.

As the bojjhangas function both in relation to the maggas and phalas they have been characterised as kusala and avyākata in relation to the first tika. Then again, as they associate only with the sobhana-cittas and cetasikas they have been characterised as araṇā in relation to the last duka. This method has to be followed in working out the detailes of the answers to the remaining questions also.

MAGGANGA-VIBHANGA—11

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here the eight maggangas have been explained in short as they have been already explained in detail in the sacca-vibhanga.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA

Just as in the case of the seven bojjhangas, so also here the eight maggangas have been explained both together and separately. Then again the aṭṭhangikamagga and the pañcangikamagga have been considered separately.[1]

The Aṭṭhakathā shows the sahassanaya in relation to the different explanations. Thus the aṭṭhangikanaya and the pañcangikanaya can be explained in terms of four thousand nayas each. When the sahassanaya is applied to the individual explanations of the maggangas, there would be as many as twenty thousand nayas. So taken together, in the case of the kusala-cittas there would be twenty-eight thousand nayas. In the case of the vipāka-cittas there would be thrice as many nayas. In other words there would be eighty four thousand nayas. So in the two types of cittas there would be one hundred and twelve thousand nayas in all.

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[1] The Aṭṭhakathā holds that in the case of the lokuttara-jhānas the path must always be of the eight angas and not of five angas as held by some. In this connection it refers to a long discussion between two different traditions. V. A., PP. 223-225.

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA

In this bhājanīya the eight angas have been explained with reference to the relevant tikas and dukas. When abridged the text would read as follows :

Ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo, Seyyathīdaṁ—sammādiṭṭhi, sammāsankappo sammāvācā, sammākammanto, sammā-ājīvo, sammāvāyāmo, sammāsati, sammāsamādhi.

Aṭṭhannaṁ maggangānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā......kati saraṇā, kati araṇā ?

Siyā kusalā, siyā avyākatā......araṇāti.

The maggangas function both in relation to maggas and phalas. For the same reason they have been shown as kusala and avyākata in answer to the questions based on the first tika. They function only in relation to sobhana cittas and cetasikas. So they have been shown only as araṇā in answer to the questions based on the last duka. This method has to be followed in working out the details of the answers to the remaining questions also.

JHĀNA-VIBHANGA—12

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

In this section, in the first place, jhānas have been stated with their short explanations after the Sāmaññaphala and other suttantas. Then there is an elaborate explanation in the commentary form. In this form all the three types of explanations—Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma can be observed.[1] In the explanations of this type may be traced the first origins of the exegetical literature.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here all the jhāna-cittas, both lokiya and lokuttara, have been explained after the Dhammasangaṇi. In the first place, all the kusalacittas—rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and lokuttara—have been given. The rūpāvacara-cittas have been treated according to both the catukka-naya and pañcaka-naya. In the second place, all the vipāka-cittas– rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and lokuttara—have heen explained. In the third place, all the kiriya-cittas—rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara—have been explained. So the order of treatment is as follows: kusala—rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and lokuttara; vipāka—rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and lokuttara; kiriya—rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara.

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA.

Here the jhāna-cittas have been studied with reference to the relevant tikas and dukas. The text, when abridged with the first tika and the last duka, would read as follows:

Cattāri jhānāni—idha bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṁ savicāraṁ vivekajaṁ pītisukhaṁ paṭhamaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati......vitakkavicārānaṁ vūpasamā ajjhattaṁ sampasādanaṁ cetaso ekodibhāvaṁ avitakkaṁ avicāraṁ samādhijaṁ pītisukhaṁ dutiyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati......pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako ca viharati sato ca sampajāno sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṁvedeti, yaṁ taṁ ariyā ācikkhanti 'upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī' ti, tatiyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati..... sukhassa ca pahāṇā dukkhassa ca pahāṇā pubbeva somanassadomanassānaṁ atthangamā adukkhamasukhaṁ upekkhāsatipārisuddhiṁ catutthaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati.

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[1] Vibhanga, PP. 186-208.

Catunnaṁ jhānānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā......kati saraṇā, kati araṇā ?

Siyā kusalā, siyā avyākatā..... araṇāti.

Here it has to be noted that in the text only the catukka-naya has been given. The reason is that so far as the jhānangas are concerned, it does not make any difference.

The jhāna-cittas are either kusala, vipāka or kiriya in nature. Now both the vipāka and kirya cittas are non-moral or avyākata in nature. So in answer to the questions based on the first tika it has been stated that they are either kusala or avyākata. For the same reason, in answer to the questions based on the last duka, it has been shown that all the jhānas are araṇā.

APPAMAÑÑĀ-VIBHANGA—13.

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here there is a comprehensive explanation of the four appamaññās—mettā, karuṇā, muditā and upekkhā—according to the suttantikanaya.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Living beings are the objects of appamaññās, and nibbāna is the object of lokuttara-cittas. So appamaññās, which are always lokiya, do not function in relation to the lokuttara-cittas. Therefore they have been studied only in relation to the lokiya jhāna-cittas—kusala, vipāka and kiriya. Here it has to be noted that upekkhā is a factor of the fourth jhāna and the fifth jhāna according to the catukkk-naya and the pañcaka-naya respectively. So in the case of the three appamaññās—mettā, karuṇā and muditā—jhānas can be attained only upto the third in the case of the catukka-naya and upto the fourth in the case of the pañcaka-naya. As regards the last appamaññā, namely, upekkhā, the fourth jhāna in the catukka-naya and the fifth jhāna in the pañcaka-naya can be attained on the same.

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA.

This bhājanīya studies the four appamaññās with reference to the relevant tikas and dukas. The abridged form of the text with the first tika and the last duka is as follows :—

Catasso appamaññāyo—idha bhikkhu mettāsahagatena cetasā ekaṁ disaṁ pharitvā viharati, tathā dutiyaṁ, tathā tatiyaṁ, tathā catutthiṁ. Iti uddhamadho tiriyaṁ sabbadhi sabbatthatāya sabbāvantaṁ lokaṁ mettāsahagatena cetasā vipulena mahaggatena appamānena averena abyāpajjhena pharitvā viharati, Karuṇāsahagatena cetasā......viharati, Muditāsahagatena cetasā......viharati, Upekkhāsahaggatena cetasā...... viharati.

Catunnaṁ appamaññānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā.. ...kati saraṇā, kati araṇā ?

Siyā kusalā, siyā avyākatā .. ..araṇāti.

The four appamaññās function only in relation to kusala, vipāka and kiriya cittas, and their associated cetasikas. Therefore they are either kusala or avyākata in nature. For the same reason they are also araṇā. This method has to be followed in working out the details of the remaining tikas and dukas also.

SIKKHĀPADA-VIBHANGA—14

(a)

Here there is no suttanta-bhājanīya. The probable reason is that the precepts in question are so well-known that they do not require any mention. Therefore they have been dealt with only from the Ābhidhammika point of view.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA

Here pañcasikkhāpadāni or the five precepts have been taken into consideration. They have been explained and interpreted in three ways : the first interpretation is in the sense of the mere abstinence from the commission of the five sinful acts, the second is in the sense of cetanā or motive that is working behind the act of abstinence and the third is in the sense of sampayuttadhammas or the cetasikas that associate with the cittas which arise at the time of taking the precepts of abstinence. These explanations are in terms of the eight types of kāmāvacarakusalacitta. The text of the three-fold explanation of the first precept would read as follows :

Tattha katamaṁ pāṇātipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ? Yasmiṁ samaye kāmāvacaraṁ kusalaṁ cittaṁ uppannaṁ hoti somanassasahagataṁ ñāṇasampayuttaṁ pāṇātipātā virmantassa, yā tasmiṁ samaye pāṇātipātā ārati paṭivirati veramaṇī, akiriyā akaraṇaṁ anajjhāpatti velā-anatikkamo setughāto—ayaṁ vuccati pāṇātipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ. Avasesā dhammā veramaṇiyā sampayuttā.

Tattha katamaṁ pāṇātipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ? Yasmiṁ samaye kāmāvacaraṁ kusalaṁ cittaṁ uppannaṁ hoti somanassasahagataṁ ñāṇasampayuttaṁ pāṇātipātā viramantassa, yā tasmiṁ samaye cetanā sañcetanā sañcetayitattaṁ—ayaṁ vuccati pāṇātipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ. Avasesā dhammā cetanāya sampayuttā.

Tattha katamaṁ pāṇātipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ? Yasmiṁ samaye kāmāvacaraṁ kusalaṁ cittaṁ uppannaṁ hoti somanassasahagataṁ ñāṇasampayuttaṁ pāṇātipātā viramantassa, yo tasmiṁ samaye phasso… ..paggaho avikkhepo—idaṁ vuccati pāṇātipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ.

The method has been followed in the case of the remaining seven types of kusala-cittas also. Further they have been explained in relation to the four iddhipādas—canda, citta, viriya and vīmaṁsā-which function in the three degrees of hīna, majjhima and paṇīta. The details of this explanation are the same as those given above. The only difference is the application of the four iddhipādas.

The last vāra of this bhājanīya has been devoted to show that though the term sikkhā has been used in a limited sense in the case of the precepts yet they can be used in a wider sense to cover up all the kusala-dhammas in the four planes of kāmāvacara, rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and lokuttara. The abridged form of the text of this vāra would read as follows :

Katame dhammā sikkhā ? Yasmiṁ samaye kāmāvacaraṁ kusalaṁ cittaṁ uppannaṁ hoti somanassasahagataṁ ñāṇasampayuttaṁ rūpārammaṇaṁ vā.........dhammārammaṇaṁ vā yaṁ yaṁ vā panārabbha tasmiṁ samaye phasso hoti.........avikkhepo hoti . ...ime dhammā sikkhā.

Katame dhammā sikkhā ? Yasmiṁ samaye rūpūpapattiyā maggaṁ bhāveti......arūpūpapattiyā maggaṁ bhāveti...lokuttaraṁ jhānaṁ bhāveti niyyānikaṁ apacayagāmiṁ diṭṭhigatānaṁ pahānāya paṭhamāya bhūmiyā pattiyā vivicceva kāmehi...... paṭhamaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati dukkhāpaṭipadaṁ dandhābhiññaṁ, tasmiṁ samaye phasso hoti......avikkhepo hoti......ime dhammā sikkhā.

The above method applies in the case of the remaining seven kāmāvacarakusaḷacittas and cetasikas also, which arise in relation to the six sense-objects of the same bhūmi. It holds good in the case of the relevant cittas and cetasikas of the remaining three bhūmis too i.e. rūpa, arūpa and lokuttara.

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA

Here the five precepts have been studied in relation to the relevant tikas and dukas. The abridged form of the text with the first tika and the last duka would read as follows :—

Pañca sikkhāpadāni—pāṇātipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ, adinnādānā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ, kāmesu micchācārā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ, musāvādā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṁ, surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā veramanī sikkhāpadaṁ.

Pañcannaṁ sikkhāpadānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā.....kati saraṇā, kati araṇā ?

Kusalāyeva.................araṇāti.

In this connection it has to be noted that the precepts in question have been explained in terms of so many kusala cittas and cetasikas. So they have all been shown as moral (kusala) in answer to the first question of the first tika. For the same reason they have been shown as araṇā in answer to the second question of the last duka. The last two questions of the first tika and the first question of the last duka do not arise in the case of moral precepts. So they have been omitted. This method has to be followed in working out the details of the answers to the remaining questions also.

PAṬISAMBHIDĀ[1]-VIBHANGA—15

(a)

SUTTANTA-BHĀJANĪYA.

Here, in the first place, the four paṭisambhidās have been stated. Then they have been explained in five vāras with reference to i. sacca, ii. hetu, iii. dhamma, iv. paccayākāra and v. pariyatti.

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[1] The four paṭisambhidas are: attha, dhamma, nirutti and paṭibhāna. Generally speaking attha means hetu-phala or the result, but analytically speaking it can be applied to five dhammas—paccayasamuppannaṁ or what is born of conditions, nibbānaṁ, bhāsitattho or the meaning of a saying, vipāko or the result and kiriya or the in-operative. Again, generally speaking dhamma means paccaya or condition, but analytically speaking it can also be applied to five dhammas—yo koci phalanibbattako-hetu or any cause that gives rise to an effect, ariya-maggo or the noble eight-fold path which leads to nibbāna, bhāsitaṁ or a doctrinal saying, kusalaṁ or moral phenomenon and akusalaṁ or immoral phenomenon. This five-fold explanation of dhamma should be understood with reference to the relative terms of the five-fold explanation of attha in consecutive order.

1. In the sacca-vāra dukkha and nibbāna, which latter is the same as nirodha, have been shown as atthas or results, samudaya and magga have been shown as the dhammas which lead to those results respectively. Nirutti is the understanding of the inner significance of the dhammas concerned with reference to their etymology. Paṭibhāna is the coordination of the three-fold knowledge.

ii. The hetu-vāra shows the general application of the four categories. Thus dhamma here stands for any hetu or cause whatsoever, and attha next. As regards nirutti and paṭibhāna, they are the same.

iii. In the dhamma-vāra the results of the nāma-dhammas and rūpa-dhammas have been shown as attha, and those nāmas and rūpas that give rise to them as dhamma. The other two categories are the same.

iv. In the paccayākāra-vāra, the four categories have been applied to the twelve links of what is known as the law of paṭiccasamuppāda. In this explanation the links have been taken in their reverse order. So in the first place jarā and maraṇa have been shown as attha in relation to jāti which is shown as dhamma here. In this manner the remaining relevant angas have also been explained. The last two categories are the same.

v. The pariyatti-vāra applies the four categories to the canonical literature which has been divided into the nine angas—suttaṁ, geyyaṁ, veyyākaraṇaṁ, gāthā, udānaṁ, itivuttakaṁ, jātakaṁ, abbhutadhammaṁ and vedallaṁ. In this vāra

Nirutti is the understanding of the significance of the dammas in relation to their etymology. Paṭibhāna is the co-ordination of the three types of knowledge born with regard to the first three categories. V.A., pp. 271-272.

The meanings of the scriptures have been shown as attha and the scriptures in the form of the nine angas as dhamma. The other two categories are the same.

(b)

ABHIDHAMMA-BHĀJANĪYA.

This bhājanīya makes a study of all types of citta with reference to the four paṭisambhidas. There are four vāras in this bhājanīya—kusala-vāra, akusala-vāra, vipāka-vāra and kiriya-vāra.

Kusala-vāra includes all the types of kusala-citta—kāmāvacara, rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and lokuttara. Here, in the first place, every citta has been presented along with its sampayutta-dhammas or the associates after the Dhammasangaṇi. Then the knowledge of every kusala-citta has been shown as dhammapáṭisambhidā and that of the respective vipāka or the resultant as atthapaṭisambhidā. As regards the remaining two paṭisambhidās, their explanations have been presented in the usual form.

Akusala-vāras include all the twelve akusala-cittas. They have been presented after the Dhammasangaṇi. The method of study is the same as in the first vāra.

Vipāka-vāra includes all the vipāka-cittas, both kusala and akusala, both sahetuka and ahetuka. The presentation of the cittas has been done after the Dhammasangaṇi.

In the study of these cittas only three paṭisambhidās have been taken into consideration—attha, nirutti and paṭibhāna. In keeping with the explanation given in the beginning, the knowledge of the vipākas has been shown as atthapaṭisambhidā. The explanations of the third and fourth paṭisambhidās are the same as in the ōther cases. Here the dhammapaṭisambhidā has been omitted as no reference is made to the moral or the immoral cittas, which alone produce vipākas,

Kiriya-vāra includes all the kiriya-cittas. Their presentation is after the Dhammasangaṇi. In this study also dhammapaṭisambhidā has been omitted. The knowledge of these cittas in question has been shown as atthapṭisambhidā. This is again in keeping with the explanation given above. The remaining two paṭisambhidās are the same.

The last portion of this bhājanīya shows as to in how many types of citta the four abhiññās arise. In the case of the sekhas they arise in relation to the four kāmāvacara-kusala-cittas which are associated with ñāṇa. In the case of the asekhas they arise in relation to the four types of kiriya-citta which are also associated with ñāṇa. Further the sekhas gain atthapaṭisambhidā upto the seventh stage of sainthood with reference to their respective magga-cittas and phala-cittas. Only the asekha gains the atthapaṭisambhidā with reference to arahatta-phala. Therefore while all the four types of paṭisambhidā can be gained in the case of lokiya-ñāṇa, only atthapaṭisambhidā can be gained in the case of lokuttara-ñāṇa.

(c)

PAÑHĀ-PUCCHAKA

Here the four paṭisambhidas have been explained with reference to the relevant tikas and dukas. The abridged form of this section with the first tika and the last duka would read as follows .

Catasso paṭisambhidā—atthapaṭisambhidā, dhammapaṭisambhidā, niruttipaṭisambhidā, paṭibhānapaṭisambhidā.

Catunnaṁ paṭisambhidānaṁ kati kusalā, kati akusalā, kati avyākatā......kati saraṇā, kati araṇā ?

Siyā kusalā, siyā avyākatā......................saraṇāti.

Here it has to be noted that the four paṭisambhidās can be gained only in relation to the four ñāṇasampayutta-kāmāvacara-kusalacittas and the four ñāṇasampayutta-kirya-cittas. Among them the first four cittas are moral in nature, whereas the second four cittas are non-moral in nature. So in answer to the second and the third questions based on the first tika, they have been shown as either kusala or avyākata. As the question of akusla-dhammas does not arise in the case of the four paṭisambhidās, in answer to the second question based on the last duka, they have been shown as araṇā. This method has to be followed in working out the details of the answers to the remaining questions also.

NĀṆA-VIBHANGA—16.

This vibhanga makes a study of so many different types of knowledge arranged in the gradual numerical order beginning with one-fold knowledge and ending with ten-fold knowledge. This vibhanga is in two parts—mātikā and niddesa. One gives mātikās or the table of contents in ten divisions and the other gives elaborate explanations of the same in their numerical order.

The first division takes up the study of the nine-fold knowledge. In this connection it takes into consideration the five viññāṇa-dhātus—cakkhuviññāṇa, sotaviññāṇa, ghāṇaviññāṇa, jivhāviññāṇa and kāyaviññāṇa—with reference to seventy eight padas or explanatory words. The most of these explanatory words are from the mātikas of the Dhammasangaṇi and others are from outside of it. Generally speaking the terms beginning with 'na hetu' to 'manoviññāṇena viññeyyā[1]' are from the mātikas of the Dhammasangaṇi, whereas the terms beginning with 'anicca' to 'yāthāvakavatthuvibhāvanā paññā' represent mātikās which do not belong to the Dhammasangaṇi. The meanings of most of the terms including those from the Dhammasangaṇi are quite easy to understand. So here mention may be made of some terms only which refer to the general nature of the types of consciousness in question.[2]

[1] The following terms do not occur in the Sangāyanā Edition—uppannā, mano-viññāṇena viññeyyā, aniccā, jarābhibhūtā.

[2] According to the traditional explanation the five viññāṇa-dhātus represent ten types of consciousness.

The terms concerned explain how these types of consciousness arise with reference to their bases (sense-organs) and sense-objects which come into existence before them. Among them the sense-organs are internal whereas the objects are external. The types of consciousness arise only in relation to their respective sense-organs and sense-objects. Accordingly there are so many sense-organs and sense-objects. They do not act without some degree of concentration and attention. They also do not arise constantly, simultaneously or immediately after one another. They do not give rise to anything like experience in the mental life.[1]

The terms that come next refer not only to the nature of the types of consciousness in question but also to that of the two sampaṭicchana-cittas which arise immediately after them. Here they have been referred to not by their names but by their position in the course of cognition. In fact, the five types of consciousness constitute the subject-matter under discussion. So the two sampaṭicchanas have been referred to by the way as they have got so many points in common with them. Their common nature is indicated with reference to the following terms :

The five types of consciousness just refer to the mere presentation of the objects before the mind's eye. No knowledge of the Dhammas can be gained either with them or with those arising immediately after them. They cannot give rise to any posture of the body—walking, standing, sitting or lying down. They cannot give rise to any action either bodily or vocal. No moral or immoral acts are committed with reference to them.

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[1] Uppannavatthukā, uppannārammaṇā, purejātavatthukā, purejātārammaṇā, ajjhattikavatthukā, bāhirārammaṇā, asambhinnavatthukā, asambhinnārammaṇā. nānāvatthukā, nānārammaṇā, na aññamaññassa gocaravisayaṁ paccanubhonti, na asamannāhārā uppajjanti, na amanasikārā uppajjanti, na abtokkiṇṇā uppajjanti, na apubbaṁ acarimaṁ uppajjanti, na aññamaññassa samanantarā uppajjanti. Pañca viññāṇā anābhogā.

There is no attaining or rising from the trances (samāpatti) with reference to them. Death or birth does not take place with reference to them. Sleeping, rising up or dreaming also does not take place with reference to them. There is only a pure presentation of the objects or the sense-data concerned[1]

These terms are from the mātikas or the table of contents. They have been elaborately explained in the niddesa in the commentary form. So for details it has to be consulted. The explanation given here sheds light on the nature of knowledge yielded by these types of consciousness. It makes clear that this knowledge is pure sensation and nothing more.

The second division studies the two-fold knowledge with reference to thirty five sets of two mātikas each. All other mātikas of this division, except the last two, are from the duka-group of the Dhammasangaṇi, The following figures refer to the mātikas as given in the Dhammasangaṇi—34 (a) (b), 35 (a) (b), 37 (a) (b), 41 (a) (b), 43 (a) (b), 47 (a) (b), 49 (a) (b), 53 (a) (b), 55 (a) (b), 59 (a) (b), 61 (a) (b), 65 (a) (b), 67 (a) (b), 71 (a) (b), 73 (a) (b), 76 (a) (b), 90 (a) (b), 92 (a) (b), 96 (a) (b), 98 (a) (b), 104 (a) (b), 109 (a) (b), 121 (a) (b). Along with atthajāpikā paññā and jāpitatthā paññā they complete thirty five sets.

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[1] Pañca viññāṇā anābhogā, pañcahi viññāṇehi na kañci dhammaṁ paṭivijānāti aññatra abhinipātamattā, pañcannaṁ viññāṇānaṁ samanantarāpi na kañci dhammaṁ paṭivijānāti, pañcahi viññāṇehi na kañci iriyāpathaṁ kappeti, pañcannaṁ viññāṇānaṁ samanantarāpi na kañci iriyāpathaṁ kappeti, pañcahi viññāṇehi na kāyakammaṁ na vacīkammaṁ paṭṭhapeti, pañcannaṁ viññāṇānaṁ samanantarāpi na kāyakammaṁ na vacīkammaṁ paṭṭhapeti, pañcahi viññāṇehi na kuslākusalaṁ dhammaṁ samādiyati, pañcannaṁ viññāṇānaṁ samanantarāpi na kusalākusalaṁ dhammaṁ samādiyati, pañcahi viññāṇehi na samāpajjati na vuṭṭhāti, pañcannaṁ viññāṇānaṁ samanantarāpi na samāpajjati na vuṭṭhāti, pañcahi viññāṇehi na cavati na uppajjati, pañcahi viññāṇehi na supati na paṭibujjhati na supinaṁ passati, pañcannaṁ viññāṇānaṁ samanatarāpi na supati na paṭibujjhati na supinaṁ passati, yāthāvakavatthuvibhāvanā paññā. Evaṁ ekavidhena ñāṇavatthu.

After going through the mātikas it can be observed that the terms of the (a) group of all the numbers from 34 to 104, with the single exception of No. 35, and those of Nos. 118 and 121 refer to the mundane knowledge as attained in the three planes of kāma, rūpa and arūpa. Their terms of (b) group refer to the supra-mundane knowledge as attained in the four maggas and the four phalas. As regards the terms of No. 35, they refer to both mundane and supra-mundane knowledge as the case may be. Again the terms of Nos. 115 to 117 refer to the knowledge of either kind according to the jhāna attained. The terms of the (a) of Nos. 115-117 refer to the knowledge of the respective planes concerned whereas those of the (b) group refer to the knowledge of the remaining three planes as the case may be. The (a) of 119 refers to the knowledge as gained in the four maggas which leads to the attainment of four phalas and for that matter Nibbāna, and (b) refers to mundane knowledge which does not lead to Nibbāna. (a) of 120 refers to the knowledge regarding the five heinous acts (pañcānantariya-kammāni), the false views which are of a definite character (niyata-micchādiṭṭhi) and the four magga-cittas. In short, the 34 mātikas of the Dhammasangaṇi explain the nature of knowledge in so many ways in accordance with the terms of reference concerned.

The last two terms of this list—atthajāpikā-paññā and jāpitatthā-paññā—have been used for paññā as associated with certain kusala, vipāka and kiriya cittas in a special relation. In these expressions 'attha' has been used in the five-fold sense already explained in the paṭisambhidā-vibhanga. So in the present context atthajāpikā-paññā refers to paññā associated with kusala-cittas which give rise to vipākas, As regards kiriya-cittas, they do not produce vipākas. But then an arahanta attains abhiññās and samāpattis in relation to the ñāṇasampayutta-kiriya-cittas. As such atthajāpikā-paññā refers to this ñāṇa also.

As for jāpitatthā-paññā, it refers to paññā as associated with vipāka-cittas. Here again in the case of the arahanta, it refers to paññā as associated with abhiññās and samāpattis which are attained in relation to ñāṇasampayutta-kiriyacittas

The third division studies the three-fold knowledge with reference to eighty eight sets of three mātikas each. They constitute so many dukas. The first four tikas are from outside the Dhammasangaṇi, and the remaining eighty four are based on certain tikas of the Dhammasangaṇi.

This division of knowledge can be studied in eight vāras. The external mātikas beginning with cintāmaya-paññā and ending with apāyakosallaṁ form the first vāra. The second vāra is formed by fourteen tikas—3, 4, 6, 7, 10, and 16–21—which are given in general form. Then they have been explained with reference to the following special terms—savitakkā-savicārā-paññā, avitakkā-vicāramattā-paññā, pītisahagatā-paññā, sukhasahagatā-paññā and upekkhāsahagatā-paññā. Accordingly savitakkā-savicārā-paññā, considered in relation to thirteen of of the above tikas, with the exception of tika No. 6, forms the third vāra. Avitakkā-vicāramattā-paññā, considered in relation to seven tikas—3, 4, 10, 11, 17, 18, 20,—forms the fourth vāra. Avitakkā-avicārā-paññā, considered in relation to twelve tikas, with the exception of tika Nos. 6 and 12, form the fifth vāra. Pītisahagatā-paññā, considered in relation to thirteen tikas, with the exception of tika No. 7 forms the sixth vāra. Sukhasahagatā-paññā, considered in relation to the same number of tikas as in the preceding vāra, forms the seventh vāra. Last of all, upekkhā, considered in relation to the twelve tikas, with the exception of 6 and 7, forms the eighth vāra. So the tikas of the eight vāras are eighty eight in all.

The fourth division studies the four-fold knowledge with reference to twenty one sets of four mātikas each. The most of the mātikas are both Suttantika and Ābhidhammika in form. The mātikas of this division read as follow :

Catubbidhena ñāṇavatthu : 1–kammassakatañāṇaṁ, saccānulomikañāṇaṁ, maggasamangissa ñāṇaṁ, phalasamangissa ñāṇaṁ. 2—dukkhe ñāṇaṁ, dukkhasamudaye ñāṇaṃ, dukkhaṇirodhe ñāṇaṁ, dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya ñāṇaṁ. 3—kāmāvacara-paññā, rūpāvacara-paññā, arūpāvacara-paññā, apariyāpanna-paññā. 4—dhamme ñāṇaṁ, anvaye ñāṇaṁ, pariye ñāṇaṁ, sammutiñāṇaṁ. 5–atthi paññā ācayāya no apacayāya, atthi paññā apacayāya no ācayāya, atthi paññā ācayāya ceva apacayāya ca, atthi paññā nevācayāya no apacayāya. 6—atthi paññā nibbidāya no paṭivedhāya, atthi paññā paṭivedhāya no nibbidāya, atthi paññā nibbidāya ceva paṭivedhāya ca, atthi paññā no nibbidāya no paṭivedhāya. 7—hānabhāginī paññā, ṭhitibhāginī paññā, visesabhāginī paññā, nibbedhabhāginī paññā. 8—catasso paṭisambhidā. 9—catasso paṭipadā. 10—cattāri ārammaṇāni. 11—jarāmaraṇe ñāṇaṁ, jarāmaraṇasamudaye ñāṇaṁ, jarāmaraṇanirodhe ñāṇaṁ, jarāmaraṇanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya ñāṇaṁ. 12—jātiyā ñāṇaṁ . ...13—bhave ñāṇaṁ......14—upādāne ñāṇaṁ ......15—taṇhāya ñāṇaṁ......16—vedanāya ñāṇaṁ......17—phasse ñāṇaṁ......18—saḷāyatane ñāṇaṁ......19—nāmarūpe ñāṇaṁ......20—viññāṇe ñāṇaṁ......21—saṁkhāresu ñāṇaṁ, saṁkhārasamudaye ñāṇaṁ, saṁkhāranirodhe ñāṇaṁ, saṁkhāranirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya ñāṇaṁ. Evaṁ catubbidhena ñāṇavatthu.

After going through the mātikas it can be seen that groups Nos. 3 and 5 are entirely based on the mātikas of the Dhammasangaṇi. As regards other groups, they may be said to be both Suttantika and Ābhidhammika in form. The first mātika of the first group refers to knowledge of the existence of a moral law, the second to the impermanent nature of the five aggregates, the third to the knowledge of the four ariya.maggas, and the fourth to that of the four ariya-phalas. The second group refers to the knowledge of the four noble truths. The third group refers to the knowledge of the four mental planes. The first mātikā of the fourth group refers to the knowledge of the four maggas and four phalas, the second refers to the knowledge of the fact that the ultimate truth was realised in the past, is realised in the present and will be realised in future only in terms of the four noble truths. The third refers to the knowledge which enables one to read the thoughts of others, and the fourth refers to all forms of knowledge other than those referred to by the preceding three mātikas. The knowledge referred to by the last mātikā is conventional in nature.

In the fifth group the term ācaya means the accumulation of kamma and apacaya the cessation of the same. Accordingly the first mātikā refers to the knowledge of kāmāvacara-kusala which leads to the accumulation of kamma, the second refers to the knowledge of the four ariya-maggas, which leads to the cessation of the same, the third refers to the rūpa and arūpa jhānas which are kusala in nature. When related to the lokiya plane, they lead to the accumulation of kamma. But when related to the lokuttara plane, they lead to the cessation of kamma. Accordingly their knowledge has been explained in two ways. The knowledge of dhammas other than those referred to above leads neither to accumulation nor to cessation of kamma. The first mātikā of the sixth group refers to knowledge which leads only to detachment,[1] but not to the attainment of the abhiññās or the realisation of the four noble truths. The second refers to knowledge which leads to the attainment of the first five abhiññās, but not to detachment[2]. The third refers to knowledge which leads to detachment as well as the attainment of the abhiññās and the realisation of the truths.[3] The knowledge of dhammas, other than the above referred to, leads neither to detachment nor to realisation.

The first mātika of the seventh group refers to that type of knowledge which has a tendency to fall. For instance when one who has attained the first jhāna is overcome by passion, then there is a fall from that state. The second mātikā refers to stability of knowledge. To take the same example, due to mindfulness a person who has attained the first jhāna remains in that state. The third mātikā refers to progress made from one state to another state of knowledge, For instance a person who has attained the first jhāna makes further efforts and attains the second jhāna. The fourth mātikā refers to knowledge which is able to penetrate into the true nature of things. For instance one who is in the first jhāna may meditate on the three characteristics of the composite things and attain the maggas and phalas. This explanation holds good in the case of all the jhānas. The next three groups refer to the paṭisambhidās, paṭipadās and ārammaṇas respectively. The remaining eleven groups are formed by eleven of the paṭiccasamuppāda-angas with the exception of avijjā. Here these angas have been taken in the reverse order. They have all been explained with reference to the four noble truths. In other words, they refer to the knowledge of the four maggasamāpannas who have realised the four truths with reference to the eleven angas. As such all the angas concerned have been explained separately with reference to the four truths.

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[1] Here this reference is to the overcoming of the five nīvaraṇas in the first jhāna..

[2] This refers to fourth jhāna in which the first five abhiññās can be attained. As the five nīvaraṇas have been already overcome in the first jhāna, the question of detachment does not arise here.

[3] This reference is to the sixth abhiññā which culminates in the highest spiritual attainment and the total destruction of desire. vide. V.A., HBS, P. 294.

The fifth divison studies the five-fold knowledge with reference to groups of five mātikas each. The first group studies the functional relation of the five factors–pītipharaṇatā, sukhapharaṇatā, cetopharaṇatā, ālokapharaṇatā and paccavekkaṇā-nimittaṁ to sammāsamādhi. Hence it is known as pañcangiko-samādhi.

Here the first mātikā refers to the knowledge of the pervasion of pīti in two jhānas, the second refers to pervasion of sukha in three Jhānas, the third refers to the knowledge of reading the thoughts of others, the fourth refers to the development of light which gives the divine-eye, the fifth refers to reflection on the object of samādhi just after arising from a certain jhāna.

As regards the second group, the first mātikā refers to the realisation of the fact that samādhi leads to happiness in the present life and happy results in the hereafter, the second refers to the realisation that samādhi is noble and free from sensual pleasures, the third refers to the realisation that samādhi is attained by great beings, the fourth refers to the realisation that samādhi is full of peace, serenity and concentration, the fifth refers to the realisation that one has to attain and rise up from samādhi with mindfulness. All the twenty one mātikās in question have been explained in detail in the niddesa.

The sixth division makes a study of what are known as cha-abhiññā or the six kinds of higher knowledge—the knowledge of performing miracles (iddhividhe ñāṇaṁ), the knowledge of the divine ear (sotadhātu-visuddhiyā ñāṇaṁ), the knowledge of reading the thoughts of others (paracitte ñāṇaṁ), the knowledge of the previous births (pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇaṁ), the knowledge of birth and death of beings (sattānaṁ cutūpapāte ñāṇaṁ) and knowledge that leads to the destruction of the defilements (āsavānaṁ khaye ñāṇaṁ).

The seventh division makes a study of the seven-fold knowledge with reference to the eleven angas of paṭiccasamuppāda—from jarāmaraṇa to saṁkhāra. Here in the first place, the relation between jāti on the one hand and jarāmaraṇa on the other has been taken into consideration. It explains how in the absence of jāti there would not be any ground for the arising of jarāmaraṇa. The knowledge of the two relevant angas has been treated as two-fold in nature. When the study is made with reference to the three periods of time, this knowledge has to be treated as six-fold in nature. When the knowledge of the conditional nature or dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇa of the two aṅgas is taken into consideration, it becomes seven-fold in nature. When all the relevant angas are thus treated, it gives rise to seven-fold eleven sets.

The eighth division studies the eight-fold knowledge with reference to the four maggas and the four phalas.

The ninth division studies the nine-fold knowledge with reference to the nine states of samāpattis beginning with paṭhamajjhāna and ending with saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti.

The tenth division studies the ten-fold knowledge with reference to dasa tathāgata-balāni or the ten powers of a Tathāgata. The explanation given in the Vibhanga may be said to be the most exhaustive account of this topic.

In the study of this section it has to be noted that no distinction has been made between Suttanta-bhājanīya and Abhidhamma-bhājanīya. All the categories, both of sutta and abhidhamma, have been treated together.

KHUDDAKAVATTHU-VIBHANGA—17.

This makes a study of what are known as akusala-dhammas and their associates arranged in the gradual numerical order beginning with groups of one akusala and ending with groups of ten akusalas. In order to complete this study, at the end taṇhā and diṭṭhi have also been taken into consideration. So after the groups of ten there is a break in the numerical order. This vibhanga is also in two parts: mātikā and niddesa. One gives the table of contents in twelve divisions and the other gives elaborate explanations of the same in their numerical order.

The first ten divisions study senventy three, thirty six hundred and two, sixty, seventy five, eighty four, fourty nine, sixty four, eighty one and seventy types of akusaladhammas in groups of one to ten. The eleventh division studies one hundred and eight types of taṇhā or desire. The twelth division only refers to the sixty two types of diṭṭhis or false views as dealt with in the Brahmajāla sutta.

Thus in this vibhanga eight hundred akusala-dhammas have been taken into consideration. In this vibhanga also no distinction has been made between the Suttantika method and the Ābhidhammika method. The reason is that once the nature of the akusala-dhammas is known it is not difficult to determine their place among the categories of the Abhidhamma.

DHAMMAHADAYA-VIBHANGA—18

This vibhanga makes a special study of twelve groups of dhammas in relation to the four dhātus—kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, arūpadhātu and apariyāpannadhātu, and certain other principles. This study has been made in ten vāras or courses.

The first vāra, known as sabbasangāhikavāra, enumerates all the dhammas included in the following twelve groups—khandha, āyatana, dhātu, sacca, indriya, hetu, āhāra, phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta.

The second vāra, known as uppattānuppattidassanavāra, studies as to how many dhammas of the twelve groups are found in each of the four dhātus.

The third vāra, known as pariyāpannāpariyāpannadassanavāra, studies as to how many dhammas of the twelve groups are included and how many are not included in the four dhātus.

The fourth vāra, known an uppattikkhaṇe vijjamānāvijjamānadassanavāra, studies as to how many dhammas of the twelve groups are present at the time of the birth of a being in the first three dhātus. Here apariyāpanna-dhātu does not come into the picture.

The fifth vāra, known as bhummantaravasenadassanavāra, studies as to what dhammas are kāmāvacara and not-kāmāvacara, rūpāvacara and not-rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and not-arūpāvacara, apariyāpanna and not-apariyāpanna. In course of this study, by way of delimitation, the lowest world and the highest world of each of the first three dhātus have been given. In the case of the apariyāpanna-dhātu the question of the world of existence does not arise. So only the dhammas concerned have been shown here.

The sixth vāra, known as uppādakakamma-āyuppamāṇadassanavāra, explains the nature of actions that lead to birth in the different worlds of the three dhātus and the extent of longevity in them. It is such deeds as charity and good conduct that lead to birth in the happy worlds of kāmadhātu. The degree of longevity varies from world to world, It is the relevant types of jhānas that lead to birth in the various worlds of rūpadhātu. and arūpadhātu. In their case also the extent of longevity varies from world to world.

The seventh vāra, known as abhiññeyyādivāra, explains as to how many dhaṁmas of the twelve groups in question are to be understood, how many are to be eliminated, how many are to be cultivated and how many are to be realised.

The eighth vāra, known as sārammaṇārammaṇavāra, studies as to how many dhammmas of the twelve groups are sārammaṇā (have objects), how many are aṇārammaṇa (do not have objects), how many are both sārammaṇārammaṇā and how many are both aṇārammaṇārammaṇā.

The ninth vāra, known as khandhādidhammānaṁ diṭṭhasutādivasena sangahetvā dassanavāra, explains as to how many dhammas of the twelve groups are diṭṭha (seen), how many are suta (heard), how many are muta (smelt, tasted and touched), and how many are Viññāta (only mentally known).

The last and the tenth vāra, known as kusalattikādivasena sangahetvā dassanavāra, explains the dhammas of the twelve groups with reference to the following tikas and dukas—kusalattika, vedanattika, vipākattika, upādinnattika, vitakkattika, rūpaduka and lokiyaduka.

ABBREVIATIONS

A. K.	Abhidharma-Koṣa.
Abhi. Phil.	Abhidhamma Philosophy.
A. K. Vyā.	Abhidharma-Koṣa-Vyākhyā.
A. S.	Aṭṭhasālinī.
N. P.	Nettippakaraṇa.
N. P. A.	Nettippakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā.
PPa. A.	Pañcappakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā.
S. P.	Samantapāsādikā.
V. A.	Vibhanga-Aṭṭhakathā.
V. M.	Visuddhimagga.
V. T.	Vibhāvinī-ṭīkā.
BOS.	Bombay Oriental Series.
COS.	Calcutta Oriental Series.
HBS.	Hevavitarne Bequest Series.
STG.	Sirīpāda Tipiṭaka Ganthamālā.
VTP.	Vidyodaya Ṭīkā Publication.

ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S CONCEPT OF DOṢA

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ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S CONCEPT OF DOṢA

Ānandavardhana, a contemporary of Avantivarman of Kashmir (855-883 A. C.) is by universal consent the promulgator of the Dhvani theory and as such his epoch-making work Dhvanyāloka is made the point of departure from the ancient schools. According to Bhāmaha[1] word and meaning are the basic elements of poetry and their superiority or excellence is constituted by Alaṅkāras since Guṇas and vṛttis are included under Alaṅkāras.[2] In Daṇḍin we come across the distinction of Guṇas and Alaṅkāras. But he regards the Guṇas as the very life of Vaidarbha style[3] and for the matter of poetry as such though the logical basis of differentiation of Guṇas from Alaṅkāras is not formulated by him in explicit form. Vāmana effected this desiderated improvement. He gave the different classification of Guṇas as formal (Śabdaguṇa) or material (Artha-guṇa). These Guṇas[4] constitute according to Vāmana the essence of Rīti or Style. And style in the ultimate analysis consists in the juxtaposition of sound and sense. In Rudraṭa we find a definite advance, in that he incorporated all the elements described by previous writers as Guṇas and Alaṅkāras and adds Rasa as an essential element in addition to the previous categories. Though Rudraṭa laid emphasis on Rasa, he does not definitely accord primacy to it over the other elements. It is in perfect conformity with the position taken up by Rudraṭa that he for the first time gives us the list of defects which detract from Rasa. He sets forth two Rasa-doṣas viz. Abrupt interception of Rasa which makes it inchoate and undeveloped. In other words the failure of development of Rasa to its full stature makes

[1] Śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam, kavyālaṃkāra. I. 16

[2] kāvya-śobhākarān dharmān aḷaṁkāran pracakṣate.
Kāvyādarśa II. 1

[3] iti Vaidarbha-mārgasya prāṇā
daśa gunāḥ smṛtāḥ. Kāvyādarśa I. 42

[4] Kāvya-śobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmāḥ guṇāḥ. Vāmana.

poetry defective and charmless. Another serious defect is according to Rudraṭa the overelaboration of Rasa. It suffers by excess whereas the former by truncated development. Rudraṭa is highly eulogistic of the function of Rasa in poery and one may feel tempted to regard him as the precursor of the modern school in which Rasa became the central essence, nay, the soul of poetry. But Rudraṭa seems unclear regarding the relative status of Rasa, Guṇa and Alaṅkāra. What he lacks is preciseness of conception and definiteness of expression. Rudraṭa is not free from the drawbacks inherent in eclecticism. We find in the Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa of Bhojarāja the same limitation which arises from the eclectic attitude. Though Bhojarāja, king of Dhārā in Mālvā, is the putative author of the work and came long after Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta he has distinctive preference for the old schools. He repudiates the theory of suggestion (Dhvani theory), propounded by Ānandavardhana. In this he seems to be influenced by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, who were proteges of King Muñja, his predecessor. These two were the authors of the Daśarūpaka and its commentry, an excellent work on dramaturgy. Though these two authors gave pre-eminence to Rasa they refuted the contention of Ānandavardhana and his followers that Vyañjanā or Dhvani (suggestion) is the vehicle of Rasa. In the Agni-Purāṇa which is a sort of encyclopaedia we come across a section on Alaṅkāra. The author[1] of this treatise unmistakably criticises Ānandavardhana and seems to be aligned with Bhojaraja. They may be regarded as reactionaries so far as Dhvani theory is concerned.

Ānandavardhana is deservedly admired by the subsequent writers, who consolidated and popularised the Dhvani school as the pre-eminently modern school of thought in poetics. He (Ānandavardhana) has a capacious intellect and comprehensive outlook. He does not ignore the findings of his predecessors and puts them in proper position in relation to Rasa-dhvani.

[1] eṣām ekatamasyaiva samākhyā dhvanir ityataḥ /
Agnipurāṇa, 345, 18.

As we are for the present concerned with the treatment of poetic defects (Kāvya-Doṣa). We have to restrain ourselves from the examination of the merits of the Dhvani theory and the wonderfully synthetic conception of poetry in which the previous speculations on Guṇas, Rītis and Alaṅkāras and vṛttis are all integrated into an organic whole. Ānandavardhana observes that Śabda and Artha (words & expressed meanings) form the body of poetry and Rasa and Bhāva are the soul of it. Guṇas and Alaṅkāras are only contributory elements to Rasa. In fact they derive their utility and charm from Rasa. In so far as they subserve the manifestation of Rasa they are to be considered as useful elements of poetry. Alaṅkāras and Guṇas serve to heighten the capacity of words and meanings for conveying Rasa to the appreciative critics. Apart from the relation of Rasa they have no particular significance and poetical charms. Doṣas are in the same position with Guṇas and Alaṅkāras with reference to Rasa. Doṣas (defects) verbal or meterial are those obstructive factors, which detract from the realization of Rasa. Ānandavardhana is aware of verbal defects (śabda-doṣas) such as *sruti-duṣṭa*[1] (harshness) and unmelodious expressions which produce an unwelcome impression upon the reader and thus fail to rivet the sympathetic attention of the reader to the beauty of poetry. Ānandavardhana has shown that the so-called Guṇas which were supposed by Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha to be concomitant with the juxtaposition of letters and words are in reality bound up with Rasa. Thus the quality of sweetness (Mādhurya) is opposite to the Raudra the sentiment of anger and the like. The quality called Ojas which is unfolded by spirited diction characterised by long compounds is really worthy of acceptance because it helps the manifestation of sentiment such as Raudra, the sentiment of anger. Alaṅkāras too have direct relevance to word (*śabda*) and meaning (*Artha*) which are made fit vehicles for different sentiments. All the beauty and charm that have been credited to Alaṅkāras are really derived from their competency to suggest the Rasa. Similarly defects are to be shunned because they hinder the realisation of Rasa. The defects have been shown to be eternal and necessary (Nitya) and also ephemeral (Anitya) according as they prove to be obnoxious or innocuous. Thus harsh sounds are defects only in relation to the sentiments of love (Śṛṅgāra) and the like. But outside these sentiments they are not regarded as defects, because they do not spoil the sentiment. On the contrary they are quite in keeping with such sentiments as the heroic (vīra) and the furious (Raudra). Old writers such as Bhāmaha noticed that these Doṣas are not universal but they could not seize hold of the secret. It is from relation to the sentiment which is suggested by the words and meanings that these Doṣas derive their *raison d'etre.* This classification of defects as universal and occasional is capable of explanation only in the Dhvani theory. Dhvani is the suggested meaning and is shown to be of three types viz. Vastu (Matter of fact), Ālaṅkāra (figures of speech) and Rasa (sentiment). It is the last type which is the Dhvani *par. excellence.*[1] The two other types are only possessed of relative value because they are independent of the expressed meaning (vācyārtha), while they culminate in Rasa. It is only the emotive value of poetry which gives it a distinctive character. Poetry is not an intellectul discourse nor is it a mere historical account of events. Because it evokes an emotional response in a man of aesthetic taste and sense of beauty, poetry has exercised an eternal influence upon the human mind. Historical truth, fidelity to the events of nature and consistency and harmony with the accepted conclusions of science and philosophy cannot be over-ridden by the poet, since this act of infringement will make the poet's work appear as unreal non-sense. The poet's approach to truth is from an angle of vision which is different from that of the scientist, historian and philosopher. The poet's appeal is to the heart and not particularly to the intellect. But, as we have just said the poet cannot give a wide berth to the truths discovered by the different disciplines without running the risk of being suspected of ignorance ending in the creation of a fantastical picture. This will stultify the poet's mission. We must be made to feel that Rāma, Sītā and Rāvaṇa were real persons. The beauty of the Kādambarī cannot be appreciated unless the reader is persuaded of the reality of Candrāpīda, Kādambarī and Mahasvetā. It is for this reason that the writers of Sanskri t poetics (Alaṅkāra śāstra) have laid due emphasis upon Vyutpatti i. e. intellectual equipment of the poet.

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[1] śruti-duṣṭādayo doṣā anityā ye ca darśitāḥ / dhvanyātmany, eva śṛṅgāre te heyā ity udāhṛtāḥ //—D. L. II. 11.

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[1] Tena rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalaṃkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasam prati Paryavasyete. Locana P. 85.

The chief merit of Ānandavardhana lies in the harmonization of the truths discovered by previous writers following the rule of thumb in a hierarchy of poetic values in which Rasa occupies the uppermost position. Defects are defects only if they have an adverse effect upon the evolution of the sentiment. The Guṇas and Alaṅkāras are not mere embellishments of diction or the brute facts conveyed by them. They are regarded as things of value in so far as they contribute to the manifestation of the emotive properties of poetry. If poetry does not produce an emotional effect it ends in failure. In conformity with these fundamental laws of poetry Ānandavardhana formulates only defects which retard or spoil the realization of Rasa. In one word he deals with Rasa-doṣas alone and leaves to subsequent writers the task of a comprehensive treatment of poetic faults. This task was performed with consummate ability by Mammaṭabhaṭṭa in his classical work *Kāvyaprakāśa.*

It may not be out of place to advert to certain sage observations of Ānandavardhana regarding the choice of appropriate words. In the sentiment of love harsh sounds must be avoided. Moreover long compounds should be studiously shunned. The poet must not aim at creating skilful feats of verbal jugglery which are pre-eminently exemplified by such artificial figures as yamaka[1] etc. The attention of both the poets and readers is diverted from the central thing to the task of unravelling the tangle of words. Even poets of acknowledged superiority could not resist the temptation of exhibiting their skill in the manipulation of strange words. These verbal tricks are nothing but legerdemain. The poet must not deliberately divert his attention to the creation of figures of speech but only concentrate on the use of words and meanings, acts and events, which have particular bearing on Rasa. If figures of speech come out spontaneously without requiring special attention and effort for that purpose they are to be accepted.[1] The language of the poet must conform to the sentiment. If the diction is out of tune with the Rasa it is convicted of inappropriateness (*Anaucitya*). Ānandavardhana specifies the different varieties of poetic compositions such as prose, romances, epics, drama and lyrics. He gives salutory instruction regarding the use of proper diction. He is not tired of harping on the appropriateness of diction to the sentiment.

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[1] dhvany'ātmabhute śṛngāre yamaka 'di nivandhanam, śaktā-vapi—pramāditvam vipralambhe viśeṣataḥ.—D. L. II. 15,

The story or the plot may be borrowed from the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇa or may be entirely invented by the poet himself. The plot however is to be managed and adjusted in such a way as all the incidents do converge on the realization of the principal Rasa or sentiment. The poet need not indiscriminately record all the facts of the story when it is borrowed from the Rāmāyaṇa or the Mahābhārata, which are regarded as the store-house by all poets. The poet must exercise his discretion in omitting what is antagonistic to his purpose and should exercise his liberty to create any episode in conformity with the principal Rasa. The playwright must not slavishly follow the directions of the dramaturgical works. These directions are rather provisional and not universal. Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa in the second act of the Veṇīsaṃhāra introduces a love scene in obedience to the direction of Bharata. This is an instance of lapse from propriety. The incident ought to be so adjusted as not to lose their remote or immediate bearing on and relevancy to Rasa. For this purpose also there should be appropriate stimulation and suppression of the relevant and irrelevant sentiments. The principal sentiment must not be lost sight of and if by pressure of circumstances it may be shoved to the background for the time being, it must be revived and kept in the foreground, as soon as the occasion arises.

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[1] Rasākṣiptatayā yasya bandhaḥ śakyakriyo bhavet, apṛthag yatna-nirvartyaḥ so'laṃkāro dhvanau mataḥ.—D. L. II. 16,

Ānandavardhana properly elaborates this idea in the commentary on the kārikās 10-14. The *vibhāva* i. e. the hero and heroine and environment, the abiding sentiment, the passing emotions all should be so depicted and the acts and words should be so adjusted as they should form as a whole an organic expression of principal sentiment. The acts and words must not strike the reader as something inappropriate or absurd. The principal character may be a divine being or an ordinary human, It will be the height of impropriety if supernatural acts are attributed to a mere human being. So if a human being is described as crossing the seven oceans and doing such other impossible feats this will only spoil the sentiment in spite of the graceful description of the poet. There are of course found anecdotes which are impossible for a human being however great or exalted he may be. Thus the description of king Sātavāhana as visiting the region of the divine Nāgas (serpents) strikes one as gross exaggeration and as false account. The element of verisimilitude is essential for the sympathetic appreciation of Rasa. Task of verisimilitude offends against the rules of propriety and ultimately ends in fiasco.[1] As regards the five Pāṇḍava brothers, they are neither entirely human nor entirely divine but a combination of both. So the supernatural exploits credited to them do not offend the aesthetic sense. Abhinavagupta observes that only those events are to be described and depicted which do not give a jolt to the aesthetic sense of the reader.[2] Thus when one describes that a king who is merely a

[1] anaucityat ṛte nānyat rasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam /
prasiddhaucityabandhas tu rasasyopaniṣat parā //

[2] yatra vineyānām pratīti khaṇḍanā na jāyate tādṛg varṇaniyam.—Locana, p. 331.

human being, crosses the seven seas, it at once strikes the reader or audience as absurd and so it fails to produce the edifying effects upon the audience. About Rāmacandra and the like there is a long standing tradition behind them which does not allow it to break the sense of verisimilitude. But the poet must be on his guard against the description of such super-human exploits to a character which is created by him *ad hoc.*

Ānandavardhana is never tired of emphasizing the supreme fact that the poet should concentrate all his efforts and resources on the creation of Rasa. The Indian concept of Rasa is equivalent to the European concept of beauty. As Keats says "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever". Beauty unrealised in experience is as good as non-existent and when realised and enjoyed it is indistinguishable from what the writers on poetics have described as Rasa. Of course Bhāmaha has spoken of *cārutā* which is nothing but beauty. Vāmana also has observed that peotry is acceptable when it is possessed of Alaṅkāra (embellishment). This embellishment is defined as beauty. But whereas the ancient writers were persuaded that the beauty of poetry derives from sonorous sounds (Guṇas) and clever turns of speech (Alaṅkāras) which constitute poetic figure, Ānandavardhana first discovered for us the philosophy of beauty. He has shown that sound and clever manipulation of words and meanings have by themselves no absolute value. Their value is relative to their efficiency in contributing to the creation of Rasa, which is a unique experience of aesthetic pleasure entirely distinct and different from the pleasure accruing from the satisfaction of material needs. It stands in a class of its own with which the fleeting pleasures of senses have nothing in common. This Rasa is a kind of spiritual experience and is more akin to the experience of the divine joy of the mystic. Just as beauty springs from the symmetrical adjustment of the physical ingredients, as for example, pieces of stone or wood or colour, or canvas, so also Rasa arises from the co-ordination of Vibhāvas (heroes or heroines (dramatic personae) and the fitting natural environment) and a dominant passion (sthāyibhāva) which is never submerged by the influx of passing emotions (*vyabhicāri-bhāvas*) and their expression in physical medium (*Anubhāva*). The ultimate resultant is the arousal of a pervasive sentiment of joy in the minds of the appreciative experience and this is called *Rasa.*

1. The plot, which develops through a series of events both favourable and unfavourable, is only the physical medium through which Rasa has to unfold itself. Ānandavardhana has given a few sage observations regarding the fit use of events and incidents which should not mar verisimilitude. He refers to the *Ratnāvalī* in which the plot progressively adjusts itself to the evolution of Rasa. Apart from the propriety and verisimilitude of the story of events and vicissitudes, the poet must take particular pains to avoid the creation of sentiments which are destructive of one another.[1] This is the first condition. Apt illustrations are given. In describing a vibhāva (a character) who is characterised by the sentiment of quietude (*śāntarasa*) arising from the realization of the futility of material advantages and pleasures, the poet must not introduce the sentiment of love as developed by the same person. Again when there is misunderstanding or the heroine is offended by a real or fancied misbehaviour of her lover the lover should not be made to appease her anger by description of the futility of worldly things. Similarly the hero must not lose his temper and put forth gestures of fury when the beloved is obdurate. The breach of this rule constitutes the flaw called mutual hostility of sentiments.

2. Too much elaboration of even of relevant things constitutes a drawback. If for instance the poet in course of his delineation of love in separatton (*vipralambha sṛṅgāra*) dwells on the beauty of hill or natural scene with extra-ordinary verve and gusto and employs difficult metres and figures like *yamaka* it

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[1] virodhi-rasa-sambandhi-vibhāvādi-parigrahaḥ /
vistareṇā 'nvitasyā'pi vastuno'nyasya varṇanam //
D. L. III. 18.

will spoil the aesthetic effect. Kālidāsa's Meghadūta is a perfect example of poetic art and the portrayal of scenic beauties which abound in it, but it does not hamper the evolution of love. There is a continuous shift of scenes but all are made to converge on the central theme, the indomitable desire for union of the hero with his sweet heart. The creation of art requires a relentless self-restraint and the poet has to avoid the description of the career of persons in whom both the poets and the readers may be deeply interested. For instance in the Abhijñāna-Śakuntala the poet does not care to cater to the cravings of the reader or the audience by describing the fortunes of Priyaṃvadā and Anasūyā. Bhavabhūti does not satisfy our curiosity regarding Ūrmilā the spouse of Lakṣmaṇa. Like-wise Bāṇabhaṭṭa does not interest himself in the career of Patralekhā, who is only used as a foil to Kādamabrī. If the poet yielded to the importunities of the readers he could not create a work of art. In other words the performance would have no beauty and consequently no Rasa.

3. The interruption and resuscitation of suspended Rasa in unseasonable moments.[1] Ānandavardhana gives a hypothetical case. Suppose that the love between hero and heroine is fully developed and each is satisfied with the reciprocation of the other, the hero is found to occupy himself with something else. This means abrupt interruption of the development of the sentiment. Analogously the description of the frivolous love episode in the second act of the Veṇīsaṁhāra between Duryodhana and Bhānumatī in the tense situation of heightened heroic sentiment is an instance of inexcusable impropriety. Ānandavardhana observes that such lapses on the part of poets occur on account of their pre-occupation with the plot or slavish conformation to the directives of text-book writers. The poet forgets that it is his principal mission to create beauty and Rasa.

4. Furthermore if a poet has succeeded in the creation of Rasa to its fullest development and again takes it up and dwells

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[1] akāṇḍa eva vicchittir akaṇḍe ca prakāśanam.

D. L. P. 361.

upon it with great avidity it will end in stultification of Rasa, just like a beautiful flower crumpled and withered by over-much manipulation.

5. The inappropriateness in speech and conduct and also of the styles of composition such as *Kaiśikī, Bhāratī* etc., which are contributories to the development of Rasa. If for instance the hero imitates the conduct of vulgar persons in expressing his desire for the enjoyment of the heroine's company, that will spoil the whole aesthetic effect and alienate the sympathy of the audience. Even a poet like Kālidāsa is found to be guilty of excess in the delineation of grief (*śoka*) of Rati, the spouse of Madana (God of love). But the poet's perfect craftsmanship does not make the reader feel an unwelcome jerk or cloyed by the surfeit of grief. But poets of lesser ability must avoid this temptation. The secret of art as we have observed before, lies in self control. He must never lose sight of the truth that too much even of a good thing produces unhealthy reaction.

But it is found that even opposite sentiments are introduced by a poet and yet it does not spoil the æsthetic effect or interfere with the development of principal sentiments. It is inevitable that events in life do not run a smooth course. There are jolts and jerks even in the best ordered life of a man. Our plans are found to be thwarted by unexpected obstacles and sometimes the visitation of ill-luck creates a stalement. For instance in the Abhijnāna-Śakuntalam the rejection of the expostulation of Śakuntalā and her relations by the King Duṣyanta and the disappearance of Śakuntalā create a void and reduce the king to an irredeemable sense of despair. The course of the love is snapped. But the pathos of the king's situation evokes feelings of commiseration in the audience. Certainly love is here baffled by pathos. But this is only a temporary set-back, ultimately love triumphs and the couple are united. Accordingly Ānandavardhana with his extra-ordinary

[1] Paripoṣam gatasyāpi paunaḥ punyena dīpanam/
ṛasasya syād virodhāya vṛtyanaucityam eva ca //

aesthetic sense and critical acumen observes that the conflict of sentiment does not mar the aesthetic effect if the opposite situation is to be worsted by or made subservient to the principal. Thus in the illness emaciation and the pining of the lovers in separation owing to obstruction of their union do not produce a destructive effect if they are shown to be temporary phases or act as a foil to the principal sentiment of love. If there is re-union the opposition of pathetic sentiment only serves to heighten the intensity and purity of love. If there is death of either lover it will mean tragedy. This is not a fault if the poet intends to create the pathetic sentiment (*karuṇa-Rasa*) and the tragic end is the logical expedient to it. But this is certainly out of place and inopportune if the sentiment of love be the dominant key-note. If there is death there should be a hope of re-union after reasonable lapse of time. This is found to be the case in the *Kādambarī*. The flame of love is not extinguished because there is assurance of the re-union of lovers. In the *Raghuvaṃśa* the death of Indumatī makes king Aja perfectly desolate and no amount of consolation succeeds in saving his life. But after death the king and the queen are reunited in heaven. Ānandavardhana gives illustration both from long epics and novels and also from solitary verses. In all such cases the conflict is temporary and provisional. Ultimately the principal sentiment gains the upper hand. There will be naturally different sentiments of conflicting nature, but one sentiment should be made the dominant key-note. If the opposite sentiments do not tend to destroy or neutralize the principal sentiment there is no shock to the aesthetic sense.

There are sentiments which are not inherently hostile to one another. For instance, the Vīra (the heroic) and Sṛṅgāra (the erotic); Sṛṅgāra and Hāsya Rasa (the comic); the Raudra (the furious) and Vīra Rasa (the heroic); and also Raudra (the furious) and Adbhuta Rasa (and the wonderful) are not constitutionally opposed to each other. The cause of love is subserved by the heroic when the hero'a prowess culminates in the acquisition of the lady-love. Comic scenes and witticisms are obviously conducive to the growth of love. Even the furious (Raudra) ends in the winning of the hand of the bride and thus subserves the erotic; but there should not be any expression of anger or cruelty to the heroine the heroic (Vīra-Ṛasa) may culaminate in wonder by its achievements. Of course this is not true of all sentiments. There is conflict between the erotic and the loathsome, heroism and cowardice, the furious and the erotic. There is innate hostility and incompatibility between these pairs. But the conflict is overcome if the other sentiment is not allowed to reach optimum development. Ānandavardhana quotes a verse[1] "The beloved is weeping in one corner and there the bugle of battle is ringing, the soldier's heart is tossed between love for his wife and his enthusiasm for the fight".

Here neither of the sentiments is given the upper hand. Even in long poems of epical dimension or a full-length drama the conflict is overcome by allowing the subordinate position to opposite sentiments. As regards the opposition of sentiments in one medium it can be avoided if they are distributed between different persons. Thus the courage of hero and cowardice of the opponent even if developed to the maximum level do not give rise to conflict. Again, the conflict between two hostile sentiments can be overcome if a sentiment agreeable to both is introduced in the interval[1]. Thus in the Nāgānanda of Śrī-Harṣa the development of love on the part of the hero who is by nature inclined to asceticism is overcome by the introduction of the sentiment of wonder in between. This also holds good in stray verses. A poet describes the fate of fallen soldiers in a battle in the following way[2]. "They are adorned with garlands of

[1] ekaśrayatve nirdoṣo nairantarye virodhavān /
rasāntara-vyavadhina raso vyaṅgyaḥ sumedhasā //
D. L. II, 26.

[2] bhu-reṇu-digdhān-nava-parijāta-mālārajo-vāsita-bāhu-madhyāḥ/
gāḍham śivābhiḥ parirabhyamaṇan surāṅganā-śliṣṭa-bhujāntarālāḥ, etc.
D. L. p- 395.

Pārijāta (of heavenly flowers) and they look upon their dead bodies dragged by jackals while they are tightly embraced by celestial damsels and so on."

Here there is description of the love and the loathsome in the same person. But the conflict is overcome by the introduction of the heroic in the interval.

Ānandavardhana winds up the discourse by offering certain wholesome admonitions. The poet must avoid conflict which is calculated to destroy the principal sentiment. He must be particularly on his guard in delineation of love which is the tenderest and most delicate of all. A slight opposition is enough to destroy it. The poet must be very careful and alert with regard to this particular sentiment. A slight deviation caused by loss of vigil and inadvertance will result in a fiasco.

NATURE IN THE THERAGĀTHĀ

Professor Ang Raj Chaudhary, M. A.

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NATURE IN THE THERAGĀTHĀ

'Solitude in the sense of being often alone,' says John Stuart Mill, 'is essential to any depth of meditation or character.' This reflection came from a mind agonised a monstrous deal by disastrous results that followed in the wake of the great phenomenon in England known popularly as the Industrial Revolution. The Victorian life was 'with its sick hurry, its divided aims,'[1] and naturally, therefore, the philosophers of that age sought refuge in the healing solitude. Mill was long ago anticipated by Lord Buddha who seeing sufferings and miseries in the world which is in constant flux and where there is nothing permanent, made Arhatship as his ideal and betrayed a predilection for solitude, "and that not within walls, but away in the forest." 'Formerly I did not live at ease, being troubled by those litigious, contentious, quarrelsome disputatious Bhikkhus of Kosambī, the constant raisers of questions before the Saṃgha. But now being alone and without a companion I live pleasantly and at ease remote from those litigious, contentious, quarrelsome disputatious Bhikkhus of Kosambi, the constant raisers of questions before the Saṃgha.'[2] And 'thus the noble one and the noble, the elephant tusked with tusks like cart poles (and the noble one among men) the mind of the one and the mind of the other harmonise in this, that they take delight in dwelling alone in the forest'.[3] Suttanta also bears out that the members of the Order were advised to cultivate the art of solitude. 'If a Bhikkhu should desire, Brethren, by the complete destruction of the three Bonds to become converted, to be no longer liable to be reborn in a state of suffering, and to be assured of final salvation, let him then fulfil all righteousness, let him be devoted to that quietude of heart which springs from within, let

[1] Matthew Arnold—*The Scholar Gypsy.*

[2] *Vinay Texts* (*Sacred Books of the East*—Max Müller), Part II p. 312.

[3] Ibid. 313-14.

him not drive back the ecstasy of contemplation, let him look through things, let him be much alone.'[1] The founder of the Monastic Order had tasted the advantages of solitude and on more than one occasion explained them to the Bhikkhus and warned them. 'Now have I made this clear to you. Here, Bhikkhus, are the roots of trees, here are empty places. Meditate, be earnest lest hereafter ye regret.'[2]

It is therefore quite natural that the members of the Order too, should betray the same predilection. In the *Theragāthā* which is a collection of the psalms of the Brethren as the Therigāthā is of the Sisters, a number of Theras have sung the praises of solitude.

> Delightful are the forests, where no crowd
> Doth come to take its pleasure ; there will they
> Who are released from passions find there joy.
> Not seekers they for sense-satiety.[3]

They realised that many were the distracting elements in the mundane life and they would not let them concentrate and meditate and achieve the tranquillity of mind and serenity of soul.

Therefore what was utterly needed was to go far away from the madding crowd, because it was only solitude which would provide the most congenial atmosphere for practising meditation. Tissa-Kumāra, the youngest brother of the king Dhammāsoka was fed up with the court life. He disliked the sycophants, courtiers and the soldiers and longed to be rid of them. One day he saw the Greek Thera, Mahā Dhamma Rakkhita seated under a tree and was so impressed that his longing to live in the forest multiplied several times. This story is told in the *Mahāvaṃsa*. Longing for the happiness of the recluse, he uttered the following gāthā.

[1] Ākaṅkheyya Sutta : *Sacred Books of the East*. Ed. Max Müller Vol. XI.

[2] *Majjhim*, I, 118.

[3] रमणीया अरञ्ञानि, यत्थ न रमती जनो,
वीतरागा रमिस्सन्ति न ते कामगवेसिनो ।

'If there be none in front, nor none behind
Be found, is one alone in the woods
Exceeding pleasant doth his life become.'[1]

But one thing is of vast importance to notice here. Did the Exalted One advise all to retire into solitude? Did he prescribe even to the novice to cultivate the art of living in solitude? No, in fact, only the Arhat is pronounced to be really fit to dwell in such solitudes. The Master knew that in the Order there were persons of various temperaments and solitude could not be prescribed to all, Subhūti says : —

'When lustful thoughts arise within my heart,
Examining myself alone I beat them down.
Thou who art by lust excited, who by things
That give offence, allowest of offence,
Feeling bewildered when strange things occur,
Thou shouldst retire far from the lonely woods.
For they are the dwelling place of men made pure.
Austere in life, free from the stains of sin
Defile not that pure place, Leave thou the Woods.'[2]

Subhūti seems to say here categorically that the woods are not for one who has not achieved self-control. Only he can live in the woods whose is 'heart thoroughly purged and well-composed.'

'But they who in the bosom of the hills
Sit with heart thoroughly purged and well-composed,
Like to so many lions crouching still,

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[1] पुरतो पच्छतो वापि अपरो चे न विज्जति,
अतीव फासु भवति एकस्स वसतो वने ॥

[2] रागू'पसहितं चित्तं यदा उप्पज्जते मम,
सयमेव पच्चवेक्खित्वा एकको तं दमेम'हं ॥
रज्जते रजनीयेसु दुस्सनीयेसु दुस्सति,
मुय्हते मोहनीयेसु निक्खमस्सु वना तुरं ॥
विसुद्धानं अयं वासो निम्मलानं तपस्सिनं,
मा खो विसुद्धं दूसेसि निक्खमस्सु वना तुरं'ति ॥

Are vauquishers over the creeping dread,
White-minded, pure, serene and undefiled.'[1]

What I have said above will serve as a necessary prolegomena to what I shall say in the following pages. That the members of the Order loved Nature is evinced by the utterances of a large number of Theras. The *Theragāthā* is a collection of such utterances and, therefore, it is a supreme record of the feelings, emotions, the thrilling sensations of joy which they derived from solitude and from the hundred thousand objects of Nature, while they practised meditation.

Primarily, the *Theragāthā* is a monumental work in the whole of Pāli literature as it is a record of the psalms of the Brethren who had broken the ten fetters[2], who had become thoroughly purged from every kind of taint, who enjoyed the tranquillity of mind and finally, who had realised the Nibbāna, the ultimate goal and the *summum bonum* of life according to Buddhist Ethics. But it is not only this. It is a *tour de force* from yet another point of view which is literary and æsthetic. The spiritual songs which are undoubtedly superb also record the Theras' love of and admiration for Nature. They have, not perhaps incidentally, described the sights and sounds of Nature very feelingly and so Winternitz is perfectly right in saying that the gāthās are the real gems of Indian lyric poetry[3]. Some of the Theras are evidently gifted with poetic talent and among the motives urging them to seek solitude a poetic gift may very well have counted[4]. And that is why even if they renounced the world, they could not be able to afford to be æsthetically insensitive and unresponsive towards Nature. They sat in the lap of Nature, drank deep the beauty and experienced the myriad sensations coming from the different objects of Nature. But it is very important to note that their love of Nature is not like Keats. These Thera-poets would not have agreed with John Cowper Powys who says, "One ought to touch it, to taste it, to embrace it, to eat it, to drink it, to make love to it"[1]. And by 'it' he means Nature.

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[1] ये सिता गिरिगब्भरं, पहितत्ता समाहिता
पुथूसीहाव सल्लीना, लोमहंसाभिसम्भुनो
ओदातमनसा सुद्धा, विप्पसन्नमनाविला ॥
दीधनिकाय [महासमयसुत्तं] १९०

[2] कामराग, भवराग, पटिध, मान, दिट्ठि, सीलब्बतपरामास
विचिकिच्छा, इस्सा, मच्छरिय, अविज्जा ।

[3] Winternitz : *History of Indian Literature* Vol. II.

[4] C. A. F. Rhys Davids : Introduction to *The Psalms of the Brethren.*

These Thera-poets did not solely cultivate the art of self-expression. It will be far from truth to say that they practised art for art's sake. On the other hand they made it subservient to the great theme of their life—the realisation of Nibbāna. No doubt, they had the capacity to appreciate the beauties of Nature but they never forgot that happiness which was yielded by 'beholding the Norm' far excelled any derived from the natural scenery.

Not music's fivefold wedded sounds can yield
Such charm as comes over him who with a heart
Intent and calm rightly beholds the Norm.[2]

But yet the *Theragāthā* remains a unique literary work in the entire extant Pāli literature.

Although the love of Nature and therefore the description thereof is scattered in Pāli literature, the *Theragāthā* is the only book wherein we get it in abundance. Among the *Jātakas*, the Vessantara Jātaka is important for the realistic descriptions of Nature. Here the flora and fauna of Himvanta region have been described at length.

When you shall hear the rivers roar, the fairy creatures sing
Believe me, you will clean forget that ever you were king.

[1] J. C. Powys: *Culture and Nature.*

[2] पञ्चङ्गिकेन तुरियेन न रति होति तादिसी।
यथा एकग्गचित्तस्स सम्मा घम्मं विपस्सतोति ॥

Rhinoceros and buffalo, that make the woodland ring
Lion and Tiger—You'll forget that ever you were king.
When on the mountain top you see the peacock dance and spring
Before the pea-hens, you'll forget that ever you were king.
When in the winter you behold the trees all flowering.
Waft their sweet odours, you'll forget that ever you were king
When in the winter you behold the plants all flowering
The *bimbajāla, kūṭaja* and lotus, scattering
Abroad their odours, you'll........................[1]

The description of Nature here is realistic and it is not this kind of treatment of Nature which the *Theragāthā* is important for. As a matter of fact, it stands supreme from all in that kind of description of Nature which Ruskin calls the Pathetic fallacy. The poet-Theras credit Nature with their emotions. When the peacocks call, it seems to *Cittaka* that they wake him from his noonday sleep to set himself to thought profound and religious.

Peacocks of sapphire neck and comely crest
Calling, calling in *Kāraṃviya* woods;
By cool and humid winds made musical:
They wake the thinker from his noonday sleep.[2]

Such descriptions and the like are characteristics of the *Theragāthā* and this excellent merit of the book earns for it a place supremely important in all the literatures of the world, more so in Pali Literature where there is much of philosophy and ethics. Even if the *Theragāthā* be regarded as a collection of the spiritual songs, it will nevertheless ever remain a unique literary feat wherein the Theras have recorded their æsthetic feelings and vibrations of the fine chords of their hearts. It will not be an exaggeration to say that the *Theragāthā*, the *Therīgāthā*, and perhaps a few other books are the only oases in the vast dry land of Pali literature. And this quality of the Theras that they had a love of Nature and they expressed it adds to rather than detracts from the spritual and literary merits.

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[1] यदा सोस्ससि निग्घोसं सन्दमानाय सिंधुया।
गीतं किम्पुरिसानञ्च न रज्जस्स सरिस्ससि ॥
यदा सीहस्स व्यग्घस्स खगस्स गवयस्स च।
वने सोस्ससि वाळानं न रज्जस्स सरिस्ससि ॥
यदा मोरीहि परिकिण्णं वरिहिनं मत्थकासिनं।
मोरं दक्खिसि नच्चन्तं न रज्जस्स सरिस्ससि ॥
यदा दक्खिसि हेमन्ते पुप्फिते धरनीरुहे।
सुरभिसम्पवायन्ते न रज्जस्स सरिस्ससि ॥
यदा हेमन्तिके मासे हरितं दक्खिसिमेदिनिं।
इन्दगोपकसंच्छन्नं न रज्जस्स सरिरससि ॥

[2] नीला सुगीवा सिखिनो मोरा कारंवियं अभिनदन्ति,
ते सीतवातकलिता सुत्तं झायं निवोधेन्तीति ॥

This quality of the *Theragāthā* takes us back to the prehistoric days when the hymns of the Vedas were composed and shows that the tradition of describing Nature in Indian literature remained uninterrupted. In the Vedas which are regarded by Winternitz 'as the oldest Indian and, at the same time the oldest Indo-European literary monument',[1] Nature has been described at length, although quite differently. This difference is due to the different attitude. In the Vedic age the philosophical speculation had just begun and the people who interpreted every phenomenon of Nature in terms of anger and pleasure of gods had to glorify, worship, invoke and above all propitiate them. They worshipped the starry sky of night, the roaring storms, the flowing water of rivers and the clouds. They addressed hymns to them.

Some of the hymns in the *Ṛgveda* which have been addressed to Dawn or to Vāta or to Savitā will ever be valued as works of poetic art. These are really the 'pearls of lyric poetry which appeal to us as much through their fine comprehension of the beauties of Nature as through their flowery language'.[1] Magnificent metaphors have been brought in to depict the splendour of the rising Dawn.

"The radiant Dawns have risen up for glory in their white
splendour like the waves of waters

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[1] Winternitz : *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, p. 91.

She maketh paths all easy, fair to travel, and, rich, hath
shown herself benign and friendly.
We see that thou art good : far shines thy lustre ; thy beams
thy splendours have flown up to heaven
Decking thyself, thou makest bare thy bosom, shining in majesty,
thou Goddess Morning.[1]

The method in such descriptions is to personify Nature, as Dawn has been personified here. Homer and Shakespeare, too, have adopted the same method. We shall do well to compare the above description of the Dawn with that of Shakespeare's. Nowhere in the literatures of world such magnificent and splendorous description of Dawn can be seen.

But, look, the morn, in russet mantle clad
Walks over the dew of yon high eastward hill[2].

The psalms of the *Theragāthā* were composed at too later a date and the Theras do not exhibit that kind of curiosity as we find in the hymns of the Vedas. And this is quite natural. These Theras made Arhatship the ideal of their life and it would have been a sheer waste of time and energy and poetic talent to indulge in such descriptions. Such descriptions, therefore, are almost absent in the Theragāthā. It will not be out of place to point out here that no Thera has written anything about the 'Dawn'. The 'Brāhmavelā' has been glorified by all and sundry as the most suitable time for spiritual practice. Even Henry David Thoreau, the American philosopher speaks in praise of it. Then wasn't it a congenial time for the Buddhist monks to practise meditation ? Or why is it that the glorious and splendorous Dawns have not attracted them ? I think, if some of the Theras would have noticed the beauty of the Dawn and would have been attracted by it as they were by the dancing and springing peacocks of variegated plumes and

[1] . उदु श्रिय उषसो रोचमाना अस्थुरपां नोर्मयो रुशन्तः
कृणोति विश्वो सुपथो सुगान्यभूदु वस्वी दक्षिणा मघोनी । etc.

[2] Shakespeare : *Hamlet.*

by the graceful sailing of the clouds in the sky there would have been some more æsthetically superb lyrics in the collection.

But there is no denying that the Theras were deeply associated with Nature. They reveal a remarkable love for the hills and caves, for the rivers and the groves and for the forests. And naturally, therefore, 'they delight in lingering over the descriptions of the forest and mountain scenery in the midst of which the solitary sage pursues his meditation.'[1] In course of their practising meditation either in a well-roofed hut or in a hut without a roof over it they directly experienced the change of season. Moreover, the magnificent landscapes formed by the change of colour in the sky filled their hearts with immense pleasure. And they garbed their reactions to these myriad forms of Nature in words. There are several descriptions of this kind in the *Theragāthā*, It is raining without and the Bhikkhu is sitting within. He utters the following gāthā.

> Well-roofed and pleasant is my little hut,
> And screened from winds. Rain, at thy will, thou god !
> My heart is well-composed, my heart is free
> And ardent is my mood, Now rain, god rain.[2]

He is not afraid of the rains, nor does he regard them as distracting. He is calm and tranquil within. The rains outside can do him no harm, now that he has withdrawn himself to contemplation. Girimānanda expresses this feeling in more beautiful words.

> God rains as't were a melody most sweet.
> Snug is my little hut, sheltered, well-roofed.
> Therein I dwell, my heart serene and calm.
> Now an it pleaseth thee to rain, god, rain.[3]

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[1] Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature, vol. II, p. 107.*

[2] छन्ना मे कुटिका सुखा निवाता, वस्स देव यथासुखं ;
चित्तं मे सुसमाहितं विमुत्तं, आतापी विहरामि, वस्स देवा' ति ॥

[3] वस्सति देवो यथा सुगीतं, छन्ना मे कुटिका सुखा निवाता ।
तस्सं विहरामि वूपसन्तो, अथ चे पत्थयसि पवस्स देव ॥

The falling rains have been compared here with a sweet melody. This is a beautiful simile and a marvellous achievement of the Thera in matters of verbal expression. He lives in a hut roofed over, probably, with straw, so the falling rains cant make any harsh sound and the comparison of the rains with a melody is an apt one. It is a 'metaphysical conceit' which has been defined by Dr. Johnson as 'the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together'. And yet how closely observed and realised this simile is! This gāthā can very well be compared with some of the modern poems.[1]

The rainy season provides the most congenial atmosphere for practising meditation. The graceful sailing of the clouds in the sky, the rolling of the thunder, the falling rains, the calling of the peacocks etc. help create a suitable atmosphere for meditation. It is here that we find a striking difference of attitude between the Sanskrit poets headed by Vālmīki and Kālidāsa and these Theras. With the advent of the rainy season the Yakṣa finds it very difficult to bear the pangs of separation and so he requests the clouds to be his messenger. Vālmīki, too, describes the agitated state of Rāma who is separated from Sītā. That the rains and the clouds stimulate erotic passion has more or less become a poetic convention and have been described in that light by many.[2] Even Tualsīdāsa could not help expressing this very idea.[3]

[1] O God, make it rain!
Loose the soft silver passion of the rain!
Send swiftly from above
This clear token of thy love,
Make it rain!

Prayer for rain : Herbert Palmer.

[2] स्निग्धः श्यामल कान्तिलिप्त वियतो वल्लेद्बलाकाः घनाः ।
वाताः शीकरिणः पयोद सुहृदामानन्द केकाः कलाः ॥
कामं सन्तु दृढं कठोर हृदयो रामोऽस्मि सर्वं सहे ।
वैदेही तु कथं भविष्यति हहा हा देवि धीरा भव ॥

[3] घनघमंड गरजत नभघोरा । पियाहीन डरपत मन मोरा ॥

There arises then a very important question. Why do the Theras describe the rainy season in an unconventional way ? No doubt, there are many charming descriptions of Nature in their gāthās but why are they largely instrumental in serving an altogether different purpose from what they do in Sanskrit works of art ? The answer can be found by analysing the predilections of the Sanskrit poets and the Buddhist brethren. Vālmīki and Kālidāsa were primarily poets ; these Theras had taken orders and their supreme object in life was to behold the Norm and to realise the Nibbāna. And so the rainy season which served the purpose of stimulating the erotic passions of the lover and the beloved and increased the pangs of separation, inspired the Theras to practise contemplation.

Hark ! how the peacocks make the welkin ring,
Fair-crested, fine their plumes and azure throat,
Graceful in shape and pleasant in their cry.
And see how the broad landscape watered well
Lies verdure-clad beneath the dappled sky !

* * * *

* * * *

Where dying cometh not, ineffable.[1]

The peacocks call. The vast earth is verdure clad. The sky is filled with the rain-laden black clouds. There is mirth and gaiety in Nature, there is unflagging zeal everywhere. So the Bhikkhus, too, are fully awake in their mind. This inspires them to realize the subtly deep, and the ineffable Nibbāna. The Theras were not like the Yakṣa and they had an altogether different predilection. It is this predilection which gives spiritual tinge to the descriptions of Nature in the *Theragāthā*. This quality of the gāthās is unique and such charming and sublime descriptions of Nature are very rare. Besides, the alliteration here makes this lyric a real artistic achievement.

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[1] नदन्ति मोरा सुसिखा सुपेखुणा सुनीलगीवा सुमुखा सुगज्जिनो,
सुसद्दला चापि महामही अयं सुव्यापितम्बू सुवलाहकं नभं ॥
सुकल्लरूपो सुमनस्स झायितं सुनिक्खमो साधु सुबुद्धसासने;
सुसुक्कसुक्कं निपुणं सुदुद्दसं फुसाहितं उत्तममच्चुतं पदन्ति ॥

The Theras had established a relationship with Nature which is almost Wordsworthian. Sabbaka declares his love of retirement by praise of his dwelling-place. He says :—

> 'Whenever I see the crane, her clear bright wings
> Outstretched in fear to flee the black stormcloud,
> A shelter seeking, to safe shelter borne
> Then doth the river Ajakaraṇī
> Give joy to me...
>
> ... ...
>
> She brings us luck. Here is it good to be'[1].

On the one hand the above mentioned gāthās astonishingly reveal the Theras' capacity to observe Nature and describe her as she is and on the other hand they express a profound love of Nature. 'Not from the mountain-streams is it time to-day to flit'[2] is an expression of that deep and profound love of Nature which is rare. In addition to these, they also show how the beauty of the rains inspires the Theras for the great task they have set themselves to.

Unlike the Georgian poets[3] who left only on the week-end days to observe and enjoy Nature, the Theras sat in the lap of Nature and observed and enjoyed her protean moods from very close quarters. They did not enjoy the rains from a distance. The rains came to them with all their charms, attractions as also with fears. John Cowper Powys says 'No, the real Nature lover does not think primarily about the beauty of Nature; he thinks about her life ..whether at the particular moment she is looking lovely or sinister, cheerful, peaceful or tragic, he loves her for herself'[1]. Even when there is storm-cloud towering high in the heavens, emitting roars of thunders Sambula Kaccāna 'fearlessly sits in his dreadful cave and meditates. He is not in the least frightened by these fearsome clouds and lightening.

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[1] यदा वलाका सुचि पण्डरच्छदा काळस्स मेघस्स भयेन तज्जिता
पलेहिति आलयमालयेसिनी, तदा नदी अजकरणी रमेति मं ।
यदा वलाका सुविसुद्धपण्डरा काळस्स मेघस्स भयेन तज्जिता
परियेसति लेनमलेनदस्सिनी, तदा नदी अजकरणी रमेति मं ।

[2] नाज्ज गिरि नदी हि विप्पवासं समयो, खेमां अजकरणी सिवा सुरम्मा ति ।

[3] W.H. Davies : *In the snow.*

> God's rain pours down, ay, and God's rain roars down,
> And I alone in fearsome hollow dwell.
> Yet dwelling so in fearsome rocky dell
> To me no fear comes nigh, no creeping dread,
> No quailing (of my soul).[2]

This reveals his absolute love of Nature and his immense fearlessness which is a fruit of his meditative exercise. He is firm and immovable like a rock. Bhūta declares emphatically that the pleasure derived from meditating lonely in the midst of the natural beauties is greater than any.

> When in the lowering sky thunders the storm-cloud's drum,
> And all the pathways of the birds are thick with rain,
> The brother sits within the hollow of the hills,
> Rapt in an ecstasy of thought no higher bliss is given to men than this.[3]

This and a few subsequent gāthās are really the marvellous achievement of the Theras. Each gāthā presents before us a landscape and the descriptions of the sights and sounds of Nature are done in a few chosen words. How great is the economy, and how captivating the result ! Just a few strokes of pen and a landscape floats before our mind.

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[1] *Culture and Nature*: John Cowper Powys.

[2] देवो च वस्सति देवो च गळगळायति एक्को चाहं
भेरवे विले विहरामि ।
तस्स मय्हं एककस्स भेरवे विले विहरतो
नत्थि भयं वा छम्भितत्तं वा लोमहंसो वा ॥

[3] यदा नभे गज्जति मेघदुन्दुभि धाराकुला विहंगपथे समन्ततो
भिक्खु च पब्भारगतो' व झायति, ततो रतिं परमतरं न विन्दति ।

'The pathways of the birds are thick with rain' is an altogether novel method of expressing that it is raining in torrents. And when it rains so heavily, the Bhikkhu hears the thunder and is rapt in an ecstasy of thought. It will not be too much to say that 'they present a unique blend of religious maturity primeval shyness and æsthetic sensitiveness.'[1] Tissa–Kumāra expresses his ardent love of solitude and his longing to go to a region remarkable for scenic beauties is expressed in these gathas.

Yea, swiftly and alone, bound to my quest,
I'll to the jungle that I love, the haunt
Of wanton elephants, the source and means
Of thrilling zest to each ascetic soul.
In Cool Wood's flowery glades cool waters lie,
Within the hollows of the hills; and there
I'll bathe my limbs when hot and tired, and there
At large in ample solitude I'll roam.[2]

'Cool woods', 'flowery glades (सुपुप्फिते सीतवने)' and 'cool waters' are the tactual and visual images which are sensuous enough to be Keatsean. But lest the meditator should indulge in them he immediately thinks of the ample solitude where he meditates. Nor are the auditory images absent from the gāthās. The Theras not only hear the roarings of the clouds but they hear the melodious cries of peacocks and the trumpetings of the elephants. 'Of forest freshened by new rain' is a supreme example of visual image.

That the Theras were poets and some of them were of the first rank is borne out by the verses uttered by Tālapuṭa. He expresses a longing for dwelling in the mountain caves and for the fresh torrents which would drench his raiment in the woods. Not only this but it is a great poetry in so far as it is born out of intense suffering.

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[1] C.A.F. Rhys Davids : Introduction to *The Psalms of the Brethren.*

[2] योगिपीतिकरं रम्मं मत्तकुञ्जरसेवितं
एको अत्थवसी खिप्पं पविसिस्सामि काननं
सुपुप्फिते सीतवने सीतले गिरिकन्दरे
गत्तानि परिसिञ्चित्वा चङ्कमिस्सामि एकको ।

> O when shall I, who see and know that this
> My person, nest of dying and disease
> Oppressed by age & death,
> Is all impermanent,
> Dwell free from fear lonely within the woods—
> Yea, when shall these things be.[1]

This has been justly remarked by Dr. Oldenberg of this poem: 'Feeling such as lives in these verses, is conceivable only as the growth of a culture that has won its way through much suffering. And to give expression to it as Tālapuṭa has done, could only be done by a poet.'

Here is an admonitory verse from the Exalted One.

> Nay, not for this that thou mayest slumber long
> Cometh the night in starry garlands wreathed
> For vigil by the wise this night is here.[2]

How beautiful is this visual image, 'Night in starry garlands wreathed.'

The sky seems to be rain washed and the stars are twinkling with added lustre and glory. This is the most congenial atmosphere to practise meditation. In the *Gītā* Śrī Kṛṣṇa has expressed the same idea.[3]

The Theras besides describing the rains and the landscapes of this season have described the winter season too. The Master asks Mogharājan:

> Well, Mogharājan, thou skin-sufferer,
> Thou blest of heart and constantly serene,

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[1] कदा अनिच्चे वधरोगनीळं कायं इमं मच्चुजरायुपद्दुतं
विपस्समानो वीतभयो विहस्सं एको वने तं नु कदा भविस्सति ।

[2] न ताव सुपितुं होति रत्ति नक्खत्तमालिनी
परिजग्गितुमेवेसा रत्ति होति विजानता ॥

[3] या निशा सर्वभूतानां तस्यां जागर्ति संयमी ।
यस्यां जाग्रति भूतानि सा निशा पश्यतो मुनेः । २।६९

Cometh the time when winter nights are cold,
And thou a brother poor—how wilt thou fare ?[1]

and thereupon the Thera replies

My little straw built canopy doth please
Better than other's way of finding ease.

Mogharājan's is a bold reply which clearly shows that he did not in the least mind to face the unpropitious weathers and forces of Nature for he knew his task was great, his aim was high.

On reading the *Therayāthā* one is immediately struck with two things. The first is the abundant descriptions of the rains and the sights and sounds of this season. The second is the paucity of the descriptions of other seasons, particularly of the spring which has been magnificently and splenderously described in other Sanskrit works of art. And naturally, therefore, the question arises what made them love the rainy season so much and why there is a plethora of beautiful landscapes related to this season ? The key to this question lies, I think, in the Vinaya rules. It was inevitable on the part of the Theras to spend the rainy season, which lasted for three months (either from the first of Āṣāḍha to the end of Bhādrapada or from the beginning of Śrāvaṇa to the end of Āśvina[2]) in a place away from the villages or towns. In the rest of the year the Theras were busy in their duty towards others. During the rainy season when they observed Vassāvāsa Retreat, the Theras withdrew themselves from the world and engaged themselves in meditative practices. They had leisure enough to observe the beautiful landscapes which inspired them for winning Arhatship and realising the Nibbāna. These landscapes were tinged with sublime beauty. They were rain-washed and pure and had almost the virginal lustre. We shall do well to notice here one thing and it is this that the descriptions of the rains in the *Theragāthā* are typically the descriptions of the rains in North India after the monsoon breaks out in the beginning or in the middle of June.

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[1] छविपापक चित्त भद्दक मोघराज सततं समाहितो,
हेमन्तिकसीतकाल रत्तियो, भिक्खु त्वं'सि कथं करिस्ससि

[2] द्वे मा, भिक्खवे वस्सूपनायिका, पुरिमिका, पच्छिमिकान्ति
अपरज्जुगताय आसाळ्हिया पुरिमिका उपगन्तब्बा,
मासगताय आसाळ्हिया पच्छिमिका उपगन्तब्बा इमा खो, भिक्खवे,
द्वे वस्सूपनायिकाति । महावग्गपालि-१४४.

> " When in the lowering sky thunders the storm clouds' drum
> " And all the pathways of the birds are thick with rain."
> or " When at dead of night in lonely wood god rains"
> or " Or in fair open glade, or in the depths of forest, freshened by new rain."
> or " Hark, how the peacocks make the welkin ring,
> Fair-crested, fine their plumes and azure throat."
> or " And see how this broad landscape watered well
> Lies verdure-clad beneath the dappled sky"
> or " Whenever I see the crane, her clear bright wings
> Outstretched in fear to flee the black storm-cloud"[1]

These and many others are the landscapes which prove beyond any doubt that the rains which have been described in the gāthās are the rains after the Monsoon breaks out. They further prove that these are the elaborate descriptions of the sky and the vegetational regions in June, July and August in which they observed Vassāvāsa Retreat.

'Depth of forest' clearly indicates that the trees in the forest have put forth new leaves and that is why the forest is dense. And it is freshened by new rain proves it almost conclusively that it is the description of the rains. The landscape is verdant leaves no room for doubt.

That it is a description of North India can be proved topographically. The rivers—Ajakarṇi[1], Nerañjarā[2] etc. and the hills Vebhāra, Pāṇḍava,[3] Vulture's-peak and the mountain Himalaya[4] are in North India.

[1] See above.

[2] अत्थाय वत मे बुद्धो नदिं नेरञ्जनं अगा,
यस्साहं धम्मं सुत्वान मिच्छादिट्ठिं विवज्जयिं ।

[3] विवरमनुपतन्ति विज्जुता वेभारस्स च पण्डवस्स च ।

[4] स वे अच्चन्तरुचि नागो हिमवावञ्ञे सिलुच्चये ।

Among the faunas described here are the peacocks, swan, crane, elephants, frogs, deer etc. Any ornithologist can say that they are seen in plenty only in the rainy season. The peacock is very much associated with it and so are the swans and cranes.

The spring is not described elaborately by the Theras because they were busy doing their duties in that season. But there may be another reason also. The spring with all its flowers, blossoms, and gorgeous wealth of colours was to the Sanskrit poets generally a time when the erotic passions were inflamed. The Theras had no such business and hence they gave it up. But it is not altogether absent.

Now crimson glow the trees, dear Lord, and cast
Their ancient foliage in quest of fruit.
Like crests of flame they shine irradiant,
And rich in hope, great Hero, is the hour.
Verdure and blossom time in every tree,
Wherever we look delightful to the eye,
And every quarter breathing fragrant airs,
While petals falling, yearning comes for fruit:—
Tis time, O Hero, that we set out hence.[1]

This is a beautiful description of Nature. The trees casting their ancient foliage in quest of fruit is a picture original enough to be compared with such description in any other world–literature. And this glowing season inspires the Theras to contemplate. This is the hour when they too should gird up their loins to make a quest of the Great Fruit. This is the finest example of pathetic fallacy. ‘Like crests of flame they shine irradiant’ ... ..., is an excellent simile based on the clear visual perception.

[1] अङ्गारिनो’दानि दुमा भदन्ते फलेसिनो छदनं विप्पहाय,
ते अच्चिमन्तो व पभासयन्ति, समयो महावीर भगीरसानं
दुमानि फुल्लानि मनोरमानि समन्ततो सब्बदिसा पवन्ति
पत्तं पहाय फलमाससाना, कालो इतो पक्कमनाय वीर ।

Such are the descriptions of Nature in the *Theragāthā*. But my dissertation will not be complete if I don't point out the significance of moon in the gāthās and in the lives of the Theras.

The moon is very dear to the romantics. When she sheds her lustre on fullmoon days, an enchanting atmosphere is created–a bewitching atmosphere, extremely appealing to them. But in the *Theragāthā* there is an altogether different use made of the moon.

They have closely observed the waxing and waning of the moon. To them, therefore, a person who is free from ill-will, free from the fetters and who has attained perfect equanimity is 'even as the moon on fifteenth day, sails clear in sky without a stain.'

He who in former days a wastrel living
In later no more so spends his time
He goeth over the world a radiance shedding
As when the moon comes, free in clouded sky.[1]

A Brother who has destroyed all canker, who is sane and immune from all impurities is like a full moon.[2] Sometimes a man who by self-control has brought to perfection the breathing exercise he casts a radiant sheen as is done by the full moon.[3]

All these go to prove that Nature has been described in *Theragāthā* in a sublime manner with her beauty and awe and this induced them to engage in meditation in order to delve into the ultimate mysteries of the universe.

[1] यो पुब्बे पमज्जित्वान पच्छा सो न प्पमज्जति,
सो'मं लोकं पभासेति अब्भामुत्तो 'व चन्दिमा ।

[2] सोहं परिपुण्णसंकप्पो चन्दो पन्नरसो यथा
सब्बासवपरिक्खीणो नत्थिदानि पुनब्भवो'ति ।

[3] अनुपुब्बं परिचिता यथा बुद्धेन देसिता
सो' मं लोकं पभासेति अब्मामुत्तो 'व चन्दिमा ।

ABHIDHARMĀVATĀRA BY AN UNIDENTIFIED AUTHOR

Some Introductory Remarks

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I

The Sanskrit original of the Abhidharmāvatāra, a small treatise by an unidentified author of Sarvāstivāda, is unfortunately not available to us now. It is, however, preserved in two versions; a Tibetan version by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla and Ye-śes-sde (Tohoku No. 4097), and a Chinese one by 玄奘 Hsüang-chuang (Taisho No. 1554). Having been wrongly regarded by L. de la Vallée Poussin[1] as a commentary to the Abhidharmakośa, it is an independent work comprising the whole system of the Sarvāstivāda philosophy in condensed form.

First, we have to spend a bit of space to take the authorship of this booklet into consideration. According to the Chinese version, the treatise is attributed to 塞建地羅 Sai-chien-ti-lo (in some editions, 塞建陀羅 Sai-chien-t'o-lo). This authorship is already recognized by the 開元釋教錄 K'ai-yüan-shih-chiao-lu, one of the oldest and most reliable catalogues of Buddhist texts in Chinese translation, which was compiled in 730 A.D. i.e. only 72 years after the translation of the treatise by Hsüan-chuang. So, it is almost beyond doubt that this text has been considered in China, since the time of Hsüan-chuang's translation, to be a work by Sai-chien-ti-lo.

Then, what is the original name transliterated here as Sai-chien-ti-lo? In his translation into English of the 大唐西域記 Ta-t'ang-hsi-yü-chi, Hsüan-chuang's record of travels in India, S. Beal restored it as Skandhila, while B. Nanjio, in his famous catalogue of Chinese Tripiṭaka, with some doubt, as Sugandhara, which A. C. Banerjee follows in his recent work.[1] Whether the author's name would be Skandhila or Sugandhara, we can not meet any evidence of him in the history of Indian Buddhism except a few mentions found in some Chinese texts.

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[1] L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu Vol. 6, p. xviii.

In the Ta-t'ang-hsi-yü-chi, Hsüan-chuang tells us that the 衆事分毘婆沙論 Chung-shih-fên-p'i-p'o-sha-lun was written by Sai-chien-ti-lo in a small monastery located in the suburbs of the ancient capital of Kaśmīra. This text, of which neither the original nor a translation is extant, can not be considered, of course, the same one as the Abhidharmāvatāra. We may simply suppose that it would be originally entitled Abhidharma-prakaraṇavibhāṣā and would be a commentary to Vasumitra's Abhidharmaprakaraṇa, one of the six 'padaśāstras' of the Sarvāstivādin, by reason that the latter has been translated into Chinese by Guṇabhadra and Bodhiyaśas as 衆事分阿毘曇論 Chung-shih-fên-a-p'i-t'an-lun. Anyway, as far as the Ta-t'ang-hsi-yü-chi tells us, we may know of Sai-chien-ti-lo's writing the Chung shih-fên-p'i-p'o-sha-lun, but the travel record suggests to us nothing about his writing the Abhidharmāvatāra.

In his commentary to Hsüan-chuang's Chinese version of the Abhidharmakoṣa, 普光 P'u-kuang, one of the eminent disciples of Hsüan-chuang, states the following :

"Ācārya Vasubandhu is a Gandhārian. He first entered the priesthood of the Sarvāstivādin and therefore accepted the tripiṭaka of that school. When he came later to learn the Sautrāntika teachings, he considered them more reasonable, and sometimes cherished an intention to criticize the orthodox teaching of the Sarvāstivādin. So, he wished to go to Kaśmīra to investigate the teachings of the Sarvāstivādin more precisely so that he might discriminate between the right and the wrong in them. Fearing lest Kaśmīrian scholars would evade him, he assumed a false name, entered Kaśmīra privately, and studied. During his four years' stay there, Vasubandhu often confuted the Sarvāstivādin theories, following the different opinions of the Sautrāntika. At that time, there was an arhat named Sai-chien-ti-lo, which may be translated into Chinese. as 悟入 Wu-ju ('apprehension-entering'), who was the teacher of Saṅghabhadra. Wondering at the marvelous sagacity of the confuter and suspecting him of assuming other name, Sai-chien-ti-lo entered into meditation in which he could know it was Vasubandhu, a famous Gandhārian scholar, who had refuted his school. Then, he told Vasubandhu privately that he should immediately go back home because he had frequently confuted the orthodox doctrine following the view of his own school, and that if, therefore, the uncultured followers of the orthodox Sarvāstivādin would know he was Vasubandhu, a Gandhārian, it was feared that they would harm him. Vasubandhu, thereat, went back to his country. Soon after his returning to Gandhāra, he wrote the Abhidharmakośa-kārikā, a 600-gāthā text, which he sent a disciple of his to take to Kaśmīra. The king as well as many priests there, being glad to hear it, came along to welcome the disciple to the border to Gandhāra, walking in an extraordinary procession with decorated banners and flags perfumed by various incenses and fragrant flowers, and performing dramatic music. Surrounding an incensed elephant on which the Kārikā text was displayed, they came back to their capital. All of them were pleased, thinking that the text would serve for propagating the teaching of their school. Wu-ju then told the people that the text would not serve for them but simply pretended to follow their orthodox teaching, that it was suggested by the word ***kila*** ('so said') often used in the text, that it was, therefore, meaningless for them to welcome it, and that if they did not believe his words they should request its author, Vasubandhu, to make a commentary on it, which would prove his words. Then, the king and the priests sent to request Vasubandhu to do so and presented him with gems and jewels. Complying with their request, Vasubandhu made a commentary (bhāṣya) of some 8000 ślokas, and sent it to Kaśmīra. On examining the commentary, the Kaśmīrian people came to know it was really as Wu-ju had said."

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[1] Sarvāstivāda Literature p. 74:

The same story is found in another Chinese commentary to the Abhidharmakośa by 法寶 Fa-pao, too. However, both in the 婆藪槃豆法師傳 P'o-sou-p'an-tou-fa-shih-chuan and in the Ta-t'ang-hsi-yü-chi, and again in the 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳 Ta-tz'u-ên-ssu-san-tsang-fa-shi-chuan, all of which are earlier and more reliable than the above-mentioned two commentaries, we can find any mention neither of Sai-chien-ti-lo as a teacher of Saṅghabhadra nor of his advice to Vasubandhu to go home, although each of those three tells us something about Saṅghabhadra's writing the Nyāyānusārin or writing two texts, the Nyāyānusārin and the Samayapradīpa, in order to confute Vasubandhu's charge against the orthodox Sarvāstivādin in the Abhidharmakośa. Moreover, whether 'Sai-chien-ti-lo' is a transliteration of Skandhila or of Sugandhara, or even if it would be that of another name of similar sound, we can hardly think that it might be translated into Chinese as Wu-ju, 'apprehension-entering'. This being the case, regarding Ācārya Sai-chien-ti-lo, we can not authorize those two Chinese commentaries to the Abhidharmakośa.

On the other hand, both the Tibetan version of the Abhidharmāvatāra and a commentary to it, Sārasamuccaya nāma Abhidharmāvatāraṭīkā, which is likewise preserved in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, do not mention anything about its author.

Therefore, on the authorship of the Abhidharmāvatāra, we may conclude as follows : (1) the Chinese traditions ascribe the Abhidharmāvatāra to Sai-chien-ti-lo, which, however, is not supported by the Tibetan traditions ; (2) of the transliterated name Sai-chien-ti-lo, the original Sanskrit form is not exactly known ; (3) of the life and the works of Sai-chien-ti-lo himself is known very little, and mentions of him in the two Chinese commentaries to the Abhidharmakośa are rather unreliable.

II

Whomever the Abhidharmāvatāra is ascribed to and whether the author of it had certain contacts with Vasubandhu or not, it seems that the text should be considered a work contemporary with or a little earlier than Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa. Examining the contents of the text, we can hardly rank it on the same line with the other Sarvāstivāda works of early date such as the Saṅgītiparyāya, the Dharmaskandha etc., or with those of middle date such as the Jñānaprasthāna etc. Let us show some points so that we may prove it.

(1) In the Abhidharmāvatāra is found the theory of four-pratyaya-six-hetu-five-phala: Though the classification of pratyayas into four and that of hetus into six are found in the texts of early date, the classification of phalas into five seems unknown in the works earlier than the Abhidharmāmṛta (rasa) or the Mahāvibhāṣā.[1] Moreover, even in the Amṛtarasa, the Mahāvibhāṣā or the Abhidharmahṛdaya, the theory of five phalas is never explained in connection with the theories of four pratyayas and of six hetus just as we see in the Abhidharmāvatāra, but is always connected with the explanation of another theory concerning the relations between causes and effects of *karman*. It is only in the latest texts such as the Abhidharmakośa, the Nyāyānusārin and the Samayapradīpa that the theory of five

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[1] In the Mahāvibhāṣā K 121, it is stated that the five-phala theory was already explained in the Sūtra-piṭaka itself. It can hardly, of course, be regarded as a fact.

phalas is found in such connection, as in the Abhidharmāvatāra, with the theories of four pratyayas and of six hetus. On reviewing the whole process of development of the classification of phalas in Sarvāstivāda literature, we may safely say as follows : As we can see in the Jñānaprasthāna K 12, and in the Abhidharmahṛdaya, Kārikā 61, the classification of phalas is first given not of the phala in general but simply of karma-phalas, which are thereby divided into three—vipāka, niṣyanda, and visaṃyoga. Later on, such as in the Mahāvibhāṣā K 121 and in the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, Dharmatrāta's commentary to the Abhidharmahṛdaya, Kārikās 156-157, the classification develops into the five-phala theory enumerating puruṣakāra and adhipati besides the above-mentioned three. It is, however, still explained particularly in relation to karma-phalas only and not to the phalas in general, and, therefore, not connected with the theories of four pratyayas and of six hetus, both of which are classifications of pratyayas and hetus in general. It is indeed on the last step of its development that the five-phala theory comes to regard phalas in general and to be connected with the four-pratyaya and six-hetu theories. In the Abhidharmāvatāra we can see this last phase of the theory development.

(2) Prāpti, one of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāradharmas*, is explained in the Abhidharmāvatāra to be comprehended in two stages, pratilambha and samanvāgama. It is also stated in the śāstra that pratilambha means acquisition of what has not been acquired yet or of what has already been lost, and that samanvāgama means keeping in possession of what is acquired. Such explanation of the technical term prāpti is quite same as that found in the second chapter of the Abhidharmakośa as well as in the third chapter of the Nyāyānusārin and of the Samayapradīpa, and is never seen in the preceding texts. In the earlier texts such as the Prajñapti-śāstra from which a passage is quoted in the Mahāvibhāṣā K 157, these three terms, prāpti, pratilambha and samanvāgama, are explained to be of the same meaning.[1] Originally, the term prāpti signifies prāpti of ārya-

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[1] Cf. Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Wogihara ed.) p. 143, 1.20 ff.

mārga in particular and not the prāpti in general. So, in earlier texts, what was opposed to prāpti was pṛthagjanatva i. e. being in want of āryamārga. When, later on, prāpti became a more comprehensive term to stand for acquisition of any 'dharma', either ārya or an-ārya and either rūpa or a-rūpa, and was defined more precisely, the words pratilambha and samanvāgama came to be used not as synonyms of prāpti but to represent the two stages of prāpti activities.

(3) It is not before the Abhidharmahṛdaya that the number of cittaviprayuktasaṃskāradharmas is fixed to be 14. In the Dharmaskandha and the Prakaraṇa they are 16, and in the Amṛtarasa 17. We find the very fourteen cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras enumerated here in the Abhidharmāvatāra, which can not be, therefore, ranked with those early works.

(4) As for nikāyasabhāgatā, one of the 14 *cittaviprayuktas*, the Abhidharmāvatāra's mention of it is merely of sattvasabhāgatā and not of dharmasabhāgatā. It is for the first time in the Abhidharmakośa that the nikāyasabhāgatā is explained to be of two kinds, sattva- and dharma-sabhāgatā. Saṅghabhadra's two śāstras follow the Kośa in this connection. It may suggest the Abhidharmāvatāra's possibly preceding Vasubandhu.

(5) In the Abhidharmāvatāra, the theory of paramāṇu is not explained. It may not, however, claim that the text goes prior to the Mahāvibhāṣā, that is considered the earliest of the Sarvāstivāda texts explaining the paramāṇu theory.

III

The Abhidharmāvatāra is set forth on the basis of 8 categories, 8 padārtha——5 skandhas and 3 asaṃskṛtadharmas. Though both the five skandhas and the three asaṃskṛtas are rather similar terms in Sarvāstivāda literature, the eight-padārtha system getting the five and the three together is not seen in any other available texts. (I have once got a chance to give a glance over the first portion of the Abhidharmadīpa, a Sanskrit text edited by P. S. Jaini and now in preparation for publication, where I found a brief mention of the eight padārthas.)

Among the cittasaṃprayuktasaṃskāras enumerated under the fourth category of saṃskāra, we find two terms, of which *saṃvega* and *pramoda* are guessed to be the original Sanskrit words. It is a little peculiar to find these terms here in the group of cittasaṃprayuktasaṃskāra, because in any other śāstra they are never counted among the 46 (or more) cetasikas, though mentions of each of the two are often made in some śāstras, e. g. in the Saṅgītiparyāya K 2, in the Mahāvibhāṣā K 28 & 81, etc. The term saṃvega should not be understood in the meaning of 'agitation' as Rhys Davids did in his translation of Saṅgīti S. in Dīgha Nikāya or not in the meaning of 'Ergriffenheit' as Neumann did. It signifies in Buddhist works, like nirveda, 'weariness, or complete indifference or disregard of worldly objects' as both Chinese and Tibetan translations here render it.

Explanations of technical terms given in the Avatāra, too, do not always coincide with those in the Kośa. For example, gandha, the third of 5 viṣayas, is divided not into four as in the Kośa and others but into three as in the Prakaraṇa ; Ātmavādopādāna, the last of four upādānas, comprises in the Avatāra 40 'dharmas' : 10 rāgas, 10 mānas, 10 avidyās, 8 vicikitsās, styāna and auddhatya, while in the Kośa they are 38 excluding the last two ; following the Kāśmīrian[1] view the Avatāra counts 15 sthānas in the Rūpadhātu, while the Kośa counts 17 adding Mahābrahmadeva.

The whole contents of the Abhidharmāvatāra are listed in the following :

Prelude

Prefatory gāthā and introductory remarks.

Eight General Categories Enumerated.

I. Rūpa-padārtha
  (a) 4 Mahābhūtas : pṛthivī, ap, tejas and vāyu.
  (b) Bhautikas : 5 indriyas, 5 viṣayas and avijñapti-rūpa.
  (c) 3 lakṣaṇas of 'dharmas'.

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[1] Abhidarmakośavyākhyā p. 255 : ṣoḍaśeti Kāśmīrāḥ.

II. Vedanā-padārtha
Generality; Kāyikā and caitasikī-vedanā; 5 kinds of vedanā.

III. Saṃjñā-padārtha.

IV. Saṃskāra-padārtha.

a. (Citta-) saṃprayukta-saṃskāra.
cetanā, sparśa, manaskāra, chanda, adhimukti, śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi, prajñā, vitarka, vicāra, pramāda, apramāda, saṃvega (?), pramoda (?), praśrabdhi, ahimsā, harī, apatrāpyā, upekṣā, 3 kuśalamūla, 3 akuśalamūla, 4 avyākṛtamūla, 9 saṃyojana (anunaya, pratigha, māna, avidyā, dṛṣṭi, parāmarśa, vicikitsā, īrṣyā, mātsarya), bandhana, anuśaya (7anuśayas,98-anuśaya theory, order of 10 anuśayas arising, causes of arising of anuśayas), 6 upakleśa, 10 paryavasthāna, mala, (subtlety of caittas), 3 āsrava, 4 ogha, 4 yoga, 4 upādāna, 4 kāyagrantha, 5 nīvaraṇa, 3 dhātu—5 gati—4 yoni—11 bhūmi, 10 jñāna, 8 kṣānti, 8 ārya-pudgala (4 pratipannaka and 4 phala), 6 classes of pudgala.

b. Cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra.
prāpti & aprāpti, asaṃjñisamāpatti, nirodhasamāpatti, āsaṃjñika, jīvitendriya, nikāyasabhāgatā, saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa (3 lakṣaṇa & 4 lakṣaṇa, lakṣaṇa and dharma, anulakṣaṇa), nāma- pada- and vyañjana-kāya.

V. Vijñāna-padārtha.
Six Hetu, Five Phala and Four Pratyaya Explained.

VI. Ākāśa-padārtha.

VII. Pratisaṃkhyānirodha-padārtha
Definition ; divisions ; different names.

VIII. Apratisaṃkhyānirodha
Epilogue.

SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL LIFE OF ANCIENT INDIA IN THE 6TH CENTURY B. C. AS DEPICTED IN THE BRAHMAJĀLA SUTTA.

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SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL LIFE OF ANCIENT INDIA IN THE 6TH CENTURY B. C. AS DEPICTED IN THE BRAHMAJĀLA SUTTA

In the whole range of the Pāli Tipiṭaka none seems so important as the Brahmajāla-sutta, the 1st Sutta of the Ist Book (Dīghanikāya) of the Ist Piṭaka (Suttapiṭaka), both from the point of view of antiquity as also of subject matter.

Some scholars are of opinion that this Sutta is the earliest specimen of the Pāli Tipiṭaka. The Brahmajāla-sutta discusses the philosophical position of the other non-Buddhist sects that were prevalent when Lord Buddha began his preaching of the Dhamma. This sutta specially criticizes the erroneous views that were held at that time by the other sects and placing them in contrast with the Buddhistic position exposes the unsoundness of the former. In the course of discussion the Sutta gives a long list of all kinds of occupations, recreations, modes of life and thought of the common people.

Sumaṅgalavilāsinī the famous commentary (aṭṭhakathā) on the Dīghanikāya by Ācārya Buddhaghosa throws a flood of light on some interesting aspects of social life of India during the time of Lord Buddha.

In this article we propose to give a brief resume of the different aspects of the popular life as we gather from the commentary of the Brahmajāla-sutta.

(A) DANCES, SHOWS AND OTHER KINDS OF ENTERTAINMENTS

There were various kinds of popular dances, sometimes accompanied by music in which the people took part. Different kinds of vocal and instrumental music are also referred to.

A kind of very popular entertainment is referred to as "Samajjo" (समज्जो). These were fairs or shows where the people were given a variety entertainment viz. singing, dancing, music, recitations, conjuring tricks and acrobatic shows.

Asoka, it may be remarked, refers to those 'Samājas' or festive gatherings in his Rock Edict I. These Samājas were of two kinds. One was of a kind of popular festival accompanied by animal fights, heavy drinking and feasting. The other kind was in the nature of a semi-religious theatrical performance. Ballad-recitations was also a kind of entertainment for the people. The Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata were frequently recited at open places. Along with this we hear about recitations of royal bards. Among other kinds of music we find, the playing on cymbals. and on 'pitchers' (Kumbhathunaṃ). It is interesting to note, in this connection that even now wayside beggars sometimes sing to the accompaniment of brass or earthen pitchers, which they use for keeping the time.

Among popular games we find mention of playing with iron balls, acrobatic feats with the help of erect bamboo poles, combat of elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, goats, rams, cocks and quails. Wrestling bouts, shamfights and military tattoos, the manoeuvres of the army arrayed in battle order and the parade of war elephants were also favourite forms of amusement.

The commentator refers to a peculiar custom called Dhopanaṃ or aṭṭhidhopanaṃ. In certain places the dead bodies instead of being cremated were interred and after a time when the body became decomposed, the bones were taken out and besmeared with perfumes and heaped together at a place where the people performed a strange rite by drinking wine in company and weeping over the dead.

(B) GAMES OF CHANCE AND GAMBLING

A game akin to chess played on board with eight or ten rows of squares. It seems to be some kind of game from which the modern game of chess has developed. The same kind of game was played on imaginary boards supposed to be hanging from the air. Prof. Rhys Davids compares it with "blindfold chess." A kind of play in which figures were drawn over the ground and a person was required to go to a particular figure by jumping—a kind of primitive hop-scotch. A game in which pieces were either removed or put in heap with the help of the nail only, without disturbing or shaking the heap. A player who disturbed the same in the process was counted as defeated.

Gambling with dice :—In one of the sculptured relief on the stupa of Bhārhut, we find a gambling scene very clearly represented, in which the pieces of the dice can be noted visibly. Playing a kind of game by hitting a small stick with a larger one.

Dipping the fingers in lac or red-dye or flour-water and striking the hand on the ground or on the walls and calling out at the same time "what shall it be ?" and showing the desired form whether of an elephant or of a horse.

Amongst other kinds of play and pastimes we find : playing with balls, blowing through small pipes made of leaves, vaulting and turning summer-saults, or playing on the trapeze. Playing with toy-ploughshares, toy wind-mills made of palmleaves and propelled by means of wind, small measures made of palm-leaves, miniature carts or bows. Guessing letters traced in the air or on the play-fellows back, other people's thoughts and mimicry or caricature of deformed persons such as the blind or the lame, were also current as favourite amusements.

C. BEDSTEADS, DIVANS AND DIFFERENT KINDS OF SEATS.

Movable settees called āsandī :—[1] Prof. Phys Ravids traces this word to the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa where it is mentioned as the seat of a king in the Vājapeya sacrifice, by reason of its height.

Cots on the legs of which animal-figures were carved. There were various kinds of coverlets in use, such as coverlets with very long fleece, counterpane made of variegated colours, white blankets, woollen coverlets thickly embroidered with flowers or figures of lions and tigers, coverlets sewn with gems, or of silk. Different kinds of rugs are also mentioned, viz. rugs with fur on both sides and embroidered with flowers, rugs used for sitting upon horse, elephant or chariots, rugs of an telope-skin or of skins of a kind of deer-called the 'kadalimiga', rugs with red or white borders or fringes, carpets so large that sixteen 'danseuse' can dance on them. Sofas with red pillows for the head and feet were also included in the list of furniture.

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[1] Pāṇini refers to Āsandī-as Āsana, I am indebted to our revered Director, Dr. S. K. Mukherjee for drawing my attention to this.

D. ARTICLES OF DRESS, TOILET, PERFUMES, MASSAGES AND SHAMPOOING :—

The aṭṭhakathā gives a detailed description of the elaborate toilette that was the fashion in those days including various kinds of dress, perfumes and cosmetics which went to complete the wardrobe of the luxurious people.

Anointing the body with scented powder, and massaging the body with oil were the two most common methods taken recourse to, to preserve the beauty and strength of the body.

Bathing in perfumed water and massaging the body like great wrestlers, with wooden clubs were in vogue. Megasthenes in his account refers to this custom of 'massaging the body with ebony rulers', being practised by the kings.

For personal toilette collyrium was used for the eyes, different kinds of cosmetics for body-ointment, powders and rouges for the face. As regards dress and ornaments people used to wear garlands of scented flowers, bracelets, necklaces, jewelled headdress and turbans, diadems, shoes made of gold and silver and decorated with peacock feathers. When people used to walk about they were in the habit of carrying walking sticks studded with gems, swords embossed with jewels, umbrellas made of tusks of sea-lion and fans made of yak's tail.

E. TABLE-TALKS AND GOSSIPS (TIRACCHĀNAKATHĀ)

The ordinary people who led an idle life, often whiled away their time in table talks and gosips of various kinds.

Recounting the exploits of kings, their spendour and prowess, stories of deeds of robbers, talks on food, drink' clothes, bed, garments, perfumes, discussion on women and indulging in village-scandals and gossips engaged the common people in their idle hours. Often the people used to assemble on streets, in places where they used to go to fetch water and talked about heroes, ghosts, about one's departed relations, and indulge in various kinds of lose or desultory talks.

(F) QUIBBLINGS AND POLEMICAL DISPUTES :

Besides engaging themselves in idle gossips, some people who were a bit educated used to take part in religious debates or polemical debates which were a common feature of the religious life of those days. Those were in the nature of logical disputations. e. g. "you don't understand this doctrine and discipline. I do. How should you know about this doctrine and discipline ? You have fallen into wrong views. It is I who am in the right. I am speaking to the point, you are not" etc.

(G) RUNNING ON ERRANDS, ACTING AS GO-BETWEEN OR MESSANGERS :

There were some people who acted as go-between the king, ministers of state. Brāhmins etc. They used to do various kinds of odd jobs like carrying of message and acting as spies.

(H) THE CROOKED-ARTS AND WRONG MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD.

There were certain trades and professions which were rather looked down upon :—

Palmistry and prophesying long life, prosperity etc. by studying some members of the body, were practised by some as professions. Divination by signs. In the aṭṭhakathā there is an anecdote by way of illustration :—King Pāṇḍu took three pearls in his closed fist and asked a diviner what he had in it ? The latter looked this way and that for a sign and seeing a fly which had been caught by a house-lizard, getting free (muttā), said pearls (muttā). "How many" said the king ? The diviner hearing a dog bark thrice said "three". Auguries drawn from thunderbolt and other heavenly portents ; Prognosticating the future by interpreting dreams. Fortune-telling by studying the marks on the body. Auguries from the marks on cloth, gnawed by mice.

In the Buddhist literature we often come across the superstition that it was unlucky to wear cloth gnawed by mice.

Sacrificing to Agni. Telling people that a sacrifice if offered to fire with such and such articles brings such and such results. Offering oblations from a particular kind of spoon of particular grains or husks to bring specific results. Oblations of husked rice, clarified butter ;musterd oil etc. Sacrifice by vomitting musterd seeds into the fire after reciting a particular spell. Offering of blood by way of oblation.

Examining the knuckles of a man and after muttering a charm (mantra) divining whether the man is lucky or not.

Determining by means of signs the luckiness or otherwise of a house or a pleasure garden, foretelling the fertility or barrenness of the soil by means of incarnations. Pacification of ghosts in a cemetery. Laying ghosts by means of spell ; knowledge of the charms to be used when residing in a mud-house. Treatment of snake bites, curing poison infection by administering counter poision. Treatment of scorpion bites. Knowledge of birds by classifying them as two-feeted, four-feeted or as uringed and wingless ones.

Divination with the help of the cawing of crows. Foretelling the life-span of a person. Giving charms to ward off arrows. Understanding the language of animals biped or quadruped. Knowledge of gems and their particular merits as bestowing prosperity, cure from diseases etc., similarly of swords, arrows bows and other weapons. Knowledge of the good or bad signs of men, women, boys girls, slave, slave girls, elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, oxen, tortoises etc. and foretelling the fortune of a particular house, in which some human being or animal endowed with the particular mark dwells. Indging of goats, sheep, fowls, quaics, ignanas, etc. and to say whether their meat is suitable for eating or not.

(I) FORETELLING EVENTS, ASTROLOGICAL FORECASTS, READING OF OMENS, NATURAL PHENOMENON, ETC.

Predicting events was a common feature of the time. We meet with the following kinds of foretelling :—

(i) The chiefs will march out on a particular day under a particular star.

(ii) The chiefs will march back.

(iii) The home chiefs will attack and the enemy will retreat, or vice-versa.

(iv) The home chiefs will be victorious and the foreign chiefs will suffer defeat and vice versa.

Astrological forecasts :—(i) There will be an eclipse of the sun (ii) There will be a lunar eclipse (iii) There will be an eclipse of stars. (iv) The sun and the moon will diverge from their proper courses. (v) The sun and the moon will return to their usual path. (vi) There will be aberration of stars. (vii) The stars will return to their normal courses. (viii) There will be a fall of meteors from the sky. (ix) There will be a junglefire. (x) There will be an earthquake. (xi) There would be thunder. (xii) There will be rising and setting, clearness and dimness of the sun and the moon or the stars and foretelling that each of the above phenomena will be accompanied by a particular result. (xiii) Foretelling abundant or deficient rainfall. (xiv) Foretelling good or bad harvests (xv) Foretelling pestilence or healthy season. (xvi) Doing arithmetical calculations by counting on the fingers. (xvii) Foretelling tranquillity or disturbances. (xviii) Counting without the use of fingers and cultivating extraordinary faculty of mental calculation. Buddhaghosa says that a man endowed with this faculty can say how many leaves a tree has got by simply looking at it. (xix) Arranging lucky marriages for boys and girls. (xx) Fixing a lucky time for the conclusion of peace. (xxi) Fixing a propitious time for the beginning of hostilities. (xxii) Fixing a lucky time for investing money so that the money may be increased two-fold or fourfold.

(J) CHARMS AND INCANTATIONS :—

(i) Using charms to make people lucky or unlucky. (ii) Using charms to cause abortion. (iii) Incantations to cause dumbness. (iv) Incantations to make a man's jaws fixed. (v) Incantations to make a man throw up his hands. (vi) Incantations to bring on deafness. Buddhaghosa says that a man after muttering such incantations goes to the court of justice and says whatever he likes which the other party can not hear. (vii) Obtaining oracular answers to questions by making gods descend in a miror. (vii) Obtaining answers from a girl who is supposed to be possessed by some god. (ix) Sun-worship. (x) Belching forth flames from one's mouth. (xi) Invoking Sirī the goddess of luck. In the Bhārut sculptures of the 2nd Century B. C. we find images of a goddess called Sirimā-devatā. Popular belief associated wealth and prosperity with the worship of this goddess.

(K) PACIFICATORY RITES AND CEREMONIES :—

(i) Promising gifts to gods on the fulfilment of certain desires. This custom is even now prevalent in many parts of India specially in the villages. (ii) Causing virility. (iii) Causing a man's desire to fail by means of incantations. (iv) Fixing of lucky sites for dwellings and consecrating them. (v) Ceremonial rinsing of the mouth. (vi) Ceremonial bathing. (vii) Offering sacrifices. (viii) Administering different kinds of drugs and purgatives. (ix) Healing the sores of ears. (x) Dropping medicinal oil in the eyes of people to cure eye-diseases. (xi) Administering drops through nose. (xii) Applying collyrium to the eyes. (xiii) Practising as an oculist. (xiv) Practising as a Surgeon, (xv) Practising as a children's doctor. (xvi) Administering roots and drugs.

The above survey allows us a glimpse of the social life of India during the advent of Buddhism, All the different arts and professions that are detailed above seem to have gained a wide popularity during the period under review.

In the highest stratum of the society were ranged the Brāhmiṇs with their numerous sacrifices and rites, and philosophical speculations about the nature of the universe and so forth, which were too high and useless for the mass at large.

The people standing at the lowest rung of the social order had no definite theory, no well-organized code of conduct to fall back upon. So they followed the numerous professions and callings and the 'crooked arts' (as they had been called) with a view to gain happiness in this world and the next.

The picture of society that we get from the above description is interesting in view of the fact that most of the 'forbidden arts' and ceremonies can be traced back to the Atharvaveda which is full of what may be commonly called "Sorcery" and "witch-craft". Some of these ceremonies survive to this day even after the lapse of centuries. Some of the arts and folk-practices are referred to in the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya. Kauṭilya speaks of astrologers and experts in omens, Mauhurtikas and naimittikas, readers of fortune from physical features, Lakṣaṇa and Angavidyā, Magicians and sorcerers, Snake-charmers, adepts in black-magic, ministrels, oracles, (praśna-vidyā) and readers of dreams and bird's voices (Svapna-pakṣī-vyahāra) "of more important subjects, Kauṭilya speaks of a highly developed art of healing producing and contracting diseases, poisons, maternity, and care of the child, and of the profession of the doctor. He refers to the lapidary art, to the science of agriculture, and the science of plantlife and to astronomical factors favourable for cultivation. He speaks of reading others' minds, perfumer's art, garlanding and shampoo." (Age of the Mauryas and Nandas—K. A. N. Sastri, p.p. 339).

The religion of the Buddha emphasized the uselessness of these rites and professions and gave to the masses an organized code of moral conduct that it stood sorely in need of. Buddhaghosa in his invaluable commentaries, has thrown a flood of light on these aspects of social life and if we ransack the entire field of the vast Aṭṭhakathā literature we can construct a more or less complete picture of Indian society as it was during the time that Buddhism was coming to the forefront as a potent factor in the history of India.

A MEDALLION AT DEOGARH

Shri S. V. Sohoni,
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A MEDALLION AT DEOGARH

BY

SHRI S. V. SOHONI

In this note, I will deal with a scene in the medallion on one of the two large pillars of the Gupta temple at Deogarh, reffered to as item (f) on plate XIV in the *Memoirs of the Archæological Survey of India,* No. 70 on this temple.

Pandit Madho Sarup Vats, the author of the Memoirs, has remarked about this medallion as follows—

> "West face. This shows two bearded anchorites with matted hair facing each other and seated on stools with criss-cross bands in a grove under the shade of a tree with outspread branches (Plate XIV, f).
>
> In front, is a long necked water flask suspended from a tripod. The elderly and emaciated figure to right may be Vālmiki in his āśrama narrating stories to Bhāradvāja, but the suggestion is merely tentative."[1]
>
> This does not appear, however, to be correct.

There is a similar article shown near the bed in the Nirvāṇa scenes sculptured in Gandhāra. The following extract from the *Mahā-Parinibbāna-Sutta,* helps in the correct identification—

> "And the Venerable Ānanda went to the council hall of the Mallas of Kusinārā; and when he had arrived there, he informed them, saying, "This day, O Vāseṭṭhas, in the last watch of the night, the final passing away of the Tathāgata will take place."[2]

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[1] Page 29 of the *Memoirs of the Archæological survey of India*—No. 70.

[2] Page 102—*Sacred Book of the East—Vol. XI.*

The first watch of the night was utilised in presenting before the Blessed One, the Mallas of Kusinārā. The other watches were utilised in discourses to the disciples, including Subhadda. The emphasis on measuring time properly, increased as the available hours were limited in number.

The article near the bed was intended to measure time—it was a water clock or *ghaṭikā*. Time was measured by the pot discharging water—not by the pot being filled with water.[1]

Of the two methods of measuring time, viz., by the help of a water clock and by the measure of the shadow of the gnomon, it was obvious that during hours of the night the water clock should prove more reliable—the gnomon could not be used at night and "held good in reality only when the day and the night were equal, and would not give the time correctly at all seasons of the year."[2] The realistic Gaṇdhāra sculptures of Mahāparinirvāṇa scene, generally include the water clock near the bed of the Buddha.

Thus, on the medallion of the Deogarh temple are shown two anchorites, who are waiting for a *muhūrta*; and with that purpose, are watching a *ghaṭikā*. It is a useful reminder that the factor of time should not be ignored while holding discussions. There is a similar sculptural representation on a small stupa in the compound of the Mahābodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya.

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[1] Page 224 of *the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1915.*

[2] Page 700 of *the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1915,*

लङ्कावतारसूत्र में निर्वाण

प्रो० महेश तिवारी, एम० ए०, पालि आचार्य, साहित्यरत्न, सिद्धान्तरत्न
पालि-प्राध्यापक, नव नालन्दा महाविहार

लंकावतारसूत्र में निर्वाण

लंकावतारसूत्र के अनुसार चित्त को परमार्थ सत् कहा गया है। चित्त के अतिरिक्त जो कुछ भी दृश्यमान जगत् के रूप में दृष्टिगोचर होता है, वह समस्त माया, आकाशकुसुम तथा स्वप्न के समान अलीक है[1]। त्रिविध भव-कामधातु, रूपधातु तथा अरूपधातु-तैमिरिक के केशजाल के समान भ्रममात्र है[2]। पंचस्कन्ध जल में पतित छाया के समान असार है[3]। चित्त ही वस्तुतः इन विविध आकारों में ग्राह्य-ग्राहक भाव से प्रवृत्त होता है। कहा भी गया है :—

> चित्तमात्रमिदं सर्वं, द्विधा चित्तं प्रवर्तते।
> ग्राह्यग्राहकभावेन, आत्मात्मीयं न विद्यते॥ लं. ३.१२१.

अब लंकावतारसूत्र की उक्त पृष्ठभूमि को आधार मानकर वर्तमान प्रसंग में यह प्रश्न विचारणीय है कि संसार तथा निर्वाण का क्या स्वरूप हो सकता है।

इस उद्देश्य से अग्रसर होते हुए प्रथमतः इस प्रश्न पर विचार किया जाय कि संसार क्या है? इस ओर प्रवृत्त होने पर प्रकट होता है कि सत्त्वों का विभिन्न योनियों में संसरण करना संसार कहलाता है। पर यह संसरण किसका कहा जा सकता है? सत्त्व तो लंकावतारसूत्र के अनुसार भित्ति-खचित विग्रह के समान निश्चेष्ट एक दृश्यमात्र हैं[4]। पंचस्कन्ध भी तैमिरिक के केशगुच्छ के समान अवास्तविक कहे गये हैं[5]। अतः ऐसे मिथ्या तथा निश्चेष्ट सत्त्व का संसरण इष्ट नहीं। अब रही बात चित्त की। इसके स्वरूप पर निकट से विचार करने पर प्रकट होता है कि चित्त का ही संसरण होता है—"तथा गत गर्भः संसरति निर्वाणसुखदुखहेतुकः[6]"।

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[1] उत्पादभंगरहितो लोकः खपुष्पसंनिभः। लं २. १.

[2] केशोण्डुकप्रख्यमिदं मरीच्युदकविभ्रमत्।
त्रिभवं स्वप्नमायाख्यं............। लं. २, १५०, १५७.

[3] जलवृक्षच्छायासदृशाः स्कन्धा........। लं. १. १४९.

[4] भित्तिखचितविग्रहसमः सत्त्वप्रचारो निश्चेष्टो........कर्मक्रियारहितो। लं. २० पृ.

[5] लं. २. १५६.

[6] लं. ४६ पृ.

चित्त अर्थात् विज्ञान की अभिव्यक्ति आठ प्रकार से बतलायी गयी है। इनमें आलय विज्ञान मूल विज्ञान कहा गया है। यही समस्त विज्ञानों का आश्रय या आधार है। यह आलयविज्ञान समुद्र के तरंगों की भाँति सदा प्रवहमान रहता है। यह प्रवाह अनवरत गति से व्युच्छेद रहित होकर चलता रहता है। कहा भी गया है :—

> आलयौघस्तथा नित्यं विषयपवनेरितः।
> चित्रैस्तरंगविज्ञानै नृ॔त्यमानः प्रवर्तते ॥
> नृत्यमानाः प्रवर्तन्ते व्युच्छेदश्च न विद्यते। लं. ४६ पृ.

यह विज्ञान ही विभिन्न रूपों में ग्राह्य ग्राहक भाव से विविध योनियों में संसरण करता है। स्कन्धादि इसी के विवर्त हैं। उनकी उन-उन रूपों में प्रतीति अनादिकालिक प्रपंचवासना के कारण होती है[1]। यहां स्पष्ट रूप से दिखलाया गया है कि एक योनि की स्थिति समाप्त होने पर आलय का विच्छेद नहीं होता है। उच्छेद होने से लोकायतों के उच्छेदवाद से इस सिद्धान्त में कोई अन्तर नहीं रह जाय। यह आलय एक योनि से दूसरी में संसरण करता रहता है[2]। इसकी इस प्रकार की प्रवृत्ति को संसार कहते हैं।

अब निर्वाण क्या है, इस प्रश्न पर विचार किया जाय। ऊपर के कथन से प्रकट है कि आलयविज्ञान का अनादिकालिक प्रपंच वासना से वासित हो ग्राह्य ग्राहक रूप से प्रवृत्त होना ही संसार है। अतः आलयविज्ञान से समस्त वासना, क्लेश, कर्मबीजों का नष्ट हो जाना तथा उसका शुद्ध रूप में परिणत हो जाना निर्वाण है। स्पष्ट शब्दों में कहा जा सकता है कि समस्त विकल्पों से रहित जो चित्त है, वही निर्वाण है।

लंकावतारसूत्र में कहा गया है कि "जब विविध दृष्टिगत वासनाओं को उत्पन्न करने वाले आलय, मनस, मनोविज्ञान आदि समस्त विज्ञानों की स्वभाव तथा वासना से रहित हो परावृत्ति हो जाती है, उसे मैं निर्वाण बतलाता हूँ"[3]। "हे महामते, मेरे मत के अनुसार विकल्पक मनोविज्ञान

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[1] अनादिकालप्रपंचदौष्ठुल्यविकल्पवासनाहेतुकं त्रिभवं पश्यतः। लं. ४३ पृ.

[2] तस्मान्महामते, न स्वजातिलक्षणनिरोधो विज्ञानानां किन्तु कर्मलक्षणनिरोधः। स्वजातिलक्षणे पुनर्निरुध्यमान आलयविज्ञाननिरोधः स्यात्। आलयविज्ञाने पुनर्निरुध्यमाने निर्विशिष्टस्तीर्थंकरोच्छेदवादेनायं वादः स्यात्। लं. ३८-३९ पृ.

[3] सर्वविज्ञानस्वभाववासनालयमनोमनोविज्ञानदृष्टिवासनापरावृत्तिर्निर्वाणमित्युच्यते। लं. ९८ पृ.

की व्यावृत्ति को निर्वाण कहा जाता है"[१]। विकल्पक चित्त चैत्यकलाप की व्यावृत्तिपूर्वक तथागत को प्रत्यात्म आर्यज्ञान से निर्वाण का अधिगम होता है[२]।

अब इस कथन पर विचार करने से प्रकट होता है कि चित्त की जो विविध विकल्पों के रूप में प्रवृत्ति है, उसका समाप्त हो जाना निर्वाण है। यहां जो उक्त वचन में 'व्यावृत्ति' शब्द का प्रयोग है, वह विचारणीय प्रतीत होता है। आलय की व्यावृत्ति का अर्थ विज्ञानमात्र का निरोध नहीं है बल्कि व्यावृत्ति का अर्थ रूपान्तरित हो जाना है। रूपान्तरित का अभिप्राय यहाँ यह है कि आलय के अन्तर्गत जो वासना या क्लेशबीज चले आ रहे हैं, तथा जिनके कारण उसका विविध रूप में प्रवृत्ति हुआ करती है, उन सब की समाप्ति तथा आलय विज्ञान को शुद्ध रूप में परिणत हो जाना। कहा भी गया है "चित्त स्वभावतः प्रभास्वर है, पर आगन्तुक क्लेशों से उपक्लिष्ट होता है"[३]। जिस प्रकार मलसहित वस्त्र मल के अभाव में शुद्ध रूप में स्थित होता है, जिस प्रकार सुवर्ण दोषरहित हो शुद्ध रूप में उपलब्ध होता है, मल के अभाव से इसका नाश नहीं होता है, उसी प्रकार चित्त समस्त क्लेशों से रहित हो, अपने शुद्ध रूप में स्थित होता है"[४]। यही शुद्ध चित्त निर्वाण है। यही परमार्थ सत् है। तथता, शून्यता, निर्वाण, धर्मधातु, चित्त के ही पर्याय हैं[५]।

पुनः निर्वाण न नाश है, न मरण है। यह मरण नहीं है क्योंकि मरण होने से पुनर्जन्म हो जायगा। यह नाश नहीं है, क्योंकि ऐसा होने से संस्कृत लक्षण से युक्त हो जायगा। अतः निर्वाण नाश या मरण नहीं हो सकता है। निर्वाण वह है जिसका न तो प्रहाण किया जा सकता है, न जिसकी प्राप्ति की जा सकती है, यह न उच्छेद है, न शाश्वत है, न एक है, न अनेक है। यह शाश्वत नहीं है क्योंकि वह सामान्य लक्षण विकल्प से रहित है। यह उच्छेद नहीं है क्योंकि अतीत अनागत प्रत्युत्पन्न आर्यों

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[१] मत्प्रवचने पुनर्महामते, विकल्पकस्य मनोविज्ञानस्य व्यावृत्तिर्निर्वाणमित्युच्यते। लं. १२६ पृ.

[२] विकल्पकचित्तचैत्यकलापस्य परावृत्तिपूर्वकं तथागतस्वप्रत्यात्मार्यज्ञानाधिगमं निर्वाणमिति वदामि। लं. २०० पृ.

[३] प्रकृतिप्रभास्वरं चित्तमुपक्लेशैर्मनादिभिः। सगा. ७५३.

[४] सगा. ७५५-७५६.

[५] तथताशून्यताकोटिनिर्वाणं धर्मधातुकम्।
......................,चित्रमात्रं वदाम्यहम्। लं. ३. ३१.

द्वारा अनुभूत है[1]। अतः निर्वाण भावाभाव विकल्पवर्जित चित्त मात्र है। कहा भी गया है—

उत्पादमथ नोत्पादं शून्याशून्यं न कल्पयेत्।
स्वभावमस्वभावत्वं चित्तमात्रे न विद्यते ॥ सगा० ४२६.

अतः अब उपर्युक्त कथन से यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि निर्वाण समस्तविकल्प रहित अस्तिरूप शुद्धविज्ञान स्वरूप है जिसे योगी साक्षात्कार करते हैं।

अब लंकावतारसूत्र के विषय वस्तु पर एक समीक्षात्मक दृष्टि डाली जाय। इस ओर बढ़ने से प्रकट होता है कि लंकावतारसूत्र में किसी एक सिद्धान्त या विषय का दृढ़ता के साथ सर्वत्र निर्वाह नहीं हो सका है। जिस प्रकार न्याय वेदान्त आदि परम्पराओं में अपना एक प्रतिपाद्य विषय होता है, उनमें प्रयुक्त शब्दों की निश्चित परिभाषा होती है, तथा उनके प्रयोग का एक सीमित क्षेत्र होता है। ऐसा होने से सिद्धान्त निरूपण में सुगमता तथा विषय के अधिगम में सरलता पायी जाती है। उस प्रकार लंकावतारसूत्र में इस प्रणाली का प्रचुरतः अभाव सा दिखता है। फलतः प्रतिपाद्य विषय का निरूपण कठिन हो जाता है। कहीं कहीं तो दो परस्परविरोधी विचारधारायें देखने को मिलती हैं जिन्हें देख कर इस प्रकार की शंका उत्पन्न होती है कि यह प्रक्षेप तो नहीं है। पर जो हो, इसी रूप में हमें लंकावतारसूत्र प्राप्त है। अतः इसके इन विविध अंशों को उपस्थित कर उन पर विचार करते हुए इसके सिद्धान्त निरूपण के लिए बढ़ा जाय।

लंकावतारसूत्र में निम्नलिखित प्रसंग आते हैं जो विचारणीय हैं—

(क) तथागतगर्भ के व्याज से आत्मवाद की स्थापना तथा पुनः इसे तीर्थिकों के आकर्षणार्थ कहकर इसका निराकरण।
(ख) आत्मवाद का समर्थन।
(ग) माध्यमिक दर्शन की ओर सिद्धान्तों की उन्मुखता।
(घ) चित्त अर्थात् विज्ञान को परमार्थ सत् के रूप में बतलाना।

अब इनमें से प्रत्येक पर विचार किया जाय। "सूत्रों में तथागतगर्भ का वर्णन आया है। तथागतगर्भ स्वभावतः प्रभास्वर, अतिविशुद्ध, मलिनवस्त्र

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[1] निर्वाणं न नाशो न मरणम्। यदि पुनर्महामते, महापरिनिर्वाणं मरणं स्यात्पुनरपि जन्मप्रबन्धः स्यात्। अथ विनाशः स्यात्संस्कृतलक्षणपतितं स्यात्।........ ....निर्वाणमार्यज्ञानप्रत्यात्मगतिगोचरं शाश्वतोच्छेदविकल्पभावाभाव-विवर्जितम्। लं. ९९ पृ.

में वेष्ठित रत्न के समान समस्त प्राणियों के देहान्तर्गत स्कन्ध आयतन धातु से वेष्ठित, रागद्वेष मोहाभूत परिकल्पमल मलिन नित्य ध्रुव शिव शाश्वत कहा गया है"[1]। तथागतगर्भ का यह उपदेश आत्मवादियों के आत्मवाद तुल्य दिखता है। डा० दासगुप्त ने भी कहा है कि ऐसा होने से यह सिद्धान्त वेदान्त के ब्रह्मवाद या आत्मवाद तुल्य है[2]।

पुनः इस प्रसंग को बढ़ाते हुए कहा गया है कि तथागतगर्भ का उपदेश आत्मवादियों के आत्मवाद तुल्य नहीं है। "तथागतों ने तथागतगर्भ का उपदेश शून्यता, भूतकोटि, निर्वाण, अनुत्पाद, अनिमित्त, अप्रणिहित के अर्थ में दिया है। मूर्खों के उत्पन्न भय के निवारणार्थ तथा आत्मदृष्टि अभिनिविष्ट तीर्थिकों के आकर्षणार्थ तथागत द्वारा तथागतगर्भ का उपदेश किया गया है। जिस प्रकार कोई कुंभकार एक मृत्पिण्ड से हस्त, शिल्प, जल, सूत्र आदि के योग से नाना प्रकार का भाजन बनाता है, उसी प्रकार तथागत समस्त विकल्पों एवं लक्षणों से रहित धर्मनैरात्म्य का उपदेश विविध नय से-तथागतगर्भ शून्यता आदि ढंग से देते हैं[3]।" अतः उनके तथागतगर्भ के उपदेश से आत्मवाद का उपदेश नहीं समझना चाहिये वल्कि उसी के व्याज से दिया गया नैरात्म्य का उपदेश समझना चाहिए।

अब यहाँ स्पष्ट है कि लंकावतार के अनुसार आत्मवाद तुल्य तथागतगर्भ का उपदेश वस्तुतः नैरात्म्य का उपदेश है। पर आगे बढ़ने पर यह धारणा अधिक दूर तक दृढ़ नहीं रह पाती है। प्रकट होता है कि लंकावतारसूत्र ने पुनः आत्मवाद का समर्थन प्रारंभ कर दिया है। वह इस प्रकार है-"जिस प्रकार औषधियों में सार है, इन्धन में अग्नि है, उसी प्रकार स्कन्धों में आत्मा है"[4]। "यदि स्कन्धों में आत्मा न रहे तो भूमियों, वशिताओं, अभिज्ञा, अभिषेक, समाधि आदि की प्राप्ति नहीं हो सके[5]।" आत्मवाद का यह सिद्धान्त तीर्थिक दोषों से मुक्त, नैरात्म्य वन का दाहक, विश्वप्रज्वलनकारी अग्नि के समान जाज्वल्यमान है[6]।" यह आत्मा प्रत्येक

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[1] तथागतगभः, पुनर्भगवता सूत्रान्तपाठे अनुवर्णितः। स च किल त्वया प्रकृतिप्रभास्वरविशुद्ध्यादिविशुद्ध........सर्वसत्त्वदेहान्तर्गतो...स्कन्धात्वायतनवस्तुवेष्ठितो... ...नित्यो ध्रुवः शिवः शाश्वतश्च भगवता वर्णितः। लं. ७८ पृ.

[2] History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I. Page 147.

[3] लं. ७९-८० पृ.

[4] सगा. ७६१.

[5] सगा. ७६३.

[6] सगा. ७६६.

प्राणी के पंचस्कन्धों में स्थित है जिसे अज्ञ देख नहीं पाते हैं[1]।" यह स्वभावतः शुद्ध है, आगन्तुक मलों से उपक्लिष्ट होता है[2]।" "यह निवृ‍ृत होकर नष्ट नहीं होता है, बल्कि शुद्ध रूप में स्थित होता है[3]।"

"जिस प्रकार मलरहित वस्त्र अपने शुद्ध रूप में स्थित होता है, जिस प्रकार सुवर्ण दोषरहित हो शुद्ध रूप में उपलब्ध होता है, उसी प्रकार आत्मा समस्त क्लेशों से मुक्त हो अपने शुद्ध रूप में स्थित होता है"[4]। "जो लोग नैरात्म्यवाद का प्रतिपादन करते हैं, वे बौद्धसिद्धान्त के घातक हैं"[5]।

अब इन वचनों से स्पष्ट है कि लंकावतारसूत्र में आत्मवाद की स्थापना की गयी है। यह बात बड़ी विचित्र लगती है। बौद्ध दर्शन मूलतः नैरात्म्यवादी कहा जाता है फिर यहाँ ऐसा क्यों? प्रो० सुजुकी ने भी कहा है कि "आत्मा सम्बन्धी ये गाथायें बौद्ध दर्शन के नैरात्म्यवाद से विरोध उपस्थित करती हैं। इन गाथाओं का क्या आशय है, यह जानना कठिन प्रतीत होता है, क्योंकि यहाँ इनका व्याख्यात्मक गद्य उपलब्ध नहीं है। सगाथकम् की कुछ स्पष्ट अर्थवाली गाथाओं को छोड़कर अन्य गाथाओं का सीधा सम्बन्ध मुख्य पुस्तक से नहीं दिखता है। अतः ऐसी अवस्था में यह कहना कठिन है कि इनका अर्थ क्या हो सकता है"[6]। जो हो, इतना तो स्पष्ट है कि जिस रूप में हमें लंकावतारसूत्र प्राप्त है, उसके अनुसार ये गाथायें आत्मा की स्थापना करती हैं। ऐसा होने से तो यह सिद्धान्त वेदान्त के आत्मवाद तुल्य प्रतीत होता है। या ऐसा भी हो सकता है कि ऐसे कथन वेदान्तियों के आत्मवत् दर्शाने के उद्देश्य से प्रक्षेप रूप हों। या यह भी हो सकता है कि ऐसे कथन पूर्ववत् आत्मवाद अभिनिविष्ट तीर्थिकों के प्ररोचनार्थ कहे गये हों।

लंकावतारसूत्र में तीसरा रूप यह देखा जाता है कि इसके सिद्धान्त शून्यवाद के सिद्धान्तों की ओर अवनत हैं। इसका परिचय निम्नलिखित उद्धरणों से प्राप्त किया जा सकता है।—।

(क) लंकावतारसूत्र—"मैं शून्यता का उपदेश करता हूँ, जो शाश्वतोच्छेद वर्जित है"।

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१. सगा. ७६२.

२. सगा. ७५३.

३. सगा. ७५५.

४. सगा. ७५६.

५. नैरात्म्यवादिनोऽभाष्या भिक्षुकर्माणि वर्जय। बाधका बुद्धधर्माणां........सगा. ७६५.

६. लंकावतारसूत्र—अंग्रेजी अनुवाद पृ. २८३-२८४,

माध्यमिक कारिका—"मैं शून्यता का उपदेश करता हूँ (जो प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद है)। यह शाश्वत, उच्छेद, एक, अनेक आदि विकल्पों से रहित है"[1]।

(ख) लंकावतारसूत्र—"संसार तथा निर्वाण अद्वय हैं।"

माध्यमिक कारिकाः—"संसार तथा निर्वाण में कोई भेद नहीं है। जो कोटि संसार की है वही कोटि निर्वाण की है"[2]।

(ग) लंकावतारसूत्र :—"निर्वाण शाश्वत, उच्छेद, भाव, अभाव विकल्प से रहित है। न इसे प्राप्त किया जा सकता है, न इसका प्रहाण किया जा सकता है," आदि।

माध्यमिक कारिका :—"निर्वाण वह है, जिसकी न प्राप्ति की जा सकती है, न इसका प्रहाण किया जा सकता है, न उच्छेद है, न शाश्वत है, न निरुद्ध होता है, न उत्पन्न होता है[3]"।

(घ) लंकावतारसूत्र—"आकाश, शशश्रृङ्ग, बन्ध्यापुत्र के समान भाव पदार्थों को न होते हुए भी उनकी कल्पना की जाती है"।

माध्यमिक कारिका—आकाश, शशश्रृङ्ग, बन्ध्यापुत्र के समान भाव पदार्थों को न होते हुए भी उनकी कल्पना की जाती है"[4]।

(ङ) लंकावतारसूत्र—"काल, निर्वाण, धर्मता, बुद्ध, सत्य, फल, हेतु आदि अवास्तविक हैं"।

माध्यमिक कारिका—"तथागत, निर्वाण, तथता, आदि प्रतिबिम्बमात्र हैं"[5]।

अब इन उद्धरणों पर ध्यान देने से प्रकट होता है कि लंकावतार सूत्र माध्यमिक दर्शन के सिद्धान्तों का पोषण करता है। पर इस निष्ठा का निर्वाह भी सर्वत्र नहीं देखा जाता है। माध्यमिक दर्शन में जहां शून्यता का निरूपण स्थापन किया गया है, वहां कहीं भी आदि मध्य या अन्त में उसका विरोध नहीं देखा जाता है। एक ही सिद्धान्त का युक्ति तथा आगम के आधार पर सर्वत्र स्थापन है। कहीं भी विरोधी बातों को देखने का अवसर नहीं मिलता है। पर लंकावतारसूत्र में ऐसी युक्तिमय पद्धति नहीं मिलती है।

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१. लं ७६ पृ. । मा. का. ११ पृ. २४, १८.
२. लं. ७६ पृ. । मा. का. २५-१९-२०.
३. लं. ९९ पृ. । मा. का. २५-३.
४. लं. १०५ पृ. । मा. का. ५२८ पृ.
५. सगा. २७६ । मा. का. ५४० पृ.

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अब चौथे रूप पर विचार किया जाय। लंकावतारसूत्र में यह चौथा रूप इस प्रकार उपलब्ध होता है कि चित्त ही परमार्थ सत् है। इसके अतिरिक्त जो कुछ भी दृष्टिगोचर होता है, वह अलीक है। चित्त की चर्चा पहले की जा चुकी है। यहां संक्षेप में उसके कतिपय अंगों पर प्रकाश डाला जायगा।

प्रस्तुत ग्रन्थ में उपलब्ध होता है कि चित्त एक सत् है, अन्य समस्त दृश्य पदार्थ इसके विकल्प हैं। यह चित्त स्वभावतः प्रभास्वर है पर आगन्तुक मलों से उपक्लिष्ट होता है। यह आगन्तुक मल आलय में संचित वासना या क्लेश बीज है। इसी अनादिकालिक वासना से वासित हो चित्त की द्विधा प्रवृत्ति होती है। जब चित्त के अन्तर्गत की यह अनादिकालिक वासना प्रहीण हो जाती है तब यह अपने शुद्ध रूप में स्थित हो जाता है। यह समस्त विकल्पों से रहित चित्त ही निर्वाण है।

लंकावतारसूत्र में चित् मात्र को सत् तथा अन्य पदार्थों को असत् बतलानेवाले बहुत स्थल उपलब्ध हैं[1]। चित्त को ही शून्यता, तथता, निर्वाण, धर्मधातु, मनोमयकाय आदि कहा गया है[2]। सगाथकम् से प्रकट होता है कि वक्ता, वाच्य, स्कन्ध, धातु, संस्कृत, बन्धन, मोक्ष, धर्माधर्म, निर्वाण, धर्मता, बुद्ध, हेतु, फल, आदि को मिथ्या कहा जा सकता है पर चित्त को मिथ्या नहीं कहा जा सकता है[3]। यह चित्त भावाभाव शाश्वतोच्छेद विकल्पों से रहित शुद्ध विज्ञानमात्र है। यह सत् है। इसके इस रूप को दिखलाने के लिए पुनः पुनः ऐसी उक्ति उपलब्ध होती है कि "चित्तमात्रम् वदाम्यहम्"[4]।

इन उद्धरणों पर विचार करने से प्रतीत होता है कि लंकावतारसूत्र में विज्ञानवाद के सिद्धान्तों का प्रतिपादन किया गया है।

अब प्रकृत प्रसंग की ओर दृष्टिपात करने से प्रकट होता है कि लंकावतारसूत्र में विज्ञानवाद, शून्यवाद, ब्रह्म (आत्म) वाद तीनों प्रकार के सिद्धान्त उपलब्ध हैं। इन्हें इस रूप में प्राप्तकर यह प्रश्न उत्पन्न होता है कि इसे किस परम्परा का ग्रन्थ माना जाय। यों तो साधारणतः किसी भी शास्त्र के निश्चित सिद्धान्त का निर्णय करना कठिन कार्य

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१. लं९८, ९९, १२६, १२७, १४९, १५३, १५४, १८२, २००, २०९-१०, ३०१-३, ३१९, ३५८-६० पृ.

२. लं. १५४ पृ.

३. लं. ३०१ पृ.

४, लं' १५४ पृ.

होता है पर यह कठिनाई उस अवस्था में और भी बढ़ जाती है जब एक ही शास्त्र में बहुत से विषयों का वर्णन रहता है तथा जिसमें परस्पर विरोधी सिद्धान्त भी उपलब्ध होते हैं। ऐसी दशा में उस शास्त्र के सिद्धान्त का क्या तात्पर्य है—इसका स्थापन निरूपण अति कठिन हो जाता है। शास्त्रगत ऐसी समस्याओं के समाधान के लिए मीमांसा शास्त्र में तात्पर्य निर्णायक छ लिंगों या गमकों की चर्चा आती है जिनके द्वारा किसी सिद्धान्त का तात्पर्य निर्धारण करने में सहायता मिलती है। ये छ लिंग हैं—उपक्रम, उपसंहार, अभ्यास, अपूर्वता, फल, अर्थवाद, तथा उपपत्ति[१]। अतः अब इन छ लिंगों के सहारे लंकावतारसूत्र के विषय के निरूपण के लिए बढ़ा जाय।

उपक्रम कहते हैं प्रारम्भ को। उपसंहार का अर्थ होता है—अन्त। जहाँ किसी शास्त्र में एक सिद्धान्त का प्रतिपादन रहता है, वहाँ इन दोनों में इसकी एकरूपता का होना आवश्यक बतलाया जाता है। इस दृष्टि से लंकावतार सूत्र में प्रथमतः यह देखा जाय कि प्रारम्भ में किस विषय का प्रतिपादन किया गया है। इस उद्देश्य को लेकर अग्रसर होने पर प्रकट होता है कि प्रस्तुत ग्रन्थ के प्रारम्भ में चित्त अर्थात् विज्ञान की चर्चा आई है। लंकाधिपति रावण भगवान बुद्ध से तत्त्व का उपदेश करने का आग्रह करते हुए कहते हैं कि "हे भगवन्, आप मुझे उस धर्मनिधि का उपदेश करें जो आत्मदृष्टि से रहित, समस्त दृष्टियों से परे, परमशुद्ध तथा प्रत्यात्मवेध है[२]। यह धर्मनिधि क्या है? प्रकृति शुद्ध चित्त अर्थात् "चित्तस्वभावनय धर्मनिधिं"। "यह चित् ही परमार्थ सत् है—यही धर्मता है"[३]। तथागत तथा तथागतगर्भ इसी के अधिवचनमात्र हैं। "यह समस्तविकल्पों तथा प्रपंचों से रहित स्वभावतः शुद्ध है[४]।" बाह्य जगत इसी का विकल्पमात्र है[५]। वे स्वप्न, माया, गन्धर्व नगर, आदि के समान अलीक हैं। चित्त ही उन उन रूपों में अवभासित होता है[६]। इस प्रकार

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१. उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासौऽपूर्वता फलम्। अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिंगं तात्पर्यनिर्णये।

२. चित्तस्वभावनयधर्मनिधिं, नैरात्म्यदृष्टिविगतं ह्यमलं।
प्रत्यात्मवेद्यगतिसूचनकं, देसेहि नायक इह धर्मनयम्। लं. ३ पृ.

३. प्रत्यात्मधर्मताशुद्धं। लं. ८ पृ.

४. लं. १९-२१ पृ.

५. धर्मांणां चित्तगोचरे। लं ९ पृ.

६. लं. ९ पृ.

यहाँ देखा जाता है कि लंकावतार सूत्र के प्रारम्भ में चित्त को परमार्थ सत् तथा बाह्य जगत को मिथ्या बतलाया गया है।

अब इसके उपसंहार पर दृष्टिपात किया जाय। इस ओर अग्रसर होने पर प्रकट होता है कि लंकावतार सूत्र के उपसंहार में भी उन्हीं तथ्यों का समर्थन तथा प्रतिपादन किया गया है, जो इसके उपक्रम में प्रतिपाद्य हैं। सगाथकम् में कहा गया है कि चित्त ही सब कुछ है, सर्वत्र है, सभी देहों में है, जो कुछ भी विविध विचित्रता देखी जाती है, वह असत् है[१]। यह चित्त ग्राह्यग्राहक भाव से प्रवृत्त होता है[२]। यह स्वयं प्रकाश है[३]। इसके अतिरिक्त बाह्य जगत् आकाशकुसुम, स्वप्न, माया आदि के समान मिथ्या है[४]।

विज्ञान (चित्त) की परमार्थता तथा जगत् की असारता की पुष्टि केवल सगाथकम् में ही उपलब्ध नहीं है बल्कि इस तथ्य का समर्थन तथा प्रतिपादन प्रायः प्रत्येक अध्याय के उपसंहार में किया गया है। प्रथम अध्याय रावणाध्येषणा परिवर्त के अन्त में कहा गया है कि भित्तिखचित विग्रह के समान यह लोक तथा सत्त्व निष्क्रिय निश्चेष्ट तत्त्व रहित हैं। तथागतगर्भ सत् है, जो प्रत्यात्मवेद्य है[५]। द्वितीय अध्याय के अन्त में इस तथ्य पर प्रकाश डाला गया है कि जिस प्रकार मल रहित सुवर्ण शुद्ध है, कलुष से वर्जित जल शुद्ध है, यथा मेघों से रहित आकाश शुद्ध है, उसी प्रकार विकल्पों से रहित चित्त शुद्ध है[६]। जो कुछ भी बाह्य जगत है वह माया है। अज्ञानी उसे सत् के रूप में मानता है पर वस्तुतः वे सत् नहीं है[७]। तृतीय अध्याय के उपसंहार में कहा गया है कि "चित्तमात्र ही सब कुछ है। चित्त ग्राह्यग्राहक भाव से अविद्या के कारण प्रवृत्त होता है। यहां आत्मा आत्मीय नहीं है। ब्रह्मलोक पर्यन्त मैं चित्त को बतलाता हूँ। चित्त से विनिर्मुक्त ब्रह्म लोकादि की उपलब्धि नहीं हो सकती है[८]।

[१] सगा. १३४.

[२] सगा. ६९९.

[३] सगा. ७६३.

[४] सगा. १-३.

[५] लं. २०-२१ पृ.

[६] लं. १३१ पृ.

[७] लं. १३० पृ.

[८] लं. २०९-२१० पृ.

चतुर्थ अध्याय के अन्त से प्रकट होता है कि निराभास अर्थात् समस्त विकल्पों से रहित चित्त बुद्धत्व का आवास है—यह अतीत अनागत तथा प्रत्युत्पन्न बुद्धों का वचन है[1]। बाह्य जगत् चित्त का विकल्प है[2]। पंचम अध्याय भी यही कहता है कि जब यह जान लिया जाता है कि बाह्य जगत् चित्त का अवभास है तो समस्त विवाद शान्त हो जाते हैं[3]।

षष्ठ परिच्छेद से प्रकट होता है कि बोधिसत्त्व लोकोत्तर भूमि में पहुँच कर यह जानते हैं कि जो कुछ भी बाह्य जगत् है, वह चित्त का विकल्पमात्र है[4]। पृथग्जन छः विज्ञानों के निरोध को देखकर उच्छेद दृष्टि के जाल में पतित होता है तथा आलयविज्ञान को न जानने के कारण शाश्वत दृष्टि बतलाता है। चित्त जब इस प्रकार के समस्त विकल्पों से रहित हो जाता है—वही मोक्ष कहलाता है[5]। यह वचन सप्तम अध्याय का उपसंहार है।

अब लंकावतारसूत्र के प्रत्येक अध्याय में वर्णित विषयों पर ध्यान देने से यही प्रकट होता है कि उसके प्रत्येक अध्याय के उपसंहार में एक ही तत्त्व उच्चरित होता आया है कि चित्त सत् है तथा बाह्य जगत् उसका विकल्प है। इस प्रकार लंकावतारसूत्र के उपक्रम तथा उपसंहार में एक ही विषय का प्रतिपादन किया गया है। अतः यहां उपक्रम तथा उपसंहार में ऐक्य दिखता है।

द्वितीय लिंग अभ्यास है। अभ्यास का अर्थ होता है पुनः पुनः कथन करना। अब इस दृष्टि से लंकावतारसूत्र पर विचार किया जाय। तात्पर्य निर्णय के इस दृष्टिकोण को ध्यान में रखकर आगे बढ़ने पर प्रकट होता है कि इस ग्रन्थ में जिस विषय का पुनः पुनः कथन उपलब्ध है, वह है चित्त अर्थात् विज्ञान की चर्चा। इस विषय की चर्चा किस प्रकार पुनः पुनः की गयी है, इसका सामान्य परिचय उपक्रम तथा उपसंहार शीर्ष में उपस्थित उद्धरणों से मिल चुका है। अन्यत्र भी जो इसकी चर्चा है वह इस प्रकार है।

"जो कुछ दृष्टिगोचर हो रहा है, वह अलातचक्र तथा धूमवत् मिथ्या है। चित्त तद्रूप अवभासित होता है"[6]। "यह आलय विज्ञान क्या है?

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१. लं. २१९ पृ.
२. लं. २१४ पृ.
३. लं. २१९ पृ.
४. लं. २३७ पृ.
५. लं. २४२-४३ पृ.
६. लं. ९ पृ.

मनोविज्ञान कैसे उत्पन्न होता ? विविध दृश्यों की प्रवृत्ति तथा निवृत्ति कैसे होती है"[1] ? दृश्यपदार्थों का विश्लेषण अणु तक करने पर भी कहीं रूप की उपलब्धि नहीं होती है। सत् रूप से चित्त ही उपलब्ध होता है[2]। आलय, मनो, मनोविज्ञान, प्रवृत्ति विज्ञान से मुक्त जो चित् है, उसे निर्वाण कहते हैं[3]। इस नय से लंकावतारसूत्र में सर्वत्र चित्त अर्थात् विज्ञान की चर्चा है।

तृतीय लिंग है अर्थवाद। इसका अभिप्राय है प्रशंसा तथा निन्दा। इसके अनुसार विधेय अर्थ की प्रशंसा तथा निषेध्य अर्थ की निन्दा का सम्यक् निर्वाह रहना चाहिए। लंकावतारसूत्र के अध्ययन से प्रकट होता है कि इसका विधेय अर्थ है चित्त अर्थात् विज्ञान। यहाँ सर्वत्र इसके स्थापन तथा निरूपण प्रसंग में इसकी प्रशंसा की गयी है। कहा गया है कि "तथता, शून्यता कोटि, निर्वाण, धर्मधातु आदि चित्त है[4]। बन्धन, मोक्ष, धर्म, अधर्म, बुद्ध, निर्वाण आदि मिथ्या कहे जा सकते हैं, पर चित्त को मिथ्या नहीं कहा जा सकता है"[5]। चित्त के कारण संसार तथा निर्वाण है। आलय का विषय पवनेरित होकर प्रवृत्त रहना संसार है तथा उसकी व्यावृत्ति निर्वाण है[6]। दूसरा पक्ष जो अविधेय अर्थ की निन्दा है उसका भी इस ग्रन्थ में पूर्ण रूप से निर्वाह दिखता है। यहाँ उन समस्त सिद्धान्तों की निन्दा की गयी है, जहाँ चित्त का इस रूप में समर्थन नहीं है अर्थात् लंकावतारसूत्र में क्षणिकवाद, शून्यवाद, लोकायतवाद, नित्यानित्यवाद, आत्मवाद आदि की निन्दा की गयी है।

क्षणिकवाद का खण्डन उपस्थित करते हुए कहा गया है कि तत्त्व का क्षणिक होना संभव नहीं क्योंकि सुवर्ण, वज्र, तथा जिनधातु अपने स्वभाव विशेष के कारण कभी भी नष्ट नहीं होते हैं। वे कल्पों तक स्थित रहते हैं— उनमें ह्रास या वृद्धि नहीं होती है। योगियों की समापत्ति, आभास्वरविमान आदि कभी विनष्ट नहीं होते हैं। यदि सम्बोधि को क्षणिक माना जाय तो आर्य लोग आर्य ज्ञान की प्राप्ति नहीं कर सकते। यस्मात् आर्यों द्वारा

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१. लं. २४-२५ पृ.

२; लं ५४ पृ.

३. लं. ५८ पृ.

४. लं. १५४ पृ.

५. लं ३०१ पृ.

६. लं. ४६, १२७ पृ.

आर्यज्ञान का अधिगम सिद्ध है, अतः सम्बोधि का क्षणिक होना अयुक्त है। इस प्रकार परमार्थ सत् का क्षणिक होना असंभव है[१]।

शून्यवाद का खण्डन उपस्थित करते हुए उपलब्ध होता है कि शून्यवाद की कल्पना विकल्प पर अवधारित है। भगवान ने कहा है—"महामते, शून्यता शून्यता जो कहा जाता है वह स्वभावतः परिकल्पित है। विकल्पों में अभिनिवेश होने के कारण महामति, शून्यता, अनुत्पाद, अद्वय, निःस्वभाव आदि कहा जाता है। यह शून्यता सात प्रकार की कही गयी है। इनसे तुम लोगों को वर्जित रहना चाहिए। इस प्रकार शून्यता का खण्डन यहाँ उपलब्ध है[२]।

लोकायतवाद के सम्बन्ध में कहा गया है कि नित्य, अनित्य, कृतक, अकृतक, पर, अपर आदि प्रकार की बातें लोकायतवाद की हैं। यह लोक है, यह लोक नहीं है, परलोक है, परलोक नहीं है, आदि भी लोकायतवाद के अन्तर्गत हैं। बुद्ध ने कहा है कि ये सारे विकल्प अनादिकालिक प्रपंचवासना के कारण हैं। जब तक चित्त ग्राह्य ग्राहक रूप से प्रवृत्त होता रहता है, तब तक ये विकल्प हैं, जब चित्त की प्रवृत्ति समाप्त हो जाती है तब चित्तमात्र ही जगत्मय देखा जाता है[३]। इसलिए कहा गया है कि—

"यावत्प्रवर्तते चित्तं तावल्लोकायतं भवेत्"।

शाश्वत अशाश्वतवाद की निन्दा करते हुए कहा गया है कि जब तक वाग्विकल्प प्रवृत्त होता है तब तक नित्य अनित्य आदि भेदक ज्ञान होते रहते हैं। विकल्पबुद्धि के क्षय से नित्यानित्य ग्राह समाप्त हो जाता है[४]। मैं महामति, न नित्य, न अनित्य का उपदेश करता हूँ[५]।

इस प्रकार लंकावतार सूत्र में अर्थवाद गमक की दृष्टि से विज्ञान अर्थात् चित्त मात्र इसका प्रतिपाद्य विषय सिद्ध होता है।

अब अपूर्वता नामक लिंग से इसकी परीक्षा की जाय। अपूर्वता का अर्थ है–अज्ञात पूर्वता। यहाँ अभिप्राय यह है कि जिस सिद्धान्त का निरूपण यहाँ किया जा रहा है, वह अपूर्व कथित हो। इस दृष्टिकोण

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१. लं. २३६-२३९ पृ.
२. लं. ७४-७९ पृ.
३. लं. १७६-८२ पृ.
४. लं. २१८-१९ पृ.
५. लं. २०८-९ पृ.

को लेकर अग्रसर होने पर प्रकट होता है कि लंकावतार सूत्र में चित्त को परमार्थतः सत् कहा गया है—"चित्तमात्रं वदाम्यहम्"। यह वचन अपूर्वज्ञात तथा अपूर्वकथित है। निर्वाण के स्वरूप पर प्रकाश डालते हुए कहा गया है कि अनादिकालिक प्रपंचवासना तथा विकल्पों से रहित चित्त ही निर्वाण है। यह निरोध नहीं है बल्कि अविनाशी है। यह प्रकृति प्रभाश्वर है, आदि। निर्वाण का इस रूप से प्रतिपादन करना लंकावतारसूत्र की अपूर्वता है। बौद्ध परम्परा में जो निर्वाण की कल्पना स्थविरवाद, सर्वास्तिवाद, सौत्रान्तिक. माध्यमिक, क्षणिकविज्ञानवाद में है, उनसे यहाँ अपूर्वता देखी जाती है।

अब उपपत्ति की दृष्टि से विचार किया जाय। उपपत्ति का अर्थ है प्रमाणाबाधिता। इसके अनुसार जिस सिद्धान्त का निरूपण किया जा रहा हो, वह प्रमाण से बाधित नहीं होना चाहिए। अतः अब इस दृष्टि से विचार किया जाय। लंकावतारसूत्र का सिद्धान्त है कि चित्तमात्र सत्य है, बाह्यजगत् मिथ्या है। चित्त ही ग्राह्य तथा ग्राहक भाव से प्रवृत्त होता है। यहाँ प्रश्न यह उत्पन्न होता है कि जब बाह्यपदार्थ की सत्ता अलीक है तो उनके अभाव में विषयविज्ञान कैसे होता है? अनुभव में तो देखा जाता है कि जब बाहर घट की स्थिति है तब घट विज्ञान होता है। अतः विषय के अभाव में विज्ञान का होना अनुभव से बाधित कहा जा सकता है। इसका उत्तर इस प्रकार दिया जा सकता है कि विषय के अभाव में भी विज्ञान का होना अनुभव सिद्ध है। तिमिरव्याधि से ग्रस्त मनुष्य सर्वत्र केशगुच्छ, चन्द्र आदि देखता है। यद्यपि वह जिन स्थानों में केशगुच्छादि को देखता है, उन उन स्थानों में उनकी स्थिति नहीं है पर उनके न रहने पर भी तैमिरिक को विज्ञान होना सिद्ध है। इसी प्रकार सर्वत्र समझना चाहिए[1]।

यथा वेदान्त में एक सत् ज्ञान आनन्दस्वरूप ब्रह्म को परमार्थ सत् कहा गया है। उनके अतिरिक्त समस्त बाह्यपदार्थ अवास्तविक हैं। बाह्य दृश्यों की प्रतीति मात्र होती है। ऐसा होने से वेदान्त का सिद्धान्त बाधित नहीं होता है। लंकावतारसूत्र भी उसी प्रकार प्रकृति प्रभाश्वर चित्त को सत् तथा बाह्य जगत् को अवास्तविक बतलाता है। अतः उक्त न्याय से इसके सिद्धान्त का बाध नहीं होना चाहिए।

इस प्रकार अब कहा जा सकता है कि लंकावतारसूत्र के सिद्धान्त प्रमाण से बाधित नहीं है।

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[1] लं. १६८ पृ.

अब अन्तिम लिंग फल की दृष्टि से लंकावतारसूत्र की परीक्षा की जाय। फल का अर्थ होता है प्रयोजन अथवा लाभ। न्यायदर्शन में कहा गया है कि जिस अर्थ की प्राप्ति के लिए मनुष्य क्रिया में प्रवृत्त होता है, उसे फल, प्रयोजन या अर्थ कहते हैं "यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्तते तत् प्रयोजनम्" १.२४। अतः इसके अनुसार जिस सिद्धान्त का निरूपण किया जाता है, उसका एक निश्चित प्रयोजन होना चाहिए। इस दृष्टि से लंकावतार सूत्र को देखने से प्रकट होता है कि इसका अपना एक निश्चित प्रयोजन है। भगवान ने इस अर्थ को दिखलाते हुए कहा है—"महामते, तथागतों की धर्मदेशना निर्वाण की ओर ले जानेवाली होती है—"तथागतानां सर्वबुद्धदेशना निर्वाण-प्रवाहानुकूला"[1]। मेरी देशना का उद्देश्य समस्त दुखों का समाप्तिकरण है। दुखों की उत्पत्ति का कारण विकल्प है। इसके कारण मनुष्य त्रिविध भव को सत्य समझता है। अज्ञान, तृष्णा, कर्मप्रत्यय की विनिवृत्ति से जब उसे ऐसा ज्ञान हो जाता है कि समस्त दृश्य चित्तमात्र हैं, तब वह दुख से मुक्त हो जाता है। यही समस्त विकल्पों से रहित चित्त निर्वाण है। इस निर्वाण का अधिगम ही यहाँ प्रयोजन है।

इस प्रकार तात्पर्य निर्णय के जो छ गमक हैं, उनसे लंकावतार सूत्र की परीक्षा करने पर इसका प्रतिपाद्य विषय चित्त अर्थात् विज्ञान फलित होता है जो अक्षय, अविनाशी, नित्य तथा सुखस्वरूप है।

अब यहाँ दूसरा प्रश्न यह विचारणीय हो उठता है कि प्रक्रान्त प्रसंग में शून्यवाद तथा आत्मवाद (ब्रह्मवाद) जैसे सिद्धान्तों की चर्चा आई है, उनका प्रयोजन क्या है ? क्या उनके सहारे भी विज्ञानवाद पर कुछ प्रकाश पड़ता है ?

बौद्धदर्शन मूलतः नैरात्म्यवादी है। नैरात्म्य का अर्थ है आत्मा का नास्तिभाव। पर यह आत्मा क्या है ? आत्मा शब्द के कई अर्थ होते हैं। इसका प्रयोग जीव, धृति, देह, स्वभाव तथा परमात्मा के अर्थ में देखा जाता है—"आत्मा जीवे धृतौ देहे स्वभावे परमात्मनि"। यहाँ शून्यवाद तथा आत्मवाद को लक्ष्य करके आत्मा को दो अर्थों में लिया जा सकता है। वे दो अर्थ हैं स्वभाव तथा आत्मा। शून्यवाद सत्त्व के स्वभाव की पूर्णरूप से नास्तितता शून्यता बतलाते हुए एकान्ततः अभाववाद का समर्थन करता है। आत्मवाद जैसा कि वेदान्त तथा असंग का है, पृथक् पृथक् सत्त्व को

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[1] लं. २३३ पृ.

अस्वीकार करते हुए एक नितान्त भावात्मक सत्ता के अस्तिभाव को स्वीकार करता है।

यहाँ शून्यवाद या आत्मवाद दोनों में किसी को स्वीकार करने पर नैरात्म्य की सिद्धि इष्ट दिखती है। शून्यवाद का कथन है कि सभी पदार्थ निःस्वभाव हैं। निःस्वभावता का अर्थ पूर्णतः नास्तिता या शून्यता है। यहाँ जब स्वभावता का अभिप्राय आत्मवाद से है तो निःस्वभावता अनात्मवाद है। अतः यह जो निःस्वभावता है वही नैरात्म्य है। इस प्रकार शून्यवाद नैरात्म्य की सिद्धि करता है। दूसरी ओर वेदान्त के आत्मवाद (ब्रह्मवाद) तथा असंग के बुद्धत्ववाद का कथन है कि निर्वाण की अवस्था में पृथक् पृथक् सत्त्व अपना अस्तित्व समाप्त कर ब्रह्म या बुद्धत्व में विलीन हो जाते हैं। ब्रह्म या बुद्धत्व में विलीन हो जाने के उपरान्त उनका अपना अस्तित्व कुछ भी नहीं रह जाता है। व्यक्तिगत आत्मा के अस्तित्व का इस प्रकार नास्ति हो जाना नैरात्म्य कहा जा सकता है। इस प्रकार आत्मवाद को स्वीकार करने पर भी नैरात्म्य की सिद्धि यहाँ स्पष्ट रूप से देखी जाती है, कहा भी गया है—वेदान्त भी नैरात्म्यवाद का प्रतिपादन करता है—"वेदान्तिनोप्यापाततो नैरात्म्यवादिन एवेति"[१]। अतः आरब्ध प्रसंग में शून्यवाद तथा आत्मवाद की चर्चा नैरात्म्य के समर्थनार्थ ही कही जा सकती है।

अब यहां पुनः प्रश्न यह उत्पन्न होता है कि जब वेदान्त के आत्मवाद को स्वीकार करने से भी नैरात्म्य की सिद्धि हो जाती है तो क्या वेदान्त को बौद्ध परम्परा के अन्तर्गत स्वीकार किया जा सकता है? इसका उत्तर यह है कि नहीं, क्योंकि बौद्ध परम्परा कभी भी वेदान्त को अपने अन्तर्गत नहीं मानती है। अतः वेदान्त का आत्मवाद बौद्ध सिद्धान्त नहीं हो सकता है। शून्यवाद बौद्ध सिद्धान्त है। प्रस्तुत ग्रन्थ में इसका अभिप्राय नैरात्म्य की सिद्धि है।

उक्त विवेचन को ध्यान में रखते हुए कहा जा सकता है कि लंकावतार-सूत्र मुख्यतः विज्ञानवाद का ग्रन्थ है पर कहीं-कहीं यह शून्यवाद के सिद्धान्त का भी स्पर्श करता गया है।

यहां तक लंकावतारसूत्र पर विविध नयों से पर्याप्त विवेचन किया जा चुका। अब यहां यह प्रश्न विचारणीय हो जाता है कि लंकावतार का मूल प्रतिपाद्य विषय क्या है? क्या यह आत्मवाद का प्रतिपादन करता है? क्या इसका विषय शून्यता है? क्या क्षणिकवाद या लोकायतवाद आदि इसके

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[१] आत्म तत्त्वविवेक—नारायणी टीका (चौखंभा) की भूमिका पृष्ठ ८,

प्रतिपाद्य हैं? क्या यह नित्य विज्ञानवाद का प्रतिपादन करता है? इन प्रश्नों का विवेचन अर्थवाद के प्रसंग में किया जा चुका है। उक्त प्रसंग से यह प्रकट है कि लंकावतारसूत्र का विषय आत्मवाद, शून्यवाद, क्षणिकवाद, लोकायतवाद नहीं हो सकता है। यहां इन वादों की निन्दा की गयी है। ये समस्त वाद विकल्प पर आधारित हैं। अनादिकालिक प्रपंचवासना के कारण इन वादों की प्रवृत्ति होती है। अतः लंकावतारसूत्र का जो विषय हो सकता है वह शुद्ध विज्ञानवाद है। भगवान् ने इस तथ्य पर प्रकाश डालते हुए कहा है—

"अहमेकस्वसिद्धान्तं कार्यकारणवर्जितम्।
देशेमि शिष्यवर्गस्य .... ॥
चितमात्रं न दृश्योऽस्ति द्विधा चित्तं प्रवर्तते।
ग्राह्यग्राहकभावेन शाश्वतोच्छेदवर्जितम् ॥ लं. १८१ पृ०

यहां शाश्वतोच्छेदवर्जित कहने का अभिप्राय यह है कि जहां तक प्रपंच का प्रश्न है उसके सम्बन्ध में शाश्वतोच्छेद कहना निरर्थक है तथा जो अनुत्पन्न अनुच्छेद आदि है, उसके सम्बन्ध में भी शाश्वतोच्छेद कहना अप्रासंगिक है।

अन्य स्थलों पर ऐसी स्पष्टोक्तियां उपलब्ध होती हैं कि "चित्तमात्रवदाम्यहम्" (लं. १५४, २०६, ३०१ पृ.) अर्थात् चित्त ही एकमात्र सत् है, बाह्यपदार्थ दृश्यमात्र हैं। चित्त ही उन-उन रूपों में अवभासित होता है (लं. १५४ पृ.)। तथता, शून्यताकोटि, निर्वाण, धर्मधातु, मनोमयकाय इसी के नाम हैं (लं. १५४ पृ.)। चित्त ही संसार तथा निर्वाण का कारण है (लं. २४२ पृ.)। यह चित्त स्वभावतः परिशुद्ध है—"अत्यन्तप्रकृति परिशुद्धिः" (लं. १२१ पृ.)। यह आगन्तुकक्लेशों से उपक्लिष्ट होता है (लं. २२२ पृ.)। यह क्लेशों से युक्त चित्त संसार है तथा क्लेशों से मुक्त परमपरिशुद्ध चित्त निर्वाण है।

इस प्रकार इन कथनों से स्पष्ट है कि लंकावतारसूत्र का मूल प्रतिपाद्य विषय विशुद्ध विज्ञान अर्थात् चित्त है।

अब विविध नयों से परीक्षा कर लंकावतारसूत्र को विज्ञानवाद परम्परा का ग्रन्थ स्वीकार करते हुए प्रश्न उत्पन्न होता है कि भगवान ने इसके अनुसार निर्वाण के स्वरूप पर कैसे प्रकाश डाला है? इस प्रश्न के उत्तर के पूर्व यह आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है कि उस तथ्य पर भी प्रकाश डाला जाय कि बुद्ध ने किसे निर्वाण नहीं बतलाया है अर्थात् वे किस निर्वाण को निर्वाण नहीं बतलाते हैं तथा किस निर्वाण को निर्वाण बतलाते हैं! इस दृष्टि से

देखने पर प्रकट होता है कि बुद्ध ने लंकावतारसूत्र के द्वितीय[1] तथा तृतीय[2] परिच्छेद में पचीस प्रकार के निर्वाण सम्बन्धी धारणाओं का उल्लेख किया है। ये धारणायें तिर्थिकों की कही गयी हैं। वे इस प्रकार हैं:—

१. जो कोई भावपदार्थ हैं, उनके स्वभाव का अभाव निर्वाण है।

२. भावपदार्थों को व्यक्त करनेवाले जो विविध लक्षण हैं, उनका अभाव निर्वाण है।

३. विविध लक्षणों से उपेत भावपदार्थ को अभाव जानना निर्वाण है।

४. स्व सामान्य लक्षण से युक्त पंचस्कन्ध सन्तति का व्युच्छेद निर्वाण है।

५. स्कन्ध, आयतन, धातु के निरोध से चित्त चैत्य कलापों की अप्रवृत्ति, निर्वापित दीप या अग्नि के समान हो जाना, दग्ध बीज के समान होना निर्वाण है।

६. मन के विकल्प समाप्त हो जाने पर देशान्तरस्थान का गमन निर्वाण है।

७. बुद्धि बोद्धव्य से मुक्ति निर्वाण है।

८. विकल्पों की अप्रवृत्ति तथा नित्य अनित्य को जानना निर्वाण है।

९. विविध रूपवान् दृश्यों को दुखवाहक समझते हुए यह जानना कि ये चित्त के विकल्प हैं तथा रूपी पदार्थों से भयभीत हो अरूप में सुख खोजना निर्वाण है।

१०. सभी पदार्थ अन्तः तथा बाह्यरूप में कभी भी विनष्ट नहीं होते हैं—भूत, भविष्यत्, वर्तमान में विद्यमान रहते हैं—यह जानना निर्वाण है।

११. आत्मा, सत्त्व, जीव, पुरुष, पुद्गल आदि को निर्वाण कहते हैं, जो अविनाशी है।

१२. कुछ प्रकृति पुरुष को निर्वाण बतलाते हैं। वे पृथक् होते हुए भी गुण के परिणाम से सब कुछ उत्पन्न करते हैं।

१३. पुण्यापुण्य का क्षय निर्वाण है।

१४. ज्ञान से क्लेश का क्षय निर्वाण है।

१५. ईश्वर विश्व के कर्त्ता हैं—यह जानना निर्वाण है।

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[1] लं. १२६ पृ.

[2] लं. १८२-८९.पृ.

१६. अन्योन्य प्रवृत्ति से जगत् उत्पन्न है। इसके अतिरिक्त अन्य कोई कारण नहीं है। ऐसे अभिनिवेश के कारण यथार्थ ज्ञान का न होना (ऐसा जानना) निर्वाण है।

१७. सत्यमार्ग का अधिगंम निर्वाण है।

१८. गुण गुणी के सम्बन्ध को निर्वाण कहते हैं।

१९. स्वभाव से, प्रवृत्ति से विविधभाव पदार्थों के स्वभाव को म्योरपंख-सा विचित्र, विविध रत्नों सा विचित्र, कंटक सा तीक्ष्ण जानना निर्वाण है।

२०. पचीस तत्त्वों का बोध निर्वाण है।

२१. राजा द्वारा छ उपदेशों का पालन निर्वाण है।

२२. काल कर्त्ता है, विश्व की उत्पत्ति उसी पर निर्भर है—इसका ज्ञान निर्वाण है।

२३. निर्वाण भाव है।

२४. निर्वाण अभाव है।

२५. भाव अभाव को जानकर कुछ ऐसा बतलाते हैं कि सभी पदार्थ तथा निर्वाण अविशिष्ट हैं। ऐसा जानना निर्वाण है।

इस प्रकार बुद्ध ने निर्वाण सम्बन्धी विविध धारणाओं को उपस्थित किया है। इनको उपस्थित करते हुए कहा है कि निर्वाण की ये कल्पनायें तीर्थिकों की हैं, मेरी नहीं हैं। ये समस्त निर्वाणवादी दो अन्तों में पतित हो, इन रूपों में निर्वाण की कल्पना करते हैं।

अब जब ये पचीस प्रकार की निर्वाण सम्बन्धी धारणायें तीर्थिकों की हैं तो बुद्ध मत से निर्वाण क्या है? इस पर विचार किया जाय।

बुद्ध ने निर्वाण के स्वरूप पर अपना मत व्यक्त करते हुए कहा है—"महामति, मेरे प्रवचन के अनुसार विकल्पक मनोविज्ञान की व्यावृत्ति को निर्वाण कहा जाता है"[1]। "जब विविध दृष्टिगत वासनाओं को उत्पन्न करने वाले आलयविज्ञान की परावृत्ति हो जाती है, उसे मैं निर्वाण कहता हूँ"[2]। परावृत्त आलयविज्ञान मोक्ष है। जब तक उसकी प्रवृत्ति होती रहती है, तब तक संसार है। जब उसकी परावृत्ति हो जाती है—उसे निर्वाण कहा जाता है—"आलय-परावृत्तिपूर्वकं"। आलय परावृत्ति का अर्थ नाश या

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[1] लं. १२६ पृ.

[2] लं. ९८ पृ.

निरोध नहीं है—बल्कि आलयविज्ञान के अन्तर्गत स्थित अनादिकालिक प्रपंचवासना का निरोध तथा उसको परम परिशुद्ध रूप में रूपान्तरित हो जाना। कहा भी गया है—"आश्रयपरावृत्तिर्महामते, मोक्षो न नाशः"[1]। चित्त का इस प्रकार शुद्ध रूप में रूपान्तरित हो अपने प्रकृतिरूप से व्यक्त होना है। चित्त स्वभावतः परिशुद्ध है। यह परम परिशुद्ध चित्त निर्वाण है।

यहाँ तक यह स्पष्ट हो गया कि लंकावतारसूत्र के अनुसार निर्वाण विज्ञान स्वरूप है। अतः पुनः इसपर इस दृष्टि से विचार किया जाय कि निर्वाण नित्य है या अनित्य। इस उद्देश्य से अग्रसर होने पर प्रकट होता है कि निर्वाण अविनाशी है। तथता, धर्मता, तथागतगर्भ, तथागतकाय, धर्मकाय, आदि इसी के पर्याय हैं। भगवान ने कहा है—"निर्वाण विनाश नहीं है"—"न च महामते, विनाशदृष्ट्या निर्वायते"[2]। "तथता परिनिष्पन्न स्वभाव वाला अविनाशी है"—"तथता महामते, अविनाशत्वात्स्वभावः परिनिष्पन्नो"[3]। धर्मकाय गंगानदी के बालुका के समान अविनाशी है—"धर्मकायो गंगानदीबालुकासमो अविनाशीः"[4]। यह अशरीरी तथा शुद्धविज्ञानमय है[5]। जिसप्रकार मलरहित हो सुवर्ण अपने शुद्ध रूप में विद्यमान होता है, जलदपटल से मुक्त हो आकाश शुभ्र रूप में स्थित होता है, उसी प्रकार समस्त विकल्पों से रहित हो चित्त अपने शुद्धरूप में स्थित होता है[6]। यही विकल्पों से रहित शुद्ध चित्त एक मात्र सत्य है,—यही निर्वाण है—"एकमेव भवेत्सत्यं निर्वाणं मनवर्जितं"[7]।

अब यहाँ आकर स्पष्ट सा प्रतीत होने लगता है कि लंकावतारसूत्र का निर्वाण एक, सत्, शुद्धविज्ञानस्वरूप, अशरीरी तथा अविनाशी है। इस प्रसंग में यह कथन उचित प्रतीत होता है कि निर्वाण का यह स्वरूप उपनिषदों के आत्मा-सा दिखता है। वहाँ कहा गया है कि आत्मा नित्य शाश्वत अज तथा पुरातन है—"अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो" (कठ. ७१ पृ.)। वह परम तेजोमय अशरीरी तथा शुद्ध है—"स पर्यगाच्छुक्रमकायव्रण, मस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम् (ईश· २८ पृ.)। यह शरीर उस

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१. लं. २२१-२२, ३५८-५९ पृ.

२. लं. १८३ पृ.

३. लं. २२७ पृ.

४. लं. २३२ पृ.

५. लं.—"धर्मश्चाशरीरः" २३५ पृ.

६. लं. १२९ पृ.

७. लं. १४१ पृ.

अशरीरी आत्मा का अधिष्ठान है—"इदं शरीरमात्तं अशरीरस्यात्मनो अधिष्ठानमात्तो" (छान्दो. ९०६)। यह आत्मा विज्ञानमय है—"योऽयं विज्ञानमयः" (बृहद्. ८९१ पृ.)। इस प्रकार उपनिषदों का आत्मा नित्य शुद्ध विज्ञानमय तथा अशरीरी है।

अब प्रारब्ध प्रसंग को यहाँ प्राप्त कर लंकावतारसूत्र में वर्णित विशुद्ध विज्ञान के सिद्धान्त को तथा उपनिषदों में वर्णित आत्मा के सिद्धान्त को सम्मुख उपस्थित करने से यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि लंकावतार सूत्र का परमपरिशुद्ध विज्ञान तथा उपनिषदों का परम विशुद्ध विज्ञानमय आत्मा स्वरूपतः एकरूपता स्थापित करते हुए से हैं। इसे स्पष्टतर शब्दों में इस प्रकार से भी कहा जा सकता है कि लंकावतारसूत्र का निर्वाण जो विशुद्ध चित्तमात्र है, एक तथा अविनाशी होने के कारण सत् है, विज्ञानस्वरूप होने के कारण चित् है, तथा समस्त विकल्पों से रहित होने के कारण आनन्दस्वरूप है। इसको इस रूप में उपलब्ध होने के कारण वेदान्त के ब्रह्मभाव या मुक्ति से इसका साम्य स्थापित हो जाता है।

चार्वाकषष्टि का दार्शनिक विषय-विवेचन

प्रो० सर्वानन्द पाठक, एम० ए०, शास्त्री, काव्यतीर्थ, पुराणाचार्य, साहित्यरत्न,
संस्कृत-प्राध्यापक, नवनालन्दामहाविहार

चार्वाकषष्टि का दार्शनिक विषय-विवेचन

उपक्रम

संक्षेप में आस्तिक और नास्तिक भेद से दर्शनों के दो प्रकार बतलाये गए हैं। उन में नास्तिक दर्शनों के अन्तर्गत चार्वाक दर्शन में 'चार्वाकषष्टि' के साठ श्लोकों के अतिरिक्त बृहस्पति के प्रणीत कुछ सूत्र हैं। यद्यपि नास्तिक-दर्शन का प्रणयन बृहस्पति को अभीष्ट नहीं था फिर भी तत्प्रणीत सूत्रों पर गंभीर विचार करने से देवगुरु का अभिप्राय ऐसा प्रतीत होता है। उनका विचार संभवतः ऐसा रहा होगा कि अपने शिष्य देवगणों की असुरों से उत्पन्न होनेवाली तथा संभावित पीड़ा को किसी प्रकार दूर किया जाए। असुरगण भी यज्ञ आदि पुण्य कर्म करने लग गये थे और उस पुण्यकर्म के प्रभाव से उत्साहित होकर देवताओं को पराजित करना चाहते थे। अतएव यज्ञ आदि पुण्य-कर्मों में जिस प्रकार श्रद्धा उत्पन्न होने न पाए और उत्पन्न हो चुकनेवाली श्रद्धा समाप्त हो जाए—इस प्रकार उपदेश करने की इच्छा से तदर्थबोधक सूत्रों के प्रणयन का विचार देवगुरु ने किया और उन्हीं सूत्रों के द्वारा दैत्यों में इस नास्तिक दर्शन का प्रचार हुआ। अश्रद्धेय एवं कर्मभ्रष्ट होकर वे असुरगण स्वर्गादि के उत्तमोत्तम सुखोपभोग से वञ्चित हुए।

मायामोहोपदेश

विष्णुपुराण[1] में ऐसी कथा उपलब्ध होती है। प्राचीनकाल में नर्मदा नदी के तीर पर कुछ दैत्यगण श्रौतपद्धति का अवलम्बन कर एकाग्रचित्त से तप कर रहे थे। देवगण भयभीत होकर नारायण के शरणापन्न हुए। देवगणों को इस प्रकार विपन्न देखकर उनकी पीड़ा को हटाने की इच्छा से नारायण ने 'मायामोह' नामक एक पुरुष को उत्पन्न किया और 'आप देवगणों का कार्यसम्पादन यही मायामोह करेगा'—ऐसा कहा। मायामोह ने भी अपने नाम तथा आकार को चरितार्थ करने और अपनी प्रवृत्ति प्रदर्शित करते हुए अपनी अद्भुत माया से दैत्यों को विमोहित कर सन्मार्ग से भ्रष्ट कर दिया। बृहस्पति के द्वारा प्रणीत सूत्रों के अनुसार मायामोह के उपदेशों को सुन-सुन कर विश्वस्तहृदय से वे दैत्य अपने तपोव्रत से पराङ्मुख हो गए। तत्पश्चात् निश्चिन्त होकर देवगण स्वर्गीय सुखों का उपभोग करने लगे।

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[1] विष्णु पु० ३।१७।४१, १८।३-३९.

बौद्ध दर्शन का उद्गम

नास्तिक मत के प्रचारक मायामोह के द्वारा कृत उपदेश अनेक प्रकारों के हैं—उनमें सर्वसाधारण एक है—'यज्ञ आदि कर्म धर्म के अंग नहीं—यह मानना होगा, क्योंकि यज्ञों में पशुओं की हत्या की जाती है। अहिंसा ही एकमात्र श्रेष्ठ धर्म है और वेद तो धूर्तों के प्रलाप हैं।' यह सुनने के उपरान्त सच्चे मनोयोग से इसमें विश्वास कर तदनुसार आचरण करने वाले चार्वाक नाम से ख्यात हुए और जिन दैत्यों में इस उपदेश से अपने अभीष्ट की सिद्धि नहीं देखी, तब मायामोह ने उन दैत्यों के प्रति इस प्रकार उपदेश आरम्भ किया—'संसार में जो ये अशेष पदार्थ आगे दृश्यमान हो रहे हैं, वास्तव में वे हैं नहीं, यह भ्रममात्र है—ऐसी बुद्धि करो। उपदेश-मात्र से बोध हो जाने पर भी 'बोध प्राप्त करो,' 'बोध प्राप्त करो'—इस प्रकार पुनरुक्ति करता गया और इस (मायामोह) के उपदेश को यथार्थ मानकर उसमें निश्चित बुद्धि धारण करनेवाले दैत्य बौद्ध नाम से प्रसिद्ध हुए।

आर्हत दर्शन का उद्गम

इतने पर भी बोध न करनेवाले अवशिष्ट दैत्यों को संकेत कर उनकी बुद्धि के अनुसार ही निम्न प्रकार से मायामोहने उपदेश करना आरंभ किया—'हो भी सकता है' और 'नहीं भी हो सकता है'। 'एक भी है' और 'अनेक भी है'। 'नित्य भी है' और 'अनित्य भी है'। 'किसी पदार्थ को निश्चित न समझना ही श्रेष्ठ धर्म है'—इसी में प्रवृत्ति करने के तुम अर्हत अर्थात् योग्य हो। मायामोह बार बार 'अर्हत'—'अर्हत'[1] अर्थात् 'योग्य हो'—'योग्य हो' कहकर विशिष्ट रूप से उपदेश देता गया और मायामोह के इस वचन में विश्वास करने वाले श्रोता आर्हत नाम से विख्यात हुए।

चार्वाकदर्शन का प्रचार

चार्वाकमत का अधिक प्रचार चार्वाकनामक[2] दैत्यने किया इसी कारण यह दर्शन चार्वाकदर्शन नाम से अभिहित होता है। चारु = सुन्दर है वाक = वचन जिसका उसे चार्वाक कहते हैं। प्राणी की निसर्ग से ही परोक्ष की अपेक्षा प्रत्यक्ष सुख की प्राप्ति के लिए तथा प्रत्यक्ष दुःख से निवृत्ति पानेके लिए प्रवृत्ति होती है। विरले ही पुरुष परोक्ष स्वर्गीय सुख-प्राप्ति के लिए यज्ञ आदि कर्मों में प्रवृत्त होते हैं और इसी प्रकार परोक्ष नारकीय दुःखों के

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[1] संस्कृत व्याकरण में 'लोट्' मध्यम पुरुष बहुवचन में अर्ह् धातु का रूप 'अर्हत' होता है

[2] द्रष्टव्य महाभारत शान्ति ३८।२२-२७।३९-३९।३-९

भयकी आशंका से कामाचारण आदि पापकर्मों से पराङ्मुख दृश्यमान होते हैं। सहज प्रवृत्ति के अनुरोध से किसी के कथन को सुनकर यदि चारुता के कारण कोई व्यक्ति उसे सहज ही ग्रहण कर लेता है तो यह लोक-प्रवृत्ति के अनुसरण करने वाली उक्ति की विदग्धता है अत एव यह दर्शन लोकमें अनायास ही फैल गया इस कारण यह लोकायत नाम से प्रसिद्ध है। दुर्योधन के मित्र तपस्वि-वेषधारी इस चार्वाक ने दुर्योधन के नाश के पश्चात् धर्मराज की सभा में जाकर ब्राह्मण के समक्ष नास्तिक मत के प्रतिपादन में इस प्रकार कहा—'सचमुच दुर्योधन भाग्यशाली तथा वीर था, क्योंकि इस भूमण्डल में योद्धा के रूपमें अशेष राजाओं के सामने राज्यलक्ष्मी को धारण करते हुए उसने अपने राज्य के सच्चे सुखों का उपभोग किया। हे धर्मराज, आज समस्त वीरों के विनष्ट होजाने पर केवल स्त्री-वालक-वृद्धों से युक्त इस लोक में तेरे लिए कौन सा सुख रह गया? आज तेरी भोग्य-सामग्रियाँ रुधिरसे सनी हुई हैं। पारलौकिक परोक्ष सुखों में अभिलाषा रखने वाले तुम वञ्चित हुए। परलोक नामक कोई वस्तु तो है नहीं[1] तो पारलौकिक सुख कहाँ से? यज्ञ आदि कर्मों को कर तुमने अपने को केवल क्लेशित किया और कुछ नहीं। इसके पश्चात् मायामोह धर्मराज के सभासद ब्राह्मणों के क्रोधानल से भस्म हो गया।

इस मत के अनुयायी चार्वाक नाम से लोकमें प्रसिद्ध हैं और ये ही—चार्वाक, चतुर्विध (माध्यमिक, योगाचार, सौत्रान्तिक और वैभाषिक) वौद्ध और आर्हत—ये छः नास्तिक कहे जाते हैं। समग्र दर्शन शास्त्र आस्तिक और नास्तिक इन्हीं साधारण दो अर्थों में अनुप्राणित हैं। इन्हीं प्रमाणों से चेतन और अचेतन तत्त्वों के मूलस्वरूप और उनके सम्बन्ध को जान कर और बन्धन-स्वरूप को निश्चित कर तत्त्वज्ञान के द्वारा मोक्ष साधन के अनुसन्धान में प्रवृत्त होना चाहिए।

षड्दर्शन और लोकायत

सांख्य, योग, वैशेषिक, न्याय, मीमांसा (पूर्वमीमांसा) और वेदान्त (उत्तरमीमांसा)—ये छः शास्त्र दर्शनशास्त्र के नाम से संख्यात हैं, किन्तु कुछ आचार्य नैयायिक और वैशेषिक सिद्धान्तों में भेद नहीं मानते तथा न्याय और वैशेषिक को पृथक्-पृथक् दर्शन स्वीकृत नहीं करते और तब उनके मत से पाँच ही दर्शन सिद्ध होते हैं[2]। ऐसी परिस्थिति में जो आचार्य न्याय और वैशेषिक में एक ही सिद्धान्त होने के कारण अभेद मान कर पाँच ही

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[1] द्रष्टव्यः शान्तरक्षितस्य तत्त्वसंग्रहे श्लो० १८६७

[2] 'नैयायिकमतादन्ये भेदं वैशेषिकैः सह
न मन्यन्ते मते तेषां पञ्चैवास्तिकवादिनः'—ष० द० सं० ७८

दर्शन-शास्त्र घोषित करते हैं, उनके मत से षष्ठ दर्शन की संख्या लोकायत अर्थात् चार्वाकमत के योग से पूर्ण होती है अत एव लोकायत या चार्वाक-मत का विवेचन अपेक्षणीय है[1]।

लोकायत का शब्दार्थ होता है—वह सम्प्रदाय, जो इस लोक के अतिरिक्त किसी परलोक के अस्तित्व को नहीं मानता हो। चार्वाक[2] इस लोकायत मत का आदि प्रवर्तक माना गया है और यह चार्वाक बृहस्पति का शिष्य था—ऐसा भी कथन है। चार्वाक नाम का एक राक्षस भी था, जो दुर्योधन का मित्र और पाण्डवों का शत्रु था[3]।

परवर्ती कतिपय विद्वानों का मत है कि नास्तिक दर्शन का प्रवर्तक चार्वाक नामक कोई विशिष्ट व्यक्ति नहीं था अर्थात् आस्तिकवाद में अनास्था रखने वाले चार्वाक नाम से प्रसिद्ध हुए। लोकायत मत या चार्वाकमत—दोनो एक ही वाद हैं और यह वाद भारतवर्ष में अति प्राचीन काल से प्रवर्त्तमान है। वैदिक काल में यह मत स्वेच्छाचार या कामाचार के रूप में प्रचलित था[4]। सृष्टि के आदि काल से वर्तमान काल तक इसकी परम्परा न्यूनाधिक मात्रा में, किन्तु अनवच्छिन्न गति से चली आ रही है और इसकी शृङ्खला कभी टूटने नहीं पाई। इस मत में स्वेच्छाचार को बड़ी स्वतंत्रता दी गई है। इस मत का कोई स्वतंत्र ग्रन्थ पुस्तकाकार में उपलब्ध नहीं है। 'चार्वाकषष्टि' नामक ग्रन्थ की चर्चा इतस्ततः श्रुति-गोचर होती थी, परन्तु महान् प्रयास करने पर भी 'चार्वाकषष्टि' की मुद्रित प्रति उपलब्ध नहीं हुई। लग-भग आज से तीन-चार वर्ष पूर्व अनायास कहीं से 'चार्वाकषष्टि' की एक हस्तलिखित पुस्तक मुझे प्राप्त हुई थी। इस पुस्तक में सब मिला कर साठ श्लोक हैं। कुछ श्लोकों को श्रीहर्ष ने अपने 'नैषधीयचरित' में उद्धृत किया है तथा कुछ श्रीहरिभद्र सूरि आदि विद्यामनीषियों ने अपने 'षड्दर्शनसमुच्चय' आदि ग्रन्थों में उद्धृत किए हैं। प्रस्तुत निबन्ध का विषय हस्तलिखित 'चार्वाकषष्टि' का संक्षिप्त विषय-विवेचन है।

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१. षष्ठदर्शनसंख्या तु पूर्यते तन्मते किल
लोकायतमतक्षेपात् कथ्यते तेन तन्मतम्'—ष० द० स० ७९

२. चारुः आपातमनोरमः वाक् उक्तिर्यस्य सः (पृ षो० साधुः)

३. देखिए म० भारत

४. देखिए ऋग्वेद सायणभाष्य—१।१६२।११, ६।१६।४७, ६।१७।११, ८।३१।९९, ८।७७।१०, १०।२७।२, १०।२८।३, १०।८६।१४, १०।७९।६, १०।८९।१४, १०।९९।१४ और १०।१६९।३।

विषयप्रवेश

सर्वप्रथम वेदविहित ज्योतिष्टोम आदि यज्ञों पर आक्षेप किया गया है। श्रुतियाँ प्रतिपादन करती हैं कि ज्योतिष्टोम आदि यज्ञकर्त्ता यजमान को स्वर्गादि फल प्राप्त होते हैं[1]। चार्वाकों का कहना है कि इन यज्ञफल प्रतिपादिका श्रुतियों की प्रामाणिकता में उतनी ही यथार्थता है, जितनी इस वाक्य में कि पत्थर जल के ऊपर तैरते हैं,[2] किन्तु पत्थरों को जल के ऊपर तैरते प्रत्यक्ष रूप में देखा नहीं गया। इसी प्रकार यज्ञकर्त्ता को यज्ञफलरूप स्वर्गादि फल मिलते हैं—यह भी किसी ने प्रत्यक्ष दृष्टिगोचर नहीं किया। इस कारण जिसकी सत्यता में प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण का अभाव हो उस भ्रामक तथा अप्रामाणिक श्रुतिसत्यता में विश्वास करना महामूर्खता है।

बुद्ध ने भी श्रुतियों को अप्रामाणिक सिद्ध किया है। उनका कथन है कि सत्त्वरूप हेतु के द्वारा जगत् अनित्य या क्षणिक है, क्योंकि इन (बौद्धों) के मत में जो 'सत्'[3] है वह अनित्य है अतएव यह दृश्यमान जगत् भी सत् होने के हेतु अनित्य है और जगत् के ही अन्तर्गत होने के कारण आत्मा भी अनित्य सिद्ध होता है। इस परिस्थिति में जिस आत्मा ने पाप-पुण्य रूप कर्म किया, वह भी क्षणान्तर में नष्ट हो गया। अतएव आत्मा पाप-पुण्यरूप कर्म का दुःख-सुखरूप फलभोक्ता कदापि नहीं हो सकता। इस प्रकार 'पूर्वकृत पापपुण्य रूप कर्म का फल समयान्तर में आत्मा को भोगना पड़ता है—यह प्रतिपादन करनेवाली श्रुतियाँ अप्रामाणिक सिद्ध हो जाती हैं।

स्मृतियों के प्रतिपादित अग्निहोत्र आदि[4] विहित कर्मों का खण्डन, चार्वाकों ने बड़े ओजस्वी शब्दों में किया है। बृहस्पति का कथन है कि प्रातः सायंकाल में हवन, तीनों वेदों का आचारपालन, तान्त्रिक अनुष्ठान, दण्डयुक्त संन्यास धारण और ललाट में भस्मलेपन—ये पञ्च कर्म बुद्धि और पुरुषार्थविहीन पुरुषों के लिए आजीविका के उपायमात्र हैं।

जाति-शुद्धि के विषय में इनका कहना है कि कोई भी जाति शुद्ध और पवित्र नहीं रह गई है, क्योंकि स्मृति के अनुसार अपने मातापिता के मातापिता (मातामहीमातामह और पितामहीपितामह) और फिर उनके

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[1] ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत--नैषध-नारायणी टीका १७।३७

[2] ग्रावाणः प्लवन्ते—नै. ना. टी. १७।३७

[3] देखिए स. द. सं. दर्शन २। पं. ११७-१२०

[4] 'अग्निकार्यं ततः कुर्यात्सन्ध्ययोरुभयोरपि'—याज्ञ० आचार-२९
'दण्डाजिनोपवीतानि मेखलां चैव धारयेत्'—याज्ञ० आचार-२९

मातापिता (प्रमातामही प्रमातामह् और प्रपितामही प्रपितामह्) इस प्रकार आदि सृष्टिकर्ता ब्रह्मा पर्यन्त प्रत्येक व्यक्ति की शुद्धि से उभय कुलों की शुद्धि मानी गई है किसी भी जाति के कुल का कहीं अन्त नहीं मिलता ऐसी अवस्था में कोई भी जाति सर्वतोभावेन निर्दोष नहीं ठहर सकती। यहाँ पर चार्वाक अपने पक्षकी पुष्टि में श्रुति-स्मृति के प्रमाण उपस्थित करते हैं—'न चैतद्विद्मो यद्ब्राह्मणाः स्मो वयमब्राह्मणा वा स्मः'[1] अर्थात् हम स्वयं नहीं जानते कि हम ब्राह्मण हैं या अब्राह्मण क्योंकि स्मृति का कथन है—'ब्राह्मण्यां ब्राह्मणाज्जातो ब्राह्मणः समुदीरितः'[2] अर्थात् ब्राह्मण पिता तथा ब्राह्मणी माता से उत्पन्न पुत्र ही ब्राह्मण संज्ञा का यथार्थ अधिकारी है—इस परिस्थिति में माता का जाति-निर्णय तो किसी प्रकार सिद्ध हो भी सकता है, पर पिता का जाति-निर्णय तो सर्वथा असंभव है। अतएव लोकायतिकमत में जातिधर्मादि छोड़कर स्वेच्छाचरण का स्पष्ट आदेश है।

पुरुषों की अपेक्षा स्त्रियों के काम—मैथुनेच्छा की मात्रा अष्टगुण[3] होती है और इसी कारण उनकी कामिनी की संज्ञा है तो इस अवस्था में कौनसा पुरुष कामिनी के संसर्ग होने पर संकरता के दोष से मुक्त कहा जा सकता है? स्मृति की उक्ति है—

'संवत्सरेण पतति पतितेन सहाचरन्'[4] अर्थात् पतित के संसर्ग से एक वर्ष के अभ्यन्तर ही कोई भी व्यक्ति पतित हो जाता है। खेद का विषय है कि दम्भ के कारण लोक में व्रतोपवास तथा तीर्थस्नानादि कर्म करने की परिपाटी है। वास्तव में सम्पूर्ण जगत् कामाचार से मुक्त नहीं। अतएव आडंबर छोड़कर स्पष्ट रूप में स्वेच्छाचार का पालन करना ही श्रेयस्कर है।

लोकायतिक मत में पुरुषजाति को स्वार्थी, ईर्ष्यालु और दांभिक कहा गया है, क्योंकि पुरुषजाति ने स्वयं अपने को सर्वथा स्वतन्त्र रखा है परन्तु स्त्रियों को कभी भी—बाल्य से वार्द्धक्य तक स्वतन्त्र रहने का अधिकार नहीं दिया[5]। स्त्रियों को सूर्यदर्शन से भी वञ्चित रखा गया है।[6] ऐसे

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१. ऋग्वेदभाष्योपोद्घात पृ.१९

२. कस्याश्चित्स्मृतेरुद्धरणम्।

३. आहारो द्विगुणः स्त्रीणां बुद्धिस्तासां चतुर्गुणा।
षड्गुणो व्यवसायश्च कामश्चाष्टगुणः स्मृतः'—हितोपदेशसुहृद्भेद श्लो० १०९

४. मनुस्मृति ११।१०८

५. 'पिता रक्षति कौमारे भर्ता रक्षति यौवने
पुत्राश्च स्थविरे भावे न स्त्री स्वातन्त्र्यमर्हति'—हितोपदेश

६. 'असूर्यम्पश्या राजदाराः'—पा० अष्टाध्यायी ३।२।३६

रूढिपालक तथा निरर्थक कुलमर्यादाभिमानी दांभिक पुरुष तो धिक्कार के ही पात्र हैं।

पर स्त्री के ऊपर दृष्टिपात करना भी शास्त्र से निषिद्ध माना गया है परन्तु इस दाम्भिक शास्त्रीय आदेश का उल्लंघन तो स्वयं वज्रधारी देवराज इन्द्र ने किया। इन्द्र ने गौतमऋषि की पत्नी अहल्या[1] के साथ संभोग किया है। लोकायतमतवादी कहते हैं कि ऐसे कामाचार के उदाहरण पुराणों में भरे पड़े हैं[2]।

लोकायतमतवादी ब्राह्मणजाति को सम्बोधित करते हुए चुटकी लेते हैं कि स्मृतिकारों के—'गुरुपत्नी के साथ संभोग करनेवाले महापातकी होते हैं'[3] इत्यादि वचन तो केवल दांभिकमात्र हैं, क्योंकि ब्राह्मणों के कुलगुरु चन्द्रमा[4] ने स्वयं गुरुपत्नी का संभोग किया। जब चातुर्वर्ण्यशिरोमणि ब्राह्मण ही ऐसा पतित है तो फिर निम्न क्षत्रियादिकों का पतित होना तो स्वाभाविक ही है, क्योंकि प्रजाएँ तो पापपुण्यादि कर्मों में राजा का ही अनुकरण करती हैं। कहा भी है—

> 'राज्ञि धर्मिणि धर्मिष्ठाः पापे पापाः समे समाः।
> राजानमनुवर्त्तन्ते यथा राजा तथा प्रजाः[5]॥'

श्रुति की घोषणा है कि मृत प्राणी को पापाचरण के कारण नरक आदि की यातना भोगनी पड़ती है और पुण्याचरण के कारण स्वर्गादि अलौकिक सुख की उपलब्धि होती है।[6] अत एव तप आदि पुण्य कर्म करना चाहिए।[7]

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१. देखिए वाल्मीकिरामायण बालकाण्ड ४८।१९-२२

२. देखिए भागवत ३।१२।२८, १०।६९।८। देवी भागवत १।११।६९, २।६ महाभारत आदि १०५।१-३२, वनपर्व १४७।२७

३. 'ब्रह्महत्या सुरापानं स्तेयं गुर्वङ्गनागमः
महान्ति पातकान्याहुः''—मनु ११।५४
'ब्रह्महा मद्यपस्तेनस्तथैव गुरुतल्पगः
महापातकिनस्ते स्युः'—याज्ञ० प्रायश्चित्त २२७

४. देवीभागवत १।११।६९ और प्रबोधचन्द्रोदयस० १। पृ. १६

५. भोजप्रबन्ध ४४

६. 'पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा, पापः पापेन'—बृ० ३।२।१३
प्राणी धर्मसमायुक्तो गच्छेत्स्वर्गगतिं पराम्
तथैवाधर्मसंयुक्तो नरकं चोपपद्यते'—ब्र० प्र० २१७।८

७. ग्रीष्मे पञ्चाग्निमध्यस्थो वर्षासु स्थण्डिलेशयः
आर्द्रवासास्तु हेमन्ते शक्त्या वापि तपश्चरेत्'—याज्ञ० प्रा० वान ५२

लोकायत-मतवादी इस तरह के शास्त्रीय विधिवाक्यों का खण्डन करते हुए कहते हैं कि प्रत्यक्ष के व्यवहार में पापाचरण और पुण्याचरण के फल सर्वथा प्रतिकूल ही दृष्टिगोचर होते हैं—देखा जाता है कि माघमास में प्रातःस्नानरूप-पुण्यकर्त्ता को शीतजनित असह्य शारीरिक कष्ट सहन करना पड़ता है, किन्तु परदारसंभोगरूप पापकर्त्ता को सद्यः अपूर्व –अलौकिक आनन्द या सुख की अनुभूति होती है। अतएव जनश्रुति की अपेक्षा प्रत्यक्ष को[1] बलवान् मानकर स्वेच्छाचार या कामाचार का पालन करना अधिक युक्ति-युक्त है।

कुछ विद्वानों का कथन है कि मरणान्तर या जन्मान्तर में देही को नरक आदि की यातना भोगनी पड़ती है– इस कारण पशुहिंसा आदि पाप कर्मों का त्याग करना चाहिए तथा कुछ अन्य विद्वानों का कथन है कि जिस देह से पाप कर्म किया, वह तो मृत्यु के उपरान्त जला दिया गया तो फिर मरणान्तर या जन्मान्तर में किस देह को दुःखरूप फल भोगना पड़ेगा? यदि एक के किए पाप से अन्य पातकी हो सकता है तो देवदत्त के भोजन करने से यज्ञदत्त को परितृप्ति होनी चाहिए, किन्तु व्यवहारपक्ष में ऐसा नहीं देखा जाता। मरने के उपरान्त देहान्तर प्राप्ति की संभावना नहीं रहने पर भी पाप का त्याग ही श्रेयस्कर है अत एव पशुहिंसा-समर्थक यज्ञों—वैदिक भागों का त्याग करना चाहिए।

सैद्धान्तिक विरोध रहने पर भी यहाँ पर लोकायतिकों ने अहिंसा[2] और हिंसा[3] प्रतिपादक स्मार्तवचनों को अपने पक्ष में दिखला कर स्वमत को पुष्ट करने की चेष्टा की है।

सनातन धर्म के आचार्य तथा विद्वन्मूर्धन्य साक्षात् व्यासदेव के वचन की ओर सङ्केत और आक्षेप करते हुए लोकायतवादी कहते हैं कि कामपीड़ित रमणी का पाणिग्रहण अर्थात् संभोग करना परम कल्याणसाधक है। जो पुरुष कामातुर स्त्री की कामजनित वासना को परितृप्त नहीं करता उसे ब्रह्महत्या का पाप लगता है—यह व्यास की उक्ति है। यद्यपि व्यासदेव ने

१. श्रुतिप्रत्यक्षयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्षमेव बलीयः’––नै० ना० टी० १७।४९

२. ‘मा हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानि’––नै० ना० टी० १७।४६
‘अहिंसा परमो धर्मः’––स्मृतिवचन

३. ‘मधुपर्के च यज्ञे च पितृदैवतकर्मणि
ऐष्वेव पशवो हिंस्या नान्यत्रेत्यब्रवीन्मनुः’—मनु ५।४१
‘एतेष्वेव पशुं हिंसन् वेदतत्त्वार्थविद्‌द्विजः
आत्मानञ्च पशुञ्चैव गमयत्युत्तमां गतिम्’—मनु ५।४२

आपद्धर्म के रूप में—

'स्मरार्त्तां विह्वलां दीनां यो न कामयते स्त्रियम्
ब्रह्महा स तु विज्ञेयो व्यासो वचनमब्रवीत्'[1]

यह श्लोक कहा है, किन्तु चार्वाकों ने सर्वसाधारण परिस्थितियों में आदर्श के रूप में इसे रखने की चेष्टा की है।

लोगों को सुकृत (दांभिक पुण्याचरण) में जितनी श्रद्धा है, उतनी सुरत (मैथुन) में नहीं। पुरुष (प्रेक्षावान् व्यक्ति) को वही कर्म करना चाहिए, जिस कर्म के करने (व्यापार) के अन्त में सुख की अनुभूति हो। रति केलि से प्रत्यक्ष और अद्‌भुत सुख की प्राप्ति होती है—इसका अनुभव प्रायः अशेष व्यक्तियों को है।

इनके मत में बलात्कार से भी परस्त्री-गमनरूप पापाचरण करने का आदेश है, क्योंकि बल से किए पाप कर्मों का फल कर्त्ता को नहीं मिलता यहाँ पर निम्नलिखित स्मार्त वचनों का सङ्केत किया गया है—

'बलाद्दत्तं बलाद्भुक्तं बलान्न्यासीकृतञ्च यत्
सर्वान् बलकृतान्दोषानकृतान्मनुरब्रवीत्'[2]

गुरुपरम्परागत शास्त्रों में निष्णात तथा प्रेक्षावान् व्यक्तियों को अपने आश्रम अर्थात् मनु-निर्दिष्ट सिद्धान्त में संशयात्मा न होकर स्वेच्छानुसार परस्त्रीगमनरूप सुख का उपभोग करना चाहिए।

तर्क का कहीं अन्त नहीं;[3] श्रुतियों (वेदों) और स्मृतियों (धर्मशास्त्रों) के अर्थ-प्रतिपादन में महापण्डितों के भी मत एक नहीं, जिसका मत प्रामाणिक माना जाए; धर्म का तत्त्व अत्यन्त गूढ़ है। अतएव व्यास आदि महापुरुषों

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[1] महाभारत

[2] मनु ८।१६८
यद्यपि मनु भगवान् का ८।१६८ श्लोक बलात्कार से किए व्यवहार से परावृत्ति के लिए है, फिर भी पाप को नहीं माननेवाला चार्वाक छल से अपने पक्ष को पुष्ट करने के लिए उपर्युक्त मनुवचन को उद्धृत करता है।

[3] 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्'—(उत्तरमीमांसा २।१।११)
'तर्कोऽप्रतिष्ठः श्रुतयो विभिन्ना
नैको मुनिर्यस्य मतं प्रमाणम्।
धर्मस्य तत्त्वं निहितं गुहायां
महाजनो येन गतः स पन्थाः'—महाभा० वन० ३१३।११७

के द्वारा आचरित सुगम अर्थ को ही ग्रहण करना चाहिए। अर्थात् कामाचार में कोई संकोच नहीं।

कोई भी व्यक्ति अपने को गोरा, काला, मोटा दुबला आदि विशेषण देकर देह ही को सङ्केतित करता है, क्योंकि ये सब विशेषण तो देह ही के हो सकते हैं तो उस (गोरे, काले, मोटे या दुबले) शरीर के जल जाने के बाद पाप की चिन्ता क्यों? जिस देह से पापाचरण किया गया, वह तो भस्म हो गया तो फिर पापफलभोक्ता कौन होगा? शब्दप्रमाण से यदि आत्मा को फल का भोक्ता मान लिया जाय तब तो सर्वशरीरगत आत्मा की एकता के हेतु से एक देवदत्त के किए पाप का फल दूसरे यज्ञदत्त को भी मिलना चाहिए और यदि ऐसा नहीं होता तो देहकृत पाप-फल का भोक्ता आत्मा नहीं हो सकता।[1]

शरीर त्याग के बाद (आत्मा को) पूर्व जन्म की घटनाओं की स्मृति रहती है; पूर्वजन्मकृत सुकर्म-कुकर्म का शुभाशुभ फल प्राप्त होता[2] है तथा श्राद्ध आदि में ब्राह्मणादि को भोजन कराने से प्रेतात्मा को तृप्ति होती है—ऐसे ऐसे निरर्थक प्रलापों के प्रतिपादक शास्त्रों के वचन धूर्तवचन होने के कारण हेय हैं। उपनिषद आदि शास्त्रों के भी ऐसे-ऐसे अनेक प्रलाप हैं।

लोक देह को ही प्रत्यक्ष आत्मा मान कर कहता है—मैं स्थूल हूँ; तुम दुबले हो; वह काला है; यह मेरी पत्नी है; वह मेरा पुत्र है इत्यादि फिर तुम देह नहीं, अजन्मा,[3] अजर और अमर आत्मा[4] हो—इत्यादि प्रलापों के द्वारा श्रुति देह को अनित्य मानने के लिए लोक को बाध्य करती है और देहान्तर धारण कराती है—ये परस्पर विरोधी दो सिद्धान्त कैसे? स्मृति का तो वचन है कि जो वस्तु जैसी है उसे उसी रूप में कहना चाहिए तथा जो उसे अन्यथा रूप में कहता है वह पापी है।[5]

१. 'सूर्यो यथा सर्वलोकस्य चक्षु र्न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्बाह्यदोषैः
एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा न लिप्यये लोकदुःखेन बाह्यः'—कठ० २।२।११

२. 'अवश्यमेव भोक्तव्यं कृतं कर्म शुभाशुभम्
नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म कल्पकोटिशतैरपि'—(महा भा. शान्ति १४०।७)
'पुण्येन पुण्यलोकं नयति पापेन पापमुभाभ्यां मनुष्यलोकम्'—(प्रश्नोप. ३।७)

३. 'स वा एष महानज आत्मा'—(बृ० ४।४।२५)

४. 'तत्त्वमसि'—(छा० ६।८।७)
पुनश्च गीता २।१३, २।२२-२३

५. योऽन्यथा सन्तमात्मानमन्यथा सत्सु भाषते
स पापकृत्तमो लोके स्तेन आत्मापहारकः'—मनु० ४।२५५

'पुत्रादि सन्तान की प्राप्ति होगी या नहीं होगी'—इस तरह के सन्दिग्ध दो विपरीत वचनों में से एक का होना अवश्यम्भावी होता है। यदि पुत्रसन्तान का जन्म हुआ तब धूर्त—पुरोहितादि उसके हेतु में अपने मन्त्रानुष्ठान की मुख्यता घोषित करते हैं और यदि पुत्रादि सन्तान का जन्म नहीं हुआ तब उसका हेतु अनुष्ठान-सामग्रियों का अभाव बतलाते हैं।

श्रौतप्रमाणों से पृथक्-पृथक् शरीरों की सत्ता उपाधिमात्र है और आत्मा की सार्वत्रिक एकता है[1]—इस परिस्थिति में सम्पूर्ण विश्व के द्वारा आचरित (परदारगमनादि) पाप से कायरता के कारण यदि अपने को असीम नारकीय दुःखों का भोक्ता समझ लिया जाए तो श्रुति प्रमाणित और सम्पूर्ण विश्व के द्वारा आचरित पुण्यकर्मों के फल भोक्ता भी अपने ही को समझ लेना चाहिए। अर्थात् समस्त शरीरगत आत्मा को एक ही मानकर स्वच्छन्दता पूर्वक इच्छानुसार सभी रमणियों में विहार करने का अधिकार होना ही चाहिए।

चार्वाक पुष्प आदि उपकरणों से देवपूजन की निन्दा करता हुआ कहता है कि पुष्पों को डण्ठल से तोड़ने से वास्तव में क्या लाभ होता है? पुष्प तो डण्ठल में लगे रहने पर ही फल रूप में परिणत होते हैं। यदि पाषाणनिर्मित देवमूर्तियों के मस्तकों पर ही चढ़ाना अभिप्रेत हो तो देवता और अपने में अभेद बुद्धि रखकर अपने ही मस्तक पर उन पुष्पों को धारण करना श्रेयस्कर है, क्योंकि श्रौत प्रमाण से इश्वर की व्यापकता सार्वत्रिक है।[2]

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१. 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म'—(छा० ६।२।१)
'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन'—(बृ० ४।४।१९)
'एष ह देवः प्रदिशोऽनु सर्वाः
पूर्वो ह जातः स उ गर्भे अन्तः
स एव जातः स जनिष्यमाणः
प्रत्यङ् जनांस्तिष्ठति सर्वतोमुखः'—(श्वेताश्वतर २।१६

२. सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः सहस्राक्षः सहस्रपात्
स भूमिं विश्वतो वृत्वात्यतिष्ठद्दशाङ्गुलम्'—(श्वेताश्वतर ३।१४)
'पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं यद्भूतं यच्च भव्यम्
उतामृतत्वस्येशानो यदन्नेना तिरोहति'—(श्वेताश्वतर ३।१५)
'सर्वतः पाणिपादं तत्सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमुखम्
सर्वतः श्रुतिमल्लोके सर्वमावृत्य तिष्ठति'—(श्वेताश्वतर ३।१६)
'तदेवाग्निस्तदादित्यस्तद्वायुस्तदु चन्द्रमाः
तदेव शुक्रं तद्ब्रह्म तदापस्तत्प्रजापतिः'—(श्वेताश्वतर ४।२)

स्त्री जाति के स्तन आदि गुप्त अङ्गों के विषय में शास्त्रों में विविध प्रकार के बीभत्स वचन कहे गए हैं[1]। लोकायतमतवादी कहते हैं कि उन घृणात्मक निन्दा वचनों का तृणों के समान त्याग करना चाहिए, क्योंकि पुरुष जाति के शरीर भी उसी तरह मांस-मज्जाओं के समूह से निर्मित हुए हैं, जिस तरह स्त्री जाति के, तो स्त्रियों को निन्दित बतला कर लोकप्रवञ्चना क्यों की जाती है। जो स्वयं व्यभिचारी और अपवित्र है उसे स्त्रियों को व्यभिचारिणी या अपवित्र कहकर निन्दा करने का स्वभावतः कोई अधिकार नहीं।

ब्रह्मा ने अपनी तनया से संभोग[2] किया और सुरपति ने गौतम की पत्नी अहल्या से[3]—अतएव ब्रह्मा आदि देवताओं ने भी जिस कामदेव की आज्ञा का उल्लंघन नहीं किया, उस ब्रह्मा आदि देवताओंसे अनुल्लंघित कामदेव की आज्ञा का पालन करना ही कर्त्तव्य है। यदि कोई कहे कि वेद का उल्लंघन कर कामवासना को क्यों पूर्ण करें—इस का समाधान यह है कि जैसे वेद देवता की आज्ञा है वैसे ही परस्त्री संभोग भी देवता की ही

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१. 'समाश्लिष्यत्युच्चैर्घनपिशितपिण्डं स्तनधिया
मुखं लालाक्लिन्नं पिबति चषकं सासवमिव
अमेध्ये क्लेदार्द्रे पथि च रमते स्पर्शरसिको-
महामोहान्धानां किमिह रमणीयं न भवति'—(शान्ति शतकम्)
'नार्यो हसन्ति च रुदन्ति च वित्तहेतो
र्विश्वासयन्ति हि नरं नहि विश्वसन्ति
तस्मान्नरेण कुलशीलवता सदैव
नार्यः श्मशानसुमना इव वर्जनीया'—(चर्वाकषष्टि-संस्कृतसारांश० २२)
'स्तनौ मांसग्रन्थी कनककलशावित्युपमितौ
मुखं श्लेष्मागारं तदपि च शशाङ्केन तुलितम्,
स्रवन्मूत्रक्लिन्नं करिवरशिरःस्पर्धि जघनं
मुहुर्निन्द्यं रूपं कविजनविशेषैर्गुरुकृतम्'—(भ. ह. वै. श. १६)

२. भागवत ३।१२।२८ और कुमारसंभव ४।४१

३. वा० रा० बाल ४८।१९-२२

यदि प्रकृति की स्वाभाविक गति को पूर्ण स्वतंत्रता दे दी जाए और सामाजिक बन्धन को शिथिल कर दिया जाए तो कोई भी पुरुष किसी भी रमणी के रमण से कदाचित् ही उपरत हो। ब्रह्मा आदि देवता भी अपने को सुरक्षित रखने में असमर्थ हुए। इसी कारण किसी नीतिकार ने विधान किया है—

—'मात्रा स्वस्रा दुहित्रा वा न विविक्तासनो भवेत्
बलवानिन्द्रियग्रामो विद्वांसमपकर्षति'—समयोचितपद्यमालिका श्लो० १०

आज्ञा है—दोनों आज्ञाएँ समान ही हुईं। इस अवस्था में एक के प्रति अपेक्षा तथा दूसरे के प्रति उपेक्षा तो सर्वथा अविधेय है।

मीमांसकों के मत में वेद अपौरुषेय और अनादि हैं, किन्तु उन वेदों के एक भाग—अर्थवाद[1] मंत्रभाग को यदि लोकमें प्रलाप अर्थात् निरर्थक माना जाता है, तो फिर दूसरे कष्टदायक (अग्निष्टोमादियज्ञविधायक) विधिवाक्योंको भी प्रलाप क्यों नहीं माना जाता। जब एक भाग को निरर्थक समझा जाता है, तब तो दोनों भागों को निरर्थक समझकर त्याग देना चाहिए।

वेद के अर्थविचार में स्थूलबुद्धि होने के कारण लोग श्रुति का आदर करते हैं; पर साथ ही साथ विक्षिप्तचित्त होकर होनेवाले धनव्यय के हेतु से श्रुति के उन भागों को, जहाँ प्रत्येक यज्ञीय स्तंभमें हस्ती बाँध कर ऋत्विजों को दान देने का विधान है,[2] प्रक्षिप्त कहते हैं—ये दोनों परस्पर विरोधी सिद्धान्त तो वांछनीय कहे नहीं जा सकते।

कौन जानता है कि जीवात्मा परलोक में जाता है[3]—यह श्रुति की उक्ति निश्चयात्मक नहीं, संशयात्मक है। जिसके अस्तित्व में श्रुति को स्वयं संशय है—परलोक की सत्तामें सन्देह है; तब उस श्रुति के ही प्रमाण से कौन प्रेक्षावान् पुरुष उस परलोक के अस्तित्व में विश्वास करे?

स्मृतिकार ने क्लेशसाध्य चान्द्रायण[4] आदि व्रतों के नियम पालन को धर्म तथा उल्लंघन को अधर्म घोषित किया है और उस अधर्मजनित पाप से मुक्ति पाने के लिए सर्वसाधारण में प्रायश्चित्त आदि की जो व्यवस्था की है, उस व्यवस्था का उद्देश्य धनलोभ के अतिरिक्त और हो ही क्या सकता है? बुद्धिमान मनुष्यों के लिए ऐसे विधिवाक्यों का तिरस्कार ही श्रेयस्कर है।

पुराणों के रचयिता व्यास स्वयं मत्स्यगन्धा के जारज[5] पुत्र थे और अपनी भ्रातृपत्नी से उन्होंने संभोग[6] भी किया था। उसी व्यास के वचन

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१. किसी विशिष्ट उद्देश्य या अभिप्राय की घोषणा—सं० श० कौ० पृ० १३१

२. 'यूपे यूपे हस्तिनो बध्वा ऋत्विग्भ्यो दद्यात्'—उद्धरण नै० ना० टी० १७।६१

३. 'कोहि तद्वेद यद्यमुष्मिँल्लोकेऽस्ति वा न वा'—(तै० सं० ६।१।१।१)

४. 'तिथिवृध्या चरेत्पिण्डान् शुक्ले शिख्यण्डसंमितान्
एकैकं ह्रासयेत्कृष्णे पिण्डं चान्द्रायणं चरन्'—(याज्ञ० प्रा० ५।३२३)
—विस्तृत विवरण के लिए देखिए मिताक्षरा टीका

५. देवीभागवतम् २।३५।२७

६. महा भा० आदि १०५।१-३२ और देवी भा० २।६

से धर्माचरण, परलोक या उस व्यास में श्रद्धा रखने वाले पुरुष बुद्धिमान् कैसे हो सकते ? व्यास के रचित मत्स्यपुराण मत्स्यरूपधारी विष्णु का मनुके प्रति उपदेशमात्र है। यह विषय अत्यन्त उपहासास्पद प्रतीत होता है, क्योंकि मत्स्य जाति तो स्वयं निकृष्ट है और धर्म के आदि प्रवर्तक मनुको शिष्य मान कर उसी निकृष्ट मत्स्य ने शिक्षक बन कर उपदेश दिया था। शिक्षक की अपेक्षा शिष्य हीनतर तो होता ही है—इस परिस्थितिमें स्मृतिधर्मावलम्बी मानव जाति को 'मत्स्य'-शब्द से भी सम्बोधित करना अनुचित है, क्योंकि स्मार्त मतानुयायी होने के कारण मानवजाति मत्स्य से भी निम्नतर कोटिमें गणनीय है।

पाण्डवों के पक्षमें रहने वाले, तथा चाटुकार और कवित्व शक्तिसम्पन्न व्यास पाण्डवोंके संकेत पर नाचते थे। जब पाण्डव दुर्योधनादि की निन्दा करते तब व्यास निन्दा करते थे और जब पाण्डव कृष्ण आदि की प्रशंसा करते तब व्यास भी प्रशंसा करते थे। अतएव चापलूस व्यासवचन के अनुयायी होनेमें बुद्धिमत्ता नहीं।

क्या व्यासने अपने भाई (विचित्रवीर्य) की पत्नी के साथ कामातुर होकर रति नहीं की थी ? यदि कहा जाए कि पुत्रोत्पत्ति के हेतु धर्मशास्त्रानुमोदित[1] (नियोग) सिद्धान्तानुसार भ्रातृपत्नीसंगम के लिए माता का आदेश था तो फिर उस समय व्यास ने दासी के साथ सङ्गम क्यों किया ? दासी के साथ संभोग के लिए तो माता का आदेश नहीं था।

ब्रह्मा आदि देवताओं ने और याज्ञवल्क्य आदि द्विजोंने जिन-जिन ग्रन्थों की रचना की है, उन-उन ग्रन्थों के ही कारण उनका लोक में आदर है। उनके आदेश से पशुरूप गौ के प्रति प्रणत रहने वाले[2] मानवों ने स्पष्ट ही अपने को पशुजाति से भी नीचतर सिद्ध कर दिया, क्योंकि जिसको नमस्कार किया जाता है उसकी अपेक्षा नमस्कारकर्त्ता तो हीनतर होता ही है।

यज्ञकर्त्ता यजमान कथनमात्र के लिए तो विषयवासनाओं से पराङ्मुखचित्त होकर यज्ञ करने के उपरान्त स्वर्गगामी होते हैं; परन्तु स्वर्ग में जाने पर

[1] 'देवराद्वा सपिण्डाद्वा स्त्रिया सम्यङ्नियुक्तया
एकमुत्पादयेत्पुत्रं न द्वितीयं कथञ्चन'—(मनु ९।५९)

[2] 'नमस्ते जायमानायै जाताया उत ते नमः
बालेभ्यः शफेभ्यो रूपायघ्न्यै ते नमः'--(अथर्व० १०।१०।१)
नमो गोभ्यः श्रीमतीभ्यः सौरभेयीभ्य एव च
नमो ब्रह्मसुताभ्यश्च पवित्राभ्यो नमोनमः'--(कल्याण गोअङ्क पृ० १)

भी कामना से मुक्ति नहीं पाते, क्योंकि वहाँ भी उन्हें तिलोत्तमा आदि सुन्दरियों को पाने की कामना बनी रहती है।[१] वस्तुतः स्वर्ग में भी कामुकता से मुक्ति नहीं होती।

इन्द्रियों के निग्रह से कहीं भी शान्ति की उपलब्धि नहीं होती है। अतएव निःसंकोच-भाव से अपनी प्रेमिका रमणी के सुखकर संभोग में संलग्न रहना ही कल्याणकर है। यदि कोई कहे कि ऐसे आचरणों से नरक आदि की यातना भोगनी पड़ती है तो यह बात यथार्थ नहीं, क्योंकि मृत्यु के पश्चात् शरीर भस्म हो जाता है तो फिर नरक की यातना किसको भोगनी पड़ती है और शरीर के अतिरिक्त कोई दूसरा आत्मा तो है नहीं।[२]

शब्द शास्त्र के मत से 'अपवर्गे तृतीया'[३] इस सूत्र का अर्थ होता है—फलप्राप्ति के बोध होने से कालवाचक तथा मार्गवाचक शब्दों में तृतीया विभक्ति होती है, परन्तु दार्शनिक विचार से 'अपवर्गे तृतीया'—इस सूत्र के प्रणेता पाणिनि मुनि का भी मत है कि ब्रह्मचर्यादि पालन के द्वारा मोक्षादि पारलौकिक साधन में तृतीयाप्रकृति अर्थात् स्त्री-पुरुषों को कामभोग में अधिकार है।

स्वर्ग का अस्तित्व ऊपर माना गया है, किन्तु स्वर्ग अर्थात् ऊपर जाने के उद्देश्य से मानव गङ्गा आदि नदियों में नीचे उतर कर स्नान करने के लिए क्रमशः उत्तरोत्तर निम्नमुख होकर डुबकी लगाते हैं। यह उस गमनशील भेड़े की चेष्टा के समान है, जो आगे से युद्ध करने के लिए कुछ पीछे की ओर हट जाता है। गङ्गास्नानादि से स्वर्ग की प्राप्ति होती है यह सिद्धान्त भ्रामक है।

अमुक पापाचरण से तिर्यक[४]—कीट, पतङ्ग तथा सर्प आदि घृणित योनियों में जन्मधारण करना पड़ता है—यह शास्त्रीय विधान निरर्थक तथा

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१. 'इष्ट्वेह देवताः यज्ञैः स्वर्लोकं याति याज्ञिकः
भुंजीत देववत्तत्र भोगान्दिव्यान्निजार्जितान्'—(भागवत ११।२१।३३
गीता—९।२० कठोप० १।१।२९.

२. 'शरीरमात्मा'—मी० द० शावरभाष्यम्। 'आत्मा देहे'—भारतीयदर्शन टि. पृ. १४८

३. पा० अष्टाध्यायी २।३।६

४. 'यज्ञार्थमर्थं भिक्षित्वा यः सर्वं न प्रयच्छति
स याति भासतां विप्रः काकतां वा शतं समाः'—(मनु ११।२९)
'चाण्डालो जायते यज्ञकरणाच्छूद्रभिक्षितात्
यज्ञार्थं लब्धमददद्भासः काकोऽपि वा भवेत्'—(याज्ञ १।९।१२७)

भय प्रदर्शनमात्र है, क्योंकि तिर्यक् योनियों में भी ऐसी ही सामाजिक व्यवस्था है। अर्थात् वहाँ भी राजिल (जल व्याल) जो तिर्यक् योनियों में हीन है, अपने सुख-साधनों से ही राजा के समान सुखी रहता है। इस कारण यथेच्छाचार ही श्रेयस्कर है।

संग्राम-भूमि में मारे गए वीर पुरुष यदि स्वर्ग में अमर होकर क्रीड़ा करते हैं[1] तो दैत्यादि विष्णु के द्वारा रण में मारे गए हिरण्यकशिपु प्रभृति दैत्यों को उनके साथ वहाँ (स्वर्ग में) भी युद्ध करना चाहिए, क्योंकि आस्तिक मानवों के मत से स्वर्ग में मारे जाने पर भी प्राणी वहाँ भी अमर की ही अवस्था में रहते हैं। जब मरने का भय नहीं तो निर्भय होकर अपने रिपु विष्णु से युद्ध करना ही युक्ति-युक्त है।

संसार में जीवात्मा और ब्रह्म—इन दोनों का अस्तित्व रहता है, पर वेदान्तियों के मत से मोक्ष हो जाने पर केवल ब्रह्ममात्र[2] शेष रह जाता है। इस प्रकार स्व (आत्मा) के नाश को ही मोक्ष[3] सिद्ध करने वाले वेदान्तियों की अतिचातुरी नहीं, उनकी अति मूर्खता ही है।

अब न्याय और वैशेषिकमत में दूषण दिखलाते हुए चार्वाक कहते हैं कि जिसने चैतन्ययुक्त प्राणियों के पाषाण के समान जड हो जाने को ही अपने न्यायशास्त्र में मुक्ति बतलाई है, उस गोतम ऋषि को शब्दशास्त्रीय व्युत्पत्ति के अनुसार जिस रूप में जाना जाता है, वह वस्तुत: वैसा ही निकृष्ट पशु है भी। 'गोतम' शब्द की व्युत्पत्ति गो (पशु)+तमः = गोतम[4] अर्थात् पशुओं से भी पशु—महापशु है—यही युक्तिसंगत अर्थ है।

ध्यान से मुक्ति होती है—इस सिद्धान्त में दूषण दिखलाते हुए लोकायत-मत वादी कहते हैं कि विष्णु और महादेव आदि की लक्ष्मी और पार्वती आदि पत्नियों का मन तो निरन्तर उन्हीं (विष्णु और महादेव आदि) में संलग्न रहता है तो फिर वे (लक्ष्मी और पार्वती आदि) क्यों नहीं मुक्त हो गईं? वे कामदेव के कामबन्धन में क्यों पड़ी रहती हैं?

[1] 'हतो वा प्राप्स्यसि स्वर्गं जित्वा वा भोक्ष्यसे महीम्
तस्मादुत्तिष्ठ कौन्तेय युद्धाय कृतनिश्चय:'—गीता २।३७
यं यं वापि स्मरन्भावं त्यजन्त्यन्ते कलेवरम्
तं तमेवैति कौन्तेय सदा तद्भावभावित:'—(गीता ८।६)

[2] 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म'— (छा० ६।२।१)

[3] 'आत्यन्तिकीदुःखनिवृत्तिर्मोक्ष:'—(स० द० स० उपो० अनुच्छेद १०)

[4] 'अतिशायने तमबिष्ठनौ'—पा० अष्टाध्यायी ५।३।५५

शास्त्रों का प्रतिपादन है कि ईश्वर सर्वज्ञ[1] है; दयालु[2] है और उसकी वाणी कभी व्यर्थ नहीं जाती।[3] यदि सचमुच ऐसी बात है, तो हमारे मांगने पर वह हमें क्यों कृतार्थ नहीं कर देता। इतने विशेषणों से युक्त होने पर भी यदि हमारे मनोरथों को परिपूर्ण नहीं कर देता, तो वास्तव में उसका अस्तित्व नहीं है।

हम स्वयं अपने ही पूर्वकृत पाप कर्म के लिए परलोक में दुःखरूप फल प्राप्त करते हैं, परन्तु उस फल के विधान में कर्तृत्व का आरोप ईश्वर में कर लेते हैं और इसे निष्कारण वैरी ठहरा लेते हैं, यद्यपि हमारे निज के किए कर्म के फल विधान में ईश्वर की किञ्चित्मात्र भी अपेक्षा नहीं होनी चाहिए। किन्तु दूसरे संसारी पुरुष तो धन आदि के अपहरण करने पर ही सकारण वैरी सिद्ध होते हैं। इस दृष्टि से ईश्वर की अपेक्षा संसारी पुरुष अधिक भाग्यवान् सिद्ध होते हैं।

एक मतावलम्बी के द्वारा उपस्थित की हुई युक्ति को दूसरा नहीं मानता, वह उसमें दोष सिद्ध कर दूसरी युक्ति उपस्थित करता है; किन्तु इस दूसरी युक्ति को भी वह पहला नहीं मानता, वह उसमें भी दोष सिद्ध कर एक तीसरी और नई ही युक्ति प्रस्तुत करता है। इस प्रकार एक के पश्चात् दूसरे तर्क के उठते रहने से उनकी कहीं भी स्थिरता या समाप्ति नहीं—इस परिस्थिति में तर्क की प्रतिष्ठा या सीमा[4] नहीं रहने के कारण समानरूप से परस्पर विरोधी मतों में किसकी प्रामाणिकता स्वीकृत नहीं की जाए?

जो दुर्वासा आदि तपस्वी स्वयं तो क्रोध की साकार मूर्ति हैं; पर दूसरों से क्रोधत्याग का उपदेश दिलाते हैं, उनका यह व्यापार वैसा ही अव्यावहारिक है; जैसे कोई निर्धन पुरुष धन प्राप्ति के लिए लोगों को धातुवाद[5] विद्या का उपदेश करता हो।

१. 'एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ
हि भूतानाम्'—(माण्डुक्य १.६)

२. 'तेषामेवानुकम्पार्थमहमज्ञानजं तमः
नाशयाम्यात्मभावस्थो ज्ञानदीपेन भास्वता'—(गीता १०।११)

३. 'इति क्षेत्रं तथा ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं चोक्तं समासतः
मद्भक्त एतद्विज्ञाय मद्भावायोपपद्यते'—(गीता १३।१८)

४. देखिए उत्तरमीमांसा २।१।११
महाभारत वन० ३१३।११७

५. रासायनिक क्रियाओं के द्वारा सोना, चांदी आदि बनाने की कला।

यज्ञ आदि उत्सवों में पात्रों को दक्षिणारूप में धनदान करना भी व्यर्थ और मूर्खता ही है, क्योंकि हरिप्रिया लक्ष्मी अदानी अर्थात् कृपण के ऊपर ही प्रसन्न रहती है। मूर्ख राजा बलि ने पात्रों को दान में अपनी सारी सम्पत्ति दे दी तो भी उन्हें बन्धन में आना ही पड़ा।

संसार में प्रायः सब लोग धनिकों के धन हड़पने में लगे रहते हैं तथा मन में भी उन (धनिकों) के साथ द्रोह भाव रखते हैं, परन्तु इस प्रकार के व्यक्ति गिने हुए एक ही दो मिलेंगे, जिन्हें दूसरे की धनसम्पत्ति ग्रहण से उपरति हो।

अब चौर्य आदि कर्मों की प्रशंसा करते हुए चार्वाक कहते हैं कि स्मृतियों में चौर्यादि[१] कर्मों को निषिद्ध तथा कुछ विशिष्ट भक्ष्यों को अभक्ष्य[२] बताकर प्रायश्चित्त का विधान किया गया है, परन्तु चोरी न करना केवल अपनी दीनता को बढ़ाना है तथा स्वादिष्ट भोजन को अभक्ष्य मानकर त्यागना अपने उदर को वञ्चित करना है। अतः शास्त्रीय निषेधों को त्यागकर सकल सुखों के मूल स्वेच्छाचारिता में ही श्रेयस्कारिता है।

अब चैतन्य की उत्पत्ति का विवेचन करते हुए चार्वाक प्रतिपादन करते हैं कि पृथिवी, जल, अग्नि और वायु[३]—ये ही चार तत्त्व हैं (प्रत्यक्ष अभाव के कारण आकाश को तत्त्वों के भीतर नहीं माना गया है) और इन्हीं चार तत्त्वों के योग से चैतन्य की उत्पत्ति[४] हो जाती है, जिस प्रकार किण्वादि द्रव्यों के एकत्र होते ही उनसे स्वयं मादकता उत्पन्न हो जाती है।

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[१] 'धृतिः क्षमा दमोऽस्तेयं शौचमिन्द्रियनिग्रहः
धीर्विद्या सत्यमक्रोधो दशकं धर्मलक्षणम्'—मनु
'ब्राह्मणः स्वर्णहारी तु राज्ञे मुसलमर्पयेत्
स्वकर्म ख्यापयंस्तेन हतो मुक्तोऽपि वा शुचिः'—(याज्ञ० प्रा० २५७)
'स्तेयं कृत्वा सुरां पीत्वा कृच्छ्रं सांवत्सरं चरेत्'—(परमापस्तम्ब)
'सुवर्णस्तेयी द्वादशरात्रं वायुभक्षः पूतो भवति'—याज्ञ० सुमन्तु

[२] मधुमांसाञ्जनोच्छिष्टशुक्तस्त्रीप्राणिहिंसनम्
भास्करालोकनाश्लीलपरिवादादि वर्जयेत्'—(याज्ञ० १।२।३३)
'पलाण्डुं विड्वराहं च छत्राकं ग्रामकुक्कुटम्
लशुनं गृञ्जनं चैव जग्ध्वा चान्द्रायणं चरेत्'—(याज्ञ० १।७।१७६)

[३] 'पृथिव्यप्तेजो वायुरिति तत्त्वानि'—(ब्रह्मसूत्र भास्कर भाष्यम्)

[४] 'विज्ञान धन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति
न प्रेत्य संज्ञा अस्तीति'—बृ० २।४।१२

अब देहात्मवाद के समर्थन में चार्वाक का कहना है कि 'मैं स्थूल हूँ', 'मैं कृश हूँ इत्यादि साधारण उक्तियों से तथा स्थूलता और कृशता आदि विशेषणों के योग से देह ही[1] आत्मा सिद्ध होता है—देह के अतिरिक्त अन्य आत्मा की सिद्धि नहीं होती। 'यह मेरा देह है'—इत्यादि कथन तो औपचारिक अर्थात् केवल कथन के लिए और गौणमात्र है।

वैदिक यज्ञ आदि में होनेवाली पशुहिंसा की निन्दा में लोकायतिक-मतवादियों का कथन है कि ज्योतिष्टोमादि यज्ञोंमें हिंसित पशु श्रुति की उक्ति के अनुसार यदि स्वर्ग को चला जायगा तो यज्ञकर्ता यजमान (उस यज्ञ में) स्वयं अपने पिता की हिंसा क्यों नहीं कर देता, क्योंकि स्वर्ग जाने में पिता को सुगमता होती—पुराण में[2] भी ऐसे प्रतिपादन मिलते हैं।

स्मृतिकारों ने श्राद्ध आदि यज्ञों के लिए महान् फलों का निर्देश किया है[3]—इनके खण्डन में चार्वाकों का कथन है कि ऐहलोकिक श्राद्धादि से यदि परलोक में मृत प्राणियों को तृप्ति और पुष्टि होती है। यदि यथार्थतः यह बात होती, तो बुझे हुए प्रदीप की बत्ती को तेल बाँधता रहता, पर ऐसा व्यवहार में नहीं देखा जाता।

घर पर रहनेवाले आत्मीय जनोंके द्वारा किए गए श्राद्धादि से यदि स्वर्गीय पथिक को पथमें तृप्ति और पुष्टि होती, तो घर से यात्रा करने वाले व्यक्तियों को पाथेय भोजन देना वृथा होता। उनके नामसे किसी को भोजन घर-पर ही करादिया जाता और यात्रियों को पथ में तृप्ति होती जाती, किन्तु प्रत्यक्ष में ऐसा देखा नहीं जाता है।

यदि लोक में दान करने से मृत प्राणियों को परलोक में तृप्ति हो सकती, तो अट्टालिका के उपरिभागस्थित व्यक्तियों को निम्न भाग में दिए

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[1] 'शरीरमात्मा''—(शावरभाष्यम्) 'चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः'—(गी० म० सू० टी० १६।११) प्र० च० २।४१

[2] देखिए वि० पु० ३।१८।८९ और ३।१८।८२-८३

[3] 'हविष्यान्नेन वै मासं पायसेन तु वत्सरम्
मत्स्यहारिणकौरभ्रशाकुनच्छागपार्षतैः'—(याज्ञ० आचा० १०।२९८)
'ऐणरौरववाराहशासैर्मांसैर्यथाक्रमम्
मासवृद्ध्याभितृप्यन्ति दत्तैरिह पितामहाः'—(याज्ञ० आचा० १०।२९९)
'तिलैर्व्रीहियवैर्माषैरद्भिर्मूलफलेन वा
दत्तेन मासं तृप्यन्ति विधिवत्पितरो नृणाम्'—(मनु ३।२८७)
'संवत्सरं तु गव्येन पयसा पायसेन वा'—(मनु ३।२७१)

भोजनादिकों से तृप्ति-पुष्टि हो जाती, किन्तु लोकव्यवहार में ऐसा नहीं देखा जाता।

आस्तिक शास्त्रों के मत से आत्मा देह से निकल कर परलोक को चला जाता है। यदि उस (आत्मा) के परलोकगमन में यथार्थता है, तो फिर वह बन्धु-बान्धवों के स्नेह से प्रेरित होकर वहाँ (परलोक) से लौट क्यों नहीं आता? यदि ऐसा होता तो कभी-कभी उसका प्रत्यागमन अवश्य होता। आत्मा के इस लोक में अप्रत्यागमन से ही उसके अस्तित्व की सिद्धि नहीं होती।

पुनर्जन्म के खण्डन करनेवाले चार्वाकों का कहना है कि यथार्थ में देह के अतिरिक्त अन्य कोई आत्मा नहीं है और देह का नाश भी अवश्यंभावी है—तो इस अवस्था में तपश्चर्या आदि के द्वारा देह को कष्ट देने में कोई चतुरता नहीं। सुकृत तथा दुष्कृत कर्मों के लिए सुख तथा दुःख फलों का भी प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण नहीं मिलता। अतएव स्वेच्छाचारितापूर्वक सुखमय जीवन व्यतीत करना ही श्रेयस्कर है। ऋण लेकर घृत-पान करने में भी संकोच करना मूर्खता है। ऋण को चुकाना भी आवश्यक नहीं, क्योंकि मर जाने पर दग्ध हो चुकने वाला देह फिर वापस आने को नहीं, तो किए गए सुकर्म-कुकर्म के लिए सुखदुःखात्मक फल का भोक्ता भी कोई नहीं रह जाता इसलिए स्वेच्छाचार या कामाचार के द्वारा सर्वथा आनन्दमय जीवन व्यतीत करना ही कल्याणकर है।

अब उपसंहार में लोकायतिकों का कथन है कि एक ब्रह्म[1] के अतिरिक्त अन्य किसी वस्तु का अस्तित्व नहीं है, अतएव 'स्व' और 'पर' का भाव छोड़कर आत्मभाव से सभी रमणियों में स्वेच्छानुसार रमण करना चाहिए। जिसे आत्मकल्याण अपेक्षित हो उसे गुरु और शिष्य सम्बन्धी परम्परागत भाव त्याग देना चाहिए, क्योंकि आस्तिक शास्त्र-पुराणों में चन्द्रमा के गुरु-पत्नी के साथ रमण करने[2] का प्रमाण मिलता है।

श्रुति की उक्ति है कि अश्वमेध यज्ञ में यज्ञकर्ता यजमान की पत्नी स्वयं अश्व का शिश्न—लिङ्ग अपनी योनि में स्थापित करे[3]—यह भण्डों का कथन प्रतीत होता है। उन्हीं भण्डों ने इससे भी अधिक लज्जाजनक वचन कहे हैं। यज्ञ में मांस-भक्षण का जो विधान वेदों में प्रतिपादित किया गया है, वह भी मांसभोजनप्रेमियों की उक्ति प्रतीत होती है।

[1] छा० ६।२।१ और बृ० ४।४।१९

[2] दे० भा० १।११।६९

[3] महिषी स्वयमेवाश्वशिश्नमाकृष्य स्वयोनौ स्थापयति—(यजुर्वेदः)

लोकायतिक कहते हैं कि रमणियों के आलिङ्गन से उत्पन्न सुखोपभोग में ही पुरुषार्थ है; कुशाकण्टक आदि के चुभजाने से या शस्त्रचिकित्सा (ऑपरेशन) आदि से जनित जो व्यथा है, वही नरक है और लोकप्रतिष्ठित राजा ही यथार्थ परमेश्वर है।

विषयसंगम जनित सुख को दुःख का कारण समझ कर त्याग देना चाहिए—यह मूर्खों की विचारणा है। ऐसा कौन आत्महितैषी व्यक्ति होगा, जो भीतर स्वच्छ तण्डुलों से परिपूर्ण धान्यों को बाहर भूसियों से ढँके रहने के कारण त्यागना चाहेगा? जिस प्रकार मत्स्यभोजी कण्टकमय मत्स्यों को ग्रहण करने से उपरत नहीं होते, उसी प्रकार दुःखान्त विषय संगमजनित सुखोपभोग से विवेकी पुरुष को उपरत नहीं होना चाहिए।

अन्त में संक्षेप में अपने मत का विवेचन करते हुए चार्वाक कहते हैं कि ज्योतिष्टोमादि यज्ञों से स्वर्ग की उपलब्धि नहीं होती, क्योंकि स्वर्ग नामक किसी पदार्थ की कहीं भी सत्ता नहीं है। मृत्यु के पश्चात् पुनर्जन्म नहीं होता, क्योंकि देह से भिन्न अन्य कोई आत्मा नहीं—देह के नाश होने पर स्वत्व का नाश हो जाता है। वेद धूर्तों के प्रयोजनसाधक निरर्थक प्रलापमात्र हैं और धर्माधर्म और स्वर्ग-नरक नामक कोई भी वस्तु नहीं है। कोई परमेश्वर भी नहीं, जो जगत् का सृष्टिकर्ता, पालनकर्ता या संहारकर्ता हो-सके। प्रकृति से ही अखिल पदार्थ उत्पन्न होते, अवस्थित रहते और विनाश को प्राप्त हो जाते हैं। प्रत्यक्ष के अतिरिक्त अन्य कोई प्रमाण भी नहीं है[1]।

इस प्रकार संक्षेप में लोकायत-मत का विवेचन हुआ। अब इसके प्रतिपाद्य तात्पर्यार्थ की समीक्षा करना निष्पक्ष तथा सूक्ष्मदृष्टि सुधीजनों का कर्त्तव्य है।

उपसंहार

इस प्रकार चार्वाक या लोकायतिक दर्शनसम्बन्धी विचारधाराओं की समाप्ति हुई। उपलब्ध चार्वाक-साहित्य के अध्ययन और परिशीलन करनेसे प्रतीत होता है कि चार्वाक या लोकायतिक दर्शन के प्रवाह, आजसे नहीं, अतिप्राचीन कालसे भारतवर्ष के प्रत्येक परिसिञ्चित क्षेत्रमें प्रवाहित होते आरहे हैं और इसके प्रसार की गति कभी स्वच्छन्द तथा अनवच्छिन्न वेगसे तो कभी सामाजिक बाधाओं से आक्रान्त होकर ईषद्-अवरुद्ध वेगसे इस भारत-

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[1] देखिए प्र० च० २।४९, सां० त० कौ०, न्या० सू० २।१।४४, २।१।६९, २।१।६७

भू के कोने-कोने में व्याप्त होती रही है। लोकायतिक दार्शनिकों को इस प्रत्यक्ष परिदृश्यमान लोक के अतिरिक्त किसी भी अन्य पदार्थ की कल्पना तक स्वीकृत नहीं थी। चार्वाकमतमें संशयवाद, जडवाद, उच्छेदवाद, दृष्टवाद, हेतुवाद, वितण्डावाद, देहात्मवाद, इन्द्रियात्मवाद, मनश्चैतन्य या मनआत्मवाद, प्राणात्मवाद, नैरात्म्यवाद, निरीश्वरवाद, तत्त्वचतुष्टयवाद, भूतचैतन्यवाद, स्वभाववाद, सुखवाद तथा ऐहिकसर्वस्व आदि प्रत्यक्षवादों का ही विवेचन हुआ है। चार्वाकमत में स्वर्ग या नरक नाम की कोई वस्तु नहीं है; धर्म या अधर्म नामक किसी पदार्थ की सत्ता नहीं मानी गई है; इस परिदृश्यमान जगत् का सृष्टिकर्त्ता, पालनकर्त्ता या संहारकर्त्ता भी कोई (ब्रह्मा, विष्णु या महेश) परमेश्वर या परमात्मा नहीं है। यह जडप्रकृति (भूतचतुष्टय के संयोग) से उत्पन्न होता है और उसी से विनष्ट हो जाता है। प्रत्यक्ष के अतिरिक्त अनुमान आदि अन्य प्रमाणों की सत्ता इन्हें मान्य नहीं है। इस भूतचतुष्टयविनिर्मित देह के अतिरिक्त अन्य-कोई भी कर्मफल का भोक्ता नहीं[1]। चार्वाकमत की तुलना बौद्धमत, जैनमत या कापालिकमत से भी नहीं हो सकती, क्योंकि इन मतों में पुनर्जन्म या परलोक की मान्यता है, किन्तु चार्वाकमतमें परलोक का सर्वथा खण्डन है[2]। वेददार्शनिक-ब्राह्मण बौद्ध तथा जैनदार्शनिक आचार्यगण चार्वाकमत को आमूल विनष्ट करने के लिए निरन्तर खड्गहस्त रहते थे। चार्वाकों को मृत्यु से भय नहीं था, क्योंकि उनके मतमें मृत्यु ही मोक्ष है[3]। वे सारी वसुधा में विचरण करते हैं। अन्य दार्शनिकों ने चार्वाकों की निन्दा करने में थोड़ा भी संकोच नहीं किया है।

वैदिक और दार्शनिक मनीषियों ने मानव-समाज के सर्वथा और सार्वत्रिक कल्याण के लिए धर्म, अर्थ काम और मोक्ष—इन चार पदार्थों या पुरुषार्थों को परम उपादेय माना है किन्तु चार्वाक दार्शनिक अर्थ और काम[4]—इन दो ही

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१. 'न स्वर्गो नैव जन्मान्यदपि च नरको नाप्यधर्मो न धर्मः
कर्त्ता नैवास्य कश्चित् प्रभवति जगतो नैव भर्ता न हर्त्ता
प्रत्यक्षान्यन्न मानं न सकलफलभुग्देहभिन्नोऽस्ति कश्चित्
मिथ्याभूते समस्तेऽप्यनुभवति जनः सर्वमेतद्धि मोहात्'—(विद्वन्मोदतरङ्गिणी ३।२)

२. 'परलोकिनोऽभावात्परलोकाभावः'———(बार्हस्पत्यसूत्रम्)

३. 'मरणमेवापवर्गः'———(बार्ह० सूत्रम्)

४. 'उभयी प्रकृतिः कामे सज्जेत्'———नै० चरितम् १७।७०
'काम एव प्राणिनां कारणम्'———गीता शां० भा० १२।८
शरीरस्थिति हेतुत्वादाहारसधर्माणो हि कामाः'——(वात्स्यायनकामसूत्रम् १।२।४६)
'अर्थकामौ पुरुषार्थौ——(बार्ह० सूत्रम्)

पदार्थों को सामाजिक कल्याण के लिए उपादेय मानते हैं और शेष दो अर्थात् धर्म और मोक्ष पदार्थों को दाम्भिक और अनुपादेय मानकर खण्डित कर देते हैं। चार्वाकदर्शन में सुखवाद[1] (Hedonism) की ओर अधिक प्रवृत्ति दिखलाई पड़ती है और इसी सुखवाद के कारण समाज में चार्वाकों की बड़ी निन्दा हुई है। यदि गहरी दृष्टि से विचार कर देखा जाए तो सुखोपभोग कोई घृणास्पद या गर्हित वस्तु नहीं। विश्वके अशेष धर्मावलम्बियों ने सुखोपभोग को वांछनीय और उपादेय ही माना है, चाहे उनके सुख का रूप किसी भी प्रकार का हो। बौद्धदर्शन हो; जैन दर्शन हो; सांख्य-योगदर्शन हो; न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन हो या मीमांसा-वेदान्त दर्शन हो—सभी दर्शनों के निर्माण का चरम लक्ष्य सुखोपभोग ही रहा है—चाहे वह सुख शारीरिक हो; चाहे मानसिक हो; चाहे आत्मिक या आध्यात्मिक हो; लौकिक हो या पारलौकिक हो, पर लक्ष्य सबका तारतम्य के विचार से उत्तरोत्तर और उत्तमोत्तम सुख की उपलब्धि ही है। श्रुति-स्मृति-पुराण आदि शास्त्रों का भी अन्तिम लक्ष्य असाधारण अभ्युदय-निःश्रेयस अर्थात् उत्कृष्टतम ऐहलौकिक तथा पारलौकिक सुखोपभोग की ही ओर है। कामसूत्र के प्रणेता वात्स्यायत का तो समाज में बड़ा ऊँचा स्थान है। उनका भी आदर्श सुखवाद ही है। हाँ, सुख भी कभी गर्हित होता है, जब कि सुख का रूप अश्लील और स्वर्थपूर्ण होता है। कुछ चार्वाकों ने भी निकृष्ट इन्द्रिय सुखोपभोग को अपने जीवन का परम आदर्श माना है, पर सभी चार्वाकों ने नहीं। चार्वाकों के दो वर्ग थे—सुशिक्षित चार्वाक और धूर्त्त चार्वाक। सुशिक्षित चार्वाकों की सामाजिक व्यवस्था का परिचालन शिष्टपद्धति से होता है। इनकी अन्तर्विचारधाराएँ चाहे जो भी हों, पर बाह्य और व्यावहारिक जीवन-प्रवाह नियन्त्रित गति से प्रवाहित होते आये हैं। धूर्त्त या अशिष्ट चार्वाकों ने स्वेच्छाचार और कामाचार को सामाजिक जीवन में पूर्ण स्वतन्त्रता दे दी है और इसलिए इसका रूप अश्लील, घृणित तथा बीभत्स-सा दिखाई देता है। इनके कामाचार का रूप पशुजगत् से भी निकृष्टतर है[2]। धूर्त चार्वाकों

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[1] 'त्याज्यं सुखं बिषयसंगमजन्म पुंसां
दुःखोपसृष्टमिति मूर्खविचारणैषा
व्रीहीन् जिहासति सितोत्तमतण्डुलाढ्यान्
को नाम भोस्तुपकणोपहितान् हितार्थी'——स० द० सं०

[2] 'गुरुतल्पगतौ पापकल्पनां त्यजत द्विजा:
येषां व: पत्युरत्युचैर्गुरुदारग्रहे ग्रहा:'--नैषध १७।४४
'स्वदारपरदारेषु यथेच्छं विहरेत्सदा
गुरुशिष्यप्रणालीञ्च त्यजेत्स्वहितमाचरन्'—विद्वन्मोदतरङ्गिणी ३।४

ने चौर्य कर्म को भी स्पष्टरूप में तथा निःसंकोचभाव से प्रोत्साहन दिया है[1]। घृत आदि पुष्टिकर तथा राजस भोजन के लिए कृत ऋण को पचा डालने को भी संकेत किया है[2]। सुशिक्षित चार्वाक उत्कृष्ट दैहिक सुखों का उपभोग करते हुए सामाजिक शिष्टाचार का भी पालन बड़े सुचारु रूप में करते थे। इनके सुखवाद के आदर्श में वात्स्यायन के सुखवाद के आदर्श से बहुत कुछ सादृश्य है। सुशिक्षित चार्वाक ललित कलाओं का अभ्यास भी करते थे। धूर्त चार्वाक बड़े स्वार्थान्ध होते थे—स्वार्थमय सुखवाद सामाजिक व्यवस्था के लिए बड़ा ही घातक होता है। मनुष्य एक सामाजिक प्राणी है और सामाजिक जीवन-संचालन के लिए उसके अपने सुख के कुछ भी अंश का त्याग दूसरे के लिए कर देने में बड़ी उपादेयता होती है। यदि ऐसा नहीं हो तो समाज-व्यवस्था का संघटित तथा सुचारु रूप में संचालन असंभव हो जायेगा। शिक्षित चार्वाक निग्रहानुग्रह करने वाले लौकिक राजा को ही परमेश्वर मानते थे[3]। इससे प्रतीत होता है कि सामाजिक व्यवस्था को भी नियम-बद्ध रखना उनका अभीष्ट था और उन्हें यह भी मान्य था कि सामाजिक जीवन में यदि दण्डनीति का विधान नहीं रहेगा तो उसे (समाज को) पाशविक रूपमें परिणत होने में विलम्ब न लगेगा। इसी कारण सुशिक्षित चार्वाक शृङ्खलित समाजसत्ता को स्थापित रखना उचित समझते थे। यह बात अवश्य है और चार्वाकमत की बड़ी विशेषता है, जिसके लिए आस्तिक भारतीय दर्शन चार्वाकों का ऋणी भी है, वह यह है कि चार्वाकों के संशय और अज्ञेयवादों से भारतीय दर्शनों को कुछ अंशों में स्वतन्त्र विचार उपस्थित करने की प्रेरणा मिली है—यह निष्पक्षपात कहा जा सकता है। प्रोफेसर 'काँट' पाश्चात्य जगत् के बहुत बड़े दार्शनिक थे। उन्होंने स्पष्ट कहा है कि 'ह्यूम' के संशयवाद से ही मेरी अन्धविश्वासीय निद्रा खुली है।' अब यह कहा जा सकता है कि सांख्य आदि भारतीय दर्शनों को चार्वाकमत ने ही हठविश्वास से सुरक्षित रखा है।

ऐसे देखा जाए तो अनादि काल से यह परिपाटीसी चली आ रही है कि एक शास्त्र, दर्शन या मत के विचारप्रवाहों का तदितर शास्त्र, दर्शन या मत में स्पष्ट रूप में खण्डन पाया जाता है, पर हमारा विचार केवल

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[1] दैन्यस्यायुष्यमस्तैन्यमभक्ष्यं कुक्षिवञ्चना
स्वाच्छन्द्यमृच्छतानन्दकन्दलीकन्दमेककम्—नैषध १७।८२

[2] 'यावज्जीवेत्सुखं जीवेदृणं कृत्वा घृतं पिबेत्
भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः'—स० द० सं०

[3] 'लोकसिद्धो राजा परमेश्वरः'—स० द० सं०

खण्डनात्मक न हो कर विचारात्मक होना चाहिए। हमें तो सर्वथा और सार्वत्रिक कल्याण की भावना से 'नीरक्षीरविवेकिनी बुद्धि' के द्वारा दोषों का परित्याग कर गुणों को ग्रहण करना है, क्योंकि प्रत्येक दर्शन के अपने-अपने पृथक् दृष्टिकोण होते हैं और स्वतन्त्र विचार होते हैं। सभी दर्शन अपने ही स्थान से और अपने ही दृष्टिकोण से परमतत्त्व को प्राप्त करने की चेष्टा करते हैं। हमें उन दर्शनों की समीक्षा उनके ही दृष्टिकोण से करनी चाहिए। उनके विचारप्रवाहों की गति निरीक्षण किए विना खण्डनात्मिका बुद्धि से काम लेने में कोई उपादेयता नहीं होगी।

इतना होते हुए भी चार्वाक दर्शन में आलोच्य विषय का भी अभाव नहीं। वे लोग केवलमात्र प्रत्यक्ष को ही प्रमाणत्व से स्वीकृत करते हैं। अनुमान तथा शब्द आदि प्रमाणों का स्पष्ट शब्दों में खण्डन करते हैं, जिससे समाज की व्यावहारिक परिस्थितियों में गड़बड़ी तथा उच्छृंखलता आजाने की संभावना बनी रहती है। तथा व्यवहार की उपपक्ति सर्वतोभावेन असिद्ध हो सकती है। मान लिया जाए कि किसी पत्नी का पति परदेश या विदेशगत है—उस समय प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण की सहायता से यदि विचार किया जाय तब तो प्रत्यक्षरूप (आँखों के समक्ष) में पति का अभाव ही प्रतीत होता है, तो क्या इस परिस्थिति में विदेशगत या परदेशगत पति की पत्नी अपने को विधवा मान कर पति के लिए श्राद्धादि क्रिया सम्पन्न करती है? नहीं, प्रत्यक्ष व्यवहार में ऐसा देखा-सुना नहीं जाता है। इसी प्रकार चार्वाक दर्शन के कुछ सिद्धान्तगत अंशोंके ऊपर विचार करने पर प्रतीत होता है कि यह मत प्रारंभिक समाजोद्यान का अविकसित कलिकारूप है। समाज का जैसे-जैसे विकास होता गया, दर्शन के रूप वैसे ही वैसे विकसित होते गये। इस प्रकार चर्वाकों का दार्शनिक दृष्टिकोण सर्वथा और सार्वत्रिक समाज-कल्याण के लिए साङ्गोपाङ्ग और परिपूर्ण नहीं कहा जा सकता। किसी अंश में इनकी दृष्टि सूक्ष्म है तो कहीं अत्यन्त स्थूल हो गई है। हो भी कैसे? संसारचक्र में पूर्णता संभव ही कहाँ? पूर्णता तो एकमात्र भगवान् ही में हो सकती है। सूक्ष्मेक्षिका से समीक्षा करने से ऐसा आभास मिलता है, मानो पूर्वपक्ष के रूप में इसका निर्माण हुआ हो। यह भी तो औचित्यपूर्ण ही है—शैशवावस्था न हो तो यौवनावस्था या जरावस्था की संभावना कैसे की जाए? कोरक या कलिका न हो तो क्रमशः मुकुल, पुष्प और अन्त में फल के रूप में किस की परिणति होगी? रोग की उत्पत्ति न हो तो किस की चिकित्सा के लिए ओषधियों का निर्माण हो? इससे स्पष्ट है कि चार्वाक अर्थात् नास्तिक दर्शन का उदय नहीं होता तो वैदिक अर्थात् आस्तिक दर्शनों का

निर्माण भी नहीं होता। अन्तिम निष्कर्ष यही निकलता है कि वेद, उपनिषद्, दर्शन, स्मृति, पुराण आदि आस्तिक या नास्तिक सभी शास्त्र परम सुखसागर या परम तत्त्व अर्थात् सत्य की उपलब्धि के लिए यात्री के रूप में पृथक्-पृथक् शम्बल लेकर प्रस्थान कर चुके हैं। सबके मार्ग पृथक्-पृथक् हैं, पर गन्तव्य स्थान ज्ञाताज्ञात रूप में सब का एक ही है। गन्तव्य स्थान की प्राप्ति में काल या समय का पार्थक्य संभव है, पर पहुँचना सब का वहीं है, चाहे वे चार्वाक-मतावलम्बी हों, बौद्ध हों; जैन हों; पारसी हों; भक्तियोगी हों; कर्मयोगी हों या ज्ञानयोगी हों; नास्तिक हों या आस्तिक हों; हिन्दू हों या अहिन्दू हों। पुष्पदन्त की उक्ति स्मरणीय है—हे प्रभो! त्रयी (वेदमार्ग), सांख्य, योग, पाशुपतमत, वैष्णवमत—सभी आप की प्राप्ति के ही मार्ग हैं। रुचिवैचित्र्य के कारण ही 'यह श्रेष्ठ है, वह हितकारी है' इस प्रकार उनमें पार्थक्य प्रतीत होता है। हे प्रभो! जिस प्रकार समस्त नदी-नालों का जल समुद्र में ही जाता है, वैसे ही सीधे-टेढ़े सभी साधन मार्गों से यात्रा करनेवाले मनुष्यों के गन्तव्य स्थान एकमात्र आप ही हैं।

'त्रयी सांख्यं योगः पशुपतिमतं वैष्णवमिति
प्रभिन्ने प्रस्थाने परमिदमदः पथ्यमिति च
रुचीनां वैचित्र्यादृजुकुटिलनानापथजुषां
नृणामेकोगम्यस्त्वमसि पयसामर्णव इव'[1]

जिस प्रकार पृथ्वी पर पतित वृष्टि का जल छोटी-बड़ी नदियों में भटकता हुआ अन्त में अपने गन्तव्य समुद्र को प्राप्त करलेता है उसी प्रकार किसी भी देवता के उद्देश्य से किया गया पूजा-पाठ अन्त में केशव—परमेश्वर को ही प्राप्त होता है।

'पृथिव्यां पतितं तोयं समुद्रमभिगच्छति
सर्वदेवनमस्कारः केशवं प्रति गच्छति'[2]

इति शिवम् हरिः ॐ तत्सत्

सर्वे भवन्तु सुखिनः सर्वे सन्तु निरामयाः
सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु मा कश्चिद्दुःखभाग्भवेत्।

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१. महिम्नःस्तोत्रम्—श्लो० ७
२. पौराणिकोद्धरणम्

सरहपा और उनकी देन हिन्दी साहित्य को

प्रो० नागेन्द्र प्रसाद, एम० ए०,
हिन्दी-प्राध्यापक, नव नालन्दा महाविहार

सरहपा और उनकी देन हिन्दी साहित्य को

सरहपा का आविर्भाव कई दृष्टियों से एक अभूतपूर्व और क्रांतिकारी घटना है। यह बड़े आश्चर्य और दुःख का विषय है कि जिस महापुरुष ने भारतवर्ष और उसके साहित्य को इतना प्रभावित किया उसके संबंध में आज से कुछ वर्ष पहले हमारी जानकारी नहीं के बराबर थी। शोधकर्ताओं के अथक प्रयास के परिणामस्वरूप सिद्धों का साहित्य प्रकाश में आया और धीरे-धीरे हम सरहपा की जीवनी और उनकी कृतियों से परिचित होते चले गए। ज्ञान के अभाव में ही हिन्दी साहित्य का प्रारंभ आज से कुछ वर्ष पहले तक संवत् १०५० से माना जाता था। पर आज हम बड़े गर्व से हिन्दी साहित्य के आदिकाल के रूप में सिद्ध साहित्य को स्वीकार करते हैं तथा आश्चर्यचकित हो सरहपा के व्यक्तित्व और उनकी प्रतिभा को श्रद्धा के फूल चढ़ाते हैं।

भारतवर्ष का यह दुर्भाग्य रहा है कि हम अपने महान् साधकों और विचारकों के जीवन के संबंध में अनभिज्ञ ही रहे हैं। सरहपा की तो बात ही दूर है, हम चंदबरदाई, तुलसी, सूर तथा कबीर जैसे महान् साधकों और विचारकों की जीवनी के संबंध में भी आज भी बहुत कम जानते हैं। किंबदंतियो तथा अन्तःसाक्ष्य और बहिर्साक्ष्य के आधार पर कुछ कह देना दूसरी बात है और निश्चित रूप से जीवनी पर प्रकाश डालना कुछ और। सरहपा के संबंध में भी कुछ ऐसी ही बात है।

महापंडित राहुल सांकृत्यायन जैसे विद्वानों ने अथक परिश्रम के बाद उनकी जीवनी निर्धारित की है पर उन्होंने भी बहुत दूर तक अनुमान का सहारा लिया है। राहुलजी के अनुसार "सरहपाद की जीवनी के संबंध में बहुत थोड़ी सी सूचना तिब्बती अनुवादित ग्रन्थों से मिलती है और वह सबसे प्रामाणिक है, इसमें संदेह नहीं।"[1] "चतुरशीति सिद्धप्रवृत्ति" में केवल सिद्धों की सूची भर दी गई है। खैर, जो भी सामग्री हमें उपलब्ध है उसके आधार पर हम कह सकते हैं कि सरहपा का जन्म पूर्व दिशा के राज्ञी नामक कस्बा में हुआ था। साधारणतः मगध से पूर्ववाले प्रदेश को पूर्व दिशा कहा जाता था, पर मगध से पूर्व कहाँ राज्ञी स्थित था इसका हमें कोई पता नहीं। राहुलजी ने भंगल (भागलपुर) और पुंड्रवर्धन (उत्तरी बंगाल) में राज्ञी को माना है।[2] वारेन्द्र और कामरूप (असम) को वे

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१. राहुल जी कृत दोहाकोश की भूमिका—पृ० ९.

२. ,, ,, ,, —पृ० १०.

इस आधार पर स्वीकार नहीं करते कि पूर्वदिशा के उल्लेख के साथ इन दोनों स्थानों का उल्लेख भी अवश्य ही होता है। किन्तु भंगल और पुंड्रवर्धन दोनों में राज्ञी को तो माना नहीं जा सकता। इनमें से किसी एक में ही राज्ञी की स्थिति मानी जा सकती है और वह भी भंगल या पुंड्रवर्धन के किसी विशेष भाग में। फिर यह कोई आवश्यक नहीं है कि राज्ञी का कोई संबंध वारेन्द्र या कामरूप के साथ न हो। संभव है 'राज्ञी' का उल्लेख करते समय लेखक ने 'पूर्वदिशा' का उल्लेख न किया हो क्योंकि पूर्वदिशा का उल्लेख यद्यपि आमतौर पर होता रहा है फिर भी ऐसा कोई आवश्यक और निश्चित नियम तो नहीं था। अस्तु, 'राज्ञी' शब्द से ही संतोष हमें करना पड़ता है। राज्ञी नाम के किसी महत्वपूर्ण कस्बा से हम परिचित भी नहीं हैं।

राज्ञी का कस्बा बहुत बड़ा नहीं होगा पर उसमें बसनेवाले ब्राह्मण अच्छी हालत में होंगे क्योंकि सातवीं-आठवीं सदी में आमतौर पर ब्राह्मण खुशहाल थे।[1] सरह का कुल ब्राह्मण था या बौद्ध यह जानने का भी हमारे पास कोई साधन नहीं है, पर उन्हें ब्राह्मण और बौद्ध दोनों रूपों में पूज्य माना गया है। यही कारण है कि सिद्ध और योगीश्वर के साथ-साथ उन्हें महान् ब्राह्मण བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆེན་པོ། (तिब्बती—ब्रम. से. छेन्. पो.) की उपाधि भी दी गई है। इस संबंध में राहुलजी का विचार पूर्णतः सही है कि ऐसा सरह के महान् गुणों के कारण ही हुआ होगा। इसका एक जबरदस्त प्रमाण तो यह है कि अपने दोहाकोश के प्रथम दोहा में ही सरह ने ब्राह्मणवाद पर तीव्र प्रहार किया है।[2] ऐसे कटु आलोचक को भी ब्राह्मणों ने महान् ब्राह्मण की उपाधि दी। क्या यह इस बात का प्रमाण नहीं है कि सरह महान् ज्ञानी थें?

सरहपा के बचपन का नाम राहुलभद्र या सरोजवज्र था। कुछ लोग उनका नाम राहुलवज्र भी बताते हैं। राहुलवज्र या सरोजवज्र नाम संभवतः वज्रयान के साथ उनके संबंध के कारण पड़ा हो। खैर, जो भी हो, इतना तो माना ही जा सकता है कि राहुलभद्र बाल्यावस्था से ही बड़े मेधावी रहे होंगे। अत्यंत मेधावी होने के कारण मस्तिष्क से

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१. राहुल जी कृत दोहाकोश की भूमिका—पृ० १०,

२. ,, ,, दोहाकोश-गीति (छाया)—

ब्राह्मण न जानते भद। यों ही पढ़े ये चारो वेद॥
मट्टी पानी कुश लेइ पढ़न्त। घर ही बैठी अग्नि होमन्त॥

वे प्रकृतिस्थ नहीं रहे होंगे। पर इसका अर्थ यह नहीं कि वे पागल थे। हाँ, आज के शब्द में उन्हें 'असाधारण' कहा जा सकता है। पुरानी परिपाटी के अनुसार उनकी शिक्षा-दीक्षा घर ही पर हुई होगी। किस प्रकार बौद्ध संघ में वे सम्मिलित हुए यह हमें ज्ञात नहीं। संभव है श्रद्धालु माता-पिता ने अपने पुत्र को बौद्ध बनाकर अपने को 'संघ का दायाद' बना दिया हो।

सरहपा के आचार्य कौन थे इसका कोई पता हमें नहीं है। पर नालंदा विश्वविद्यालय में उन्होंने प्रवेश पाया और शांतरक्षित के शिष्य हरिभद्र का शिष्यत्व उन्हें प्राप्त हुआ। बाद में वे नालंदा में अध्यापन कार्य भी करने लगे[1]। इससे अपने अर्जित ज्ञान को और भी बढ़ाने का सुअवसर उन्हें मिला। वस्तुतः उस समय तक एक से एक बढ़कर सुन्दर और महत्वपूर्ण काव्य तथा नाटकों की रचना हो चुकी थी अतः यह तो अनुमान लगाया ही जा सकता है कि सरह ने अश्वघोष के 'बुद्धचरित' और 'सौन्दरनन्द' काव्य; गुणाढ्य की 'वृहत् कथा' तथा भास, कालिदास और भवभूति की अमर कृतियों को पढ़ा होगा।

राहुलभद्र असाधारण प्रतिभा के आदमी थे। इसका एक प्रमाण तो यह है कि अकस्मात् उन्होंने नालंदा त्याग दिया और इसके साथ-साथ भिक्षुजीवन के अन्य आवश्यक बाह्य नियमों को भी त्याग दिया। संभवतः वे नियम उनकी नजरों में अनावश्यक या ढोंग से प्रतीत हुए होंगे। लोगों ने उन्हें सनकी या पागल समझा होगा। पर सरह अब ऐसी भूमिका में पहुँच गए थे जहाँ पहुँचकर उन्हें इन बातों की कोई परवाह ही नहीं रह गई थी। फलतः उहोंने तत्कालीन समाज और सामाजिक नियमों और मर्यादाओं के विरुद्ध एक खुला विद्रोह कर दिया। अपनी इसी बगावत के मूड में उन्होंने एक शरकार-बालिका को अपने साथ रख लिया और स्वयं भी सरकंडों का शर बनाने लगे। इसीसे उनका नाम सरहा पड़ा और बाद में उनके भक्तों ने श्रद्धासूचक 'पाद' शब्द जोड़कर उन्हें सरहपाद या सरहपा की उपाधि दी। अनेक लोगों ने उनका विरोध भी किया पर उन्हें इसकी कोई चिंता नहीं थी। वे तो अपनी महामुद्रा—शरकार-कन्या के साथ विचरण करते रहे। किन्तु एक बात स्पष्ट है। उनका हृदय

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[1] नालंदा के साथ सरह का इतना गहरा सम्बन्ध था और वे इतने लोकप्रिय थे कि कुछ पदार्थों और वस्तुओं के नाम भी उन्हीं के नाम पर रखे गए। नालंदा के पास मुजफ्फरपुर नामका एक गाँव है। आज भी उसके एक तालाब को सरहपा पोखर या सरहापोखर कहा जाता है।

एकदम निष्कपट था तथा अन्तर और बाह्य बिल्कुल खुला था। छल और कपट का कोई स्थान उनके पास नहीं था और न ही वे अपनी करामात दिखाना चाहते थे। ऐसे व्यक्ति का विरोध बहुत दिनोंतक नहीं चल सकता। परिणामस्वरूप सरहपा के विरोधियों की संख्या घटती चली गई। फिर तो उनका प्रभाव कुछ ऐसा हावी हुआ कि सर्वत्र उनकी पूजा होने लगी। यद्यपि सरहपा चौरासी सिद्धों के अगुआ हैं पर सिद्ध तो उनके पहले भी हो चुके थे। लेकिन आज हम सिद्धों का प्रारंभ सरह से ही मानने लगे हैं। यह उनके प्रभाव का ही परिणाम है। सरह के विचारों में ध्यान के साथ करुणा का मणिकांचन संयोग मिलता है। पर सबसे बड़ा गुण जिसने जनता को उनकी ओर बड़े वेग से अकर्षित किया वह है जन भाषा की ओर उनकी रूझान। उन्होंने अपनी रचनाएँ प्रचलित संस्कृत में न कर अपभ्रंश में की जिसे साहित्यिक मान्यता भले ही न मिली हो पर जिसे जनता ने अपनी स्वीकृति दे दी थी।

रचना :—पर इसका अर्थ यह नहीं कि सरह ने संस्कृत की नितांत उपेक्षा की हो। बात तो यह है कि उन्होंने सात संस्कृत ग्रंथ—विशेषकर तंत्रों की टीकाएँ लिखीं जो तिब्बती तन्ग्युर में संगृहीत हैं। इसके अतिरिक्त उनके द्वारा रचित सोलह अपभ्रंश की कविताएँ तन्ग्युर के तंत्र विभाग में संगृहीत हैं। इनमें सरह के स्वतंत्र एवं फक्कड़ विचारों को हम साफ-साफ देख सकते हैं।

संस्कृत के ग्रन्थ :—[1]

१. बुद्धकपाल तंत्र पंजिका 'ज्ञानवती'।
२. बुद्ध कपाल साधन।
३. बुद्ध कपाल मंडल विधि।
*४. त्रैलोक्य वंशकर लोकेश्वर साधन।
*५. त्रैलोक्य वंशकर लोकेश्वर साधन।
६. त्रैलोक्य वंशकरावलोकितेश्वर साधन।
*७. त्रैलोक्य वंशकर लोकेश्वर साधन।

अपभ्रंश की रचनाएँ :—

१. दोहा कोश गीति।
२. दोहा कोशाचर्या गीति।

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[1] सरह के संस्कृत और अपभ्रंश की रचनाओं की सूची राहुल जी ने अपने दोहाकोश में दी है। देखिए पृ०—१६-१७।

* नम्बर ४, ५ और ७ भिन्न आचार्यों द्वारा अनुवादित हैं।

३. दोहा कोशोपदेश गीति।
४. क.ख. दोहा नाम।
५. क. ख. दोहा टिप्पण।
६. कायाकोशामृत वज्र गीति।
७. वाक्कोशरूचिर स्वर वज्रगीति।
८. चित्तकोशाज वज्रगीति।
९. काय वाक्चित्तामनसिकार।
१०. दोहा कोश महामुद्रोपदेश।
११. द्वादशोपदेश गाथा।
१२. स्वाधिष्ठानक्रम।
१३. तत्वोपदेश शिखर दोहा गीतिका।
१४. भावना दृष्टिचर्याफल दोहा गीति।
१५. वसंत तिलक दोहाकोश गीतिका।
१६. महामुद्रोपदेश वज्रगुह्य गीति।

भाषा :—यद्यपि दोहा कोश तथा अन्य कृतियों की रचना अपभ्रंश भाषा में हुई है तथापि विभिन्न लोगों ने समयानुसार उसमें सुधार लाने का प्रयास किया। यही कारण है कि भिन्न हस्तलेखों में अन्तर आ गया है। डा० बागची द्वारा संपादित दोहा कोश तथा ससक्य के हस्तलेख की तुलना से यह बात स्पष्ट हो जाती है।[1] स्वरों में ऋ, ऌ, ऐ, औ तथा व्यंजनों में श और ष उस समय की भाषा में व्यवहार में नहीं थे। आश्चर्य तो यह है कि उस समय ह्रस्व, ए और ओ थे पर दीर्घ ऐ और औ नहीं थे। *य* का उच्चारण *ज* की भाँति तथा *व* और *ब* के उच्चारण में भेद का अभाव तो आम बात थी। छंदोभंग के दोष से बचाने के लिए ह्रस्व का उच्चारण दीर्घ की तरह और दीर्घ का उच्चारण ह्रस्व की तरह होता था।

उस युग के अपभ्रंश को देखने पर एक विशेष बात जो ध्यान में आती है वह है नपुंसक लिंग का अभाव। पुरानी परंपरा यहाँ आकर समाप्त हो जाती है और पुल्लिंग तथा स्त्रीलिंग—केवल दो ही लिंगों का प्रयोग मिलता है।

समासों में कर्मधारय, तत्पुरुष, द्वन्द्व तथा बहुव्रीहि का प्रयोग अनेक स्थानों पर मिलता है, पर तद्धित का प्रयोग बहुत कम मिलता है।

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[1] राहुल जी कृत दोहाकोश की भूमिका—पृ०—४०।

अतः यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि सरहपा ने अपनी अपभ्रंश रचनाओं में तथा शब्दावलि और उच्चारण में पूरी तौर से प्राचीन प्राकृत का अनुसरण और अनुकरण नहीं किया है। अनेक बातों में वे आधुनिक भाषाओं का पथप्रदर्शन करते हैं। सरह द्वारा प्रयुक्त कितने शब्द आज भी प्रयुक्त होते हैं तथा कितने ही शब्दों के रूप इसे आधुनिक भाषाओं से मिलाते हैं। जैसे—खुसखुसाइ (फुसफुसाई); चाउल (चावल)। इसके अतिरिक्त आवइ-जाइ; उत्तिम; तथा जसु जैसे शब्द सरह की भाषा का संबन्ध आधुनिक भाषा से बताते हैं।[1]

प्रत्येक भाषा के कुछ अपने प्रिय और विशेष छंद होते हैं। प्राकृत का विशेष छंद गाथा या आर्या हैं जिसका सुन्दर प्रयोग हमें गाथा सप्तशती में देखने को मिलता है। उसी प्रकार अपभ्रंश का विशेष छंद दोहा-चौपाई है। पर यहाँ भी एक उल्लेखनीय बात है। गाथा या आर्या का प्रारंभ प्राकृत से नहीं हुआ और इस छंद का प्रयोग पहले भी मिलता है। अतः गाथा या आर्या को केवल प्राकृत का छंद नहीं माना जा सकता। पर दोहा-चौपाई का न केवल आरंभ अपभ्रंश भाषा से होता है वरन् इसका सबसे पुराना नमूना भी सरह की रचनाओं में ही मिलता है। जब तक सरह के पहले की कोई रचना दोहा-चौपाई में नहीं मिल जाती है तब तक तो हमें सरह को ही दोहा-चौपाई का जन्मदाता मानना पड़ेगा। इस प्रकार सरह न केवल भाव और साहित्य की दृष्टि से वरन् छंद की दृष्टि से भी मौलिकता लिए हुए थे और उनके आविर्भाव से एक नई दिशा की ओर निर्देश मिलता है। यद्यपि सरह की रचनाएँ दोहा-कोश के नाम से अधिक प्रसिद्ध हैं तथापि उन्होंने दोहे-चौपाई के अतिरिक्त पद्धरिया छंद में भी लिखा है जो दोहा-चौपाई से बिल्कुल मिलता-जुलता है। हाँ, चौपाई के अंत में गुरु आता है और पद्धरिया के अंत में लघु और यही एक अंतर इन दोनों छंदों को एक दूसरे से पृथक् करता है। साथ ही दोहा-कोश के नाम से विख्यात होने पर भी सरह ने दोहे-चौपाई के अतिरिक्त अन्य छंदों का भी प्रयोग किया है। संभवतः उस समय दोहा शब्द आज के अर्थ में रूढ़ नहीं हुआ था ठीक उसी प्रकार जिस प्रकार कोश शब्द से डिक्शनरी या शब्दकोश का अर्थ नहीं लिया जाता था, वरन् इसका एकमात्र अर्थ होता था संग्रह या संचय। अतः दोहा कोश का अर्थ दोहों का संग्रह या संचय मात्र ही है। "गाथा सप्तशती" और "आर्या सप्तशती" को भी तो पहले गाथा कोश या आर्या कोश कहा जाता था। सरह ने जो छः रचनाएँ प्राकृत भाषा में

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[1] १. राहुल जी कृत दोहा कोश की भूमिका—पृ० ६१-६२

की हैं उनमें गाथा या आर्या छंद का प्रयोग किया है। इससे यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि गाथा या आर्या छंद प्राकृत के थे और उनका कोई संबन्ध अपभ्रंश से नहीं था।

इसके अतिरिक्त एक और छंद का प्रयोग सरह ने अपनी अपभ्रंश रचनाओं में किया है जिसे दुवहय कहा जाता था। यह दुवहय दोहा के रूप में ही प्रचलित था। सरह ने इसी रूप में इसका प्रयोग किया है। दुवहय छंद के संबंध में कुछ लोगों का कहना है कि यह ग्रीक छंद से लिया गया है। राहुलजी भी इस मत से सहमत हैं और उनका कहना है कि यवन, ग्रीक और हूण आदि जातियों ने भारत में बस कर यद्यपि अपनी भाषा खो दी पर उनके गीतों की ध्वनियों और छंदों को भारतवासियों ने ग्रहण कर लिया।[1] ऐसा होना असंभव भी नहीं है। इसका एक प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण तो यह है कि मुस्लिम-काल में हिन्दी ने अरबी-फारसी के अनेक छंदों को ग्रहण कर लिया। हो सकता है कि दोहा को शकों से लोकगीतों में अपना लिया गया हो और लोकगीतों से सरह ने इसे अपना लिया हो। पर यह एक उत्प्रेक्षा मात्र ही होगी। किसी प्रत्यक्ष या अप्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण के अभाव में हम इसे नहीं मान सकते हैं। राहुलजी इस अनुमान को इस आधार पर संभव मानते हैं कि उन्होंने रूसी और ताजिक लोकगीतों को भोजपुरी बिरहा की लय में गाये जाते सुना।[2] पर केवल इसी आधार पर यह मान लेना सही नहीं होगा कि दोहा को लोकगीतों में शकों से लिया गया और उन लोकगीतों से इसे सरह ने ग्रहण कर लिया। सच तो यह है कि जब तक कोई प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण इस बात का नहीं मिल जाता तब तक हम सरह को ही दोहा-चौपाई का जन्मदाता मानें और इस प्रकार उनकी मौलिक और सृजनशील प्रतिभा को अपनी श्रद्धा, भक्ति और कृतज्ञता के पुष्प अर्पित करें। डा० शहीदुल्ला ने "दोहाकोशगीति" में दोहा, सोरठा, पादाकुलक, अडिल्ल वदनक, गाथा, रोला, उल्लाला, महानुभाव तथा मरहट्ट छंदों का प्रयोग पाया है।

सरह की भाषा के संबंध में विचार करते समय हमें यह ध्यान में रखना है कि अन्य सिद्धों की भाषा की तरह सरह की भाषा को भी संध्या-भाषा या संधा भाषा कहा जाता है। इस "संध्या" शब्द का अनेक प्रकार से अर्थ लगाने की चेष्टा की गई है। कुछ विद्वान संध्या भाषा से संधिकालीन भाषा का अर्थ लगाते हैं। कुछ अन्य-विद्वान इससे अस्पष्ट और दुरूह भाषा

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[1] राहुल जी कृत दोहाकोश की भूमिका—पृ० ६४

[2] ,, ,, पृ० ६९

का अर्थ लगाते हैं। जिस प्रकार संध्या बेला के धुँधलके में सब कुछ अस्पष्ट रहता है और साफ साफ दिखाई नहीं देता उसी प्रकार सिद्धों के भाव तो दुरूह और क्लिष्ट होते ही हैं साथ ही उन भावों को व्यक्त करने के लिए जिस भाषा का प्रयोग किया गया है वह भी जन साधारण के समझ में आने योग्य नहीं है। अस्पष्ट और दुरूह तथा साधनात्मक भावों को व्यक्त करने के लिए जिस अस्पष्ट भाषा का उपयोग किया गया है उसके लिए "संध्या भाषा" का व्यवहार उचित ही है। जो सिद्धों की भाषा और भाव का ज्ञाता हो वही सरह की रचनाओं का मर्म समझ सकता है।

यह तो कहा ही जा चुका है कि सरह बड़े विद्वान थे। उनका विद्या-प्रेम केवल इस बात से प्रकट होता है कि वे पहले नालंदा में शिष्य के रूप में रहे और बाद में इस विश्व-विद्यालय में कई वर्षों तक उन्होंने अध्यापनकार्य भी किया। सौभाग्य से समय भी उनके लिए अनुकूल था। सरह के समय तक संस्कृत और प्राकृत दोनों साहित्य अपने मध्याह्न को पार कर चुके थे। अतः संभव है अश्वघोष, भास, कालिदास, सुबंधु, भामह, दंडी तथा प्रवरसेन की कृतियों को सरह ने अवश्य ही पढ़ा होगा। तभी तो नालंदा विश्वविद्यालय में वे संस्कृत के महान् पंडित के रूप में पूजे जाते थे। अतः सरह के पास न विद्या की कमी थी और न प्रतिभा की। वे बड़ी आसानी से शिष्ट सरणी का अनुसरण करते हुए संस्कृत में अपनी रचनाएँ कर सकते थे। पर सरह उन मौलिक और क्रांतिकारी महापुरुषों में हैं जिनका आविर्भाव सदियों के बाद होता है। योग्यता के रहते हुए भी उन्होंने प्रचलित परिपाटी का विरोध करते हुए लोकभाषा को अपनाया और जनता के हृदय की आवाज को बुलंद किया। सरह ने अपभ्रंश भाषा में लिखते हुए भी अपनी महान् और मौलिक प्रतिभा का परिचय दिया है। एक से एक सुन्दर उपमा दोहा कोश 'चर्यागीति' में भरी है, तथा उनकी रचनाओं में शास्त्र सम्मत गुणों और मान्यताओं के प्रति आदर-भाव मिलता है। उपमा के दो-एक उदाहरण देखने योग्य हैं—

क—जैसे फूल के भीतर की मधु को मधुमक्खी ही जानती है।

ख— जैसे बीज से अंकुर होता है, अंकुर के कारण टहनियाँ होती हैं।

सरह की रचनाओं में कुछ नई और ऐसी मान्यताएँ मिलती हैं जो उनके पहले नहीं थीं और जिनके विधायक सरह ही हैं। सम्भव है वे मान्यताएँ लोककाव्य में रही होंगी पर इसका कोई प्रमाण हमारे पास नहीं है। व्यंगोक्तियाँ और उलटबाँसियाँ भी इन्हीं मान्यताओं में हैं। ये

मान्यताएँ आगे चलकर संतकाव्य की कसौटी बन गईं और इनकी एक लंबी परम्परा कबीर, नानक, दादू आदि सन्तों में मिलती है।

पर सबसे बड़ी बात तो यह है कि सरह न तो कविता करना अपना ध्येय समझते थे और न उन्होंने कभी अपने आप को कवि समझा। जैसा कि कहा जा चुका है वे आज के शब्दों में असाधारण प्रतिभा के व्यक्ति थे। उन्होंने अपने विचारों को लौकिक छन्दों में गूँथा है। पर यहाँ भी हमें याद रखना चाहिए कि सरह ने स्वयं कुछ नहीं लिखा होगा। वे अपनी अलमस्ती में गुनगुनाते जाते होंगे और उनके साधकों ने उसे लिपिबद्ध किया होगा। इसका एक सबल प्रमाण तो यह है कि दोहा कोश के छन्दों की संख्या और क्रम में बड़ा अन्तर पाया जाता है। खेद है कि ऐसे प्रतिभासंपन्न साधक की कृतियाँ मूल रूप में हमें उपलब्ध नहीं हैं और उनके तिब्बती अनुवाद से ही हमें काम चलाना पड़ता है।

सरह की रचनाओं पर विचार करने पर यह पता चलता है कि मूलतः वे विद्रोही और क्रांतिकारी महापुरुष थे। विचारों की दुनिया में इस तरह उथल-पुथल मचाने वाला दूसरा कवि उस समय क्या बहुत बाद तक नहीं हुआ। आगे चलकर कबीर के विचारों ने हमें झकझोरा अवश्य पर कबीर ने तो सरह के बताए हुए मार्ग का ही अनुसरण किया। धर्मध्वजियों और उनके भ्रामक विचारों का तीव्र रूप से खण्डन सरह ने किया।

इसी प्रकार के भाव को अभिव्यक्त करते हुए छः शताब्दी बाद कबीर ने कहा कि—

*का नांगे का बाँधे चाम। जौ नहिं चीन्हसि आतम राम।
नांगे फिरे जोग जे होई। वनका मृग मुकति गया कोई।
मूँड मुँड़ाये जौ सिधि होई। स्वर्गहि भीड़ न पहुँची कोई।

ऐसा लगता है जैसे निरक्षर होते हुए भी कबीर ने सरह के विचारों को ही एक नई और अपनी भाषा में दुहरा दिया है। अपने समय के कितने ही मूढ़ और भ्रामक विचारों का खण्डन सरह ने किया है। मंत्र तंत्र का विरोध करते हुए वे कहते हैं—

मन्त ण तन्त ण धेअ ण धारण। सब्बवि रे वढ़ विब्भमकारण।

शास्त्रों के ज्ञाता होते हुए भी शास्त्रों से सरह को घृणा थी। तभी तो उन्होंने उन्हें मरूस्थल की संज्ञा दी जहाँ राही (पाठक) गुमराह होकर प्यासा ही मर जाता है—

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* कबीर ग्रंथावली—पृ०-१३०

गुरू वअण अमिअ-रस, धवडि ण पिबिअउ जेहि ।
बहु सत्तात्थ-मरूत्थलेहि, तिसिअ मरिबूबो तेहिं ।।

कबीर भी तो शास्त्रों की निस्सारता बताते हुए कहते हैं—

पोथी पढ़ि पढ़ि जग मुआ, पंडित भया न कोई ।
ढाई अच्छर प्रेम का पढ़ै सो पंडित होई ।।

इससे यह स्पष्ट होता है कि सरह को ज्ञानियों के लिए शास्त्रों की निस्सारता का ज्ञान हो चुका था और वे तर्क-वितर्क की सीमा को पार कर चुके थे। पंडितों को भी फटकारने में सरह चूकते नहीं हैं—

पंडिअ सअल सत्थ बक्खानअ। देहहिं बुद्ध बसन्त ण जाणअ।

छुआ-छूत और भक्ष्या-भक्ष्य के कठोर नियम भी सरह के लिए निस्सार हैं—

जइ चाण्डाल घरें भुंजइ, तअवि ण लग्गई लेउ।

साधु होना भी सरह को प्रिय नहीं। वे तो बस चित्त की निर्मलता चाहते हैं।

णउ घरे णउ वणें बोहि ठिउ, एहु परिआणहु भेउ।
णिम्मल चित्त-सहावता, करहु अविकल सेउ।।

इन्द्रिय संमय को वे मानते हैं पर एक सीमातक।

ठीक यही बात समाधि के संबंध में भी कही जा सकती है। सरह योगी ही नहीं योगीश्वर थे पर योग की निस्सारता को उन्होंने खूब अच्छी तरह पहचाना था। उन्होंने योग का स्वयं अभ्यास किया था इसलिए वे उसके अवगुणों से परिचित थे। यद्यपि उस समय सबलोग समाधि के पीछे पागल थे—"झाणें मोहिअ सअलवि लोअ।" तथापि सरह ने ऐसे योग को काष्ठयोग की संज्ञा दी है। योग के चमत्कार का जादू अब उनके ऊपर नहीं चल सकता था। वे तो चित्त की अपार शक्ति को सब कुछ मानते थे और उसे समझलेना पहुँचे हुए योगी की कसौटी मानते थे। मन या चित्त को मुक्त करना ही योगी का परम कर्तव्य मानते थे—

वज्झइ कम्मेण जणो, कम्म विमुक्केण होइ मण मुक्को।
मण मोक्खेए अणुअरं, पाविज्जइ परम निब्बाणं।।

इसीलिए तो वे मुक्त हृदय से कहते हैं—

चित्ते बद्धे बज्झइ मुक्के मुक्कइ णत्थि संदेहो।

पर सरह के इस योग के साथ करुणा और नैरात्म का अद्भुत संयोग है। सरह जैसे महापुरुष उस जीवन को कभी नहीं पसंद कर सकते हैं जिसमें किसी की सहायता न हो सके। जब योगी में यह भाव आ जाता

हैं तब आत्म और पर का भेदभाव जाता रहता है और वह निर्मल हो जाता है।

हठयोग योग या समाधि का एक महत्वपूर्ण अंग है जिसके अन्तर्गत इला, पिंगला, सुषुम्ना नाड़ी तथा षटचक्र और अनहत नाद की बात आती है। बाद के हठयोगियों ने तो मुक्ति प्राप्त करने का इसे एकमात्र साधन मान लिया। कबीर ने भी इस हठयोग की प्रक्रिया का वर्णन किया है, पर यहाँ भी वे सरहपा का ही अनुसरण करते दीख पड़ते हैं। आश्चर्य तो यह है कि सरह के पहले की प्रचलित योग क्रियाओं में चंद्र-सूर्य साधना का कोई जिक्र नहीं मिलता है। बहुत संभव है यह सरह की सूझ और अभ्यास का परिणाम हो। जब तक कोई ऐसा प्रमाण नहीं मिल जाता जिससे यह सिद्ध हो कि सरह के पहले भी हठयोग की क्रिया की जाती थी तब तक सरह को ही इसका विधायक हमें मानना पड़ेगा; और यहाँ भी सरह की महान् सृजन-शील प्रतिभा का पता चलता है। आज भी हठयोग की साधना करने वाले साधकों की संख्या तिब्बत में बहुत है। सरह चंद्र-सूर्य के महत्व पर प्रकाश डालते हुए कहते हैं—

चन्द-सुज्ज घसि घालइं घोट्टइ। सो अणुत्तर एत्थु पइट्ठइ॥

किन्तु इसका अर्थ यह नहीं कि सरह ने योगाभ्यास को ही सब कुछ मान लिया और उसी में रम गए। सरह जैसे व्यक्तित्व से ऐसी आशा करना उचित भी नहीं है। सरह ने अपने जीवन काल में हर प्रकार का अनुभव किया तथा हर प्रकार की साधना और क्रिया का मर्म पहचाना, पर वे किसी एक में रम न सके। किसी में इतनी शक्ति न थी कि सरह का हृदय जीत सकता। उन्होंने सब कुछ देखा और अनुभव किया पर किसी में उन्हें कोई सार न दिखाई दिया। अंत में सरह इस निष्कर्ष पर पहुँचते हैं कि जीवन को अपने सहज स्वाभाविक मार्ग पर छोड़ देना चाहिए। उन्होंने सहज या नैसर्गिक जीवन पर जोर दिया और यह सरह की सबसे बड़ी देन है। इस सहजवाद के प्रथम आचार्य या विधायक होने के कारण उनके पंथ को सहजयान की संज्ञा दी गई है। यह सहजयान इतना महत्वपूर्ण, विख्यात तथा प्रिय हुआ कि बाद के कवियों और साधकों ने इसे मुक्त हृदय से स्वीकार किया। सरह के अन्य विचारों और भावों की तरह कबीर ने उनके सहज जीवन के सिद्धांत को भी ग्रहण किया। यद्यपि कबीर के युग में तथा उनके जन्म-देश में एक भी बौद्ध या सहजयानी नहीं रह गया था तथापि वे सहज समाधि से प्राप्त होने वाले सुख की बात बताते हुए कहते हैं—

अब मैं पाइबो रे पाइबो ब्रह्मगियान* ।
सहज समाधैं सुख में रहिबो, कोटि कलप विश्राम ।

वास्तव में कबीर चौरासी सिद्ध शब्द से पूर्णतया परिचित थे—

+धरती अरु असमान बिचि, दोइ तूबड़ा अवध ।
षट दरसन संसै पड्या, अरू चौरासी सिद्ध ॥

निरक्षर होते हुए भी कबीर को सिद्धों का इतना स्पष्ट ज्ञान था। इससे तो सरह और उनके सहजयान की लोकप्रियता का ही परिचय हमें मिलता है। सरह पहले व्यक्ति थे जिन्होंने कहा था कि ज्ञानहीन होकर साधुवेष में रहने से कहीं अच्छा है कि आदमी अपनी भार्यासहित घर में रहे—

झाणहीण पब्बजें रहिअऊ । गही बसन्तें भाज्जें सहिअऊ ॥

क्या कबीर ने अपनी पत्नी लोई और पुत्र कमाल के साथ घर में रहते हुए सरह के विचार का अक्षरशः पालन नहीं किया? सरह तो खुल कर कहते हैं—

खाअन्ते पीवन्ते सुरअरमन्तें । अलिउल बहलहो चक्क फरन्ते ॥
एवहि सिद्धि जाइ परलोकह । माथे पाअ देइ भुअलोक ॥

किन्तु इसका अर्थ यह नहीं कि सरह जीवन के भोगों में डूब जाने का संदेश देते हैं। उन्होंने जीवन के भोग और आनन्द को न त्यागने की सलाह दी है पर स्पष्ट ही उनमें आसक्ति को वे पसंद नहीं करते। उपनिषद् के संतों के 'बाल्येन तिष्ठासेद्' की भाँति सरह भी कहते हैं—

चिन्ताचित्तवि परिहरहु, तिम अच्छहु जिम बाल ॥

आसक्ति और छल पाखंड का विरोध करते हुए उन्होंने सहज जीवन व्यतीत करने की सलाह दी है। जब उन्हें यह सत्य समझ में आ गया तब उन्होंने भिक्षुजीवन और चीवर को उतार फेंका। इतना ही नहीं, अपनी खुली बगावत को और भी तीव्र रूप में प्रकट करने के लिए उन्होंने एक शरकार-कन्या के साथ अपना संबंध जोड़ा और उसे अपने साथ रखने लगे। लोगों ने उनकी निंदा की। उनका विरोध भी किया गया। कुछ लोगों ने उनको सनकी या पागल समझा, पर सरह निस्संकोच भाव से समस्त उत्तरी भारत में अपनी महामुद्रा शरकार-कन्या के साथ विचरते रहे। सरह का सर्वाधिक विख्यात और प्रिय नाम क्या इस बात का प्रमाण नहीं है कि

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* कबीर ग्रंथावली—पृ०—८९

+ कबीर ग्रंथावली—पृ०—६४

लोगों ने उनकी इस बगावत को कालांतर में पसंद किया और शरकार-कन्या के साथ उनके संबंध को बतलाने के लिए 'सरह' की संज्ञा उन्हें दी। इतना ही नहीं आदरसूचक 'पाद' शब्द के संयोग से उन्हें सरहपाद या सरहपा कहा जाने लगा। उनका हृदय पवित्र था और वे अपने सहज स्वभाव में कहते थे कि—

विसअ रमन्त ण विसअहिं लिप्पइ। उअअ हरन्त ण पाणीच्छुप्पइ ॥

भला ऐसी क्षमता कितने संतों में होगी कि विषय में रमण करते हुए भी वह विषयों में लिप्त न हो तथा पानी निकालते हुए पानी को न छुए? लोगों की आलोचनाओं की परवाह किए बिना वे कहते हैं कि जगत सहज आनन्द से भरा हुआ है। नाचो, गाओ और अच्छी तरह विलास करो। सरह के ये विचार आज भी कितने विद्रोही और क्रांतिकारी हैं। फिर यह आसानी से कल्पना की जा सकती है कि आज से बारह सौ वर्ष पहले इन विचारों ने आचार और निवृत्ति प्रधान भारतीय समाज को किस प्रकार झकझोरा होगा। जिस आदमी में समाज का इस प्रकार विरोध करने की शक्ति हो वह निश्चय ही साधारण व्यक्तित्व का आदमी न होगा। आज से छः सौ वर्ष पहले जब कबीर ने समाज तथा निरर्थक रूढ़ियों और मान्यताओं पर निर्मम प्रहार किया तब उनके सामने सिद्ध सरहपा का आदर्श चिर प्रदीप्त सूर्य की तरह चमक रहा होगा।

इस सहजयान को कुछ लोग वज्रयान भी कहते हैं। यह सहजयान या बज्रयान महायान का विकसित रूप है इसलिए इसका संबंध असंग के योगाचार और नागार्जुन के शून्यवाद के साथ है। पर सरह अद्वैत तत्व की बात अधिक करते हैं इसलिए उनका झुकाव योगाचार दर्शन की ओर अधिक है। तभी तो असंग के अनुज वसुबंधु के "वीचि-तरंग-न्यायेन तदुत्पत्ति" का समर्थन करते हुए वे कहते हैं—

आलअतरु उमलइ, हिण्डइ जगच्छाच्छन्द।

अंतर केवल इतना है कि बसुबंधुने आलय विज्ञान को समुद्र की संज्ञा दी है और सरह उसे स्वच्छंद हिलने-डोलने वाला तरुवर कहते हैं। स्वच्छंद विशेषण उनका निष्प्रयोजन नहीं है। इसका अर्थ यह है कि "संसार या आलय के मूल तत्व को चालित करने वाली कोई दूसरी शक्ति (ईश्वर) नहीं है, बल्कि उसकी गति स्वच्छन्द-औटोमेटिक है। प्रारंभ से ही बौद्ध अनीश्वरवादी और अनात्मवादी हैं, यह सभी जानते हैं"।[1]

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[1] राहुलजी कृत दोहाःकोश की भूमिका—पृ०—३३

यही कारण है कि सरह ने परमपद को मन की अवस्थाविशेष माना है। जब मन की शंकायुक्त स्थिति हट जाती है और उसकी चंचलता मिट जाती है तब महासुख की स्थिति आती है—

जहि मण पवण ण संचरइ, रवि-ससि णाहि पवेस।
तहिं बढ़ चित्त विसाम करू, सरहें कहिअ उऐस॥

इसी परमपद को सरह ने लोक भाषा में शून्य निरंजन कहा है। यह शून्यवाद भी सरह के अन्य विचारों की तरह इतना प्रबल और प्रिय हुआ कि आगे आने वाले संतों ने भी इसकी महिमा गाई। कबीर भी इस शून्य निरंजन का वर्णन करने से नहीं चूकते। किन्तु इस परमपद को प्राप्त करने के लिए कहीं बाहर जाने की आवश्यकता नहीं है और न ही तीर्थ व्रत करने की कोई जरूरत है। यह देह ही सबसे बड़ा तीर्थ है। कभी यह गंदगी का पनाला बन जाता है और कभी पवित्रता का स्रोत। सरस्वती, सोमनाथ, बनारस आदि तीर्थ इसी में हैं—

एथु से सरसइ सोबणाह, एथु से गंगासाअरू।
वाराणसी पआग एथु, सो चन्द दिवाअरू।
खेत्त पिट्ठ उअपिट्ठ एथु, मइ भमिअ समिट्ठउ।
देहा सरिस तित्थ, मइ सुणउ ण दिट्ठउ॥

कोई भी महापुरुष अपने युग और युग की परिस्थिति की उपज हुआ करता है। अतः युग और युग की परिस्थितियों का प्रभाव तो उस पर पड़ता ही है साथ ही अपने युग को वह प्रभावित भी करता है। सरह जैसे महापुरुष इसके अपवाद नहीं हो सकते। सरह का आविर्भाव आठवीं सदी के पूर्वार्द्ध में हुआ जो धर्म की दृष्टि से एक नवीन युग तो था ही, साथ ही जिसने सरह के आविर्भाव के लिए अनुकूल वातावरण पैदा कर दिया था। सातवीं शताब्दी तक वसुबंधु, दिङ्नाग तथा धर्मकीर्ति का महायान धर्म और दर्शन अपने चरम विकास पर पहुँच चुका था। हीनयान और महायान की सीमा पीछे छूटी जा रही थी और बौद्धधर्म एक नवीन दिशा लेने की तैयारी कर रहा था। महायान की परिणति अब मंत्रयान, वज्रयान या सहजयान में हो रही थी जिसका नेतृत्व सरह को करना था। महायानी वैयक्तिक निर्वाण को हेय मानते थे तथा उनका उद्देश्य था कि प्राणिमात्र का दुःख से छुटकारा हो। यही कारण है कि बौद्ध धर्म का क्षणिक और अनात्मवादी दर्शन नागार्जुन के शून्यवाद तथा असंग के योगाचार दर्शन तक पहुँच गया था। अब धारणाएँ बदल रही थीं। समय बड़ी तेजी से एक नई दिशा पकड़ रहा था। अस्तु, आवश्यकता इस बात

की थी कि शील, समाधि, प्रज्ञा आदि के संबंध में प्रचलित पुरानी मान्यताओं और रूढ़ियों का पुनर्मूल्यांकन किया जाय। व्यर्थ की रूढ़ियों से जनता घबड़ा उठी थी। अतः उनपर कठोर आघात का स्वागत करने को जनता तैयार थी। फलतः सरहपा को हम कटु शब्दों में व्यर्थ की रूढ़ियों और विचारों तथा विश्वासों का खंडन करते पाते हैं। धर्म और समाज के क्षेत्र की फैली हुई कुरीतियों और गंदगियों से उन्हें घृणा थी। अतः उन्होंने सहजजीवन के सिद्धान्त को स्वीकार करते हुए भक्ष्य-अभक्ष्य तथा गम्य-अगम्य की पुरानी मान्यताओं पर कसकर प्रहार किया। हाँ. इसके लिये सरह ने संस्कृत को छोड़ जनभाषा का सहारा लिया। यह सरह की सूझ-बूझ का ही परिणाम है कि उनकी रचनाओं से जनता इतना अधिक प्रभावित हुई। संस्कृत के महान् पंडित होते हुए भी उन्होंने अपभ्रंश में अपनी रचना की। क्या यह इस बात का प्रमाण नहीं है कि सरह का हाथ समय की नब्ज़ पर था? जब सरह के समय की यह अवस्था थी तो उसके बहुत बाद कबीर ने संस्कृत में रचना न करने का कारण बताते हुए कहा कि—

"संसकिरत है कूप जल, भासा बहता नीर।"

तो इसमें आश्चर्य की बात ही क्या है?

किन्तु सरहपा जितनी दूर तक अपने युग से प्रभावित हुए उससे कहीं अधिक प्रभाव उन्होंने अपने युग और युग के साहित्य पर डाला। यह प्रभाव इतना गहरा था और इतने विविध रूप में पड़ा कि आगे आने वाली पीढ़ी भी इस प्रभाव से न बच सकी। सरह ने लोकभाषा को अपनाकर न केवल स्वयं एक महत्वपूर्ण कार्य किया वरन् उन्होंने आगे आने वाली पीढ़ी के समक्ष एक नया आदर्श रखा और वस्तुतः हम बाद के चोटी के साधकों और कवियों को लोकभाषा को अपनाते हुए देखते हैं। सूर और तुलसी ने ब्रज भाषा और अवधी में लिखकर लोकभाषा की महत्ता पर अपनी मुहर लगा दी। लोकभाषा को अंगीकार करने में कबीर इन सबसे आगे निकल गए और उन्होंने अपनी पञ्चमेल खिचड़ी को बड़े गर्व के साथ जनता के सामने रखा। कबीर की लोकप्रियता का एक कारण यह भी है कि उनकी भाषा में ब्रजभाषा, अवधी, पंजाबी, राजस्थानी, बुंदेलखंडी, आदि भाषाओं के शब्द मिलते हैं जिसके कारण इन सभी भाषाओं के बोलने वाले कबीर की रचना को पसंद करते हैं।

सरह की मौलिक और सृजनशील प्रतिभा ने तत्कालीन धर्म, समाज और साहित्य को कुछ ऐसी मौलिक देन दी है जिसे बाद के कवियों और धर्मसुधारकों ने भी अंगीकार किया और उनमें से कुछ की परंपरा तो

आजतक विद्यमान है। उन्होंने न केवल अपभ्रंश भाषा में लिखा वरन् दोहा-चौपाई में रचना करने वाले भी वे ही पहले व्यक्ति हैं। उनसे पूर्व के किसी कवि की कोई रचना दोहा-चौपाई में अभी तक न मिली है और स्वभावतः किसी ऐसी रचना के अभाव में सरह को ही इन छंदों का विधायक मानना पड़ता है। आगे चल कर तो दोहा-चौपाई की इतनी ख्याति हुई कि समूचा हिन्दी साहित्य दोहे-चौपाइयों से भर गया। कोई भी ऐसा विख्यात और प्रतिभासम्पन्न कवि नहीं है जिसे इन छंदों ने अपनी ओर आकृष्ट न किया हो। सूरदास के दोहे तो प्रसिद्ध हैं ही, तुलसी के मानस में भी इनकी भरमार है। रहीम और बिहारी की तो बात ही कुछ और है। बिहारी के दोहों की लघुता और प्रभावात्मकता को देखकर ही तो उन्हें "नावक के तीर" की संज्ञा दी गई है—

सतसइया के दोहरे, अरु नावक के तीर।
देखन में छोटे लगैं, घाव करैं गम्भीर॥

इतना ही नहीं, इन दोहों में तो "गागर में सागर" भरने की क्षमता है। आज भी जब कि हमारा हिन्दी साहित्य छायावाद, प्रगतिवाद आदि नवीन प्रवृत्तियों और काव्य-धाराओं को पार करता हुआ बड़ी तेजी से विविध रूपों में ढल रहा है, दोहे-चौपाइयों की परम्परा अक्षुण्ण है और इनकी लोकप्रियता ज्यों की त्यों बनी है। बिहारी के दोहों की लोकप्रियता तो उनके ऊपर लिखी गई टीकाओं और आलोचनाओं से ही सिद्ध हो जाती है।

जिस प्रकार सरहपा ने दोहे-चौपाई में अपभ्रंश भाषा में पहली बार रचना की उसीप्रकार हठयोग और सहजजीवन के सिद्धांत को भी उन्होंने ही पहली बार लोगों के सामने रखा। चंद्र-सूर्य की साधना तथा इला, पिंगला आदि नाड़ियों की प्रक्रिया का कोई प्रमाण सरह से पहले नहीं मिलता। साथ ही सरहपा ने साधकों के समक्ष सहजजीवन का सिद्धांत रखा। उनका सहज जीवन-यापन का आदर्श इतना लोकप्रिय हुआ कि उसे लोगों ने सहजयान की संज्ञा दे दी। इतना ही नहीं, सरह ने काव्य की अनेक नवीन मान्यताओं की उद्भावना की। व्यंगोक्तियों और उलटबाँसियों की बात सरह से पहले लोग नहीं जानते थे। सरह ने पहली बार इन्हें अपने काव्य में स्थान दिया। सरह की प्रतिभा ने काव्य की इन नवीन उद्भावनाओं को कुछ इस रूप में रखा कि आगे आनेवाले कवियों और साधकों—विशेषकर संतकाव्य के लिए ये कसौटी बन गईं। सरह के इन आदर्शों की ही प्रतिध्वनि बार-बार संतकाव्य में सुनाई देती है। कबीर ने हठयोग की प्रक्रिया का वर्णन करते हुए जब कहा कि—

गगन गरजि बरसै अमी, बादल गहिर गंभीर।
चहुँदिसि चमकै दामिनी, भीजै दास कबीर॥

और जब सहज जीवन यापन पर जोर देते हुए वे कहते हैं कि—

पाइबो रे पाइबो ब्रह्म गियान-।
सहज समाधें सुख में रहिबो, कोटि कलप विश्राम।

तथा साधु-संन्यासियों पर व्यंग्य कसते हुए जब कहते हैं कि—

दढ़िया बढ़ौले जोगी बढ़ौले जैसे बकरा।

तथा उलट बाँसी से भरे शब्दों में जब वे बोल उठते हैं कि—

नइया बिच नदिया डूबल जाइ।

तो ऐसा लगता है जैसे कबीर की यह देन हिन्दी साहित्य को अपनी है। वस्तुतः सिद्ध साहित्य के प्रकाश में आने से पूर्व ऐसा समझा भी जाता था। पर सरह की रचनाओं को देखते हुए यह मानना पड़ता है कि सरह ने न केवल तत्कालीन युग और साहित्य के लिए नवीन उद्भावनाएँ कीं वरन् आगे आनेवाले कवियों और साधकों के लिए भी उन्होंने एक आदर्श उपस्थित किया। हिन्दी साहित्य के इतिहास में संतकाव्य का एक अपना विशिष्ट स्थान है और संतकाव्य की इन विशेषताओं के आधार में सरह का व्यक्तित्व काम कर रहा है। अतः यदि अन्य कवियों और साधकों को हम छोड़ दें तो भी केवल संतकाव्य पर सरह के प्रभाव को देखते हुए यह कहा जा सकता है कि हिन्दी साहित्य को उनकी देन अमूल्य है।

सरह का सहज जीवन का सिद्धांत इतना प्रसिद्ध हुआ कि उसे सहजयान की संज्ञा मिली। उनके इस सिद्धांत का जब कुछ लोगों ने विरोध किया तब सरह अधिक उग्र हो उठे। विद्रोही और क्रांतिकारी प्रतिभा की कोई कमी भी उनके पास न थी। वस्तुतः ऐसी विरोधी और क्रांतिकारी प्रतिभा सदियों बाद आती है। सरह उन विद्रोही महापुरुषों में थे जो झाड़-फटकार और तोड़-फोड़ का सहारा लेकर समाज में सुधार करना चाहते हैं। वे तत्कालीन समाज और उसकी रूढ़ियों के भग्नावशेषपर एक नवीन और स्वस्थ समाज का निर्माण करना चाहते थे। उनका सिद्धांत था कि ज्ञान रहित होकर साधु का वेष बनाकर भटकने से कहीं अच्छा है कि आदमी अपनी गृहस्थी बसाय और अपनी पत्नी के साथ घर में रहे।

जीवन को वे अपने सहज स्वाभाविक मार्ग पर छोड़ देना चाहते थे। हाँ, यहाँ बुद्ध के 'मध्यम प्रतिपदा के सिद्धांत को वे भूलना नहीं चाहते थे। अस्तु, न तो विषयों में लिप्त होकर वे खो जाना चाहते थे और न उनसे

बिल्कुल अलग रहना चाहते थे। यही कारण है कि अपने सहज जीवन के सिद्धांत को और भी स्पष्ट करने के लिए उन्हों ने अपने विचारों को मूर्त्त रूप दिया। उनसे प्रायः छः शताब्दी बाद कबीर को हम अपनी पत्नी और पुत्र के साथ गृहवास करते हुए देखते हैं तो कुछ आश्चर्य होता है। पर यहाँ भी सरह का प्रभाव (अप्रत्यक्ष रूप से ही सही) काम कर रहा है। आज तो हम सरह नाम से ही अधिक परिचित हैं। उनके बचपन का नाम राहुलभद्र तो जैसे अब खो गया है या कुछ विशेष अध्ययन करने वाले पाठकों के लिए ही शेष रह गया है। इसी विद्रोही और क्रांतिकारी प्रतिभा की झलक हमें कबीर आदि संतों में मिलती है। कबीर तो मानों सरह के ही प्रतिरूप हों। कबीर ने भी तो तोड़-फोड़ और झाड़-फटकार का सहारा लेकर एक नया समाज बसाना चाहा था। प्राचीन और रूढ़िग्रस्त तथा मृत समाज को ध्वस्त कर वे एक नवीन और जीवित समाज का निर्माण करना चाहते थे।

भारत में तो सरह के व्यक्तित्व की अमिट छाप है ही। हिन्दी साहित्य पर भी उनकी प्रतिभा की मुहर लगी है। पर इसका अर्थ यह नहीं कि उनका प्रभाव केवल भारत तक ही सीमित रहा। सच तो यह है कि सरह उन महापुरुषों में हैं जो देश और काल की सीमा से परे हैं और जिनकी सर्वत्र पूजा होती है। यही कारण है कि आज भी तिब्बत में सरह की पूजा द्वितीय बुद्ध के रूप में होती है। इतना ही नहीं, आज भी तिब्बत में बुद्ध की शिक्षा सरह की शिक्षा में घुल मिल गई है। सरह ने हठयोग के जिस सिद्धान्त का प्रणयन किया उसका जबरदस्त रूप से प्रचलन तिब्बत और नेपाल में अभी भी है। ऐसे महापुरुष को यदि युग-प्रवर्तक की संज्ञा दी जाय तो कोई अत्युक्ति न होगी।

दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान की कृतियाँ

(तिब्बती-हिन्दी अनुवाद)

रिगज़िन लुनडुब लामा

तिब्बती-प्राध्यापक, नव नालन्दा महाविहार

दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान की कृतियाँ

(तिब्बती-हिंन्दी अनुवाद)

प्राक्कथन

इस पुस्तक में दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान की कृतियों का अनुवाद है जो तिब्बती तेनग्युर में सुरक्षित है। उनकी कृतियों में बोधिपथ-प्रदीप नामक ग्रन्थ महत्वपूर्ण है जो इस अनुवाद के प्रारम्भ में है। सन् १९५९ में भिक्षु डा० प्रज्ञानन्द, बुद्ध-विहार, रिसालदार पार्क, लखनऊ द्वारा बोधिपथ-प्रदीप का पृथक रूप से प्रकाशन हुआ है। बोधिपथ-प्रदीप में तीन कोटि के पुरुषों पर जोर देते हुए उनके लक्षणों के भेदों को भी प्रकाश में लाने का प्रयास किया गया है। तीन कोटि के पुरुष हैं—हीन, मध्यम और श्रेष्ठ। हीन, मध्यम और श्रेष्ठ का अर्थ क्रमशः श्रावकयान, प्रत्येकबुद्धयान और बोधिसत्वयान होता है। श्रावकयानी पुरुष वह है जो सांसारिक दोष और निर्वाण सम्बन्धी गुणों को दूसरों से श्रवण करता हो। वह संसार से उद्विग्न होकर अकेले शान्तिपद की ओर झुकता है, लेकिन उसमें परार्थ करने का उत्साह नहीं रहता। उसकी इस कमजोरी के कारण उसे हीन पुरुष कहा जाता है। वह शील का पालन करता हुआ श्रवण, मनन और भावना का अभ्यास करता है। काम-राग उत्पन्न होने पर शरीर की ३६ गंदगियों पर मनन करता है। विकल्प की उत्पत्ति होने पर आनापान-सति भावना करता है जिससे उसका चित्त स्थिर हो जाता है। वह चार स्मृत्युपस्थान की भावना करता है। उसे इस बात का ज्ञान हो जाता है कि यह शरीर आदि कहलाने वाली वस्तुओं में पुद्गल का कोई स्वरूप नहीं है। सर्व धर्म पुद्गल नैरात्म्य है; अनित्य है; दुःख है। इस प्रकार मनन करता हुआ श्रावकयानी पुरुष चार सम्यक प्रधान, सम्भार मार्ग तथा प्रयोग-मार्ग पर आरूढ़ होता है। दर्शन-मार्ग की अवस्था में पुद्गल नैरात्म्य के साथ चार आर्य सत्यों का साक्षात्कार कर लेता है। संक्षेप में पाँचों मार्ग के साथ ३७ बोधिपाक्षिक धर्मों की भावना कर क्रमशः स्रोतापन्न सकृदागामी और अनागामी पद को प्राप्त होता है। उसका चरम लक्ष्य है अर्हत् पद की उपलब्धि। प्रत्येक-बुद्धयानी वह है जो सांसारिक दोष और निर्वाण के लाभ को अपने पूर्व जन्म के संस्कार के बल पर जान लेता है अर्थात् श्रावक की भाँति गुरु की आवश्यकता नहीं पड़ती। वह संसार

से विरक्त हो श्मशान आदि में पड़े हुए सब को देखकर विचारता है कि यही जरा-मरण है और इसका कारण है जाति (जन्म)। इस प्रकार वह प्रतीत्य-समुत्पाद के अनुलोम और प्रतिलोम को ठीक से जान कर चार आर्य सत्य के यथार्थ रूप को जान लेता है। वह पुद्गल नैरात्म्य और धर्म नैरात्म्य को जान, प्रज्ञा और समाधि के द्वारा नाना प्रकार की ऋद्धियों का प्रदर्शन करता हुआ अन्त में प्रत्येक बुद्ध के फल का साक्षात्कार कर लेता है। बोधिसत्वयानी अथवा महायानी पुरुष वह है जो समस्त प्राणिमात्र के लिये अनुत्तर संबोधि-चित्त उत्पन्न कर असंख्य कल्पों तक छः पारमिताओं, पाँच मार्ग, चार अप्रमाणों और दस भूमियों का अभ्यास करता है। दोनों नैरात्म्य को जान, प्रज्ञा और उपाय कौशल के द्वारा संसार और निर्वाण दोनों को समान रूप में मानता हुआ असंख्य प्राणियों का उद्धार करता है। संक्षेप में बोधिसत्व छः पारमिताओं, चार अप्रमाणों, पाँच अभिज्ञाओं, चार संग्रह-वस्तुओं, चार प्रति संविदाओं, दो सम्भार, ३७ बोधिपाक्षिक धर्मों, समाधि और विपश्यना, धारणी-प्रतिभा, चार लक्षणों आदि का अभ्यास करता हुआ अन्त में निरुपाधिशेष निर्वाण को प्राप्त होता है। इस पुस्तक में अनूदित दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान की अन्य कृतियों का नाम इस प्रकार है—संग्रहगर्भ, हृदय-निश्चित, बोधिसत्वमणिवली, बोधिसत्वचर्या संक्षिप्त, बोधिसत्वकर्मा दिमार्गावतार देशन, शरणागता देश, महायान पथ साधन वर्णन संग्रह, महायान पथ साधन संग्रह, अपना कर्त्तव्य, सूत्रार्थ समुच्चय उपदेश, दशाकुशल कर्म पथ, कर्म विभंग तथा चर्या संग्रह। संग्रहगर्भ में आचार्य ने प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद द्वारा भौतिक भाव के निवारण करने की शिक्षा दी है। हृदयनिश्चित में आवागमन और मुक्ति के लक्षणों का संक्षिप्त रूप में प्रकाशन करते हुए प्रज्ञोपाय, पुण्य-सम्भार तथा ज्ञान-सम्भार द्वारा त्रिकाय की प्राप्ति का मार्ग बताया गया है। बोधिसत्वमणिवली में स्मृति-संप्रजन्य और अप्रमाद के साथ चित्त शुद्धि पर जोर दिया गया है। उपर्युक्त सभी पुस्तकों का विषय यहाँ सारांश के तौर पर उल्लेख किया जाने पर भी प्राक्कथन का आकार बढ़ ही जाता है। अतः स्वयं विज्ञ पाठक इस अनुवाद को आद्योपान्त पढ़ कर समझलें तो उत्तम होगा।

अब पाठकों के लिए दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान के संबंध में कुछ बतला देना आवश्यक है। दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान का जन्म ९८० ई० में विक्रमशिला के जहोर् में महाराज कल्याण श्री और महारानी प्रभावती के पुत्ररूप में हुआ था। २९ वर्ष की अवस्था में उन्होंने बौद्ध धर्म की दीक्षा ली थी। उन्होंने ओदन्तपुरी विहार में प्रवेश कर महायान बौद्ध धर्म और बौद्ध तन्त्र का गहरा अध्ययन किया था। बाद में विक्रमशिला विहार में जा बौद्धधर्म

के अध्यापन का कार्य सम्भालते हुए बहुजन का हित सम्पन्न किया। ६० वर्ष की वृद्धावस्था में तिब्बती सम्राट् ज्ञानप्रभ के निमंत्रण पर दुर्गम पहाड़ों को पार करते हुए वे तिब्बत की ओर चल पड़े। फिर तिब्बत में १० साल से अधिक बौद्धधर्म के प्रचार और बौद्ध ग्रन्थों के अनुवाद का कार्य सम्पन्न कर तिब्बती जनता का बहुत बड़ा उपकार किया। ई० ११ में उन्होंने ब्कह्-ग्दम-प सम्प्रदाय की स्थापना की। ब्कह्-ग्दम-प का अर्थ है बुद्धवचन अनुयायी। ब्कह्-ग्दम-प सम्प्रदाय के परंपरागत शिष्य मर-प ने ब्कह्-ग्युर्द-प सम्प्रदाय की स्थापना की जो ब्कह्-ग्दम-प की एक शाखा है। इस सम्प्रदाय का मर-प के शिष्य महासिद्ध मिला-रस्-प द्वारा खूब प्रचार हुआ। ७३ साल की अवस्था में ल्हासा से एक दिन के रास्ते पर ञे-थङ नामक विहार में दीपंकर श्री ज्ञान का देहावसान हुआ। इस प्रकार तिब्बती बौद्ध धर्म के इतिहास में आपके अद्भुत व्यक्तित्व का अद्वितीय स्थान रहा है।

बोधिपथ-प्रदीप

बोधिसत्व मंजुश्रीकुमारभूत को नमस्कार।

त्रिकाल के सब बुद्धों, उनके धर्मों और संघों की समादर बन्दना कर, भद्रशिष्य बोधिप्रभ द्वारा प्रेरित किए जाने पर यहाँ बोधिपथ-प्रदीप का प्रकाशन किया जाता है। लघु, मध्यम और उत्तम की दृष्टि से तीन कोटि के पुरुष समझना चाहिए। उनके लक्षणों को प्रकाश में लाने के लिये यहाँ प्रत्येक के भेद का उल्लेख किया जाता है। किसी प्रकार के उपाय से जो अपने लिये सांसारिक सुख भर की प्राप्ति करना चाहता हो, उसे अन्तिम (हीन) पुरुष समझना चाहिए। जो भव (भौतिक) सुख से विमुख हो, पाप कर्मों से विरत रह, केवल अपने लिये शान्ति की इच्छा करता है वह पुरुष मध्यम कोटि का कहलाता है। जो अपने हृदय के अन्तर्गत दुःख के द्वारा समस्त परदुःखों को सर्वथा क्षीण करने की प्रबल इच्छा करता हो, वह पुरुप उच्चकोटि का होता है। परम बोधि प्राप्ति के इच्छुक उन सत्प्राणियों को यहाँ गुरु द्वारा निर्दिष्ट सम्यक-पथ बताया जाता है। सम्बुद्धों के चित्र, स्तूप, सद्धर्म आदि के अभिमुख हो पुष्प, धूप, अथवा यथाप्राप्त पूजा की सामग्रियों से उनकी पूजा करनी चाहिए। समन्त भद्रचर्या में वर्णित सात प्रकार के पूजन के साथ बोधिगर्भ की प्राप्ति के लिये अनिर्वचनीय चित्त से त्रिरत्न पर श्रद्धा कर, घुटने भूमि पर टेक, अंजलि बाँध, तीन बार त्रिशरण ग्रहण करना चाहिए। तब समस्त प्राणियों के प्रति मैत्री चित्त की भावना कर, तीनों दुर्गति और जन्म-मरण आदि से पीड़ित समस्त जगत् पर दृष्टिपात कर, उन्हें

दुःख और दुःख के मूल कारणों से मुक्त करने की कामना करते हुए दृढ़ प्रतिज्ञा के साथ बोधिचित्त उत्पन्न करना चाहिए। इस प्रकार प्रणिधान चित्तोत्पाद के गुण का वर्णन मैत्रेय द्वारा गण्डव्यूह सूत्र में किया गया है। उन सूत्रों का पाठ करे अथवा गुरु से श्रवण कर सम्बोधिचित्त की उपयोगिता को अनन्त समझ कर उसकी (बोधिचित्त) स्थिति के लिये बार-बार चित्तोत्पाद करना चाहिए। इसके पुण्य का प्रदर्शन वीरदत्त-परिपृच्छ-सूत्र में किया गया है। यहाँ संक्षेप में उसके तीन पाद का उल्लेख किया जाता है। यदि इस बोधिचित्त का पुण्य साकार होता, तो समग्र आकाशधातु की अपेक्षा अधिक बड़ा होता। गंगा के बालू तुल्य बुद्ध क्षेत्रों को रत्नों से भर कर लोकनाथ को समर्पित करने की अपेक्षा कोई व्यक्ति यदि अंजलि बाँध बोधिचित्त की ओर नत-चित्त होवे, तो उसकी वह पूजा कहीं अधिक श्रेयस्कर होगी। उसका अन्त नहीं है। बोधि प्रणिधिचित्त उत्पन्न कर अनेक परिश्रमों से उस बोधिचित्त का सर्वत्र प्रचार करना चाहिए। इस बोधिचित्त का जन्मान्तर में भी स्मरण करने के लिये यथाकथित शिक्षा का भी पालन करना चाहिए। बोधि प्रस्थान-चित्त और आत्म संयम के विना इस प्रणिधान की वृद्धि हो नहीं सकती। इसलिये संबोधि संवर के प्रचार करनेवाले इच्छुक को इसे यत्नपूर्वक ग्रहण करना चाहिए। सातों प्रातिमोक्ष नियमों से सम्पन्न होने पर ही बोधिसत्वों के संवर का अधिकारी हो सकता है अन्यथा नहीं। सात प्रकार के प्रातिमोक्ष को तथागत ने बताया है। उनमें से ब्रह्मचर्य ही सर्वश्रेष्ठ है जो भिक्षु नियम माना जाता है। बोधिसत्व भूमि के शीलपरिवर्त में बताई गयी विधि द्वारा सम्यक् लक्षणों से सम्पन्न सद्गुरु से दीक्षा ग्रहण करनी चाहिए। जो संव विधि में कुशल हो, स्वयं नियमों का पालन करता हो और दीक्षा देने में समर्थ तथा करुणामय हो, उसे सद्गुरु समझना चाहिए। यदि प्रयास करने पर भी ऐसे गुरु की प्राप्ति न हो सके, तो दीक्षा लेने की अन्य विधि बताई जाती है। प्राचीन काल में जब मंजुश्री का जन्म अम्बराजा के रूप में हुआ था, तब उन्होंने जिस प्रकार बोधिचित्त उत्पन्न किया था, जिसका वर्णन मंजुश्री-बुद्ध-क्षेत्र-गुण-व्यू-सूत्र में हुआ है, उसी प्रकार यहाँ उल्लेख किया जाता है। नाथों (बुद्धों) के समक्ष इस प्रकार सम्बोधि चित्त उत्पन्न करना चाहिए: मैं समस्त जगत् को आमंत्रित कर उन्हें आवागमन से मुक्त करूँ। आज से लेकर बोधित्व की प्राप्ति तक प्रतिहिंसा, क्रोध, मात्सर्य और ईर्ष्या नहीं करूँगा। अपने को शीघ्र बोधिलाभ के लिये उत्साहित न कर, एक प्राणी के लिये कल्पों तक आवागमन में विचरना चाहिए। अप्रमेय और अचिन्त्य (बुद्ध) क्षेत्रों की विशुद्धि करनी चाहिए। दश दिशाओं में अवस्थित बुद्धों का नाम लेकर अपने काय, वाक और मन द्वारा किये गये (पाप) कर्मों

को सर्वथा शुद्ध करना चाहिए। कायिक, वाचिक और मानसिक विशुद्धि द्वारा बोधिचित्त प्रस्थान के साथ आत्म-संयम पर सुदृढ़ हो, त्रिशिक्षाओं का यदि ठीक से पालन किया जाय, तो तीनों शिक्षाओं पर श्रद्धा बढ़ती जाती है। इसलिये बोधिसत्वों की शिक्षा का यत्नपूर्वक निर्वाह करने से सम्बोधि-संभार शीघ्र परिपूर्ण होता है। यह सर्व बुद्धों की मान्यता है कि पुण्य-संभार और ज्ञान-संभार के शीघ्र परिपूर्ण होने का एकमात्र साधन है अभिज्ञा उत्पन्न करना। बिना पंख बढ़े पक्षी जैसे आकाश में उड़ नहीं सकता वैसे ही अभिज्ञा के बिना प्राणियों का हित नहीं हो सकता। अभिज्ञानी द्वारा २४ घंटे में संचित पुण्य अभिज्ञारहित द्वारा शत जन्मों में भी अर्जित नहीं किया जा सकता। इसलिये जो शीघ्र संबोधि संभार के परिपूर्ण होने की अभिलाषा करता हो, उसे यत्नपूर्वक अभिज्ञा उत्पन्न करनी चाहिए। तभी सिद्धि मिलेगी, आलस्य से नहीं। शमथ (समाधि) की सिद्धि किये बिना अभिज्ञा उत्पन्न नहीं होती। इसलिये समाधि की साधना के लिये बार-बार प्रयास करना चाहिए। शमथ के अंग विहीन होने से सहस्राब्दियों तक भावना करने के बावजूद समाधि की सिद्धि नहीं हो सकती। अतः समाधि-सम्भार परिवर्त में वर्णित (समाधि) अंगों के आश्रय से अपने चित्त को किसी (ध्यान) के आलम्बन में लगाये रखना चाहिए। योगी को समाधि की सिद्धि हो जाने पर अभिज्ञा की भी सिद्धि मिल जाती है। लेकिन प्रज्ञापारमिता के बिना आवरण (क्लेश) क्षीण नहीं हो सकते। इसलिये क्लेशावरण और ज्ञेयावरण दोनों के त्याग के लिये योगी को नित्य उपाय के साथ प्रज्ञापारमिता की भावना करनी चाहिए। क्योंकि उपायरहित प्रज्ञा और प्रज्ञारहित उपाय भी बुद्ध ने बन्धन कहा है। अतएव दोनों का त्याग नहीं करना चाहिए। ये प्रज्ञा और उपाय क्या हैं? इस सन्देह को दूर करने के लिये दोनों का प्रभेद बताया जाता है। प्रज्ञापारमिता को छोड़ दान पारमिता आदि सभी कल्याणधर्मों को बुद्धों ने उपाय बताया है। जो उपाय का अभ्यास कर प्रज्ञा की भावना करता हैं वही शीघ्र बोधित्व प्राप्त कर पाता है। केवल नैरात्म्य की भावना करने से नहीं। स्कन्धों, धातुओं और आयतनों को अनुत्पाद और स्वभावतया शून्य जान लेना प्रज्ञा कहलाता है। सत् की उत्पत्ति भी युक्ति नहीं है। असत् भी ख-पुष्पवत् है और सत् और असत् दोनों परस्पर विरुद्ध स्वभाववाले होने के कारण उभय की भी उत्पत्ति नहीं हो सकती। पदार्थ न स्वतः उत्पन्न होता है, न परतः, न उभयतः और न अहेतुक ही। इसलिए स्वरूपतः (समस्त धर्म) निःस्वभाव है। अथवा समस्तधर्म (बुद्धिग्राह्य पदार्थ) का एकानेक रूप से विचार करने पर उसका स्वरूप अनुपलब्ध प्रतीत होता है। इसलिये समस्त धर्म

निस्वभाव ही है। शून्यता सप्तति, युक्तिषष्ठिका, मूलमाध्यमिक आदि में भी बताया गया है कि पदार्थों का स्वभाव शून्य ही सिद्ध होता है। ग्रन्थों की बहुलता के कारण यहाँ विस्तार से उल्लेख नहीं किया गया है। अतः (इस पुस्तिका में) केवल साधना और भावना के लिये (संक्षिप्त) सिद्धान्त बताया गया है। इस प्रकार समस्त धर्मों का स्वभाव अनुपलब्धि है। इसलिये नैरात्म्य की भावना करना ही प्रज्ञा की भावना करना है। प्रज्ञा के सहारे समस्त धर्मों के निःस्वभाव होने का ज्ञान प्राप्त कर निर्विकल्प के साथ उसी प्रज्ञा की भावना करनी चाहिए। भव (संसार) की उत्पत्ति विकल्प से हुई है। इसलिये समस्त विकल्पों के त्याग देने से परम निर्वाण की प्राप्ति होती है। भगवान् बुद्ध ने भी कहा हैं—यह विकल्प महान् अविद्या है। यह भवसागर में गिरानेवाला है। निर्विकल्प होकर समाधिस्थ होने से आकाश की भाँति अविकल्प का साक्षात्कार होता है। अविकल्प-प्रवेश-धारणी में भी उल्लेख किया गया है—जिनपुत्र (बोधिसत्व) इस सद्धर्म पर निर्विकल्प का चिन्तन करे, तो दुर्गम विकल्प को पारकर क्रमशः अविकल्प को प्राप्त करता है। आगम और युक्ति के सहारे समस्त धर्मों को अनुत्पाद निःस्वभाव जानकर अविकल्प की भावना करनी चाहिए। इस प्रकार उसकी भावना करने से क्रमशः उष्णता आदि पाकर प्रमुदिता आदि प्राप्त करता है और बोधित्व की प्राप्ति में विलम्ब नहीं होता है। कलशभद्र आदि आठ महासिद्ध भी यह मानते हैं कि मंत्र-प्रभाव से सिद्ध किये जानेवाले शान्त और विपुल आदि कर्मों तथा सुखों के द्वारा बोधिसंभार शीघ्र परिपूर्ण होता है। यदि क्रिया और चर्यातन्त्र आदि में गुह्यमंत्र का आचरण करना हो तो सर्वप्रथम आचार्य (योग्य गुरु) से अभिषेक ग्रहण करना आवश्यक है। इसके लिये गुरु की आज्ञा पालन, बहुमूल्य की भेंट और आदर सत्कार द्वारा गुरु की आराधना करनी चाहिए। गुरु के प्रसन्न होने पर शिष्य को सम्पूर्ण अभिषेक मिलता है जिसके फलस्वरूप शिष्य के समस्त पाप धुल जाते हैं और वह सिद्धिप्राप्ति का अधिकारी होता है। आदि-बुद्धमहातन्त्र में इस बात का प्रयत्नपूर्वक निषेध किया गया है कि ब्रह्मचारी को गुह्यज्ञानाभिषेक नहीं ग्रहण करना चाहिए। यदि अभिषेक ग्रहण किया जाय तो ब्रह्मचर्यवास नष्ट हो जाता है क्योंकि उसे (भिक्षु-नियमों के विरुद्ध) निषिद्ध (पदार्थों) का भोग करना पड़ता है। फलस्वरूप उसका व्रत टूटकर उसे पाराजिक दोष लगता है और दुर्गति में गिर जाने के कारण उसे सिद्धि कदापि नहीं मिलती। यदि ब्रह्मचर्यवास वाले को अभिषेक देनेवाले आचार्य से अनुमति मिल जाय और वह (शिष्य) तत्वज्ञानी भी हो, तो वह सब तन्त्रों के श्रवण, व्याख्यान, होम तथा यज्ञदान

आदि कर सकता है। इससे उसको कोई अपराध नहीं होता। बोधिप्रभ के आग्रह पर स्थविर दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान ने सूत्र आदि धर्मशास्त्रों के अनुसार बोधिपथ का निर्देश संक्षिप्त रूप में किया है। दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान और तिब्बती दुभाषिया भिक्षु कल्याणमति द्वारा अनूदित, संशोधित और निर्धारित किया गया।

बोधिपथप्रदीप ग्रन्थ समाप्त।

संग्रहगर्भ नाम

महान् दयावन्त को नमस्कार।

त्रैधातुक महासागर में दुःखरूपी हिलोरें पुण्य और अपुण्य आदि साश्रवकर्मों से उठते हैं। इनकी उत्पत्ति राग-द्वेष आदि क्लेशों के कारण होती है। इनका प्रादुर्भाव भी प्रियाप्रिय आदि द्वैतभाव से होता है। इन सब की उत्पत्ति का कारण है शाश्वत, व्याप्ति आदि भौतिक भाव। अतएव भाग्यवान पुरुष को चाहिए कि परात्मा की मुक्ति की कामना से प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद आदि के अभ्यास द्वारा भौतिकभाव का निवारण करें।

बाह्य अथवा आन्तरिक समस्त धर्मों (पदार्थों) को निमित्तवर्जित आकाश के सदृश जान, भौतिकभाव से ग्रस्त समस्त जगत को दृष्टि में रख, दुःखसागर के शोषक तथा आत्म-परार्थ के साधन, बहुमूल्य बोधिचित को उत्पन्न करना चाहिए। छः पारमिता आदि महाबोधिचर्यों का समाधि और योग से अभ्यास कर, पाँच मार्गों पर क्रमशः आरूढ हो, दो प्रकार के आवरणों को दूर कर, दो सम्भारों को परिपूर्ण कर, त्रिकायिक-फल की प्राप्ति करनी चाहिये। त्रिकाय-साधन का लक्षण है—आकाश के समान शून्यता से अप्रयास मेघरूपी करुणा से द्विकाय अमृतधारा बरस कर, तीनों लोकों के अनावृष्टि अन्तःकरण सींच कर, बोधिगर्भ बीजों से पुण्य फसल का फलीभूत होना। यही संग्रह गर्भ है जो सभी बुद्धों का सार है। कालान्त में मनुष्य अल्पायुता, अनेक व्याधि, दरिद्रता और आपत्ति विपत्तियों के शिकार बन जाने के कारण चिरकाल तक जीवित रहने में असमर्थ होते हैं। अतएव शब्द सम्भार का पीछा करना छोड़, सत् कल्याण मित्रों की संगति कर, अति प्रयत्नशील हो, संसार के प्रपातों का स्मरण कर, परात्मा की मुक्ति लाभ के निमित्त, सारगर्भ का शीघ्रता से संग्रह करें। इस कृति के पुण्य से मंदभाग्य प्राणी भी वोधिचित्त-सम्पन्न हो, सारगर्भ का शीघ्र संग्रह करें। महान् आचार्य श्री दीपंकरज्ञान द्वारा प्रणीत संग्रह-गर्भ नामक समाप्त।

हृदय निश्चित

त्रिरत्न को नमस्कार।

अभ्युदय और निश्रेयस को प्रदान करनेवाले त्रिरत्नों की सादर वन्दना कर, संसार भय को हरण करनेवाले हृदय निश्चित का वर्णन किया जाता है। दुःख, कर्म, क्लेश और विकल्प—ये आवागमन के लक्षण हैं। संसार-कार्य-कारण का यह क्रम संक्षिप्त रूप में बताया गया है। मुक्ति का लक्षण बोधि है। प्रज्ञा, उपाय, चरित, पाँच मार्ग और दो सम्भारों द्वारा त्रिकाय सम्पन्न निर्वाण को प्राप्त होता है। मोक्ष-कार्य-कारण का यह क्रम भी संक्षिप्त रूप में बताया गया है। त्रिधातु महासागर में दुःखरूपी लहरों का उदय कुशलाकुशल आदि साश्रव कर्मों से होता है। राग-द्वेष-मोह आदि क्लेशों के कारण इसका उत्पादन होता है जिसका मूल उत्पादन प्रियाप्रिय आदि द्वैतभाव से होता है। सभी उत्पत्ति का कारण है अहंकार और आत्मभाव, और फिर इसकी भी उत्पत्ति शाश्वत्, केवलात्म, व्याप्ति आदि भौतिक भाव से होती है। अतएव प्रज्ञावान् को इन्हें त्याग देना चाहिए। परात्मा की मुक्ति की इच्छा करने वाले को प्रमाणिक आगम, प्रतीत्य समुत्पाद आदि के अभ्यास से भौतिकभाव का सर्वथा निवारण करें। इस प्रकार बाह्य और आन्तरिक सभी धर्मों को आकाश के समान निमित्त वर्जित समझ सतत इसकी साधना करें। अनादि काल से इस संसार में भौतिक भाव के शिकार बने हुए समस्त जगत् को अनुगृहीत कर, मैत्री आदि चार अप्रमाणों के द्वारा दुःख-समुद्र के शोषक, असीम महाकारुणिक, आत्म परार्थ साधक बहुमूल्य बोधिचित्त को सुदृढ़तापूर्वक उत्पन्न करना चाहिए। चाहे स्वकीय सम्पत्ति हो या परायी हो सभी सांसारिक धर्मों से उद्विग्न होना चाहिए। जो सभी भय से रक्षा करनेवाले त्रिशरण सम्पन्न हों उसे प्रातिमोक्ष में प्रतिष्ठित होना चाहिए। सुशील-सम्पन्न तथा महायान कुल में उत्पन्न पुरुष को अशरण जगत को शरण देने के लिये स्वयं त्रिशरण में जा प्रणिधान चित्त उत्पन्न करना चाहिए। अधिचित्त सम्पन्न के सहारे प्रस्थान चित्त उत्पन्न करने से उक्त प्रणिधान चित्त की व्यापक रूप में वृद्धि होती है। बोधिसत्वाचरण करनेवाले को छः पारमिता आदि समाधि और योग के द्वारा सम्भार मार्ग की दृढ़तापूर्वक साधना करनी चाहिए। पाँच मार्ग पर क्रमशः चल कर, दो आवरणों का शोधन कर, दो सम्भारों को सम्पूर्ण कर त्रिकाय फल को प्राप्त करो। त्रिकाय-साधन का लक्षण है आकाश तुल्य धर्मकाय के करुणामय मेघों से द्विकाय रूपी (सम्भोग काय और निर्माण काय) अमृत धारा बरस कर, त्रैधातुक अनावृष्टि चित्त को सींच

कर बोधिगर्भ बीजों से पुण्यफसल का परिपक्व होना। तीनों कालों के बुद्धों द्वारा उपदिष्ट सार गर्भ का यहां संग्रह किया जाता है। सांसारिक दुःखों से छुटकारा चाहने वाले को इसका अभ्यास करना चाहिए। कलियुग में मनुष्य अल्पायु, अनेक व्याधि, सम्भोग हीनता और अनेक दुर्घटनाओं और विघ्नबाधाओं का शिकार बन जाता है। जिसके फलस्वरूप उसमें चिरजीवित रहने की क्षमता नहीं रहती। इसलिये शब्द संभार के पीछे न पड़, महायान कुल में उत्पन्न पुरुष को सत्कल्याण मित्र का सेवन कर अति लगन चित्त से सांसारिक दुःख का स्मरण करते परात्मा को मुक्त करने के हेतु सार-गर्भ का शीघ्र संग्रह करना चाहिए। इस कृति के द्वारा समस्त अधिकारी प्राणी बोधिचित्त सम्पन्न हो सार-गर्भ का शीघ्र संग्रह करें।

महापण्डित श्री दीपंकर ज्ञान द्वारा सब्वे-थङ विहार में प्रणीत हृदय निश्चित नामक ग्रन्थ समाप्त।

श्री दीपंकर ज्ञान और भिक्षु जिनशील द्वारा अनूदित, संशोधित तथा निर्धारित किया गया।

बोधिसत्वमणि अवली

महाकारुणिक, श्रद्धेय देवों और गुरुओं को नमस्कार।

सभी विचिकित्साओं को त्याग, साधना का प्रयत्न करो। स्त्यान-मृद्ध और आलस्य को त्याग सतत वीर्य का आरम्भ करो। स्मृति, संप्रजन्य और अप्रमाद के साथ इन्द्रिय द्वारों की सदा रक्षा करनी चाहिए। दिन-रात अपने चित्त की बारंबार परीक्षा करनी चाहिए। अपने अपराधों को प्रकाशित कर, दूसरों की गलतियाँ न ढूँढ़नी चाहिए। दूसरे का गुण-कीर्तन कर अपने गुणों को छिपा कर रखना चाहिए।

लाभ-सत्कार, मान और यश को त्याग, मैत्री और करुणा की भावना कर बोधिचित्त को स्थिर बनाये रखना चाहिए। दश अकुशलों को त्याग, सदा दृढ़ विश्वास रखना चाहिए। अल्पेच्छुक, संतोषी और कृतज्ञ हो, क्रोध तथा अभिमान को पराजित कर विनीत भाव से रहना चाहिए। मिथ्याजीविका को त्याग धर्म से अपना जीवन यापन करना चाहिए। सभी द्रव्यों का त्याग कर, आर्य धनों से सम्पन्न होना चाहिए। श्रद्धा धन, शीलधन, अपत्रपाधन, लज्जाधन, श्रुतिधन, त्यागधन और प्रज्ञाधन ये सात प्रकार के धन अक्षयनिधि हैं जिसकी चर्चा अमनुष्यों से नहीं करनी

चाहिए। सदा कोलाहल से दूर रह एकान्तवास करना चाहिए। संप्रलाप (बकवास) को त्याग सदा वाक्‌संयम पूर्ण रहना चाहिए। गुरु और आचार्य के दर्शन होने पर आदरपूर्वक उनका सत्कार करना चाहिए। धर्मचक्षुवान् पुरुष और आदिकर्मिक प्राणियों में अपने शास्ता का भाव रखना चाहिए। सभी प्राणियों में माता-पिता और पुत्र-पोते का भाव रखना चाहिए। पापी मित्र को त्याग कर, कल्याणमित्र की संगति करनी चाहिए। वैरी से भरे और संकटपूर्ण स्थान को त्याग जहाँ आरामदेह स्थान हो वहाँ जाकर विहरना चाहिए। जिसमें आसक्त हो उसी को त्याग विरक्त हो कर विहार करना चाहिए। आसक्ति सुगति प्राप्ति के बदले मोक्षप्राण का संघात करती है।

जिधर शुभ कार्य दृष्टिगोचर हो उधर सदा उद्योग करना चाहिए। पहले जिस कार्य का आरम्भ कर चुका हो उसी का सम्पादन करना चाहिए। ऐसा करने से सभी कार्य भली-भाँति सम्पन्न होते हैं, अन्यथा दोनों ही अधूरे रह जायेंगे। पाप से सदा घृणा करनी चाहिए। जब अभिमान हो तो उसे तोड़ कर गुरु के उपदेशों का स्मरण करना चाहिए। जब विषाद हो तो अपने चित्त को हर्षित कर सदा शून्यता की भावना करनी चाहिए। जब राग-द्वेष का विषय उत्पन्न हो तो माया-निर्मित के सदृश दृष्टिपात करना चाहिए। जब अप्रिय वचन सुनाई दे तो प्रतिध्वनि के सदृश मानना चाहिए। जब शरीर में किसी प्रकार की पीड़ा हो जाय तो अपने पूर्वजन्म का कर्म समझना चाहिए। प्रान्त अथवा अरण्य में मृत मृगों की भाँति अपने आपको छिपा कर तथा विरक्त हो कर वास करना चाहिए। सदा इष्टदेवों का आश्रय ले, जब आलसी और कलुषितचित्त हो जाए तब अपने आप को तिरस्कार करते हुए व्रत का स्मरण करना चाहिए। यदि कोई अन्य व्यक्ति दृष्टिगोचर हो जाए, तब शान्त, नम्रतापूर्ण और ऋजुवचन का प्रयोग करना चाहिए। चिड़चिड़ाहट को त्याग सदा प्रसन्न हो कर रहना चाहिए। अन्य किसी को देखने पर कृपणता न कर दानप्रिय होना चाहिए। सदा ईर्ष्या को त्याग, दूसरे का मन रखने के लिये सभी प्रकार के विवादों को त्याग, क्षमाशील होना चाहिए। न खुशामद करनी चाहिए, न गुप्त संगति ही सदा स्मृतिवान् होना चाहिए। दूसरों का तिरस्कार न कर नम्रभाव से रहना चाहिए। दूसरों को धर्मोपदेश करुणामय और हित भावनायुक्त होकर देना चाहिए। धर्म का अपमान नहीं करना चाहिए। जिस पर आस्था हो उसी का यत्न करे। दस धर्माचरणों द्वारा रात-दिन उद्योग करें। समाज के बीच अपने वचन का परीक्षण कर तथा अकेला रहते समय अपने चित्त का परीक्षण करें। त्रिकाल में जितने कुशलमूलों का संचय किया हो

उसे अनुत्तर बोधित्व में परिणामना करें। संचितपुण्य से प्राणिमात्र के सुख के लिये प्रार्थना करें। सदा सप्तांगिक प्रणिधान करें। ऐसा करने से पुण्य सम्भार और ज्ञान सम्भार दोनों परिपूर्ण हो, दोनों आवरणों का क्षीण हो जाता है। इस प्रकार मनुष्यतन प्राप्ति की उपयोगिता से अनुत्तर बोधिलाभ होता है।

भारतीय आचार्य श्री दीपंकर ज्ञान द्वारा रचित बोधिसत्व मणि अवली समाप्त।

बोधिसत्त्वचर्या संक्षिप्तोपदेश

बुद्धों और बोधिसत्वों को नमस्कार।

निश्रेयसम्बोधि और अभ्युदय लाभ करने की इच्छा करने वाले को त्रिरत्न के प्रति श्रद्धा कर, प्रथमतः सबों पर दयादृष्टि रखनी चाहिए। तब बोधिचित्त उत्पन्न कर उपाययुक्त आचरणों द्वारा अपने चित्त का दमन करो, क्योंकि अपने को दमन किये बिना दूसरों का दमन कैसे हो सकता है? जैसे अपूर्ण पंख वाले पंछी को आकाश में उड़ने की क्षमता नहीं होती वैसे ही दृष्टि और आचरण हीन पुरुष कैसे मुक्त हो सकता है। इसलिये दोनों ही दृष्टि से सिद्ध करने के हेतु तप-श्रम द्वारा अभ्यास करना चाहिए। कठिनाई से अभ्यास किये बिना सहज में अभ्यस्त कैसे हो सकता है? उपर्युक्त प्रयोजन के इच्छुक जिन-पुत्र को कल्याणमित्र की संगति कर, तीन प्रज्ञाओं पर आश्रित हो, परमपद-गामी दृष्टि का विशेष रूप से अभ्यास कर, पवित्र-शील-वस्त्र पहन साधन का उद्योग करना चाहिए। धर्मानुसार साधन करने के लिये सभी कालों और अवस्थाओं में प्रारम्भ से लेकर अन्ततक अपने कर्मों का स्मरण रखना चाहिए। बुरे कर्मों का त्याग, भले कर्मों का सम्पादन करते हुए सफल बनो। व्यर्थ में कभी समय न गवाँ कर, नित्य अपना विद्योपार्जन कर, शुभकर्मों के प्रति उत्साहित होना चाहिए। दोषत्यागी और पुण्यवर्धक मित्र का अन्वेषण कर उसके अनुकूल कार्य कर उसका मन रखना चाहिए। विज्ञों का समादर करें। क्लेशपूर्ण मित्र, ऊँच अथवा नीच सभी मित्रों से, जैसे बच्चा अपनी माँ के स्तनपान करता है वैसे ही, कुशलतापूर्वक बुराइयों को त्याग अच्छाइयों का ग्रहण करना चाहिए। उपकार के प्रति प्रत्युपकार कर दूसरे के पाप का कारण न बन, पुण्योपार्जन में विघ्न बाधा न डाल, उच्च वर्गों की सम्पदा के प्रति ईर्ष्या और मित्र तथा नीच वर्गों का तिरस्कार नहीं करना चाहिए। अपने दोषों के साथ दूसरों के गुणों का प्रकाशन करना चाहिए। दूसरों की आलोचना और अपनी स्तुति

नहीं करनी चाहिए। इहलोक की अपेक्षा परलोक को प्रधान मान, सभी कार्य धर्मानुसार सम्पादन करना चाहिए। भौतिक धन-धान्य को त्याग, आर्यधनों से सुसम्पन्न होना चाहिए। दुःख को सुख न मान, स्त्यान-मृद्ध आलस्य तथा विक्षेप का परित्याग कर मृत्यु अवश्यम्भावी है इस की भावना करनी चाहिए। अल्पपुण्य का भी यत्नपूर्वक संचय कर, लघु-से-लघु पाप का भी परित्याग करना चाहिए। धार्मिक क्रिया-विधि में उपयुक्त वस्तुओं को छोड़, आहार, वस्त्रादि की लालच न करें। अल्पाभिलाषि और सन्तोषी हो, अष्टलोकधर्मों को त्याग, खुशामदी तथा पराये दोषों का समालोचक न बनें। किसी कार्य के सम्पादन करने के लिये अपना वचन देकर अथवा अपनी वीरता या सामर्थ्य का प्रदर्शन कर तदनुसार सम्पन्न न कर सके तो उसे पहले ही त्याग दें। छल कपट और मिथ्याजीविका को त्याग, धर्मानुकूल कार्य करना चाहिए। कुटुम्ब और सम्बन्धी के प्रति आसक्ति न करें, पक्षपात न करें। दूसरों पर आशा न लगावें। अकुशल कर्म की प्रशंसा न करें। व्यर्थ के कोलाहल से दूर रह, गल्प-सल्प के प्रति अभिरुचि न करें। आसक्ति से उत्पन्न मनोरथों का अवरोध करें। ज्ञान प्राप्ति और सम्भारवर्धक कार्यों में अनुत्साहित न होना चाहिए। अभिमान को प्रतिपक्ष से नष्ट कर, दुष्टता और यश-कीर्ति को त्याग दें। व्यक्तिगत रूप से हो या परम्परा से हो सभी प्राणी अपने बन्धु-बान्धव हैं। इसलिये तन मन वाणी से उनके प्रति अपने पुत्रतुल्य दृष्टि रक्खें। दयालु, हँसमुख और सत्यवादी हो सब पर प्रिय दृष्टि रखें। परिवार, मित्र, ऊँचनीच सब के प्रति समान भाव रखें। स्तुति और सत्कार से गर्वित न होवें और निन्दा तथा तिरस्कार से घृणित। दीन दुखी का उपकार करें। लोभ को त्याग, दरिद्रों को करुणा और हित-भावना से उपदेश दें। प्राणियों की भिन्न-भिन्न भावनाएँ होती हैं, इसलिये आवश्यक कार्य को सोच-बिचार कर करें। समस्त प्राणियों को कौन प्रसन्न कर सकता है ? तो भी दुःख को ठुकरा कर सुख में अनासक्त हो कर इतना करें जिससे अपने को पश्चात्ताप न हो। अपने चित्त की शुद्धि कर दूसरे का मन रखें। तिरस्कार अथवा आपत्ति आ पड़े तो उसका प्रतिपक्ष, कर्म और असत्यता द्वारा समाधान करें। इस प्रकार की दृष्टि से बोधिचर्या को सुदृढ़ बनाये रखना चाहिए। इस बहु-मूल्य मनुष्य-तन को बरबाद न करें, मृत्यु अवश्यम्भावी है। तथा अवकाश कम है। अतएव प्रज्वलित अग्नि के समान वीर्य का आचरण करें। आसक्ति और आत्म-दृष्टि का उन्मूलन कर दें। सांसारिक राग, द्वेष और मोह को प्रतिपक्ष द्वारा नष्ट कर दें, विपर्यय रूपी प्रपात को त्याग दें। संसार प्रवाह को रोक, कर्म रूपी जल को सुखा दें। तीनों दुर्गतियों का द्वार बन्दकर, त्रिःदुखी रूपी व्याधि का शमन कर स्वर्ग

और मोक्ष की सीढ़ी पर आरोहण करें। दो आवरणों का शोधन कर, दो सम्भारों को सम्पूर्ण करें। त्रिकाय और ज्ञान की प्राप्ति कर, अनायास परार्थ साधना करें। महान आचार्य श्री दीपंकरज्ञान द्वारा रचित बोधिसत्वचर्या संक्षिप्त उपदेश समाप्त।

बोधिसत्वकर्मादिमार्गावतारदेशन

सद्गुरु को नमस्कार।

दुर्गति और संसार के विनाशक, अभ्युदय तथा निःश्रेयस के प्रदाता दशों दिशाओं में अवस्थित समग्र त्रिरत्न एवं गुरुओं के चरणपाद को नमस्कार। स्वभावतः जो महाकारुणिक और महाप्रज्ञावान् तथा महायानी कुल में उत्पन्न हो अथवा पूर्वजन्म में महायान धर्म का जिसने अभ्यास किया हो, संसार से विरक्त-चित्त तथा मरणानुस्मरण करनेवाला, अन्तर्बाह्य वस्तुओं के प्रति अनासक्त और ऐसा चिन्तन करनेवाला हो कि मैं ऐसे योग्य कल्याणमित्र का अन्वेषण करूँ जो मुझे महायान धर्म का उपदेश दे सकें। ऐसे पुरुष को एक योग्य कल्याणमित्र की खोज कर धर्मशास्त्र में कथितानुसार त्रिरत्न की शरण में जा, अनन्त जगत् को दृष्टि में रखते हुए सद्भावना के साथ परम बोधिचित्त को उत्पन्न करना चाहिए। बोधिचित सम्पन्न हो छल-कपट रहित बोधिचित्त प्रस्थान द्वारा बोधिसत्व शीलत्रायी शिक्षाएँ ग्रहण करें। तब से वह बोधिसत्व सम्भार-मार्ग पर आरूढ़ हो जाता है, और उससे किये जानेवाला कोई कर्म व्यर्थ नहीं होता।

इस प्रकार उसे भोजन में मात्राज्ञ, इन्द्रियों पर संयत, अतिसूक्ष्म अवद्य पर भी भय की दृष्टि रखते हुए दिन-रात योगाभ्यास करना चाहिये। परार्थ की कामना करनेवाले ऐसे बोधिसत्व को ब्रह्ममुहूर्त में उठ शौच आदि से निवृत्त हो सभी जगत के हित की कामना करते हुए चार अप्रमाण्यों के साथ बोधित्व को चित्तोत्पाद करना चाहिए। त्रिरत्न की प्रतिमा के सम्मुख लेप्य से भलीभाँति लेप कर सुगन्ध पुष्प बिखेर, घुटने टेक, अँजलि बाँध लोक-धातु के दशों दिशाओं को अवस्थित सभी बुद्धों धर्मों और संघों के सम्मुख अपने शरीर को कल्पना द्वारा अनगिनत रूप में निर्मित कर प्रत्येक त्रिरत्न के चरण में प्रणाम करना चाहिए। अनेक पूजा सामग्रियों से उनकी आराधना करनी चाहिए। तब प्रत्येक शरीर से अनगिनत जिह्वा निर्मित कर परात्मा के सारे पापों की देशना कर पुण्यानुमोदन करना चाहिए। उन भगवान् बुद्धों से जिन्होंने सम्बुद्धत्व की प्राप्ति कुछ ही समय पहले की है, धर्मचक्रप्रवर्तन के लिये याचना करनी चाहिए। जो बुद्ध

धर्मचक्रप्रवर्तन करने के पश्चात् शरीर छोड़ने को तैयार हों, उनसे प्रार्थना करनी चाहिए कि जबतक संसार की स्थिति बनी रहेगी, तबतक वे परिनिर्वाण को प्राप्त न करें। सभी कुशलमूलों को अनुत्तर सम्यक् सम्बोधि की उपलब्धि के लिये बोधिपरिणामना करनी चाहिए। सूत्र में वर्णितानुसार प्रत्येक (सप्तविधपूजन के) अंग का विस्तार-पूर्वक पाठ करना चाहिए। सप्तविध-पूजन के अनन्तर समग्र जगत् को दृष्टि में रख मैं त्रिशरण में जाता हूँ, इस प्रकार तीन बार कहना चाहिए। तब बोधिचित्त उत्पन्न के पश्चात् तीन बार यों कहें कि मेरे किये गये दानादि द्वारा जगत् कल्याण के निमित्त मैं बुद्धत्व का लाभ करूँ। तब आत्मसमर्पण कर महापुरुषों के धर्म पंथ में चलने की प्रतिज्ञा करें। तब आसन लगाकर गुरु भट्टारक श्री बोधिभद्र द्वारा रचित समाधिपरिच्छेद में वर्णितानुसार नवांगिक समाधि को समझ, शमथ और विपश्यना योग की भावना करनी चाहिए। भावना करते समय योग की भावनाओं में आनेवाली स्त्यान-औद्धत्य आदि बाधाओं का निवारण करना चाहिए। तब आँखें खोल, प्रश्वास कर अन्तर्बाह्य वस्तुओं के प्रति ऐसा बोध करना चाहिए कि आश्चर्य है! आश्चर्य है!! आकाश की भाँति इन अनुत्पत्ति धर्मों में प्रतीत्य समुत्पाद के बल पर नाना प्रकार के धर्म आभासित होते हैं, और इन्हें अष्टमायावी दृष्टान्त के रूप में समझना चाहिए। तब महाकरुणामय चित्त के साथ सभी अदृश्य जीवों को धर्मोपदेश देने के लिये यथाज्ञान के साथ महायान सूत्र का पाठ करना चाहिए। तब भोजन प्रवृति के समय ऐसा संकल्प करना चाहिए कि ३६ अशुचि पदार्थों से परिपूर्ण इस असार शरीर, जो अन्त में नाश होनेवाला है, के द्वारा बुद्ध के धर्मकाय का अन्वेषण करना चाहिए। न मैं इस आहार का उपयोग मद होने के लिये करूँगा, न रस में आसक्त होकर, परन्तु शरीररूपी नौका के सहारे बुद्धत्व लाभ करने के संकल्प से ग्रहण करूँगा। भोजन की मात्रा जाननी चाहिए। चिकित्सा विद्या के अष्टांगिक-तंत्र में उल्लेख है कि पेट का तिहाई हिस्सा अन्न से और दो हिस्सा पानी से भर एक हिस्सा खाली रखना चाहिए। आहार को चार भागों में विभाजित करना चाहिए। एक हिस्सा त्रिरत्न एवं गुरु को चढ़ाना चाहिए। एक हिस्से का स्वयं भोग कर, एक हिस्से को बच्चों अथवा अनाथों को दान के रूप में खिलाना चाहिए, और एक हिस्सा कुत्तों और कौवों आदि जन्तुओं को खिलाना चाहिए। अन्य विद्वान् ने चरित्रसंग्रह प्रदीप नामक ग्रन्थ में अन्य ढंग से उल्लेख किया है। प्रात-काल, मध्याह्न, सन्ध्या, रात्रि और अर्धरात्रि सभी पहरों में यथाकथित विधि का पूर्णतया पालन करें। ऐसे योगी के लिये सुप्तावस्था या जागृतावस्था में कोई अन्तर नहीं है, क्योंकि ऐसे साधक के

सम्भार मार्ग पर आरूढ़ हो जाने के कारण उसका कोई भी कार्य असफल नहीं रहता। इसलिये ऐसे साधक पर आपत्ति आये तो कैसे? यदि कुसंस्कार की प्रबलता से आपत्ति लग भी जाय तो वह शीघ्र ही उसका पोषण कर लेता है। पोषण की विधि गुरु के उपदेश द्वारा समझना चाहिए। महायानी साधकों को बोधिप्रभ आदि शिष्यों की प्रेरणा से सत्पुरुषों द्वारा दर्शित इस सन्मार्ग पर चलकर, द्विपदेन्द्र के क्षेत्र में पहुँचना चाहिए। भिक्षु बोधिप्रभ ने भट्टारक गुरु बोधिसत्व से प्रार्थना की थी और भिक्षु जिनशील ने इसका अनुवाद तथा संशोधन किया था। महायानी साधक इसे अपनायें।

आचार्य श्री दीपंकरज्ञान द्वारा रचित बोधिसत्त्वादिमकर्मावतारदेशन समाप्त।

शरणागतादेश

त्रिरत्न को नमस्कार।

तीनों दुर्गति और जगत् के सम्पूर्ण दुःखों के विनाशक, स्वर्गीय तथा निर्वाण सुख के प्रदायक की वन्दना करता हूँ। यहाँ शरण गमन का वर्णन किया जायगा। अधिकरण अर्थात् आश्रय (साधक पुरुष), स्थान, भावना, काल, स्वभाव, परिमाण, आचार पद्धति, प्रकार, शिक्षा, कर्म, दृष्टान्त, भेद, आदिनव (दुष्परिणाम) प्रयोजन और अनुशंसा (लाभ) ये पन्द्रह प्रकार के संक्षिप्त रूप हैं। अधिकरण पुरुष दो प्रकार का होता है—महायान जातिवाला और हीनयान जातिवाला। स्थान दो प्रकार का होता है—महायान और हीनयान के भेद के अनुसार। महायानीय ग्रन्थ में त्रिरत्न का भेद इस प्रकार है—यथार्थ त्रिरत्न अभिसमय त्रिरत्न और सामने विराजमान त्रिरत्न। यथार्थ त्रिरत्न है—सभी ज्ञातव्य को यथार्थ रूप में जाननेवाले, निर्विकल्पी, अद्वैतज्ञानी, धर्मधातु में स्थित, विशुद्ध धर्मधातु प्रज्ञापारमिता जाननेवाले, समाहितकाल में सकल धर्मों का ज्ञान आकाश के सदृश जाननेवाले तथा ऊर्ध्व भूमि में प्रतिष्ठित बोधिसत्व यथार्थ त्रिरत्न कहलाते हैं।

अभिसमय त्रिरत्न है—दो प्रकार के मूर्तरूपी, चार आर्य सत्यों को जाननेवाले, बोधिपक्ष के ३७ धर्मों को जाननेवाले, दस भूमियाँ और प्रज्ञापारमिता को जाननेवाले और प्रयोग मार्ग पर आरूढ़ बोधिसत्व अभिसमय त्रिरत्न कहलाते हैं। सामने विराजमान त्रिरत्न हैं—चित्र, मूर्ति आदि, नवांग प्रवचन, धार्मिक ग्रन्थ और सम्भार मार्ग पर आरूढ़ बोधिसत्व।

हीनयानी ग्रन्थ है—जो त्रिरत्न की शरण जा कर, अशैक्ष्य (मार्ग) शैक्ष्य (मार्ग) और निर्वाण पद की शरण जाता है। महायानी की भावना है, कि वह सकल प्राणिमात्र के हित के लिये संकल्प करता है जब कि हीनयानी स्वार्थ का चिन्तन करता है। महायानी का काल बोधिप्राप्ति तक होता है और हीनयानी का जीवन पर्यन्त।

स्वभाव है—लज्जावान, अपत्रपा और अविज्ञप्ति को उत्पन्न करना। भावना है—कर्म को स्वीकार करना, (दूसरे को) शरण देना और विज्ञप्ति को उत्पन्न करना। आचार पद्धति है—शरण जाने की विधि जिसका अपने गुरु से श्रवण करना चाहिए। शिक्षा है - सामान्य शिक्षा और असामान्य शिक्षा। इसका भी श्रवण अपने गुरु से करना चाहिए। निरुक्त है—अपने को दास का भाव रखते हुए प्रभु त्रिरत्न के अतिरिक्त अन्य किसी स्वामी की खोज न करना। कर्म है—बोधिचित्तरूपी वृक्ष उगाने के निमित्त कर्मरूपी मूल बनना, मोक्ष नगर में प्रवेश करना, उपवास आदि सभी संयम का आधार बनना। दृष्टान्त होता है—जिस प्रकार प्रजा अपने राजा अथवा मंत्री की आज्ञा का उल्लंघन न कर उसकी आराधना करती है वैसे ही आदर्श साधक को बनना चाहिए। भेद होता है—साधारण और असाधारण का अन्तर। आदिनव दो तरह का होता है—शरण से पतित हो जाना अथवा त्रिशरण को न समझना। शरण से पतित होने का अर्थ है, जैसा कि चन्द्रकीर्ति ने कहा है, श्रेष्ठ आश्रय को पाकर, पुनः हीनाश्रय ले तो पतन के साथ भटकता रहता है तथा वह सत्पुरुषों का हास्यास्पद हो जाता है। प्रयोजन होता है—भगवान बुद्ध ने कहा है—भयभीत और घबड़ाया हुआ मनुष्य प्रायः पहाड़ों, वनों, विहारों, आराम और वृक्षों की शरण में जाता है। परन्तु वह शरण न तो प्रधान है और न श्रेष्ठ ही। उस शरण के अवलम्बन से सब दुःखों से छुटकारा नहीं पाता। जब कोई बुद्ध, धर्म और संघ की शरण जाता है, वह दुःख दुःखसमुदय, दुःख निरोध, दुःख निरोध गामिनी प्रतिपदा आर्य आष्टांगिक मार्ग की ओर अग्रसर हो निर्वाणपद को प्राप्त होता है। जो चार आर्य सत्यों पर प्रज्ञा द्वारा दृष्टिपात करता है वह शरण प्रधान और उत्तम है। उस शरण का सहारा लेने से सकल दुःखों से मुक्त हो जाता है, ऐसा बुद्ध का कथन है। अनुशंसा (लाभ) है—कार्यावस्था (हेतु) की अनुशंसा, मार्गावस्था की अनुशंसा, कारणावस्था (फल) की अनुशंसा। ये तीन प्रकार की अनुशंसाएँ हैं। कार्यावस्था की अनुशंसा है इस जन्म में और जन्मान्तर में पानेवाली, इस जन्म में कौन से लाभ पाते हैं ? जो आठ प्रकार के भय से मुक्त होना, विघ्नबाधारहित, शासन (बौद्धधर्म) प्रेमी देवताओं द्वारा सहयोग, मरणकाल

में प्रसन्नतापूर्वक मरना आदि। जन्मान्तर में कौन से लाभ मिलते हैं ? सांसारिक दुःखों और दुर्गति दुःखों से पार हो, निर्वाण तथा स्वर्गीय सुख को प्राप्त होता है। मार्ग-अनुशंसा है—चार आर्य सत्य, आर्य आष्टाङ्गिक मार्ग, सात बोध्यांग आदि में स्थापित किया जाता है। फल लाभ होता है—दो प्रकार के निर्वाण और त्रिकाय की प्राप्ति होती है। यह उल्लेख संक्षिप्त रूप में किया गया है। विस्तार के लिये शास्त्रों तथा गुरुओं से जान लेना चाहिए।

गुरु बोधिसत्व दीपंकर श्री ज्ञान द्वारा प्रणीत शरणगच्छामि देशना समाप्त।

महायानपथ साधन वर्णन संग्रह

सर्व बुद्धों और बोधिसत्वों को नमस्कार।

अचिन्त्य महान और अनुत्तर बोधि लाभ की कामना करता हो, तो यह बोधि-साधन पर ही निर्भर है। अतएव साधना-परायणता ही अपने जीवन का लक्ष्य बनाना चाहिए। यह अत्यन्त दुर्लभ क्षण-सम्पत्तिशाली (मानव) तन को पाकर व्यर्थ में अपना जीवन नहीं बिताना चाहिए. क्योंकि यह मानव तन पुनः दुर्लभ ही नहीं, प्रत्युत असम्भव होगा। अतएव यत्नपूर्वक साधना कर सफलता प्राप्त करनी चाहिए। बुद्ध का प्रादुर्भाव होना, भिक्षु और मनुष्य तन पाकर तथा दुर्लभ कल्याणमित्र का दर्शन पाकर व्यर्थ में समय मत बरबाद करो, ऐसा बुद्ध का कथन है। जैसे वायु में दीपक वैसे ही इस जीवन की स्थिति पर विश्वास नहीं। इसलिये ऐसी शीघ्रता के साथ साधना में उद्योग करो जैसे कोई मनुष्य अपने सिर या शरीर में आग लग जाने पर वेग से आग बुझाने का प्रयत्न करता है। पारलौकिक और लौकिक दोनो प्रकार की सम्पत्तियाँ भी साधना के प्रभाव से मिलती हैं। साधना को अपना मुख्य लक्ष्य माननेवाला बुद्धिमान यहाँ और परलोक दोनों में सुखी होता है, इसमें कौन विद्वान सन्देह करेगा ? इसीलिये बुद्धिमान को उचित होगा कि वह साधना में ही संलग्न हो। काम-राग के प्रति आसक्त होने के कारण जो व्यक्ति साधना और आचार पद्धति से भ्रष्ट हो जाता है, वह लौकिक तथा पारलौकिक सभी सम्पदाओं से दूर ही रहता है। संकटपूर्ण सांसारिक बन्धनगृह में नाना प्रकार के क्लेश बन्धनों से बंधे उन प्राणियों को अपार सांसारिक दुःखों से संतप्त होने के कारण कभी सुख नहीं होता। इसलिये बुद्धिमान को समुचित होगा कि कामासक्ति को त्याग कर धर्म करने में अपना मुख्य कर्त्तव्य

समझे। वीतराग होने के निमित्त शास्त्रों में उल्लेख किये गये अनन्त दोषों को समझ सदा योनिशः मानस्कर करना चाहिए। तुच्छ एवं महान अपराधपूर्ण (सांसारिक वस्तु या कार्य को) विष-पान के सदृश समझना चाहिए। अधर्म दुःख हेतुभूत को तृण अग्नि के सदृश जानना चाहिए। कामों से तृप्ति नहीं होती, प्रत्युत तृष्णा की वृद्धि होती है जो लवणमय-जलपान करने के सदृश है, ऐसा मुनेन्द्र के आगम में उल्लिखित है। वृक्ष शिखर के फल तथा सड़क पर स्थित पेड़ के फल के सदृश कामों से अनेकों अपकार होते हैं। बाल (मूर्ख) मनुष्य अनेक बार कामासक्त होने के कारण अनर्थ करता है। कामोपभोग से अपराध न हो ऐसी कोई भी सम्भावना नहीं। इसके उपभोग से दुःख ही उत्पन्न होता है। अनादिकाल से कामासक्ति के कारण निरन्तर संसार चक्र में फँस, कामरूपी जल के वेग से संसार चक्र घूमता रहा है। इसका दोष अनगिनत है। संसार का दोष अनन्त है। पूर्व में संताप हुआ, वर्तमान में संताप हो रहा है, तथा भविष्य में भी संताप होगा ही, इस बात को सदा ध्यान में रखना चाहिए। हमें ऐसा जानना चाहिए कि संसार बन्धनगृह में बन्दी के समान अनेक कष्टों का सामना करना पड़ रहा है। इस प्रकार स्मरण करने से वैराग्य अपने आप उत्पन्न हो आता है। बन्दी जैसे बन्धनगृह से निकल भागने का मौका मिलते ही तत्काल निकल भागता है वैसे ही इस संसार महासागर से पार होने का मौका मिलते ही निकल भागना चाहिए। अपने तथा दूसरे को सांसारिक दुःखों से मुक्त करने के लिये काम को अग्नि के समान तुरन्त त्याग कर धर्म साधना करना क्या तुम्हारे लिये उचित नहीं है? साधना करने की इच्छा करनेवाले पुरुष को पहले धर्मों का आधार त्रिशरण में जा उसकी शिक्षा का अभ्यास करना चाहिए। छः अनुस्मृतियों की सतत भावना करनी चाहिए। साधक को बुद्ध के अनन्त गुणों का स्मरण कर उसके प्रति दृढ़ आस्था रखनी चाहिए, क्योंकि सभी धर्मों का मूल श्रद्धा है। तृण के ऊपर ओस की भाँति इस जीवन की स्थिति चिर तक नहीं बनी रहेगी। इसलिये बुद्धिमान को इस क्षणिक जीवन के लिये सर्वथा पाप नहीं करना चाहिए। उसके फलस्वरूप दुर्गति का दुःख भोगना पड़ता है। दश कुशल और शील की शुद्धि कर, प्रातिमोक्ष संवर का भी यथासाध्य पालन करना चाहिए। वही सब आर्य धनों का हेतु तथा बहुश्रुति धन है, इसलिये उससे सम्पन्न होना चाहिए। शील धन से पतित हो जाता है, वैसे ही बहुश्रुति धन से विहीन होने वाले मनुष्य को निस्सन्देह अत्यधिक पछताना पड़ता है। अपने मान को तोड़, धर्मोपदेश करने वालों का सम्मान करना चाहिए। महायान धर्म क्षेत्र में प्रवेश करनेकी इच्छा करने वाले को, अंधकार

को दूर करने वाले, संताप को शांत करनेवाले सूर्य चन्द्रमा के सदृश बोधिचित्त को कल्पों तक यत्नपूर्वक उत्पन्न करना चाहिए। उस बोधिचित्त को उत्पन्न करने में कल्पों तक भले ही लग जायँ पर उसके अभ्यास करने में सुमेरु की भाँति स्थिर रहना चाहिए। बोधिचित्तोत्पाद के अभ्यास की इच्छा करने वाले को मैत्री आदि चार ब्रह्म विहारों का यत्नपूर्वक ध्यान कर, राग, ईर्ष्या को त्याग यथाविधि करने से बोधिचित उत्पन्न होता है। अप्रमादधर्म से पतित मनुष्य सब धर्मों से खंडित हो जाता है। जिस तरह माता-पिता अपने इकलौते पुत्र की रक्षा करते हैं, काना आदमी अपने एक नेत्र की रक्षा करता है, पथिक अपने मार्ग-दर्शक की रक्षा करता है उसी प्रकार साधक को अप्रमाद चित्त की रक्षा करनी चाहिए, क्योंकि वही चित्त बोधित्व का मूल बताया गया है। बोधिसत्वों के आचार संबंधी सभी मण्डल भी बोधिचित्त के प्रभाव से आविर्भूत हुए हैं। उस उत्तम चित्त से विहीन होने पर दानपारमिता से लेकर प्रज्ञापारमिता तक के छः आचरण का अभ्यास करने पर भी विफल रहेगा। क्योंकि बोधिचित्तरूपी आश्रयहीन होने के कारण पारमिताओं का नाम भी नहीं। उस समाधिचित्त जिसमें समस्त पुण्य निहित हैं, को उत्पन्न नहीं करने से चार ध्यान, चार अरूप और समाधि की अनेक बार प्राप्ति होने पर भी श्रावकों की भांति वह भवसागर से पार होने में असमर्थ होता है। बोधिचित्तरूपी वाहन के सहारे मरणानुस्मृतिरूपी कोड़ा बारम्बार लगा, भयानक भवमार्ग को शीघ्र पार कर अभय बुद्धक्षेत्र में पहुँचने का प्रयत्न करना चाहिए। त्रिशरण, अधिशील और प्रणिधान के आधार पर स्थित हो, बोधिसत्व संवर ग्रहण कर पारमिता आदि सभी बोधिचर्या का यथासाध्य आचरण करना चाहिए। बोधिप्रस्थान के लिये मुख्यरूप से उल्लेख किये हुए सूत्रों का अध्ययन तथा शास्त्रों का श्रवण करना चाहिए। धर्म जल से तृप्ति न होनेवाला समुद्ररूपी मनुष्य को रत्न भरे सागर तुल्य, सम्पूर्ण ज्ञानों का आकर, महायान ग्रन्थों में प्रशंसित कल्याणमित्र का चिरकाल तक सेवन करना चाहिए। महासागर में सरिता के सदृश इस साधक में सम्पूर्ण ज्ञान समा जाता है तथा बोधिसत्त्वचर्या में वह निपुण हो जाता है। महान बोधिचर्या में दृढ़ आस्था रखनी चाहिए।

अप्रमाद, स्मृति, संप्रजन्य और योनिः मनसिकार के द्वारा संक्लिष्ट आलम्बन पर से अपने चित्त को हटाकर, बुद्ध और धर्म के आलम्बन पर चित्त सदा लगाये रखना चाहिए। इस प्रकार आचरण करनेवाला जिन पुत्र अपने आचरण से कभी भ्रष्ट नहीं होता है। अपने कल्याण मित्र के उपदेश अनुसार सभी कार्यों का महायान ग्रन्थ में वर्णित अनुसार आरम्भ करना

चाहिए। अन्तिम परामर्श धर्म से लेना चाहिए। कोई भी धर्म के विरुद्ध हो, तो त्याग दो। धर्मानुकूल आचरण करना चाहिए। बुद्धिमान जो भी आरम्भ करे, चाहिए कि धर्म के रूप में करे। ऐसा करने वाले को निःसन्देह इहलोक तथा परलोक दोनों में ही सुख की प्राप्ति होती है। अल्पश्रुत (बकवास न सुनना) हो परिवार को त्याग, वन और विहारों में वास करना चाहिए। शान्त और विनीत आचरण सीखने का यत्न करना चाहिए। किसी भी घर गृहस्थी पर दृष्टिपात न कर, दूसरे के दोष की परीक्षा न कर अपने दोषों का अवलोकन करना चाहिए। पर हृदय में अप्रिय लगने वाले वचन को त्याग देना चाहिए। इन गुणों से सम्पन्न बुद्धपुत्र अन्त में अखण्डता तथा सुखपूर्वक मोक्षको प्राप्त होता है, ऐसा मुनि का कथन है। दूसरे का तिरस्कार तथा अपमान करना अपने को हीन बनाना है। सबके प्रति अपने शास्ता का भाव रखने का अभ्यास करना चाहिए। धर्म-क्षेत्र में प्रविष्ट और बोधिसत्व को विशेषतया उपर्युक्त भावना से युक्त होने की आवश्यकता है। प्रव्रजित के लिये सख्त बन्धन है लाभ-सत्कार के प्रति आसक्त होना। इसलिये उसे त्याग देना चाहिए। उन बन्धन से मुक्त पुरुष अग्निमध्य कमल के सदृश विज्ञों का आश्चर्यास्पद हो जाता है। प्रव्रजित साधक को सभी बुद्ध-धर्मों का उद्गम चार आर्यकुल में स्थित हो, अल्पेच्छुक तथा सन्तोषी होकर द्वादश शैक्षणिक गुणों का अभ्यास करना चाहिए, ऐसा मुनि ने कहा है। अल्प सामग्री के साथ रह, सभी परिग्रहों से विमुख होकर विहरना चाहिए। अज्ञात देशों में चारिका करते हुए पक्षी की भाँति प्रतिदिन का आहार प्रतिदिन खोज कर खाना चाहिए (अर्थात् वस्त्रान्न आदि संचित करके नहीं रखना चाहिए)।

जो अपने दुर्दम्य चित्त को स्वेच्छापूर्वक छोड़, यश आदि लोक धर्म के लिये रात दिन, हर समय वाद-विवाद सीखते, श्रवण अथवा उपदेश आदि करने में निरत रहता है उसका जीवन व्यर्थ में व्यतीत हो जाता है। परम पथ से वह भ्रष्ट हो जाता है। मृत्यु समीप आते समय उसका हृदय पश्चात्ताप से पीड़ित हो जाता है। लोकधर्म पर समान भाव रखने का अभ्यास करना चाहिए। लोकधर्म से बाल (मूर्ख) धोखा खाता है। शरीर छोड़ने के बाद संसार में किसी के मस्तिष्क में अपना नाम तक स्मरण नहीं रहेगा। ऐसा समय आ जाएगा जब कि शरीर की अत्यन्त सूक्ष्म अस्थि भी संसार में नहीं रहेगी। उस समय लाभ-सत्कार यश कीर्ति आदि के नष्ट होने की बात तो कहना ही क्या? इसलिये बुद्धिमान को एकान्त में बैठ कर विचार करना चाहिए, क्योंकि आदिकर्मिक साधक को, जब तक वह शारीरिक एकान्तता का सहारा नहीं लेगा, मानसिक

एकान्तता की प्राप्ति में कठिनाई होगी। अधिक मिलने जुलने से अधिक परिचित हो जाते हैं जिससे अनुराग पैदा होता है। वही अनुराग संसार चक्र को घुमाता है। इसलिये मिलन का त्याग कर सदा अप्रमाद के साथ वास करना चाहिए।

निद्रालु न हो, सब प्रकार के धर्म सीखने के लिये वीर्यारम्भ करना चाहिए। चार स्मृत्युपस्थान की भावना कर, चार विपर्यय दृष्टि को त्याग, बोलने में अधिक रुचि न ले अर्थ का मनन करना चाहिए। खोई में कोई सार नहीं होता है। प्रीतिकारी रस तो भीतर होता है। खोई भक्षक ईख का स्वादिष्ट रस नहीं पा सकता। इसी प्रकार यहाँ बकवादी की तुलना खोई से की जाती है और अर्थ चिन्तन करनेवाले की रस से। आकाशपर्यन्त प्राणिमात्र के लिये कवच पहनना चाहिए न कि कुछेक प्राणियों के लिये। अनुयायी, लाभ, सत्कार और मित्र की इच्छा से उत्साहित होकर बहुभाषी होने का मन हुआ तो यह साधना में विघ्न डालनेवाला भूत अपना चित्त ही है। मित्र आदि किसी से प्रेम करना तथा आवश्यकताओं को अल्प कर देना चाहिए। आवश्यकताओं द्वारा मनुष्य पतित हो जाता है तथा धर्म में भी बाधाएँ उपस्थित होती हैं। सांसारिक धंधों में रति करना त्यागकर अपने दुर्दम्य चित्त का दमन कर पुण्याचरण करना चाहिए। प्रपञ्च की अभिरुचि त्याग क्षमाशीलता से अपने को विभूषित करना चाहिए।

क्षमाशीलता की महिमा अपरिमित है। लाभ-सत्कार आदि छः धर्मों को दोष समझना चाहिए। यद्यपि बोधिसत्वों की चर्या असंख्य है किन्तु संक्षेप में उपाय और प्रज्ञा ये दो ही हैं। प्रज्ञोपाय रूपी माता पिता अपने बुद्धतुल्य पुत्र को जन्म देते हैं। सुगतपुत्र बनने की इच्छा से माता-पिता रूपी प्रज्ञोपाय की संयुक्त रूप से साधना करनी चाहिए। इन दो साधनाओं के विलग होने से बुद्धपुत्र होने में असमर्थ रहेगा। स्त्री और पुरुष एक दूसरे के साथी नहीं बनने से वह भी एक प्रकार का वियोग रूपी बन्धन है। उसी प्रकार से प्रज्ञा और उपाय का सम्बन्ध भी समझना चाहिए, ऐसा तथागत ने कहा है। जिसे सभी धर्मों का मूलबताया गया है उसकी सदा अभिलाषा करनी चाहिए।

शुक्लपक्षीय चन्द्रमा के सदृश साधना-इच्छा की वृद्धि होने पर आर्द्र पहाड़ी पर के पेड़ पौधे के समान साधना की प्रगति होती जायेगी। साधक को साधन की प्रबल इच्छा रहे तो चर्या का भारी बोझ दीर्घ काल तक ढोने पर भी कोई थकावट नहीं होगी। दश धर्माचरण द्वारा दो सम्भारों के संचित करने में तत्पर होना चाहिए। शिक्षा सीखते समय

जिस साधक में बड़प्पन है उसमें सब धर्मों का अपने आप उदय हो जाता है और वह आगे चलकर प्राणिमात्र के हित करने में प्रभावशाली होता है। अन्त में उसे तीनों काय के साथ ज्ञान प्राप्त होता है। जो प्रज्ञोपाय का सार है वह शमथ और विपश्यना की भावना करनी है। सम्पूर्ण लौकिक तथा पारलौकिक सफलता इन्हीं दोनों में है ऐसा कहा गया है। अभिज्ञा, अनुभाव तथा अनाश्रव मार्ग की उत्पत्ति के लिये पहले शमन की भावना करनी चाहिए। शमथ स्कन्ध के खण्डित होने पर दीर्घ काल तक प्रयास करने पर भी सिद्धि नहीं होगी। समाधि स्कन्ध का अभ्यास करना चाहिए। क्लेश-संग्राम पर विजय पाने के लिये शमथ के सहारे विपश्यना की भावना करनी चाहिए। विपश्यना की सिद्धि होने पर समाहित अवस्था में हो चाहे प्रवृत्ति की अवस्था में हो, सभी धर्मों पर अष्टमायावी उपमाओं के समान देखने का अभ्यास डालना चाहिए। समाहित के समय शमथ और विपश्यना का समान रूप से अभ्यास करना चाहिए। इस प्रकार नियमानुसार अभ्यास करने के प्रभाव से उष्णता आदि दस भूमियों का ज्ञान क्रमशः उदय होता है, जिससे वह शीघ्र ही बुद्धत्व का लाभ कर लेता है। अनन्तर वह अनायास परार्थ की साधना करने लगता है। यहाँ अत्यन्त संक्षिप्त और अत्यन्त विस्तृत दोनों को छोड़ बुद्धिमानों के ज्ञान के उपयुक्त उल्लेख किया गया है। इसे वे सीखें तो लाभान्वित होने की सम्भावना है। जो श्रद्धावान्, प्रतिभाशाली एवं साधना का इच्छुक हो, तो यह महायानपथ-साधन के अनुसार करने से परात्मार्थ करने में उपयुक्त होगा।

आचार्य दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान द्वारा प्रणीत महायानपथ साधना वर्ण संग्रह समाप्त। स्वयं दीपंकर श्रीज्ञान और दुभाषिया भिक्षु कल्याणमति द्वारा अनूदित और संशोधित एवं निर्धारित।

महायानपथ साधन संग्रह

सर्व बुद्धों और बोधिसत्त्वों को नमस्कार।

अतीत और वर्तमान के सभी तथागतों के जन्मदाता माता-पिता रूपी साधना-धर्म को मैं श्रद्धापूर्वक मन तथा वचन से नमस्कार करता हूँ। अचिन्त्य महिमा युक्त गुरुपद एवं बोधि-लाभ करने की इच्छा हो तो यह साधना पर ही निर्भर है, इसलिये साधना में तत्पर रहना चाहिए। उसे त्रिशरण में जा, समस्त अकुशलों से विरत रह अधिशील का शुद्ध रूप से पालन करना चाहिए। बोधिचित्तयान पर आश्रित हो, मरणानुस्मृति की प्रेरणा से

बार-बार प्रेरित कर भयानक भवमार्ग को शीघ्र पार कर अभय बुद्ध क्षेत्रों में पहुँचना चाहिए। प्रणिधान पर आधारित हो, बोधिसत्व संवर को ग्रहण कर, छः पारमिता आदि बोधिचर्या का यथार्थ रूप से पालन करना चाहिए। उसका सारांश, प्रज्ञोपाय का निर्वाण प्राप्ति के लिये अभ्यास करना चाहिए। निर्वाण की इच्छा करनेवाले को वैराग्य चित्त से नित्य आदरपूर्वक भावना करनी चाहिए, जिससे साधक शीघ्र बुद्धत्व की प्राप्ति करता है। तदुपरान्त वह अनायास परार्थ करेगा। इस महायानपथ साधन संग्रह को साधक को अच्छी तरह सीखना चाहिए। बिना अभ्यास किये चित्त के लिए इस साधन का स्पर्श करना कठिन है। इस संग्रह के पुण्य से समस्त जगत महायान साधने में तत्पर रहें। मैं भी बुद्धत्व की प्राप्ति कर जगत का उद्धारक बन सकूँ।

दीपंकर ज्ञान द्वारा प्रणीत महायान पथ साधन संग्रह समाप्त। स्वयं आचार्य और दुभाषिया भिक्षु कल्याणमति द्वारा अनूदित, संशोधित और निर्धारित।

सब बुद्धों और बोधिसत्वों को नमस्कार।

इस संसार में अनादिकाल से अपरिमित क्लेशवासनाओं के कारण जब कुविषय से संयोग होता है तब दुःख उत्पन्न होता है। उस समय अपने स्मरण के लिये इसकी रचना की गयी है। भीतरी चित्त का दमन हो जाने पर बाह्यशत्रु का कोई असर नहीं पड़ सकता। आन्तरिक चित्त के विचलित हो जाने पर बाह्य शत्रु उसके कारण का रूप बन जाता है और चित्तरूपी शत्रु अपने अन्तःकरण को जला देता है। इसलिये भीतरी शत्रु को नष्ट करना चाहिए। जिस प्रकार विषमय पात्र खाद्य भोज्य को बिगाड़ देता है उसी प्रकार आध्यात्मिक मल से कुशल स्कन्ध का विनाश हो जाता है। प्रतिपक्ष जल से धुलाने से स्वच्छ होकर महासुख को प्राप्त होता है। जब कभी मनोमालिन्य शत्रु का आगमन होता है तब नाना उपायों के सहारे उसके दमन तथा शुद्धि के लिये प्रयत्न करना चाहिए। जो कोई जब अपने अन्तःकरण की परीक्षा करता है तब चित्त विषय पर दौड़ता है।

चित्त प्रवृति का विषय तीन क्लेश है—क्लेश, मध्यम और कुशल। हेतु प्रत्यय विषय के भेद के कारण क्लेश भी तीन प्रकार के हैं—महान, मध्यम और लघु। क्लेशों के अनुसार ही प्रतिपक्ष होना चाहिए। जहाँ महान् क्लेशों का उदय होता है वहाँ पुण्य सम्भार को भी बड़े परिमाण में

उत्पन्न करना चाहिए। उसी प्रकार मध्यम और लघु भी समझना चाहिए। हर समय पुण्यसम्भार के बड़े परिमाण में संचित हो सके तो उत्तम है। मध्यम और लघु का भी स्मृति तथा भावना के द्वारा महान् रूप में परिणत किया जाना चाहिए। उन पुण्यों की जगत कल्याण के लिये परिणामना करनी चाहिए। अनादि काल से हम राग, द्वेष और मोह के कारण संसार में चक्कर लगाते रहे हैं। जब-जब कुशल चित्त की वृद्धि होती है तब-तब अभिसम्बोधि की ओर अग्रसर होता है। हम मोह अंधकार से ढँके हैं। अंधेरे में जैसे विद्युत क्षणभर अपनी चमक दिखा जाती है वैसे ही बड़ी कठिनाई से यह स्मृति मिलती है। ऐसे सुअवसर पर यत्नपूर्वक साधना करनी चाहिए। यद्यपि मृत्यु से बचने का अधिकार कोई नहीं दे सकता, तथापि मैं अभी बहुत दिनों तक जीऊँगा, ऐसा सोचकर बोधिलाभ की साधना करनी चाहिए। साथ ही साथ दूसरे को भी प्रेरित करे। जैसे अबोध बालक को अग्नि, प्रपातों आदि का भय नहीं रहता है वैसे ही जगत् को मोह के कारण दुर्गति का भय नहीं होता। जैसे रोगी को स्वादिष्ट उत्तम भोजन खिलाने पर भी वह पसंद नहीं करता है वैसे ही उपाय के साथ निर्दिष्ट मेरे उपदेशों को मूढ़लोग पसंद नहीं करते। कुछ लोगों का चित्त वायु की भाँति चंचल होता है और वे उचितानुचित दोनों कर बैठते हैं। कुछ लोग श्वेत वर्ण की भाँति किसी भी कारण के संयोग से वैसा ही रूप धारण कर लेते हैं। कुछ लोग स्वभाव से धर्मात्मा होते हैं परन्तु कुसंगति से दूषित हो जाते हैं। कुछ लोग दुराचारी होते हैं पर सुसंगति और धर्मात्मा के संयोग से पापों को त्याग, शुभ कर्मों का सम्पादन कर, दूसरों को भी प्रेरित करते हैं। कुछ लोगों को प्रेरणा की आवश्यकता नहीं पड़ती।

आचार्य श्री दीपंकर ज्ञान द्वारा रचित अपना कर्त्तव्य प्रेरणासहित लिपिबद्ध नामक ग्रन्थ समाप्त।

स्वयं आचार्य और महान संशोधक तथा दुभाषिया भिक्षु कल्याणमति द्वारा अनूदित, संशोधित तथा निर्धारित।

सूत्रार्थ समुच्चय उपदेश

त्रिरत्न को नमस्कार।

समुद्र और आकाश के सदृश गम्भीर तथा विस्तृत सूत्र-पिटक का निरूपण कर और श्रीमान गुरु के मुख से श्रुत दुर्लभ विषयों का यहाँ उल्लेख किया जायगा। बोधिसत्त्वों को अपने धन और प्राण के समान पचास धर्मों

का पालन करना चाहिए। जिस प्रकार प्राणियों को अपने प्राण का प्रेम होता है, उसी प्रकार बोधिसत्त्वों को अपने बोधिचित का प्रेम होता है, और उस पर आश्रित होता है। शून्यता और करुणा माता-पिता के सदृश धर्म हैं, क्योंकि विना शून्यता और करुणा से उत्पन्न बोधिसत्व हो ही नहीं सकता। मृत्यु, शिक्षा और कर्म संचय की गणना मुर्गी के समान धर्म है, क्योंकि दिन-रात इसकी संगति में रहना होता है। दस कुशल गृह के समान धर्म हैं, क्योंकि दस कुशलों के द्वारा दुर्गति का द्वार अवरुद्ध हो जाता है। सात आर्य धन सम्पत्ति के समान धर्म हैं। ये हैं—अल्पेच्छ, संतोष आदि। सांसारिक धंधा करते हुए भी जिसका आशय निर्वाण की ओर झुका हुआ हो, महादान करके उसके विपाक अथवा फल की इच्छा न करना, सम्पूर्ण धर्मों के अनुत्पाद जानते हुए भी कर्म विपाक को मानना तथा सम्पूर्ण धर्मों के अनुत्पाद जानते हुए भी प्राणिमात्र के प्रति दया करना ये मित्र के समान धर्म हैं। श्रद्धा, श्रुति, त्याग और क्षान्ति, ये मूल के समान धर्म हैं। क्षेत्र के समान धर्म है-शील। दस पारमिताएँ बन्धु के समान धर्म हैं। छः अनुस्मृतियाँ आचार्य के समान धर्म हैं। आर्य काश्यप द्वारा परिपृच्छ सूत्र में वर्णित बोधिचित्त अविस्मरण चार धर्म उपाध्याय के समान धर्म हैं। व्यापारी के समान धर्म हैं शिक्षा समुच्चय में उल्लेख किये गये १४ अपकारों के प्रतिपक्ष। चार अप्रमाण्य धर्म भगिनि के समान हैं। चार संग्रह वस्तु भृत्य के समान धर्म हैं। प्रजा के समान धर्म हैं—कुत्ते, दास और चाण्डाल के समान अभिमान रहित रहना। अधिचित्त और विशुद्ध चित्त हैं, चक्षु के समान धर्म। धात्री के समान धर्म है—कल्याणमित्र। नरेश के समान धर्म है—त्रिरत्न। सरिता के समान धर्म है—त्रिकोटि परिशुद्धि। पथदर्शक के समान धर्म हैं—स्मृति, सम्प्रजन्य, योनिःमनस्कार, अप्रमाद और चार विपर्ययों का प्रतिपक्ष। आर्य के समान हैं—प्राणिमात्र को अनुगृहीत करना। आभूषण के समान हैं—श्रद्धा, शील, त्याग, श्रुति और प्रज्ञा। रोग और पीड़ा के समान हैं—बाह्यान्तर वस्तुओं के प्रति आसक्ति करनेवाला चित्त। कष्टदायक चित्त वाले मनुष्य के समान धर्म हैं—गृहस्थ बोधिसत्त्व ऐसा सोचे कि कब मैं प्रव्रजित हो ब्रह्मचर्य का पालन कर दुःखी जगत को दुःख से मुक्त करूँ। आलसी के समान धर्म है—गृहस्थ का अपने खेत आदि का त्याग न करना तथा प्रव्रजित बनावट आदिधर्म का त्याग न करना। जैसे कि शील-स्कन्ध सूत्र में उल्लेख है—भिक्षुओ प्रव्रजित यदि लड़ते हुए हाथी को देखे तो वह भी उसकी मिथ्या आजीविका होगी। मित्र के समान है—योनिसः मनसिकार से युक्त। हकलाने वाले के समान है—पराये दोष और भूल

की आलोचना तथा निन्दा न कर एवं अपने गुणों का भी प्रकाशन न करना। अन्धे के समान है—परायी भूल को न देखना। चोर पकड़नेवाले के समान है—सद्धर्म के नष्ट हो जाने पर सद्धर्म को धारण करना। बालक के समान है—आज्ञाकारी, सहज ही पोष्य, सहज ही प्रसन्न होनेवाले, सन्तोषी आदि। दूध के समान है—अनेक उद्देश्य रखने वाला बोधिसत्त्व, अनेक क्रियाशील आदि। मंत्री के समान है—सुदृढ़ प्रतिज्ञ होना। पण्डित के समान है—प्राणिमात्र के प्रति घृणा न करना तथा सहज ही सुधरने वाला। शिष्य के समान है—रात-दिन गुरु का आदर-सत्कार करना, पुण्य-संभार करना, संवर-पोषण करना। स्वागतकर्ता तथा विदा देने वाले के समान है—सम्पूर्ण प्राणि के बुद्ध-लाभ के पश्चात् ही अपने बुद्धत्व प्राप्ति की इच्छा करना। अन्धसहारे के समान है—स्वयं बुद्ध होने के बाद परार्थ साधना। आदि कल्प मनुष्य के समान है—आचार, शील, जीविका विधि और दृष्टि का सम्पन्न होना। इच्छुक पुरुष के समान है—सम्पूर्ण आचार पद्धति दूसरों (के हित के लिये) परिणामना करना। आर्यरत्न मेघ सूत्र में इसका उल्लेख है। अन्धकार के समान—माध्यमिक अर्थ में नित्य स्थित होना। वधक के समान है—मिथ्यादृष्टि का उत्पन्न होना जिसका त्याग करना है। तस्कर के समान है—प्रमाद और अशिष्टता, जो त्याज्य है। शत्रु के समान हैं—निर्लज्जता और प्रमाद। मूढ़ के समान हैं—स्मृति और संप्रजन्य का अभाव। मतवाले के समान हैं—चार कृष्ण धर्म। पशु के समान है—शिक्षापदों का ज्ञान होना। कसाई के समान है—निर्दयतापूर्ण व्यवहार। अकृतज्ञ के समान है—प्रातिमोक्ष-संवर को छोड़ना। अनाथ बालक के समान है—उपाय-कौशल का अभाव होना। पागल के समान है कृत्याकृत्य का ज्ञान न होना। मार्ग-गर्वित के समान है—५५ और ३२ अन्तराय धर्म का ज्ञान न होना। आर्य बोधिसत्व पिटक के ५५ अन्तराय धर्मों का उल्लेख इस प्रकार है—एक अन्तराय धर्म प्रमाद है। दो अन्तराय धर्म है निर्लज्जता और अपत्रपता। तीन है—राग, द्वेष और मोह। चार है असद्गति। पाँच है—हिंसा, चोरी, व्यभिचार, झूठ और मद्यपान। छः है—बुद्ध, धर्म, संघ, शील, आचार और ज्येष्ठों का अनादर करना। सात है—सात प्रकार के अभिमान। आठ है—आठ मिथ्याएँ। नौ संताप करने वाली वस्तुएँ। दस है—दशाकुशल। ३२ अन्तराय धर्मों का उल्लेख भी आर्य महायानोपदेश सूत्र में इस प्रकार है—श्रावकयान और प्रत्येक बुद्धयान की इच्छा करना। इन्द्र और ब्रह्मा की इच्छा करना। जन्मस्थ ब्रह्मचर्य की इच्छा करना। एक ही कुशल मूल की इच्छा करना। सम्पत्ति की कृपणता करना। प्राणियों को समान रूप से दान न देना। शील में शिथिलता

करना । परचित की रक्षा न करना । प्रतिहिंसा और क्रोध करना । साहस तोड़ना । विस्मरण होना । श्रवण की इच्छा न करना । विवेकहीन होना । अनार्य चरित होना । अभिमान की अत्यधिक वृद्धि होना । कायिक, वाचिक और मानसिक कर्म की अशुद्धि होना सद्धर्म की रक्षा न करना । .... (चार) संग्रह वस्तुओं का त्याग करना । पापी मित्र की संगति करना । त्रिस्कन्ध के प्रतिकूल वोधित्व के लिये परिणामना न करना । अल्प कुशल मूल पर गर्वित होना । मजबूरी से पातकपूर्ण बुद्धि उत्पन्न होना । त्रिरत्न की स्तुति न करना । वोधिसत्व के प्रति द्वेषपूर्ण संकल्प करना । अश्रुत धर्मों का त्याग करना । मार द्वारा प्रेरित कर्म करना । लोकायत के सिद्धान्त या रहस्यों का ग्रहण करना । प्राणियों को परिपाक न करना । संसार से उद्वेग न होना । ये ३२ धर्म महायान के लिये विघ्नकारक हैं । इन अन्तरायों द्वारा सर्वज्ञता की प्राप्ति नहीं की जा सकती । तथापि बुद्ध का कथन है कि महायान में जितने गुण हैं उतने विघ्नकारक भी हैं । और भी इसी प्रकार अनेक अन्तरायों का उल्लेख सूत्रपिटक में उपलब्ध है पर ग्रन्थ की बहुलता के कारण यहाँ उनका उल्लेख नहीं किया जा सकता है । इसलिये इस धर्म मार्ग पर चलने वाले बोधिसत्वों को उन सूत्रों का निरूपण कर उसके अभ्यास करने का प्रयत्न करना चाहिए । और भी अनेक कथनीय है कि चिरकाल तक असह्य दुःख का सहन करना भी आश्चर्य की वात है । स्त्री और गृह को त्याग कर व्रत को ग्रहण कर नित्य काय, वाणी और मन का विक्षिप्त रहना भी आश्चर्य की बात है । किञ्चित्मात्र पुण्य के संचित किये बिना परम ज्ञान का अन्वेषण करना भी आश्चर्य है । प्रातिमोक्ष की शिक्षा ग्रहण किये बिना महायान परमवोधि का अन्वेषण करना भी आश्चर्य है । इसी प्रकार और भी अनोखी बातें तो हैं हीं तो भी जम्बूद्वीप के लोगों की विभिन्न कल्पनाओं और विचारों का वर्णन नहीं किया जा सकता । अतः मुमुक्षु विज्ञ जनों को उन पागलों की संगति न कर अप्रमादी के साथ विचरण करना चाहिए । क्योंकि ऐसे दयनीय लोग उत्तम मार्ग के बताये जाने पर भी ठीक से नहीं चलते । अतः मैं क्या कर सकता । जब तक अभिज्ञा की प्राप्ति न होगी, तब तक परार्थ करने में असमर्थ रहता है । इसलिये अभिज्ञा की प्राप्ति के लिये एकान्तवास करना चाहिए । सद्गुरु की खोज कर नित्य सूत्रों का पाठ करना चाहिए । आचार्य दीपंकर श्री ज्ञान द्वारा रचित सूत्रपिटक का अर्थ समुच्चय उपदेश समाप्त । स्वयं दीपंकर श्री ज्ञान और महान संशोधक तथा दुभाषिया भिक्षु शील विजयी द्वारा अनूदित, संशोधित तथा निर्धारित किया गाय ।

दश अकुशल-कर्मपथ

त्रिरत्न को नमस्कार।

सुगति प्राप्ति की कामना करने वाले केलिये वर्जनीय दश अकुशल कर्म हैं। उनमें कायिक कर्म तीन हैं, वाचिक कर्म चार हैं, तथा मानस कर्म तीन हैं। बुद्ध ने इन्हें दश अकुशल कहा है। प्राणातिपात या हिंसा, अदत्तादान या चोरी, मिथ्याचार या व्यभिचार ये काय द्वारा होने वाले अकुशल कर्म हैं। मृषा वचन या झूठ, पिशुण वचन या चुगली, परुष वचन या कटुवचन, संप्रलाप या बकवाद ये वाणी द्वारा होनेवाले अकुशल कर्म हैं। अभिध्या या लोभ, व्यापाद या प्रतिहिंसा, मिथ्यादृष्टि या झूठी धारणा ये मानस द्वारा होनेवाले अकुशल कर्म हैं। प्राणातिपात हैं—जो प्राणी हो अथवा प्राणी की संज्ञा वाला हो, उसे वध करने का संकल्प करना अथवा कराने का उपाय करना अथवा अपने हाथ से वध करना, इन पाँच अंगों से युक्त हों, तो प्राणातिपात की आपत्ति होती है। अदत्तादान है—पराये का हो अथवा दूसरे द्वारा परिगृहीत किया गया हो, चोरी करने का संकल्प किया गया हो, अथवा करने की युक्ति की गयी हो अथवा गाँव या अरण्य में रखा हुआ धन—सामान ले लेना इन पाँच अंगों से युक्त हों, तो अदत्तादान का दोष लगता है। व्यभिचार होता है—अनुचित स्थान, अकाल, अनुचित अंग और अगम्य इन पाँच प्रकार से युक्त हों, तो व्यभिचार होता है। कौन सा अनुचित स्थान? सद्धर्म, त्रिरत्न की मूर्ति, बोधिसत्वों के निवास स्थान का, आचार्य, भाई-बहन, दक्षिणीय, माता-पिता और गुरु के निकट व्यभिचार करना ये अनुचित स्थान है। कौन सा अकाल? दिन में, मासिकयुक्त, गर्भवती, शिशुपालिका, अनिच्छुक, दुःखी, अमनस्क और आष्टांगिक उपवास करनेवाली से व्यभिचार करना, ये अकाल ठहराया जाता है। कौन अनुचित अंग? मुँह, पायु, बालक या बालिका के सामने से पीछे के छिद्र में तथा अपने हाथ से वीर्यपात करना ये अनुचित अंग हैं। कौन सी अगम्य है? परायी सभी नारियाँ, धर्म द्वारा रक्षित, जातिवालों द्वारा रक्षित, दूसरे पुरुषों की अपनायी हुई वेश्या, कुटुम्ब और पशुओं के साथ व्यभिचार करना अगम्य है। मृषावचन होता है—जो वस्तु न हो या वस्तु स्थिति से हीन हो, जो मिथ्या का संकल्प किया गया हो, जो मिथ्या का उपाय किया गया हो तथा मृषावचन बोलना इन पाँच अंगों से युक्त हो, तो मृषा वचन ठहराया जाता है। पिशुण-वचन होता है—क्लेशपूर्ण चित्त से दूसरों में फूट डालना पिशुण वचन है। परुषवचन होता है—दूसरे के हृदय में चोट करनेवाला द्वेष पूर्ण वचन। प्रलापी होता है—

कामयुक्त अथवा रागयुक्त बोलना। अभिध्या होता है—दूसरे के धन, ऐश्वर्य और संभोग के प्रति लोभ करना। व्यापन्नचित्त होता है—प्राणियों के प्रति द्वेष करना, यह प्राणि मारेजायँ, वध किये जायें, बाँधे जाएँ ये व्यापन्नचित है। मिथ्यादृष्टि है—दान कुछ नहीं, यज्ञ कुछ नहीं, यह लोक नहीं, परलोक नहीं, श्रमण नहीं, ब्राह्मण नहीं, देवता नहीं, भगवान् बुद्ध नहीं, अर्हत् नहीं, प्रत्येक बुद्ध नहीं, सदाचार नहीं, दुराचार नहीं, सुकृत दुष्कृत कर्मों का फल विपाक नहीं है। भगवान् ने कहा है—आर्य सद्धर्म स्मृति प्रस्थान और महायान सूत्र में उल्लेख दशाकुशलों के पथ का जो सेवन करता है वह नारकीय स्रोत में बह जाता है। आचार्य दीपंकर श्री ज्ञान द्वारा प्रणीत दश अकुशल देशना समाप्त। स्वयं आचार्य दीपंकर श्री ज्ञान और महा संशोधक दुभाषिया भिक्षु जिन शील द्वारा अनूदित, संशोधित तथा निर्धारित किया गया।

कर्म विभंगनाम

त्रिरत्न को नमस्कार।

वर्तमान युग में जन्मने वालों को स्वर्ग प्राप्ति ही दुर्लभ है, फिर निर्वाण-प्राप्ति की संभावना कैसे? अतएव यहाँ मैं अपने स्मरण के हेतु उल्लेख करता हूँ। सतासत, शाश्वत या उच्छेद से परे सुख-भोगसंपन्न तथा जगत को सफल बनाने वाले उन सत्पुरुष की वन्दना करता हूँ। उन भगवान (बुद्ध) को जो लौकिक और अलौकिक महानुभावों में से श्रेष्ठतम तथा विशिष्ट है नमस्कार करके कुशलाकुशल-कर्मों का यहाँ विभाजन किया जाता है। संवर-शील से (अभ्युदय स्वर्ग) दिव्य-शरीर और मानव शरीर की प्राप्ति होती है। उस (संवर-शील) के भ्रष्ट होने से नरक, प्रेत और तिर्यग्योनि प्राप्त होती है। देवों और मनुष्यों के सम्बन्ध में विस्तार के लिये कोश (अभिधर्मकोष) के तृतीय परिच्छेद आदि में देखना चाहिए। इस प्रकार ताप नरक इस जम्बूद्वीप के पाताल से बीस हजार योजन की दूरी पर अवस्थित है। अन्य सात क्रमशः उसके ऊपर स्थित हैं। उनके आयु-मान को मनुष्यों, कामधातुक देवताओं और संजीव आदि नारकीय दिनों, मासों और वर्षों के क्रम से मिला कर समझना चाहिए। शीत नरक तिसि (कैलाश?) के नीचे अवस्थित है। उनके आयुमान मध्यदेश की रजिया से परिमित ८० तिल के बोझोंमें से एक व्यक्ति प्रत्येक सौ वर्ष पर एक-एक तिल जब निकालता है तब उसकी (अर्वुदः (नरक) के प्राणियों की) आयु क्षीण होती है। उसके निचले नारकीय प्राणियों की आयु

उससे बीस गुना दीर्घ होती है। उनके प्रसंग में यहाँ सूत्र के अनुसार संक्षेप में उल्लेख किया जाता हैं। नरकों की संख्या १६ है। ये दुस्तर, क्रूरतापूर्ण कर्मों से सर्वत्र व्याप्त दीवारों और चहारदीवारियों से चारो ओर घिरे, प्रज्वलित आग से सैकड़ों योजन तक व्याप्त होते हैं, ऐसा भगवान का कथन है। कोष में भी इसका उल्लेख है। उनकी बगल में कुक्कूल-निरय, कुणप, क्षुरधार आदि नरक अवस्थित हैं। प्राचीन काल के कुछ विद्वानों का कथन है कि उक्त नरक अवीचि नरक के दाहिनें और बायें अवस्थित है। प्रत्येक नारकीय और नारकीय प्राणियों के निवास स्थान का कोई निश्चय नहीं होता। वे नदियों, पहाड़ों, मरुभूमि आदि के ऊपर अथवा नीचे कहीं भी वास करते हैं। विस्तार के लिये स्मृत्युपस्थान और कोष के तृतीय परिच्छेद में देख लें। प्रेतों का निवास स्थान राजगृह नगर के नीचे पाँच सौ योजन पर स्थित है। वहाँ प्रेतों का राजा वास करता है। विस्तार के लिये प्रेतावदान में देखें। तिर्यक का मूल स्थान महासमुद्र में है। मैदान नदी, पहाड़, श्मशान आदि उसका विस्तृत किया गया स्थान है। विस्तार के लिये अन्यत्र देखें। तीनों लोक में सुख का अभाव है। दुःख और दुःख समुदय सहित का वर्णन सूत्र और धर्मशास्त्र में किया गया है। उस प्रकार नरक, प्रेत, तिर्यग के दुःख और दुःख के कारण का भी उल्लेख सूत्र तथा शास्त्र में मिलता है। मानव के ११० दुःख की जानकारी के लिये आर्य असंग द्वारा प्रणीत योगाचर्य में देखना चाहिए। देवताओं को और कोई दुःख नहीं होने पर भी मृत्युनिमित्त और मृत्यु के पाँच उपलक्षण हैं। ये हैं:—वस्त्र में मैल जमना, पुष्पमाला का मुरझाना, काँख से पसीना छूटना, शरीर से गन्ध निकलना और अपने आसन पर अप्रसन्न होना। पाँच उपलक्षण हैं- वस्त्राभूषणों से अप्रियध्वनि होना, शीरर का तेज कम हो जाना, स्नान करते समय शरीर पर जल बूंद पड़ जाना, चंचल स्वभाव का होता हुआ भी एक ही विषय पर चित्त लगना इत्यादि। इन दुखों की उत्पत्ति किस कारण से होती है? कर्म से होती है। कर्म दो प्रकार का होता है—गुरुकर्म और लघुकर्म। श्रावकयान और महायान के अनुसार देश और आशय के प्रभेद द्वारा इनमें भी दो रूप होते हैं। गुरुकर्म दो प्रकार का होता है—विषयक गुरुकर्म और मानसिक गुरुकर्म। लघुकर्म भी उसी प्रकार है। श्रावकयान के अनुसार विषयक भारी कर्म है—पाँच आनन्तर्य्य अथवा पाँच अन्तराय लानेवाले कर्म में पितृघात को छोड़ कर चार ही होते हैं। संघ में फूट डालना उससे भी कहीं अधिक गुरुकर्म है। मैत्रीय समाधिस्थ, भवाग्र समाधि आदि से उठे योगी, उपाध्धाय, आचार्य, भिक्षु, भिक्षुणी, माता-पिता अन्तिम जन्मवाले बोधिसत्व, बौद्ध

धर्मोपदेश करनेवाले, स्रोतापत्ति, सकृदागामी, अनागामी और अर्हन्त को जान से मार डाले, मारे जायें, बाँधे जायें, उनका धन-सामान चुरा लें, स्तूप, संघ, धर्म और बुद्ध का सामान चुरालें, त्रिरत्न से झूठ बोलना कटुवचन का प्रयोग करना, उनके आपस में फूट डालना, कुवाक्य बोलना इत्यादि विषय के गुरुकर्म हैं। मानसिक गुरुकर्म हैं—महामिथ्यादृष्टि उत्पन्न करना। पशु और श्मशान के पिशाच को जान से मार डालना देश्य लघुकर्म है। मानसिक लघुकर्म उपर्युक्त से भिन्न है। महायान के अनुसार देश का गुरुकर्म है—अपने गुरु, प्रथम चितोत्पाद करनेवाले बोधिसत्व, पिता, माता, तत्वज्ञानी योगी, अपने देवता, त्रिरत्न आदि के प्रति पूर्ववत कायिक, वाचिक और मानसिक कर्म द्वारा किये जानेवाले कुकर्म। इसी तथ्य पर विचार करते हुए भगवान ने वज्रचूड़ा नामक महायोग तंत्र में कहा है—हे गुह्यपति! (वज्रपाणि का दूसरा नाम) दुराचार दो प्रकार का होता है अर्थात गुरुकर्म (भारी अपराध) और साधारण (लघुदोष)। माता-पिता आदि को जान से मार डालना, मरवादेना आदि कायिक दुराचारों में भारी अपराध है। जीव हिंसा आदि अन्य तीन कायिक दुराचार लघुकर्म हैं। सद्धर्म को छोड़ना, देवताओं के प्रति कटुवचन बोलना, माता-पिता और गुरुजन आदि के प्रति कटुवचन का प्रयोग करना वाचिक दुराचारों में लघुकर्म हैं। कोई पुरुष यह कहे कि जब परलोक ही नहीं तो श्रद्धापूर्वक कुशल कर्मों का सम्पादन कर, पारलौकिक सुख प्राप्ति की इच्छा करना व्यर्थ है, यह अलौकिक मृषावचन होता है अर्थात वाचिक गुरुकर्म कहलाता है। शुभ कार्य में विघ्नकारक भाषण करना, गुप्त रूप से आक्षेप लगाना आदि वाचिक अकुशलकर्मों में लघुकर्म अर्थात साधारण अपराध है। मानसिक दुराचार तीन प्रकार का होता है—मानसिक दुराचार, चैतसिक अपराध और अविद्या जन्य अपराध। मान-अभिमान, क्रोध, प्राणि-विनाश, काम-राग चित्त से परायी स्त्री के प्रति अनुराग करना, दूसरे का प्राण छीनने का संकल्प, गुरु-सूत के प्रति छल कपट और द्वेष करना चैतसिक अकुशल हैं। दश कुशल-कर्म-पथ और छः पारमिताओं को त्याग कर विस्मृत होना, संशय तथा स्त्यान अविद्याजन्य दुराचार हैं। महायान के अनुसार क्रोध को मानसिक गुरुकर्म माना गया है। आचार्य शान्तिदेव का यह कथन है—सहस्रों कल्पों तक संचितदान, सुगत-पूजन आदि सदाचार हैं उसे क्रोध नष्ट कर डालता है। गुरुकर्म और लघुकर्म के लोभ, द्वेष और मोह के द्वारा तीन प्रकार के होते हैं। लोभ जन्य जीव हिंसा है—छाल आदि शरीर अंग के लिये, धन सम्पत्ति के लिए, क्रीड़ा के लिये, आत्मरक्षा के लिये और अपने मित्र की रक्षा के लिए प्राणातिपात करना। द्वेष पूर्वक की गयी जीव हिंसा हैं—वाद विवाद और वैर से

की गयी जीव हिंसा। मोह से उत्पन्न जीवहिंसा है—यज्ञ करना और राजपुरोहित को प्रामाणिक मानकर धार्मिक विचार से जीव हिंसा करना अथवा कोई राजपुरुष राजा से कहे कि किसी अपराधी को प्राणदण्ड दिया जाय तो यह राजा के लिये पुण्यपात्र योग्य बनेगा। सिन्धी लोगों की धारणा है कि बुजुर्ग माता-पिता के रोग ग्रस्त हो जाने पर उन्हें जान से मार डालना ही पुण्य है। मनुष्यों को क्षति पहुँचाने वाले सर्प-विच्छू आदि को मार डालना पुण्य है। मृग, पशु-पक्षी, महिष आदि को मनुष्यों के भोग के लिये मार डालना पुण्य है। यह मोह से उत्पन्न प्राणातिपात हुआ। राग से उत्पन्न अदत्तादान है—परलाभ, परसत्कार, यश, आत्मरक्षा अथवा स्वजनों के परित्राण के लिये अपहरण करना। द्वेष से उत्पन्न पूर्ववत है। मोह से उत्पन्न है—प्रमाणिक राजपुरोहित का दावा करते हुए अपराधी को दण्ड द्वारा अपहृत करना। ब्राह्मण लोग कहते हैं कि ये सभी ब्रह्मा द्वारा ब्राह्मणों को प्रदान किये गये हैं इसलिये यदि ब्राह्मण ही भ्रष्ट हो जाय तो अन्य जाति को इसके भोग करने का कहाँ अधिकार। ब्राह्मण द्वारा अपहृत धन-सामान को अदत्तादान नहीं माना जाता चूँकि यह सब तो ब्रह्मा ने ब्राह्मणों को ही प्रदान किया है। इसलिये ब्राह्मण स्वयं इन्हें खाते-पीते हैं। ब्राह्मण स्वयं पहिनते हैं और दान भी देते हैं यह हुआ मोह से उत्पन्न अदत्तादान। काम-राग से उत्पन्न व्यभिचार है—पर नारी के प्रति राग करना, लाभ-सत्कार के लिये, आत्मा और सुहृद् परित्राण के लिये व्यभिचार करना। द्वेष से उत्पन्न पूर्ववत् है। मोह से उत्पन्न व्यभिचार है—पारसी लोग कहते हैं कि अपनी माता के साथ, भगिनि के साथ, और स्वजाति वालों के साथ भोग करने तथा गौ आदि के साथ मैथुन करने में कोई अपराध नहीं है। इसी प्रकार राजा के हास्य के लिये, शादी-विवाह के अवसरपर, और सब धन सम्पत्ति छीन लेने पर झूठ बोला जाय तो उसका कोई दोष नहीं होता। यह हुआ मिथ्यादृष्टि-मृषावचन। बाकी अकुशल भी पूर्ववत हैं। संक्षेप में दश अकुशल को इस प्रकार कहा जाता है—जान बूझकर बेकसूर को जान से मार डालना प्राणातिपात है। पराक्रम से या लुका-छुपा कर दूसरे का धन सामान अपनाना अदत्तादान है। अगम्या स्त्री के साथ मैथुन करना व्यभिचार है। मनोवृत्ति को दूसरे भाव में परिवर्तित कर बोलना मृषावचन है। क्लेशपूर्ण चित्त से दूसरों को पृथक् करना पिशुन है। अप्रिय शब्द बोलना कटुवचन यो परुषवचन है। संगीतशास्त्र, नाटकशास्त्र आदि की बातें करना बकवास अथवा प्रलाप है। परायी धन सम्पत्ति के प्रति लोभ करना अभिध्या अथवा लोभ है। प्राणिमात्र के प्रति द्वेष करना व्यापाद है। कार्य-कारण अथवा कर्मविपाक को न मानना मिथ्यादृष्टि है। महायान

के अनुसार में भगवान ने कहा है—हे बोधिसत्वो ! जानबूझकर जीवहिंसा करने से विरत रहना चाहिए। वैर को भी त्याग दो। बोधिसत्व को चाहिए कि वह अपने प्राण के समान दूसरे के प्राण की भी रक्षा करे। अदत्तादान से विरत रहना चाहिए। पर परिगृहीत भोगों के प्रति इच्छा करना भी निषेध है, अदत्तादान लेने की बात तो करना ही क्या। काम मिथ्याचार से विरत रहना चाहिए। परपुरुष की अपनायी हुई स्त्री, जाति तथा धर्म द्वारा रक्षित के प्रति राग करना भी निषिद्ध है तो फिर अनंग तथा दो इन्द्रियों के परस्पर सम्मेलन करने की बात ही क्या। झूठ बोलने से विरत रहना चाहिए। जान-बूझ कर बुद्ध के बोधिलाभ को धोखा देनेवाले मृषा वचन का अपनी जान के लिये भी प्रयोग नहीं करना चाहिए। कटुवचन से विरत रहना चाहिए। प्राणियों को मधुर, मृदुल और हृदयंगम वचन बोलना चाहिए। सो क्यों ? गुह्यपति ! क्योंकि बोधिसत्व को सब प्राणियों के हित साधन करने में प्रथमतः मधुर वचन ही बोलना चाहिए। चुगलखोरी से विरत रहना चाहिए। किसी भी प्रकार फूट डालने वाले वचन, पींड़ित करनेवाले वचन का प्रयोग नहीं करना चाहिए, चूँकि बोधिसत्व प्राणियों में फूट डालनेवाला नहीं होता। प्रलाप से विरत रहना चाहिए। बोधिसत्व को काल और देश के अनुसार, सार्थक वाणी से सभी प्राणियों को हृदयंगम तथा समुचित भाषण करना चाहिए। सो क्यों? क्योंकि बोधिसत्व सुभाषण करनेवाला होता है। लोभ से विरत रहना चाहिए। पराये भोग और धन सम्पत्ति के प्रति लोभ नहीं करना चाहिए। सो क्यों? चूँकि बोधिसत्व विरक्त चित्तवाला होता है। यदि बोधिसत्व अभिध्यालु (लोभी) हो तो वह सर्वज्ञता के पथ से भ्रष्ट हो जाता है। गुह्यपति जो बोधिसत्व प्रमुदिता भूमि की ओर अग्रसर होता हो उसे ऐसा संकल्प करना चाहिए कि हर प्राणी सम्पत्तिशाली हो, इसलिये मैं बार-बार यही कामना करूँ कि उन प्राणियों की भोग-वस्तु किसी भी प्रकार बरबाद न हो जाय। गुह्यवति ! फिर व्यापाद से विरत रहना चाहिए। बोधिसत्त्व को सर्वत्र शान्तिशील, मैत्रीपूर्ण, द्वेष रहित होकर उपेक्षा की भावना करनी चाहिए। अपने प्रिय के समान शत्रु के प्रति भी बरतना चाहिए। सो क्यों? चूँकि बोधिसत्त्व मानसिक दौष्ठूल्यःरहित (पाप रहित) होता है और वह स्वभावतः परिशुद्धचित्त का होता है। गुह्यपति ! इसलिये बोधिसत्त्व को व्यापाद रहित होना चाहिए। गुह्यपति ! पुनश्च बोधिसत्त्व को मिथ्यादृष्टि से विरत रहना चाहिए। सम्यकदृष्टि, परलोक से भयदृष्टि, छल-कपट रहित तथा ऋजु होकर बुद्ध, धर्म और संघ के प्रति दृढ़ विश्वास रखना चाहिए। सो क्यों? गुह्यपति ! चूँकि मिथ्यादृष्टि बोधिसत्वों के लिये महावद्य है जो सभी

कुशलमूलों को नष्ट कर डालती है। यह समग्र अकुशलमूलों की मातामही है। इसलिये गुह्यपति, अन्ततः हँसी मजाक के लिये भी मिथ्यादृष्टि उत्पन्न नहीं करना चाहिए। ऐसा बुद्ध ने उपदेश किया है। देश, संकल्प, क्लेश, काल, संख्या, अंग आदि के अनुसार लघु मध्यम और महान तीन प्रकार के दश अकुशलों के भेद को समझ लेना चाहिए। देश की दृष्टि से अकुशलों का भेद पूर्ववत् समझना चाहिए। तीन प्रकार के मानसिक अकुशल इस प्रकार हैं—अज्ञानतापूर्वक किये गये अकुशल कर्म लघु हैं। अप्रमाद से किये गये मध्यम हैं। अनादरपूर्वक किया गया महान होता है। क्लेश से किये गये तीन प्रकार के अकुशल कर्म इस प्रकार हैं—कामराग आदि उघु मध्यम और महाक्लेश द्वारा जीवहिंसा आदि करना। आरम्भ, मूल और समाप्ति के किसी एक से युक्त हो तो काल अन्तर्गत लघु कर्म है। दो से युक्त हो तो मध्यम है। तीनों से युक्त हो, तो महान (आपत्ति) है। एक बार, दो बार और तीन बार किया तो ये संख्या के अन्तर्गत क्रमशः लघु, मध्यम तथा महान आपत्ति है। अपूर्ण अंग वाले जीव का प्राणातिपात करना लघु है। लगभग पूर्ण अंगवाले प्राणी का वध करना मध्यम है। सम्पूर्ण अंगवाले को जान से मार डालना महान अपराध है। एकबार की हिंसा लघु होती है। पश्चाताप न करना मध्यम है। प्रतिपक्ष का सहारा न लेना महान है। संयम करना लघु है। प्रायश्चित करना मध्यम (दोष) है। पाराजिक होने पर महान अपराधी होता है। क्रीड़ा और मिथ्याचार में भाग लेने से लघु दोष होता है। अपने को क्लेश और अपराध न होने पर भी दूसरों में फूट डालकर पाप का कारण बनने से मध्यम दोष होता है। स्वयं अपराधी हो कर दूसरे से भी अपराध कराना महान अपराध है। पापी और अकल्याण मित्र की कुसंगति के कारण विवश हो कर कोई पाप करे तो लघु दोप है। यश और कीर्ति के लिये करना मध्यम है। कर्म-विपाक से भय न खाना महान है। दश कर्म पथ के सम्बन्ध में और विस्तार के लिये आर्य स्मृत्युपस्थान आदि सूत्र में, आचार्य ब्राह्मण धर्मवान सुभूतिघोप की कृति तथा आर्य असंग द्वारा रचित, विनिश्चित संग्रह आदि योगाचार भूमि में देखिये। पुनश्च, जानबूझ कर सम्पूर्ण अपश्चाताप, प्रतिपक्ष का अभाव, संसार और विपाक द्वारा संचित कर्म संक्षिप्त रूप है। कृष्णकर्म, श्वेतकर्म और मिश्रित कर्म तीन प्रकार के होते हैं जिनका वर्णन सूत्र और शास्त्र में किया गया है। कर्म शतकल्पों तक क्षीण न होकर समय आने पर उसका विपाक भोगना पड़ता है, ऐसा शास्ता ने बताया है इसलिये कर्म विपाक पर विश्वास करना चाहिए। जगत के समस्त प्राणी इस जम्बुद्वीप में उत्पन्न होवें तथा दशाकुशल का

आचरण कर क्रमशः सद्‌गुरु की संगति कर, अनाश्रव शील को प्राप्त होवें। आचार्य श्री दीपंकर ज्ञान द्वारा प्रणीत कर्मविभंग नाम समाप्त। आचार्यश्री दीपंकरज्ञान और महान्‌ दुभाषिया भिक्षु जिनशील द्वारा अनूदित संशोधित तथा निर्धारित।

चर्यासंग्रह प्रदीप

लोकेश्वर को नमस्कार।

वाणी रूपी रश्मि से हम मूढ़ प्राणियों के हृत्पुण्डरीक को विकसित करनेवाले सत्पुरुष की मैं वन्दना करता हूँ। गुह्यमंत्र और पारमिताओं के सहारे बोधित्व का साधन करने को गुरु तथा बुद्ध ने बताया है। इसलिये उसका यहाँ मेरे द्वारा उल्लेख किया जाता है। गुह्यमंत्र की चर्चा यहाँ नहीं की जानी चाहिए। पारमिता अथवा बोधिसत्वचर्या का संक्षेप में उल्लेख किया जाता है। प्रथमतः बोधिसत्त्वचित्त को उत्पन्न कर बोधिसत्त्व संवर को ग्रहण करना चाहिए। सूत्रों के अध्ययन के साथ सभी धर्मशास्त्रों का श्रवण करना चाहिए। तथाकथित संवर की काय, वाग और चित्त से अखण्डतापूर्वक रक्षा कर शील कीं विशुद्धि होनी चाहिए। भोजन में मात्र जान, इन्द्रियों का संयम कर, रात्रि के प्रथम तथा अन्तिम भाग में न सोकर योगाभ्यास करना चाहिए। सूक्ष्म से सूक्ष्म अवद्य करने में अति भय रखना चाहिये। रात को तीन हिस्सों में बाँटकर अन्तिम हिस्सा में जाग उठना चाहिये। स्नान आदि से निवृत्त होने के पश्चात्‌ सुखासन पर बैठ, धर्मों के धर्मत्व का स्मरण करना चाहिए। यदि निमित्त से चित्त विक्षिप्त होने के कारण असमर्थ रहे तो खड़े होकर सारी वस्तुओं के प्रति माया के सदृश कल्पना करनी चाहिए। बीच बीच में सप्तविध पूजन को पूर्ण रूप से करना चाहिए। प्रणिधान करते समय उदारचित्त होना आवश्यक है, अथवा उपर्युक्त भावना का अभ्यास करना चाहिए। तब भोजन के समय ऐसा संकल्प करना चाहिए कि मुझे इस असार शरीर के द्वारा सारयुक्त धर्म का अन्वेषण करना है। यह शरीर भवसागर को पार करनेवाला नौका के समान है। मद होने के लिये भोजन नहीं करना चाहिए। रस में आसक्त होकर भोजन नहीं करना चाहिए। भोजन को चार भाग कर, प्रथम भाग अपने इष्टदेव को भोग चढ़ाना चाहिए। तत्पश्चात्‌ धर्म संरक्षकों को बलि देनी चाहिए। खा कर बचे-खुचे उच्छिष्ट भूत-प्रेतों को खिलाना चाहिए। अवकाश प्राप्त होने पर किस्सा कहानी और अनोखी बातेंभी करनी चाहिए। अनन्तर उठ खड़े होकर कुछ चंक्रमण अथवा प्रतिमा एवं स्तूप के चारों ओर

प्रदक्षिणा करना चाहिए। जप, पाठ, धार्मिक ग्रन्थों का पठन अथवा सुगत का चित्र बनाना चाहिए। जबतक शरीर से पसीना न छूटे प्रदक्षिणा करते प्रणिधान करना चाहिए। संक्षेप मैत्रेय द्वारा उपदिष्ट दस धर्माचरण करना चाहिए। यदि अपने पास धन हो तो संघ की पूजा अथवा बालोत्सव मनाना चाहिए। अनाथों को दान करने से योगी का पुण्यसम्भार संचय होता। दिन भर और रात्रि के प्रथम प्रहर में अपने चित्त को प्रपंच रहित धर्मता में प्रतिष्ठित करना चाहिए। अर्धरात्रि में सिंह के समान लेटे शुभसुप्तिकरनी चाहिए। यदि समाधि में चित्त स्थिर रहे तो कायिक और वाचिक शुभकर्मों को मुख्य नहीं मानना चाहिए। समाधि का साक्षात्कार नहीं हो सके तो लोकानुकूल कायिक और वाचिक कुशल कर्मों को यथासाध्य करना चाहिए। लोक भावना के प्रतिकूल कोई धर्म न करना चाहिए।

नेपाल देश में अपने मित्र की प्रेरणा पर दीपंकर श्री ज्ञान द्वारा प्रणीत चर्या संग्रह प्रदीप नामक ग्रन्थ समाप्त। स्वयं दीपंकर श्री ज्ञान और दुभाषिया भिक्षु जिनशील द्वारा अनूदित और संशोधित किया गया। मङ्गलम्।

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